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0                 50 Miles
Map 0.1  Map of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. By Annelieke Vries.
 c. 1474  Anacaona born in Yaguana, chiefdom of Xaragua, Ayiti
 1500  Spanish authorities declare the island a Crown  
colony, Santo Domingo
 1502 First Africans brought in slavery to Santo Domingo
 1508 Indigenous rebellion in Higüey
 1545  Maroon communities reach about seven thousand
 1585–86  Siege of Santo Domingo by Sir Francis Drake
 1605–6  Spanish authorities forcibly resettle colonists  
toward the southeast
 1664  France names a governor in the west of the island, 
Saint- Domingue
 1697  Treaty of Ryswick recognizes Saint- Domingue (west) and 
Santo Domingo (east)
 1721  Revolt in Santo Domingo’s Cibao valley against trade  
prohibitions with Saint- Domingue
 1777  Treaty of Aranjuez fixes borders and authorizes trade
 1791 Revolutionary fighting begins in Saint- Domingue
 1793 Abolition won in Saint- Domingue
 1795  Spain cedes Santo Domingo to France, midfighting




 1801  General Toussaint Louverture reaches Santo Domingo; 
1801 constitution affirms abolition
 1802  Arriving French forces pursue Louverture, reestablish  
slavery in Santo Domingo
 1804  Haiti proclaims in de pen dence
 1805  Haitian emperor Jean- Jacques Dessalines invades Santo 
Domingo  after direct threats from the French governor  
in the east
 1806  Haiti fractures into a northern republic (kingdom, 1811)  
and southern republic
 1808–9  Dominican rebels and allies expel French administration, 
reinstate Spanish flag
 1810s  Multiple rebellions and conspiracies in Santo Domingo
 1820  President Jean- Pierre Boyer reunifies Haiti
 1821  Dominican in de pen dentists proclaim the In de pen dent 
State of Spanish Haiti
 1822  Unification of the  whole island begins; Boyer abolishes 
slavery in the east for a second time
 1825  France demands an “indemnity” to cease its aggression 
 toward the island
 1838  Haiti and France renegotiate payments; abolition in British 
Ca rib bean islands
 1842  Major earthquake devastates Cap- Haïtien and other towns
 1843  Reform movements threaten Boyer; Dominican politicians 
ponder French annexation; Boyer flees
 1844  Unification ends, Dominican Republic proclaimed;  
antislavery rebellion and repression in Cuba
 1840s  Restrictive  labor codes passed in Danish West Indies,  
other nearby islands
 1854  Dominican treaty with United States fails over popu lar 
opposition
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 1856  Haitian emperor Faustin Soulouque rebuffed from an  
invasion attempt on the east, his last
 1857  Cibao politicians rebel against the administration in  
the Dominican capital
 1859  President Fabre Nicholas Geffrard restores republican  
government to Haiti
 1861  Spain annexes Dominican territory as the province of 
“Santo Domingo” once more
Figs. 0.1 and 0.2  Monuments to guerrilla fighters, Santiago de los Caballeros. Photos by 
author, 2008.
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Listen, then:  there is an Antille
in the  middle of the Ca rib bean sea
that gets light and life
from the sun of Liberty
— manuel rodríguez objío, “Mi patria” (1868)
 After dark on a late spring night in 1864, an anonymous group toppled a tow-
ering palm tree, the Tree of Liberty, in the town square of Santo Domingo. 
Planted by officials from Jean- Pierre Boyer’s administration four de cades 
earlier, the tree represented a cele bration of Dominican emancipation, in-
de pen dence, and the unification of the former Spanish colony with the revo-
lutionary Haitian state.1  Those who won abolition in 1822 called themselves 
“freedmen of the Palm.” The tree grew just meters from the plaza’s whipping 
post.2 The unification of Santo Domingo and Haiti lasted for more than two 
de cades before it dissolved, and a mobilization in the east created a separate 
republic. The night the palm fell, however, in de pen dence had vanished. A 
colonial slave power ruled Dominican territory again, warships threatened 
Port- au- Prince, and fighting raged throughout the east. Spanish troops, who 
controlled the Dominican capital, moved into  free black neighborhoods and 
other parts of the city to prevent protests over the tree’s destruction.3 “The 
tree of our glories is toppled to the ground,” a Dominican poet decried, imploring, 
“Brave Dominicans, why do you suffer so much insult?”4
We Dream Together considers anticolonial strug gle in an island at the heart 
of Ca rib bean emancipation and in de pen dence, Hispaniola, Quisqueya, 
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or Ayiti.5 Spanish Santo Domingo was the oldest site of indigenous deci-
mation and Eu ro pean colonial settlement in the Amer i cas, as well as the 
first nucleus of sugar slavery and marronage. The French colony of Saint- 
Domingue, established in the west of the island, gave the world nearly one- 
third of its sugar, at a staggering  human cost. Tremendous upheaval from 
1791 to 1804— a collection of strug gles that became known as the Haitian 
Revolution— swept the  whole island and region into pitched  battles for 
freedom. One might easily extend the dates of emancipation and in de pen-
dence fighting to include the military campaign of Jean- Jacques Dessalines 
in 1805, when a French governor, poised in the east of the island, threatened to 
capture and enslave Haitian  children across the mountains. The dates of rev-
olutionary strug gle might include the 1810s, when French warships arrived 
repeatedly and the northern Haitian empire braced for war, as  whole cities 
emptied at the threat of  battle. They might even extend into the 1820s, as 
so- called indemnity payments to France for recognition and in de pen dence 
rocked the Haitian administration, then extended to the  whole island. They 
might extend into the 1850s, the first time both states on the island, now 
separated, had anything like regular international recognition. In 1861, how-
ever, an eastern leader gave the Dominican Republic back to Spain, a slave 
power. Fighting was not over.
We Dream Together recounts the im mense opposition to self- rule directed 
 toward the island and a popu lar Dominican and Haitian mobilization, 
when the Dominican Republic was annexed back to Spain, to defend that 
autonomy at any cost. The Dominican Republic and Haiti, two countries 
with impor tant postslavery peasantries born of marronage and revolution, 
grappled with state making as anti- emancipation voices grew the loudest, as 
slavers continued to ferry tens of thousands of  people past their shores, and 
as new imperial proj ects deepened.6 Atlantic empires  were in a moment of 
profound transition. Power shifted in the Gulf of Mexico, where plantation 
regimes faltered but indenture expanded, large swaths of Central Amer i ca 
changed hands, steam power and canal proj ects loomed, and U.S. interests 
grew. In domestic contests and imperial expansion, the hemi sphere was 
an uneven geography of slavery and precarious sites of refuge. Although 
Spanish authorities promised they would protect  free  labor in Dominican 
territory, administrators dreamed of new proj ects of agricultural production, 
settler colonization, and  labor control. Dominican elites shared the same 
hopes. Rural residents, who or ga nized their lives with their own author-
ity networks, confronted both  these domestic and occupying authorities 
si mul ta neously.
In response to Spanish reoccupation in 1861,  whole communities left 
their homes, made new alliances, burned down their own towns, and risked 
their lives. They did so collectively, despite divisive elite narratives and with 
barely any resources. Their commitment was unrelenting, even as Spanish 
authorities sent a host of warships to defeat them. Over a two- year period, 
more than fifty thousand troops arrived from Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico 
to crush the rebels, as Spain poured millions into military offense.7 Not even 
prominent military men had control over the insurgents, who grew more 
radical in the course of the fighting. Residents of the island, fully immersed 
in Civilization’s assault, forged lucid, alternative solidarities. They defended 
self- government and community, confronting opposition from both domestic 
and imperial authorities. They fought, explic itly, against the reestablishment 
of slavery, and they understood the stakes of their  battles to reach far beyond 
the island. In their victory, guerrilla fighting spread from the island to 
the rest of Spain’s Ca rib bean empire. Many demands and solidarities of the 
rebellion, however, like rural freedom in Santo Domingo, quickly became 
obscure to rec ord and memory beyond the island. They  were written in 
 battle, even at home.
Severing Colonial Bonds
A common refrain in the pres ent- day Dominican Republic reminds listeners 
that the country was “the only one in the hemi sphere” to become in de pen-
dent from another American state, when politicians of the territory pro-
claimed separation from Haiti in 1844. This aphorism is not true, of course, as 
Panamanians, Ec ua dor ians, Belizeans, Uruguayans, or  others could affirm. 
Extrication from formal Eu ro pean colonialism, the settling of borders, the 
forming and re- forming of federations, and lasting regional divides bedev-
iled new national proj ects. In cases like Paraguay’s border conflicts with Bra-
zil and Argentina in the 1860s, nationalist mobilizations and the settling of 
borders caused tremendous bloodshed. Although leaders compared vocifer-
ously, Santo Domingo’s conflicts  were minor in comparison.8 Regional fis-
sures nagged, however, even grew. Economic and po liti cal divisions caused 
power ful residents of León to tangle with Granada, Córdoba with Buenos 
Aires, Les Cayes with Port- au- Prince, Santiago with Santo Domingo, Quet-
zaltenango with Guatemala City. Proponents of federalism tangled with 
centralists, regional leaders competed for power, and divisions proliferated. 
Leaders vied, variously and alongside their constituents and clients, for local 
authority or centralized government. One constitution followed another. 
 These fissures brought Venezuela to bloody civil war in 1858, for example, in 
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 battles that often drew on questions of racism, land tenure, po liti cal rights, 
and the very idea of autonomy itself. Limited economic integration and in-
de pen dent peasantries made leaders’ wishful centralization more difficult. 
The only way to avoid tyranny was for rule by “cumaneses in Cumaná; apure-
ños in Apure,” combatants earnestly argued.9 Where growing U.S. aggres-
sion in the Gulf of Mexico disrupted sovereignty and divided elites, state 
consolidation became all the more difficult.10
Old colonial divides carved up and united Hispaniola.  After Columbus 
 initiated a violent pro cess of Spanish attacks and settlement, Eu ro pean 
powers recognized the island as juridically Spanish for more than one 
hundred years. French adventurers reached the western part of the island in 
the seventeenth  century;  after a series of  battles, Spain recognized French 
Saint- Domingue in 1697. In the intense colonial milieu of Ca rib bean em-
pire—as  imperial powers tacked back and forth for way stations, planta-
tions, geopo liti cal influence, and brutally gleaned profits— division of the 
island had ample pre ce dent. The Dutch and the French had divided Saint 
Martin (Soualiga) in two, just de cades before. Many more Ca rib bean sites, 
including nearby Jamaica, had simply changed hands at the muzzle of a 
cannon. Symbiotically, Santo Domingo and Saint- Domingue grew together. 
Just as the  Middle Colonies formed part of a greater slave system that con-
nected to the U.S. South, so  were the  cattle, hides, and foodstuffs of Santo 
Domingo directly essential to the functioning of the deadly, and growing, 
plantations in Saint- Domingue. Dominican colonists fought to break mer-
cantilist restrictions across the island. Like many other Ca rib bean plantation 
landscapes, the two colonies  were nodes of an interdependent system.11 By the 
late eigh teenth  century, Dominican elites sought to parlay profits into more 
slavery of their own. Their hopes  were similar to  those of the elites in Cuba, 
whose plantation aspirations  were rising si mul ta neously.12 As elite supplicants 
vied for state attention, ranchers and a flourishing peasantry continued to 
trade. The population qua dru pled.13 And then, in 1791, revolutionary fight-
ing exploded.
Dominicans’ in de pen dence unfolded over de cades, propelled by this 
fighting. Revolution in French Saint- Domingue engulfed the  whole island. 
Spanish authorities,  after abetting western rebels for a time, hastily ceded 
Dominican territory to France. Toussaint Louverture, claiming a French 
mandate, reached Santo Domingo. Four Dominicans signed Louverture’s 
1801 constitution, which abolished slavery on Dominican soil for the first 
time.14  After Louverture’s defeat, however, two successive French generals 
occupied the Dominican capital, threatening newly in de pen dent Haiti. 
Both generals  were pro- slavery, and the latter introduced unpopular new 
taxes.15 In this light, one can see the 1808–9 Dominican effort to expel them 
and to restore a Spanish flag— even as other territories in Latin Amer i ca 
 were beginning to mobilize for in de pen dence—as a devolution of authority 
back to the island, a  battle against French domination on both sides of the 
Atlantic.16 A party of Dominicans and Puerto Rican allies, aided by British 
ships and Haitian munitions, expelled the French occupation. A Dominican 
stepped in as a Spanish figurehead. He ruled by verbal edict, and he made 
significant diplomatic entreaties to the in de pen dent Haitian states, now 
split into a northern kingdom and a southern republic.17 For more than a 
de cade, as Spanish authorities practically ignored the territory, colonial 
sovereignty eroded. Dominican conspirators regularly appealed to Haitian 
rulers for arms and support for the many revolts and conspiracies that en-
sued, and pro- unification plans emerged.18 Dominican residents of center- 
island towns held ceremonies that celebrated Haitian in de pen dence.19 
Authors of a brief in de pen dence conspiracy in 1821 sought to link the terri-
tory, to be called “Spanish Haiti,” to Gran Colombia, in a scheme that would 
have maintained slavery. Within two months, however, a wave of Domini-
can support ushered in Haiti’s president, Jean- Pierre Boyer, into the eastern 
capital.20 Boyer was a republican who had defeated the northern monarch, 
King Henry I. Boyer proclaimed Dominican emancipation for a second time 
on 9 February 1822, as the colony became part of Haiti. Officials planted the 
Tree of Liberty less than two weeks  later.21 The  whole island was now Haiti, 
the only in de pen dent nation in the Ca rib bean. One man  later remembered 
Dominicans everywhere expressed solidarity with their “new fellow co- 
citizens,” in de pen dent at last.22
For the next twenty- two years of political unification, stability reigned. 
Emancipation proceeded smoothly. In the former Dominican capital, many 
freedmen joined the ranks of the African Battalion, two regiments of freed-
men in the city who also regularly welcomed escapees from neighboring 
 islands. Outside of the capital, where sugar plantations had endured, families 
reclaimed the land. Small, local, unpro cessed sugar production continued. In 
eastern  cattle country,  little changed.23 New communities of regional mi grants 
fleeing slavery formed on the northern coast. In urban settings, it is likely that 
proponents of “vernacular citizenship” demanded, fundamentally, new recog-
nition and stature.24 Dominican elites grudgingly admitted, “Boyer’s mea sures 
[ were] very just,” even as they complained about his policies of “spreading 
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employment and official recognition indistinctly among  people of this and 
that color.”25 Coffee, tobacco, and wood selling thrived, with direct encour-
agement from Port- au- Prince.26 The reach of the government into rural areas 
all over the island, however, was minimal. As if by some miracle, the regime 
endured for two de cades, despite the fragility of its infrastructure. Residents 
in most areas lived within networks that  were centripetal to Port- au- Prince 
or Santo Domingo. Small ships traveled along the coast,  because overland 
travel was prohibitively difficult. Travelers and mi grants connected, some-
times furtively, port- town residents to islands and coasts near and far. They 
articulated “public rights,” positive claims to authority, belonging, and  legal 
personhood, rooted in their own autonomy and in the in de pen dence of the 
island itself.27
Years passed, and a  whole new Dominican generation was born into 
Haiti’s autocratic, but defiant, republicanism. Residents of the unified is-
land grew up with in de pen dence and emancipation while in close contact 
with mi grants, sailors, travelers, and traders from islands where slavery was 
steadfast. The freedmen regiments guarded the pacific Dominican capital 
the  whole time, led by veteran officers of the Haitian Revolution. Haiti’s 
constitution broadcast a welcome for  people of color everywhere.28 Groups 
of enslaved men and  women from Jamaica arrived to the north coast in cir-
cuitous routes by small craft, hiding “ under the lee of the Caicos reeds.”29 
 Others from Puerto Rico and the United States chose the Dominican capital 
and other towns, as they had done even in de cades before Dominican 
emancipation. Purposefully eluding official notice, they left few traces.30 
Dominicans lived  free and in de pen dent for sixteen years before hundreds 
of thousands of their neighbors won full emancipation in the British West 
Indies. The unified administration, meanwhile, survived despite French 
threats and the ominous burden of Haiti’s so- called indemnity debt to 
France, which brought warships to Haitian shores. A veritable discursive 
defense industry sprang up in Haiti, defending black nationhood.31 Do-
minican writers defended the administration, too.32  Those arriving from the 
United States brought their own elegies about, and ideas of, Haitian free-
dom, as they joined and  shaped vari ous north coast communities.33 Region-
ally, however, the island was entirely alone in po liti cal in de pen dence. All 
the islands in Dominicans’ immediate po liti cal and commercial sphere— 
Saint Thomas, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Jamaica, Curaçao, Puerto Rico, 
Cuba— remained colonized, and the  waters percolated with illegal  human 
traffic. No other Ca rib bean territory inched  toward self- rule.
In early 1844, a small movement changed Dominican flags again, as dis-
sidents in the east seceded and proclaimed a new state. Opponents, reform 
movements, and peasant opposition proliferated all over the island, from 
Les Cayes to Santo Domingo, fed up with Boyer’s mono poly on the adminis-
tration. Participants marveled at the pan- island catharsis from 1843 to 1844, 
during which “democracy flowed full to the brim.”34 Boyer fled the island, 
and the east seceded, all within a  matter of months. At the time, the pro cesses 
of early spring 1844  were commonly known as Separation.  There was a fair 
amount of continuity, again, as the pro cess unfolded. Dominican legisla-
tors merely  adopted most of the articles of an 1843 joint reform constitu-
tion that almost ruled.35 Moving forward in trying economic and po liti cal 
circumstances, politicians of Haiti and the Dominican Republic remained at 
once vulnerable and hopeful for greater integration. The nineteenth  century, 
a journalist reported, was “the  century of lights,” and island elites expected it 
to shine on their own endeavors. “The world has taken on a new character . . .  
the fogs have dis appeared and ignorance has taken refuge,” another writer 
proclaimed.36 Politicians praised Giuseppe Garibaldi, dreamed of partici-
pation in the rise of nations, and contemplated cash crop expansion. As 
in other states, debt, po liti cal and regional divisions, and frequent armed 
movements, driven by opponents with conscripted armies, challenged both 
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seemed only to be worsening. “ Every nation is  free, as small as it might be, 
and has the right to make its own laws,” the Dominican foreign minister 
proclaimed.38
Emancipation, Empire, and Caribbean Freedom
Ca rib bean in de pen dence faced more menacing scrutiny than Latin Amer-
i ca’s movements did. The liberation strug gles of the Haitian Revolution 
unleashed an unrelenting torrent of international attention. Hemispheric 
master classes invoked Haiti’s existence as a specter of black rebellion, and 
they used the moment to shore up and expand their own plantation re-
gimes.39 As a direct response to Haiti’s in de pen dence, imperial authorities 
ruled surrounding islands in a state of exception.40  After abolition in Brit-
ish and French islands, elites judged abolition to be a failure, compounding 
old discourses about the supposed dysfunction of sugar- island spaces with 
new layers of racist disappointment.41 Authorities paid indemnity to slave-
holders, tidily celebrated their own beneficence, restricted the rights of the 
emancipated, capaciously expanded indenture, and resented, judged, and 
excoriated the tenacious efforts of individuals and communities to carve out 
spaces of autonomy, even where land was scarce.42 The fiction of experi-
mentation, of “hopefulness,” Diana Paton observes, was “itself profoundly 
connected to coercion and to ideas of white superiority.”43 Precisely through 
Ca rib bean emancipation, scientific racism enshrouded the putatively race-
less liberal subject.44 As plantation production declined— and postslavery 
peasantries grew— Britain opened up its islands to  free trade, depressing 
prices further. Politicians began to recast the Ca rib bean sugar islands as an 
imperial burden, dependencies that a magnanimous, white empire would 
only have to bear as it expanded further.45 British abolitionists envisaged 
Sierra Leone to be a refuge precisely in its capacity as an “anti- Caribbean” 
space where  free  labor would actually prevail.46
Opposition to Ca rib bean self- rule fed on  these anti- emancipation narra-
tives, racist pseudoscience, and an increasingly voracious imperial appetite. 
Scholars described neat hierarchies of race cultures and fantasized about 
permanent subordination. White travelers journeyed from island to island 
and told the same story: that the freed communities of color they encoun-
tered (or rather  imagined)  were “lazy,” and their “wants . . .  but few,” their 
religious practice “witchcraft,” their resolutions for self- governing, ultimately 
absurd.47 Only force could compel  these subjects to  labor, imperial proponents 
argued. Maybe they would cease to exist entirely.48 In the islands, po liti cal 
practice followed this useful pessimism. French authorities eliminated vot-
ing rights almost as soon as they  were extended.49 In Jamaica and other Brit-
ish possessions, white colonists deepened their commitment to empire and 
actively abnegated the island’s self- rule. In de pen dence, from the perspec-
tive of a white minority, was out of the question.50 Ca rib bean indenture and 
new proj ects of Asian and African imperialism represented a global imperial 
promise that weathered, and even took strength from Ca rib bean abolition: 
unfree  labor had an expanding territory, a brown or black face, and a lucra-
tive  future. As one U.S. southerner remarked, confidently, the increased in-
terlinking of the world markets and imperial reach meant that the “civilized 
Nations of the Temperate Zone” would continue to profit from “tropical 
regions”  after emancipation.51 Power ful En glish figures, relentless, argued 
that slavery should not have been abolished at all.52
In the Spanish Ca rib bean forced  labor and colonialism ruled. Sugar slav-
ery dominated western Cuba, as planters reor ga nized, centralized, and ex-
panded their holdings. Cuban planters, like their peers in the U.S. South and 
Brazil, had doubled down against emancipation,  adopted technological in-
novation, expanded infrastructure, committed to the illegal slave trade, and 
profitably integrated brutal plantation regimes into growing international 
markets.53 Colonial officials relied on elite loyalty in exchange for official under-
girding of slavery.54 Authorities made extensive inquiries into the reform and 
expansion of vagrancy laws, trying to draw rural and urban residents into state 
control.55 In Puerto Rico, sugar and coffee production doubled from an amal-
gam of slave and  free  labor.56 “Force could domesticate them externally, but 
they would continue internally to be bad citizens, disgruntled [infelices], and 
traitors, invisible enemies,” one Puerto Rican official insisted.57 Skepticism 
easily turned to persecution.58 Nearly one in  every four Cubans was enslaved, 
and the trade, though illegal, was massive. In Spain, abolitionist proponents 
amounted to “a voice in the wilderness.”59 Indenture complemented chattel 
trade. Spanish senator Argudín boasted that he planned the importation 
of forty thousand African “apprentices”; observers claimed he had struck a 
deal with the British to maintain slavery in Cuba  until 1900.60 Like pro- slavery 
 advocates and imperial abolitionists alike,  these authorities invoked the 
emancipated Ca rib bean as a specter. When the governor of Puerto Rico 
claimed that abolition led to “indolence and ruin,” he directed his condemna-
tion squarely at Haiti.61
Dominican separation from Haiti emerged at this precise midcentury 
moment of retrenchment and contest, in which Haiti faced a veritable “pro- 
slavery clamor,” and pro- slavery entrenchment in the United States only 
grew louder.62 Mapmakers and politicians of nearby Latin American nations, 
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in their first de cades of in de pen dence, increasingly distanced themselves 
from their own Ca rib bean shores, insisting that autonomy existed else-
where. Intelligent sia in new nations like Costa Rica and Colombia in ven ted 
normative Atlantic geographies, through which they drafted themselves 
outside of the Ca rib bean. Rather, they chose the “Atlantic” to bind them.63 
When representatives from Costa Rica, Mexico, New Granada, Peru, El 
Salvador, and Venezuela met to draft an emergency treaty meant to fore-
stall U.S. incursion in the Ca rib bean and Central Amer i ca in 1856, they did 
not invite  either Haiti or the Dominican Republic, not only  because they pre-
ferred not to but  because neither had the formal recognition of the United 
States at all.64 One African American author assessed Santo Domingo to be 
a dysfunctional, if fertile, space. He prescribed “Anglo- African empire” to 
better it.65 Island politicians, keenly aware of the content and scope of dis-
cursive hostility, meticulously embraced Civilization’s precepts. Referring 
to his invitation to African Americans to  settle in Haiti in 1824, President 
Boyer wrote that he was saving them from “the alternative of  going to the 
barbarous shores of Africa.”66 “Civilization is a fact in our days, a semiuni-
versal doctrine,” a Dominican politician opined, agreeing— but pessimism, 
vio lence, and anxiety pursued them.67
The pact made by some Dominican elites in dialogue with hemispheric 
white supremacist and imperial pressures is infamous: effusive anti- Haitian 
intellectual production and racism. A vocal portion of Dominican elites 
blamed Haiti for their territory’s ills, and they did so, from the earliest 
years, in explic itly racist terms.68 Like other hemispheric elites, writers in 
the capital embraced dichotomous language: of pro gress versus backward-
ness, civilization versus barbarism, order versus atavism, Chris tian ity versus 
fetishism, and Providence versus disorder; in the absolute weakness of their 
administration, they externalized the entire narrative.69 To Dominican writ-
ers’ distinct advantage, however, they conjured an external vector for their 
anx i eties that outsiders readily embraced. A minority literate group in the 
Dominican capital and other towns,  eager to cement distance between their 
national proj ect and the west, began a furious anti- Haitian writing cam-
paign. They excoriated Haiti’s black citizenship as exclusionary; they reas-
sured international imperial audiences of Dominican eagerness for outside 
(white) investment and capital. Several Haitian military mobilizations— 
but, overwhelmingly, the relentless poverty and precarity of the Dominican 
Republic itself— inflamed their sentiments. White travelers, journalists, 
and politicians from slaveholding socie ties  wholeheartedly agreed with, and 
amplified,  these Dominican elites’ narrative of a race war on the island and 
agreed that protections against capital  were backward, if not monstrous.70 
Accordingly, they demonstrated a preoccupation with the whiteness of 
the Dominican Republic—as a calculus for its annexionability as well as 
victimhood— that bordered on obsessive.71 “The entire universe  will judge 
between the haitians [sic] and the Dominicans,” a Dominican writer unctu-
ously agreed, and these accounts dominated new national narratives.72
Annexation, Belonging, and Sovereignty 
Although scholars sometimes characterize Dominican annexationists as a 
uniquely conservative minority, politicians’ recourse to outside aid and terri-
torial cession was quite common throughout the hemi sphere.73 Annexation-
ism embodied the crux of elite, lettered anxiety over “race,” autonomy, and 
citizenship vis- à- vis a rural and nonwhite majority, regional divisions, a frac-
tured partisan scene, economic difficulties, and imperial incursion. Especially 
in moments of economic necessity, politicians throughout the hemi sphere 
toyed with outside intervention and territorial cession. Usually,  these  were 
short- term bargains to keep their own power against po liti cal opponents, but 
the proj ects sprang from a durable distrust of popu lar politics.74 Annexation 
was an enduring psychological refuge and a po liti cal tactic. This experimen-
tation was everywhere, but it was particularly enduring in the crucible of 
the Gulf of Mexico, where Eu ro pean powers, U.S. interests, and international 
pressures converged. Foreign reparations demands and outright aggression 
 were common. Cuba’s annexationists knew they had willing U.S. ears. Some 
Mexican elites, in turn, looked eagerly to the island.75 As po liti cal turmoil 
and poverty plagued them, many Dominican elites deci ded nationhood was 
uncertain, even undesirable. Foreign interest in the poor territory, which 
began slowly, quickly grew more pronounced. Dominican annexationists 
 were markedly omnivorous in response, offering their struggling adminis-
tration  every which way: to Britain, Spain, the Low Countries, the United 
States, Sardinia, and especially France.76 “They know perfectly well that their 
republic, without any other resource than the port taxes of a few boats and 
the printing of continually depreciating paper money,  isn’t  viable,” one visitor 
to Santo Domingo asserted smugly.77
Spanish annexation of the Dominican Republic in 1861 tested an Atlan-
tic empire in transition. As other scholars have observed, facile narratives 
of Spanish imperial decline  after the 1820s preempt discussion of the po-
liti cal contests that followed.78 As  U.S. expansion, antislavery re sis tance, 
and the threat of Ca rib bean in de pen dence movements loomed, Spanish 
reformers realized administrative restructuring that had been debated 
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since the  in de pen dence movements several de cades before, centralizing 
overseas administration. Constitutional repre sen ta tion remained in limbo, 
but Spain shared  these debates with Britain, France, and other imperial 
powers that had not yet neatly codified distinctions between imperial and 
national subjects.79 In settler proj ects on multiple continents, debates over 
incorporation and autonomy accelerated, vacillating between assimilation, 
association, and other models, as legislators circumscribed po liti cal inclusion 
along bound aries of lineage, “race,” and culture.80 Many Spanish liberals sup-
ported federalism, popu lar in new Latin American states as well, as a means 
to po liti cally integrate, and save, Spain’s Ca rib bean empire.81 Cuban po liti-
cal elites looked to U.S. annexation and to the models of semi- autonomous 
government in the British Ca rib bean and Canada with pointed cupidity.82 
Si mul ta neously, Spanish authorities also quietly grappled with the idea of 
abolition in  future de cades. Puerto Rican plantation  owners, without the 
capital to compete, tangled with the idea more immediately.83 The Cuban 
governor, a driving force for annexation, proposed to incorporate the Do-
minican territory as a province without slavery, purposely to call the ques-
tion of legislative unity and  labor modes into debate. Once more, po liti cal 
impetus in the Ca rib bean catalyzed imperial debates.84
Annexationists exulted, at the same time, in a heterodox diffusion of ra-
cialist thinking, nationalist rhe toric, and imperial force. Massive territorial 
grabs, armed filibusters, trade imbalances, and conspiracies facilitated the 
urgent fraternal language on which Spanish and Dominican annexationists 
traded. Expansion by the United States, piratic and power ful, catalyzed ur-
gent debates over race and po liti cal destiny among Latin American politi-
cians, who began to identify collectively as such.85 The language of the rights 
of nations, self- determination, and federalism saturated both American and 
Spanish po liti cal discourse.86 Dominican and Spanish annexationists con-
sidered that a shared raza— a racial collective of language, religion, culture, 
and “blood”— offered a workable paradigm for Dominican integration, a 
“language of affiliation.”87 Dominican emissaries deployed fraternal narra-
tives of Spanishness tactically in recognition missives, even as they made 
myriad appeals to other powers si mul ta neously. Just as in Central American 
contexts, their fraternity was a whitened one.88 They asserted the existence 
of a “permanent war” with Haiti to an audience that was immediately recep-
tive to a race- war paradigm. In response, Spanish annexationists traded on 
old revenge fantasies  toward Haiti and lofty egalitarian promises in breezy 
tandem. Romantic language of racial destiny and voluntarism abetted uto-
pian thinking and masked the vio lence of territorial gain. As other scholars 
have observed, proponents of  these utopias usually indulged in  free- soil 
claims that belied explicit plans for racial hierarchy.89 A  U.S. filibuster, 
meanwhile, suggested that the Dominican Republic could become “another 
California.”90 So the French consul dreamed of establishing a massive “im-
migrant empire” in Samaná.91 Unaware of the territory’s tiny and inconsis-
tent electoral history, the Cuban governor enthusiastically swore not a single 
Spanish soldier would arrive  until approved by universal suffrage.92
As with other imperial proj ects, discursive justifications  were win dow 
dressing for economic and strategic interests that drove Spanish policy. 
Keen enthusiasm for renewed colonial expansion, or at least the preserva-
tion of Spanish Ca rib bean power, outweighed discourse about prestige, the 
reclamation of Columbus’s island, and other florid narratives.93 The territo-
ry’s potential value in staving off U.S. interests was paramount. The Samaná 
peninsula was perfectly located to establish a coaling station. “Samaná is 
to the Gulf of Mexico what Mayotta is to the Indian Ocean,” a British con-
sul agreed. “It is not only the military, but also the commercial key of the 
Gulf.”94 Around the new administration, the coterie of Dominican elites 
gathered who ascribed to proposed proj ects of  labor control and indenture 
schemes, distanced from the Dominican rural majority.95 “I give you a  people 
without journalists and devoid of  lawyers,” the Dominican president report-
edly bragged.96 Industrialists proposed a railroad “like the French have done 
from Puebla to Veracruz,” canals and communication infrastructure “like 
the En glish have done in India,” an import scheme “like Java or Mauritius,” 
and a naval station to “block the mouth of the Mississippi.”97 Annexation 
was fundamentally experimental, but the Spanish officers felt confident that 
the moment demanded innovation. “Annexation of Santo Domingo is an 
event as rare as it is new . . .  and it is beyond our normal rules,” the Cuban 
governor urged. “Many of the mea sures we  ought to adopt must also be of a 
most special and very extraordinary character.”98
International imperial powers, meanwhile, ignored Dominican elites’ 
pronouncements of Spanishness or, in fact, any narrative of Dominican agency. 
It was easy to imagine, in 1861, that an in de pen dent Ca rib bean nation might 
dis appear. Massive territorial loss to the United States threw Mexican poli-
tics into a tailspin  after 1848, Nicaraguans confronted armed conspiracies, 
and Eu ro pean groups launched a joint intervention in Mexico.  These same 
countries deepened networks in Africa, moralized about so- called legitimate 
commerce, and mounted new plantation experiments. Commentators de-
ployed  toward the island the same benevolence narratives honed in other 
imperial sites. “The Christian and the Philanthropist must hail the event 
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which  will put Hayti  under any influence or dominion,” one pamphleteer 
declared.99 “Dominicana has a government—so poets have empires,” a U.S. 
man concluded, predicting their demise.100 A French columnist urged Span-
ish authorities to discard the voluntary pretext. “[Spain] would do better 
just simply to say that she is retaking Santo Domingo  because she wants 
to,” he remarked dispassionately.101 Fi nally, other Eu ro pean powers looked 
with equanimity and even approval on Dominican annexation not only 
 because they naturalized its absorption but  because, at a crucial moment 
of U.S. weakness, Spanish annexation might forestall several de cades of U.S. 
expansion in the Gulf. The timing was incredibly propitious. Just months be-
fore annexation began, states in the U.S. South began to secede, one by one.
The Living Nightmare of Slavery
Beyond the capital, confronting the critical test of annexation,  were the 
 people. A small canon of early national writing, from a tiny group of elites, 
obscures them relentlessly. As Raymundo González observes, elites’ “anti-
peasant, racist mindset” sprang from their disdain for the very formation 
of the Dominican peasantry itself, which was born, in many areas, from an 
in de pen dent rural maroon population who worked on the margins of  cattle 
society or entirely for their own subsistence.102 Elites  were studiously  silent 
on race not only out of putative republicanism but precisely in defiance of 
Haiti’s privileging of black citizenship. The relentless invective directed 
 toward Haiti for its defense of black sovereignty compounded their silence 
further; Dominican elites defined the nation as the purposeful absence of 
 these discussions.103 As Haitian heads of state issued periodic invitations for 
African American mi grants, Dominican ministers secretly wrote to agents 
in New York demurring any new schemes of black migration.104 Rumors 
of black mi grants’ arrival spurred alarm among officials, who wanted mi-
grants from the Canary Islands, Spain, or another Eu ro pean country.105 A 
submerged wave of popu lar politics burgeoned in the rural areas and towns, 
which elites minimized and denied as they gambled with foreign powers and 
renarrated Dominican identity. Politicians regularly ignored popu lar antira-
cism and anti- imperialism, even when it led to public protests, as they toyed 
with slave powers on a razor’s edge. Writers admitted that popu lar warn-
ings about reenslavement, for example,  were an “eternal ghost . . .  the night-
mare of slavery,” but insisted they  were a ridicu lous relic, “from the time of 
Boyer.”106
Most Dominicans left no written response.  There was no planter class 
fastidiously observing them, no logbook, no epistolary archive.  There was no 
archivist even of the Dominican government for the first fifteen years of 
separation.107 Rural residents lived outside of documentation regimes as they 
made lives from woodcutting, hunting, livestock, honey and wax, and lim-
ited coffee production.108 Contraband, slow and small- scale migration, and 
the lived geographic linkages to nearby island towns and coasts produced 
 little rec ord. Transportation between any of the regions was difficult, usually 
undertaken by  horse or mule. Carts, even small ones,  were largely limited to 
the towns, further impeding trade.109 Communities relied more on orality 
than the written word, personal distribution of justice rather than bureau-
cratic dissemination, local networks more than state ambit and resources, in-
terpersonal obligations more than contracts, usufruct rights versus titled 
owner ship, subsistence rhythms more than other par ameters of time, and 
so on. As for  labor, their governing logic was more the moral economy of a 
day’s manual  labor than “ labor discipline” in any industrial iteration, slow or 
seasonal production and storage more than accumulation or capitalization, 
and a relative nonspecialization of  labor, except perhaps along gendered 
lines. Like other peasantries with limited market production,  there was  little 
tying them to administrative centers.110 Their dispersal was a purposeful, 
centuries- old marronage.111 As a con temporary observed from one central 
valley town, they  were the  children of slavery.112
We Dream Together explores a po liti cal consensus shared by this rural 
majority, and also by many in towns: vigilance over emancipation outside of 
plantation spaces, anticolonial commitment, keen understanding of the rac-
ism that surrounded them, and discourses of community and pride they 
articulated in response. Although they left no writing, seeking “collective 
biographies and community studies” reveals the many intersecting frames 
of a precarious entente.113 Dominican autonomy emerged out of de cades 
of revolutionary fighting and strug gle, of small- scale regional migration, 
interchange, and constant domestic conversations, vigilance, and esteem. 
Throughout the territory, Dominicans’ commonsense assumptions differed 
gravely from the small group who held power in the capital. Understanding 
of emancipation and in de pen dence was grounded in generations of con-
versation and interchange, at the heart of popu lar sentiment, and directed 
to defense of the  whole island against outside hostility, which many under-
stood to be constant.114 Scholars of annexation often analyze it in nationalist 
terms.  These interpretations tend to downplay domestic discussions about 
racism, which elites refused to rec ord, as well as Dominicans’ engagement with 
the ongoing  battles over emancipation throughout the Ca rib be an.115 As 
with many rural would-be citizens throughout the hemi sphere, Dominicans 
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shared a commitment to relative egalitarianism, general rights to po liti cal 
decision- making in one’s community (a personhood more expansive than 
bourgeois citizenship), and a hybrid assemblage of positive rights, including 
that of military belonging.116 The most impor tant of  these rights was prob-
ably the right to the means of subsistence (that is, in de pen dence and land), 
and for many it also included a certain degree of autonomy from the reaches 
of a formal state. With annexation, their articulation became clear.117
The  middle chapters of this book detail the immediate conflicts that Do-
minicans confronted in the new occupation, as the colonial proj ect immedi-
ately betrayed Spain’s fraternal promises. In the face of material scarcity and 
subsistence  labor, administrators constantly produced colonial difference 
in narrative and practice. Their registers  were marvel, classification, and 
disdain.118 Officials passed a series of reforms that  were abrasive and alien, 
and the frank racism of everyday officials betrayed their explic itly race- blind 
mandates. Both parties felt they had preexisting knowledge of each other, 
and neither was pleased. The occupation was intimately linked to plantation 
slavery. The captain general of Cuba planned it, Spanish troops who had re-
cently been stationed in Cuba guarded it, Cuban coffers funded expansion, 
and secret slaving missions buzzed the island’s north coast as the Cuban 
governor celebrated the inauguration of Jefferson Davis.119 Even when the 
proj ect was only a rumor, widespread rejection and anticolonial sentiment 
 were evident in Dominican territory. One early small uprising over enslave-
ment, quickly crushed,  ought to have warned authorities of the conflicts 
to come. Legend grew around the man who had led the small revolt in the 
next two years  after his trial and execution; residents said that he was very 
old, blind, heroic.120 Within weeks of the first renewed rebellion, fighting 
exploded across the territory. Pop u lar anticolonialism, republicanism, citi-
zenship language, and ties of solidarity with Haiti flooded public discourse 
against the Spanish, which became known as the War of Restoration.
The rebellion gave voice to rural politics, trenchant critiques of colonial 
despotism, and republican and demo cratic ideas that outpaced feasible 
implementation. As in many rural uprisings, including the Haitian Revolu-
tion, authorities had  little inkling of the scale of the  battle before them.121 
Every one commented, in awe, on the popu lar nature of the war. “The current 
revolution was the masses rising up, dragging the rest with them,” a town 
resident marveled.122 The Dominican former president supposed that the 
mobilization was a military one, that he could simply neutralize the uprising 
by  going  after prominent opponents. He was wrong; the rebellion was more 
massive and more total than anything that had come before in his lifetime.123 
Fear of reenslavement, particularly, electrified the  whole territory.  These 
slavery discussions, which Spanish authorities characterized as “rumor,” 
 were rather a precise win dow into the living discussions of autonomy, an 
unwritten assessment of Ca rib bean emancipation as news of other contests 
reached Dominican shores, and only lastly a response to the precipitously 
arrived new state.124 They  were ubiquitous, and the fighting spread like a 
whirlwind. Whole families left towns and refused to return. Rebels barely 
had munitions, but they  were willing to burn their own towns to destroy 
Spanish advantage. The Spanish  were exasperated. “In Santo Domingo one 
fights against invisible enemies,” one lamented, “chasing ghosts.”125
Rebels had heterogeneous tactics, allegiances, and goals. The war had 
no front line. As in other Ca rib bean contests, Dominicans and their allies 
resisted the Spanish troops in local networks that  were constantly shift-
ing, with very  little outside help.126 They called on de cades of experience. 
Mobilization— even the very language of it— called on the island’s shared 
military history.127 Average soldiers who had previously fought for separa-
tion came to call for reunification.128 Prominent generals espoused a range 
of ideologies. Like other midcentury leaders, their language was capacious, 
often contradictory, with ample space for pragmatism.129 As with the loyalists, 
 there was a portion of the rebel leadership who clung to an absolute silence 
on race, who insisted any mention of it was “unprincipled,” that their fight 
was one of raceless national liberation.130 All  these leaders made overtures 
to the Haitian president, however, calling on his republicanism. Members 
of the newly formed Provisional Government extolled, “Liberty! Liberty! 
Poetry in  every language!”131 As the fighting continued, a more radical lead-
ership grew to share popu lar irreverence  toward civilizationist claims, and 
their anticolonial vocabulary became more explicit. Their overtures to Haiti, 
especially, reflected a “black recognitionist” discourse.132 They praised the 
real democracy of Restoration ranks, called for direct suffrage, and moved to 
forge lasting alliances with other anticolonial activists. Other leaders, in 
horror, sought to topple them.
Dominicans and their Haitian allies defeated the Spanish in 1865, with 
the rapt attention of regional neighbors and increasing anticolonial ties. 
One Spanish senator invoked the Haitian Revolution and recent rebellions 
in India when he called, in vain, for a massive troop surge to crush them.133 
News of Spanish defeat spread even faster than in earlier de cades, as prison-
ers, travelers, missives, elegies, newspapers, sailors, and returning troops 
circulated descriptions of Hispaniola’s triumph. Dominican rebel leaders 
traveled, too, reaching Curaçao, Saint Thomas, Venezuela, New York,  Grand 
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Turk, Haiti, Mayagüez, and numerous other ports. Together with other an-
ticolonial activists from other islands, they acted with a keen sense of a 
heroic and historic pres ent. The fighting inaugurated a period, much like 
Latin American in de pen dence that preceded it, that was “improvised and 
reactive . . .  [a] time of macrosocial change.”134 Plans for an in de pen dent 
Ca rib bean federation bloomed. The fraternity that bound them was hybrid 
and multiple.135 Rulers came and went; some stayed long past their wel-
come. Rebels often found themselves in outright antistate alliances. But 
new anticolonial alliances formed; imperial pressure constantly renewed 
them. Coastal towns served as vital regional outposts centuries  after their 
outsize importance in the construction of Ca rib bean empire.
The Dominican War of Restoration coincided with, and contributed to, 
a renewal of emancipation energy, won through tenacious, constant fight-
ing. As in de pen dence and antislavery fighting began in Cuba, Hispaniola 
provided concrete and ideological refuge in a deeply transcolonial space.136 
Intra- Caribbean migration accelerated, as thousands left for seasonal work, 
and steam travel, for some residents, made the Ca rib bean smaller by incre-
ments.137 Even  those who  were not supporters of pan- Caribbean federation 
readily admitted its feasibility. “The idea of the ‘Antillean League’ can be 
realized one day, the day that  Great Britain gives its permission . . .  , so 
the Spanish Government should open its eyes,” predicted one prominent 
Dominican liberal.138 Idealists rallied for po liti cal “regeneration” and frater-
nal, voluntary alliances that could bridge po liti cal divides, defeat logistical 
difficulties, and overturn absolutism. Technological changes like the tele-
graph abetted their sense of the pos si ble. “This is quite an era in [the] West 
Indian story,” a visiting Jamaican man remarked.139 In a hard won moment, 
optimists felt like all tides might rise, that Providence and pro gress might 
uplift every one.140
Independence and Sacrifice
In de pen dence came at a high cost. Imperial threats and state fragility kin-
dled the new po liti cal experiments. As with other new states, on Hispaniola 
 there  were “a number of competing utopias,” po liti cal frames that ranged 
from regional autonomy, to larger federations, to proj ects of sheer personal 
ambition.141 Co ali tions of guerrilla fighters trickled apart as the fighting 
ended, as individuals and families returned to their homes in a devastated 
landscape. In the division and exhaustion on Dominican soil, a wealthy, 
prominent po liti cal figure, a familiar face, handily reclaimed power. Once 
again  there was a widening of the distance between popu lar visions and 
the praxis of  those at the helm. Foreign attention, and loan offers, loomed. 
 There existed a “mercantile oligarchy, that has never been Dominican, and 
has always used any means to realize its traitorous plans,” one veteran pro-
tested, in exasperation.142  After Restoration fighting, opponents of annexa-
tion still felt the danger acutely. The scope of their imagination sprang not 
just from optimism but also from the relative insecurity of the two nations 
themselves, and possibility took root not only from a hostile international 
climate but also from internal regionalism, separatism, fracture, and repres-
sion. Many idealists lived lives of almost constant fighting. In “stable . . .  
instability,” life went on.143
Popular solidarities, forged by Dominicans, Haitians, and their neigh-
bors, faced concrete and discursive opposition. Dominican elites renar-
rated the fighting even as it was happening. Within forty years, an unrecog-
nizable narrative expunged all of the uncertainty, all plural visions, and all 
of the contests of the period. A small group of writers supplanted them with 
tales of the heroism of a single blond- haired, blue- eyed man who was barely 
in Dominican territory at all during  these de cades, Juan Pablo Duarte.144 
They re- remembered separation from Haiti as cataclysmic and the devotion 
of the Dominican public to nation as unwavering and inevitable.145 In the 
gendered memory production of military glory, authors redrafted  women’s 
signal contribution to Restoration fighting into larger narratives of abnega-
tion.146 Through the eyes of an exile narrative, in fact, the nation became a 
morality tale of tragedy, sacrifice, and obedience for most Dominicans.147 
Outsiders minimized and marginalized the guerrilla war, too, in de cades 
that followed. With in de pen dence and pan- Caribbean organ izing famously 
described as “Cuba and Puerto Rico, two wings of the same bird,” the geo-
graphic body, in the form of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, sustains the 
wings without mention.148 In the wake of  these willful counternarratives, au-
thors work hard to recover the neglected historiographical space for Haitian 
po liti cal thought in the east, when elites sought to silence it most avidly.149 
Pop u lar memories eluded this erasure, refused silencing, and frustrated the 
discipline of  these unitary narratives. So Dominican authorities must have 
worried, when they arrested a group of men and  women for commemorating 
the War of Restoration with vodou rites during Trujillo’s dictatorship sixty 
years  later, in the heart of the capital.150
Being alive on Hispaniola in  those de cades, on  either side of the island, 
kindled a constant and vigilant defense of autonomy itself. President Boyer’s 
Tree of Liberty on Dominican soil— adopted, embraced, toppled, mourned, 
forgotten— exemplifies the vibrant faith in autonomous citizenship, born of 
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the revolution, that emerged on both sides of the island and endured across 
generations, but that always faced incredible contest. In a critical moment 
in a fight for self- rule, many Dominican rebels overwhelmingly rejected 
divisive narratives that had brought about annexation itself. In their solidar-
ity, enduring and obvious, Haitian citizens helped them frankly, repeatedly, 
generously, and simply  because their own survival was also at stake. It was a 
collection of  battles that escaped the control of the leaders for a time. In the 
po liti cal and military contests that followed,  these active negotiations con-
tinued. Investment, capitalization, and industrialization loomed, but nei-
ther the rate, nor the authors, nor the impact was predetermined. One writer 
described the pitched strug gle that persisted: “Tyranny and liberty fight 
each other tenaciously and fiercely: the first are all the forces of hate and 
desperation, the second, love for the homeland and hope for the  future.”151
“The  people are miserable:— true, but not as much as in the Haitian time,” a 
journalist in Santo Domingo argued in late summer 1846, two years  after 
Separation. “Paper money has no value:— it has more than that of the Haitians,” the 
author persisted.1 In the Dominican capital, columnists condemned Hai-
tian politics in order to externalize po liti cal scrutiny and to deny the dire, 
authoritarian po liti cal drama that was unfolding in Santo Domingo at the 
same time. They allowed themselves considerable hyperbole. “We have a 
liberal Constitution and an honorable and patriotic leader who executes it 
punctually,” one writer boasted, hopefully. He claimed that the newly sepa-
rated east would have reduced military forces and civil rights for all citizens.2 
Instead, repression and insecurity mounted. “The public is groaning in mis-
ery,” another admitted.3 Soldiers mocked the new Dominican motto (“God, 
Country, Liberty”), changing it to “God, Country, Slavery, and Lean Meat.”4 
Residents of the capital marked the anniversary of the constitution signing 
with “embarrassing coldness and indifference,” and one man compared the 
new republic to someone slowly  dying of fever.5
Over a series of months between 1843 and 1845, as President Jean- Pierre 
Boyer’s power collapsed, Haiti fractured into two administrations. In cha-
otic and depressed circumstances, the men who held on to the reins of power 
in the east, the newly in de pen dent Dominican Republic,  were largely the 
same southern elite who had worked with the Unification regime. The first 
Dominican president, Pedro Santana,  rose to power at the head of an army 
of loyal followers from his home province, and his prestige made him a “true 
feudal seigneur,” contemporaries observed.6 Buenaventura Báez, the man 
one
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who emerged to be Santana’s primary po liti cal rival, was a large landowner. 
Well traveled and wealthy, Báez was a high- level politician who easily weath-
ered the changes in flag. Separation came easily, but consolidating a new 
state proved difficult. In the Dominican capital, a tiny electorate rallied 
around the administration, but censorship, exile, and executions cooled the 
atmosphere. Alternating terms in power, Santana and Báez controlled the ad-
ministration with heavy hands. Both invoked a war powers clause of the consti-
tution, Article 210, for autocratic license. They used the clause domestically, 
restricting freedom of the press, relentlessly pursuing critics, and trading 
off power in a continuous pattern of usurpation, corruption, and revenge.7 
Reformers had  little recourse but to complain about “the plague of parties.”8
Most Dominicans, meanwhile, lived far from the capital, in de pen dent 
and dispersed. No export bonanza or internal migration brought them in 
closer contact, nor could authorities in Santo Domingo generate resources 
with which to expand their administration.9 Internal travel was treacher-
ous, and small boats, yolas or balandras,  were the only practicable way to 
reach other coastal towns.10  After de cades of flag changes and rural in de-
pen dence, power had devolved “from one to many”: to regional military 
networks,  family units, religious brotherhoods, tobacco, wood, and  cattle 
trade, and, only lastly, to the nominative southern administration.11 As Sep-
aration unfolded, the idea of a new republic did not extend beyond a handful 
of towns.12 Residents might have considered themselves at vari ous points 
“Haitian- Spanish,” “Dominican- Spanish,” or even “not Spanish nor French 
nor Haitian”; more likely still, they embraced local identities that  were more 
salient.13 Residents of the north coast  were deeply tied with Cap- Haïtien, 
surrounding islands, and the Atlantic. In the Cibao, politicians wealthy from 
tobacco trade pulled away from the capital. They wanted a federalization of 
power, or to relocate the government totally. In the center of the island, the 
unpopularity of Haiti’s emperor stymied solidarities for a time, but residents 
 were hardly faithful. In the new state, domestic flashpoints became more 
critical with each passing year.
This chapter details how citizens made their lives between foreign 
powers and po liti cal revolution. Even in the capital, few  people thought 
 autonomy was pos si ble.14 British, French,  U.S., and Spanish authorities 
 intervened constantly in Dominican affairs. They jockeyed for competing 
concessions, supported vari ous protectorate, citizenship, or colonization 
schemes, manipulated treaty negotiations, meddled in domestic po liti cal 
strug gles, demanded indemnities, sent warships as implied menace, and 
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generally intervened aggressively for their own interests, all while with-
holding recognition.
As capital city figures made increasing bargains with  these powers, residents 
engaged in active debates about identity and citizenship. Feeling anxiety over 
the  future, Dominicans in multiple sites responded to  these developments 
with steady vigilance, frequent protests, and warnings of slavery. From rural, 
center- island spaces, where de cades of trade, travel, and po liti cal connec-
tion tied them to Haiti, military men occasionally drew a handful of local 
residents into intrigues to re unite the island. As years passed, the very fra-
gility of the Dominican administration, wracked with po liti cal competition, 
economic crises, and growing imperial aggression, made  these pacts more 
urgent. The grip of the capital was loosening.
Reform and Separation, 1843–1846
Unification of the  whole island, which began in early 1822, lasted  under the 
rule of President Boyer for two de cades.  After abolition in Unification’s first 
days, many lived life much as before.15 In towns, the administration had an 
uneven impact. The government employed several hundred officials in the 
Dominican capital and dozens in other towns. Much of the quotidian ad-
ministration continued in Spanish.16 Prominent Dominicans like Manuel 
Joaquín Delmonte earnestly and unctuously praised the regime. “Let us all 
toast to the day that the knot that binds us gets tighter,” he urged, from a 
Masonic lodge called “Perfect Harmony” in Azua.17 Black regiments in and 
around the capital, which predated Unification, enjoyed larger ranks and 
status.18 Black Dominicans forged “the tightest of bonds” with arriving Hai-
tian soldiers and administrators, one traveler remarked.19 In the Cibao val-
ley, Dominican tobacco merchants and  others benefited from stability and 
government support.20 In rural areas, the reach of the state was minimal.21 
As years passed, however, and as outside observers heaped noisy judgment 
on Boyer’s regime, fissures grew.22 Boyer’s autocratic style, the po liti cal and 
economic burden of a so- called indemnity debt to France, regional divisions, 
and a plurality of other grievances rankled an increasing number of po liti cal 
opponents.23 Dominican periodicals  later blamed a parasitic administration 
and a bloated administrative and military class.24 Boyer’s aides had sheltered 
him from rumblings of discontent for years, the journalists argued.25 By 
the early 1840s, a significant group in the Dominican capital had begun to 
support separation, Delmonte and other former Unification supporters in-
cluded. In the west, anti- Boyer voices grew louder si mul ta neously.
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A natu ral disaster accelerated the fracture, heralding a providential reck-
oning. A massive earthquake struck the heart of Haiti on 7  May 1842. It 
seemed like the apocalypse. In towns across the island, “not one stone was 
left on top of the other,” an observer wrote in horror. The calamity destroyed 
homes, churches, and businesses and left thousands more on the brink of 
collapse. Vis i ble devastation surrounded the living. On the northern coast, 
from Port- de- Paix to Monte Cristi, a wall of seawater flooded over residents. 
Rivers overflowed, and the deluge covered  whole fields. Violent aftershocks 
“frightened and made the  people more desperate.” The island’s capital, 
Port- au- Prince, burned day and night on end.26 “I  will tell you the horror, the 
death, the tears, the endless havoc into which the miserable nation of Haiti 
has sunk,” an eastern poet wrote. “What confusion! What horror! What 
fright!” He wrote of religious fear and of the “reckless pride” of his compa-
triots, swallowed up in a horrible din.27 A hurricane followed that summer. 
Port- au- Prince burned again in the beginning of the new year.28
Boyer’s regime, already on the precipice of collapse, quickly crumbled. 
Po liti cal “excitement . . .  spread like a contagion to  every nook,” observers 
reflected.29 Earnest island liberals, Dominican separatists and annexation-
ists, ambitious military figures of varying allegiances, prominent southern 
Haitian families, and growing rural opposition in the western south all vied 
for power. A handful of Dominican nationalists had recently returned to 
Santo Domingo from San Juan, inspired by liberal discontent and pro- 
in de pen dence murmurings in the late 1830s.30 They joined a secret society 
in the capital, the Trinitarios, whose members  were a small group of urban 
elite with insular  family and geographic ties.31 Their critiques  were moderate 
but increasingly nationalist in elocution. Other plans proliferated, including 
renegotiating the terms of Unification. Dominican commentators remem-
bered the possibilities of the moment acutely. “It seems to me that Boyer 
knew best the true path of happiness for all Haitians,” one Dominican wrote, 
de cades  later. “He was only wrong about one  thing: not having founded the 
 union of the two pueblos on a more equal and advantageous base, for example 
a confederation,” he concluded.32
From diff er ent sites, anti- Boyerists tried to salvage a federation. In Les 
Cayes, Haitian and Dominican reformers formed the Society of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen, demanding wide- ranging government changes.33 At a 
constitutional convention in Port- au- Prince, Puerto Plata deputy Federico 
Peralta y Rodríguez spoke frankly of “atrocious oppression . . .  and total 
ruin” of many prominent families— his frankness already revolutionary— but 
also expressed enthusiasm for proposed reforms, “so liberal and demo cratic” 
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as they  were. He and  others hoped for serious constitutional changes.34 Re-
formers tried to save the  union, drafting a Haitian- Dominican Constitution 
that was unmistakably liberal, according much more power to the legislative 
branch, abolishing presidency- for- life, and reducing the army. They hoped 
to maintain and strengthen island unity, proposing a trilingual national 
school (En glish, Spanish, and French).35 In Santo Domingo, meanwhile, 
Haitian opposition leaders Alcius Ponthieux and General Étienne Desgrotte 
plotted together with Dominican Trinitaria members to take the fort of the 
capital in the spring of 1843, but no mobilization materialized. In solidarity, 
 whole regiments deserted Boyer’s unpopular campaign against the south-
western conspiracy.36 Boyer fled for Jamaica in February 1843, ending more 
than two de cades of rule.
Fig. 1.1 Domingo Echavarría (1805–1849, attributed), “Terremoto en la isla de Haití,” 
1842. Colección bibliográfica J. R. Marquez, Santo Domingo.
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As months passed, however, po liti cal turmoil increased. General Charles 
Rivière- Hérard increasingly presided over the reform convention and ma-
neuvered to impose his authority, proclaiming himself president. He re-
ceived, and then imprisoned, Trinitario emissary Ramón Mella, as he moved 
to squash other reforms. Southern Haitian peasants protested his betrayal 
and mobilized in de pen dently; the movement became known as the Piquet 
Rebellion.37 A popu lar song rebuked the presidential usurper:
President Rivière was cross- eyed!
He thought he was the king!
He thought he was the king!
He thought he was the king!38
Dominican commentators expressed dismay. An editorial critiqued Rivière’s 
January 1844 Constitution and scolded him for his excesses, calling him 
a “dictator who only use[d] the liberal title of president.”39 “[Without our 
cooperation] the revolution would not have been more than a crazy plan,” 
another disillusioned Dominican columnist reflected. “And what was our 
prize . . . ? What  were the considerations, the improvements, the guarantees, 
for our unalienable rights? Dark dungeons in Port- au- Prince!”40
French interference loomed as many Dominican politicians grew di-
vided between separation or a French protectorate. From Port- au- Prince, a 
prominent southern Dominican, Buenaventura Báez, tried to sabotage other 
movements. He warned Rivière of Dominican opposition and furiously tried 
to conspire for a French protectorate instead, continuing to do so  after he 
became the mayor of the Dominican town of Azua.41 “Frenchified” Domini-
cans (los afrancesados) in Azua boasted their own flag: red and white vertical 
stripes, with a small tricolor in the top- left corner.42 The strongest clarion 
call for total separation from Haiti was actually Azuans’ demand for French 
annexation; authors of a separation statement from the Dominican capital 
simply called for provincial autonomy.43 Meanwhile, prominent rancher Pedro 
Santana led a military mobilization for separation from further east, marshal-
ing a loyal band of peons and peasants from his home province, Seybo. He 
wrote confidentially that he feared many Dominicans opposed separation, 
and may have even briefly lent his own allegiance to the French cause.44
French officials collaborated and encouraged Dominican protectorate 
plans, but they insisted that residents of the east continue to pay Haiti’s in-
demnity. In a menacing and opportunistic stance, they lobbied for cession 
of the Samaná peninsula in exchange.45 Diplomats felt confident that the 
plan could be secured in a  matter of weeks.46 Both Unification and protec-
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torate advocates faltered; the indemnity was a major sticking point, even for 
reform proponents. Cap separatists made a last- minute call to make a new 
North Haiti– Dominican union— they freed all Dominican prisoners in the 
town, designed a new red and blue flag with a star at the center, and sent 
overtures proposing a federative alliance to central and northern Dominican 
towns— but eastern observers worried that a clash with France was immi-
nent. Unity seemed too costly.47
Quietly, secession proceeded in the Dominican capital and spread piece-
meal to other towns. With most western troops already departed, a group of 
Dominicans proclaimed Separation in Santo Domingo, fairly uneventfully, 
on 27 February 1844. A number of Haitian residents in the town openly sup-
ported the movement, and a handful of Dominican residents left for Saint 
Thomas to avoid taking sides.48 Official secession occurred the next day, 
with a cordial withdrawal accord for property guarantees, re spect, dignity, 
and “frankness and loyalty” on all sides.49 In March, the leading men of 
several towns in the Cibao valley and elsewhere declared themselves in  favor 
of an eastern republic. As news reached Haiti, President Rivière called for 
a mobilization. Trying to reach the Dominican capital, he occupied Azua, 
where Santana defeated him. Dominicans quickly defeated his auxiliary in 
Santiago, too, and a series of small skirmishes in border towns came to  little 
that spring. Some central towns changed hands several times, but the en-
counters often involved only small groups of soldiers.50 Southern Haitian 
peasants, still in a demo cratic mobilization of their own, observed Rivière’s 
defeat by Dominicans with satisfaction. “The Spaniards chased him, he ran 
like a dog  after fresh carrion!,” one song rebuked him.51 Losing everywhere, 
Rivière was unseated by May 1844. He, too, left for Jamaica.52
As Pablo Mella observes, traditional accounts maintain a conspiracy of 
silence about Dominican racism and class divisions, framing the uncertainty 
of 1844 as mere conflict between “liberal” and “conservative” factions.53 
Among the tiny formal po liti cal class  there did exist a plurality of positions, 
of course, and regional elites in the Cibao also hoped for power. Much more 
salient, however,  were the divides between the tiny elite who  were assum-
ing power and most Dominicans.  These  were the men in the capital whom 
most dubbed “white Spaniards,” whom many residents considered almost a 
foreign group.54 Defiantly, the Separation junta held whites- only meetings, 
and government emissaries bragged to foreign authorities that it had been 
whites who had led Separation.55 At one meeting, liberal Juan Pablo Duarte 
proposed an amendment arguing, “The unity of race . . .  is one of the fun-
damental princi ples of our po liti cal adhesion,” but to his alarm, other 
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 attendees tore up the proposal.56 At the head of the military forces, Santana 
aligned himself with  these prominent whites, who appealed abroad for rec-
ognition, annexation, and white immigration si mul ta neously.57 Santana’s 
collusion with  these elites disgusted and worried prominent military offi-
cers of color in the capital, even  those who had previously supported him.58 
Town residents  were abuzz that the group was considering reinstating slav-
ery,  either in a new Gran Colombia- like federation, like the pro- slavery sepa-
ration movement of 1821, or through a French protectorate.59 A col o nel of 
the African Battalion, Santiago Basora, blocked the entry of separatist forces 
to the capital.60 General José Joaquín Puello, a prominent officer from the 
Unification period, joined Duarte and  others in spreading the alarm among 
soldiers and concerned citizens.
Tension between the governing group and the town’s black regiments 
and other citizens peaked during the summer. To  counter General Puello 
and to silence ner vous town residents, Santana arrived with two thousand 
of his own followers from outside the city. In a tense compromise, Santana 
allowed Puello to keep command of the plaza, and several of the most vocal 
antiblack Junta members resigned.61 The governing group published a de-
cree in July reaffirming the abolition of slavery.  Later the same month uproar 
returned to the capital, however, when a wealthy planter arrived from Puerto 
Rico, intent on recapturing nine men who had escaped to freedom. The 
group of men, who had already joined the town’s black regiment, recognized 
the slavemaster on the street, and a large group of armed Dominicans aided 
them in cornering him in a private  house. The men’s protectors very nearly 
attacked Santana, who arrived to the planter’s rescue. Promising to jail him, 
Santana merely snuck him off in a boat  under the cover of night. Santana 
went on the offensive, trying to neutralize the black regiments entirely. He 
dispatched many of them off to the border, “with extensive promises about 
their continuing liberty.”62 To assuage the alarm of town residents, the Junta 
reiterated once more that Santo Domingo was  free soil and decreed that any 
Dominican who mounted a slave voyage would be classified a pirate, tried, 
and executed.63 Assuming the title of “Supreme Chief of the Republic,” 
however, Santana expelled and exiled a number of the reformist legislators. 
Observers continued to report that the government, other than Santana, was 
all white.64
Adding their support to the opposition, families and soldiers in the out-
skirts of the capital and the center- island distrusted new Dominican rule 
and continued to support Unification. Through July 1845, a number of men 
in Santa María refused to join the new Dominican forces, convinced that 
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the proj ect was to reestablish slavery.65 Unification loyalists raised the Hai-
tian flag in San Juan, Las Matas, and Bánica in 1846; authorities from the 
capital gave chase and made arrests as best they could. In the spring of the 
following year, rumors of unification intrigue in  these same central towns 
 rose again. Only “brute force” pacified the towns, an observer noted.66 Some 
military officials changed sides in the ensuing months, throwing their al-
legiance back to Unification.67 Arrests continued on the border and in the 
capital, and rumors abounded. Within the year, Santana executed several 
prominent Trinitarios and military men of color in the capital, including 
General José Joaquín Puello and his  brother, Gabino, just before Christmas. 
The power strug gle had reached a dramatic moment. All manner of town 
elites  were satisfied with the executions, including proponents of a French 
protectorate. Unrepentant biographers  later claimed Puello was simply “ar-
rogant” and “hostile to the white race.”68
By the end of the year, a small administration fi nally solidified around 
Santana, who ruled autocratically. Legislators borrowed 113 articles of the 
new Dominican constitution directly from the defunct Port- au- Prince re-
form constitution of 1843.69 They kept much of the civil code, but they at-
tacked civil marriage and a recent expansion of  women’s property rights.70 
Santana filled his cabinet largely with loyal allies. Unification authorities had 
appropriated church lands around the capital into state possession; San-
tana maintained control over  these properties and simply distributed them 
among his supporters.71 He pursued his opponents and perceived opponents 
quickly and mercilessly. Some wrote anguished poetry from exile.72 Observ-
ers compared his government to a hierarchical “ family” and his forces, who 
 were mostly from his home province, to his “henchmen.”73 One columnist 
rhapsodized about Santana’s “tender and sweet name,” while another wrote 
a thinly veiled poem critical of the “abuse of a  father.”74 Archbishop Thomas 
de Portes threatened excommunication to Santana’s opponents.75 Santana 
wielded his military power constantly, justifying his heavy- handed rule on 
the pretext of permanent war with Haiti. Observers  were not convinced of 
Santana’s feeble justification for his virtual dictatorship. “The War with the 
Haitians is preoccupying weak spirits and serving as a pretext to the malin-
tentioned and egotistical, who benefit exclusively from the revolution,” one 
Spanish official wrote.76
The rest of Separation was anticlimactic. A short- lived successor to Rivière, 
General Jean- Louis Michel Pierrot, tried to mount a campaign to take the 
Dominican capital. Dominican columnists appealed directly to a hy po thet-
i cal Haitian readership to chide Pierrot for his hy poc risy and lament the 
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continued fighting. Pierrot was just “a puppet chosen by Boyeristas,” and se-
rious po liti cal men  were fleeing the vio lence, one argued.77 Capital city writers 
became bellicose, even bloodthirsty. One poet rhapsodized about the “last 
Haitian biting the dust” in  battle.78 They told sentimental fables of Domini-
can unity and exaggerated Haitian excesses. Priests argued Separation was 
divinely ordained; papers republished their sermons.79 The paper’s editors 
announced that  every issue of Santo Domingo’s first regular newspaper, El 
Dominicano, would “refute the apocryphal writings” from official presses in 
Port- au- Prince that claimed official Haitian victories.80 Dominican papers 
ridiculed hawkish propaganda for its dishonesty to the Haitian public.81 
They need not have bothered; or, rather, the  whole island was in agreement. 
Haitian enlisted men refused to mobilize, and Pierrot’s own troops overthrew 
him. They did so, not casually, on the 27 February 1846.82 With the periodic 
border spats all but uneventful, Dominican journalists turned their focus to 
economic and po liti cal concerns.83
The new administration’s economic predicament was dire and urgent. 
Foreign currency was the only hard specie, British and Saint Thomas mer-
chants demanded exorbitant loan terms, the government printed reams of 
paper money, and even prominent men from the capital refused to lend the 
new administration any funds. Beleaguered elites bragged of extroversion 
and dreamed of foreign capital, condemning the supposed isolation of the 
wealthier state from which they had just emerged. Haiti’s property protec-
tions, Dominican journalists and politicians argued,  were as “absurd as they 
 were ridicu lous.”84 In real ity, many Haitian elites shared the same capital 
development dreams, publishing front- page critiques of barriers to foreign 
investment and land owner ship and promoting cash crop production.85 Do-
minican policy vis- à- vis immigration and investment, anyway, remained more 
similar to Haitian law—or Mexican, which they also occasionally excoriated— 
than diff er ent.86 Lawmakers passed a 30  percent tax on the sale of territory to 
foreigners, who also had to rely on individual dispensation of naturalization 
from the president.87 Critically, they maintained a Unification- era policy of 
restricting foreign traders to  wholesale activity.88 They also left tariffs at 
Unification levels.89
Boasting of their extroversion was essentially a rhetorical exercise, one 
which Dominican elites could practice without par tic u lar consideration for 
consequences: few investors came. Meanwhile, the entire state bud get hov-
ered between $200,000 and $300,000, declining slightly over time.90 Domes-
tic agriculture was insufficient even to maintain the population; all manner 
of  things  were imported into towns of the republic, even staples like flour.91 
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Grass grew in capital city streets, and  houses slowly crumbled.92 The trade 
balance was abysmal. “In Saint Thomas se vende pero no se compra,” journalists 
lamented.93
Geography, Racism, and Town Politics
Over the next two de cades, a small group held power. Both of the republic’s 
first long- ruling presidents  were wealthy men of color. Pedro Santana was 
born in the rural center of the island and grew up in the  cattle country of 
the east. The son of a military hero, he confidently justified his power as 
a heroic crusade, immune to outside assessment.94 Divine vindication and 
a loyal army afforded him pronounced immunity to any sort of deference. 
Years  later, he pointedly received the Cuban governor barefoot.95 Imperial 
outsiders directed racism, disdain, and pity  toward  these presidents. White 
French observers could not contain themselves from commenting on the 
texture of President Báez’s hair, nor from mocking the impoverished girls of 
the capital.96 The po liti cal coterie around the executive, meanwhile, except 
for high military officials, was largely white. Baptized in twenty- two years of 
governance with the revolutionary Haitian state,  these figures never publicly 
breathed a word against  either leader along racist lines, even as small snip-
pets of song from the capital betray how phenotype preoccupied them.97 As 
power was reshuffling at the beginning of the republic, a few liberals did 
speak about race openly, even if seeking to “transcend” it.98 Overwhelm-
ingly, however, elites renounced any division and repudiated discussion 
entirely. Rather, they defended the republic in oblique, civilizationist terms, 
and many poured massive intellectual energy into didactic anti- Haitianism. 
Both Santana and Báez assented and collaborated extensively with  these 
allies.  There was only one press in the capital, owned by the state.99
Members of the small but po liti cally dominant elite who lived in the 
capital  were the protagonists of settler and protectorate schemes. Promi-
nent families ruled: the Delmonte, Alfau, Bobadilla, Galván, and Guridi, 
among them. Many owned land around the capital and profited from the 
sales of mahogany in other parts of the south, as far east as Higüey. Visitors 
referred to “wealthy non- workers” and “patrician families”; they reported, 
too, on the families’ “faithful” servants.100 They established small private 
seminaries to educate the “higher classes of society.”101 The sugar indus-
try near the Dominican capital had left its mark, ideologically and materi-
ally, de cades  after its absolute decline, but plans to revive it with Canary 
Islander colonization proj ects predated Separation.102 The  daughter of one 
large plantation owner, wealthy in property if not capital, ran one of the few 
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guest houses in the capital.103 An intermittent diaspora of Dominican elites 
to Cuba during the nineteenth  century— fleeing the Haitian Revolution, 
fleeing Unification— meant that a handful of wealthier residents in Santo 
Domingo had  family in Havana, Santiago de Cuba, San Juan, and other sites. 
 Others had sojourned in Havana for  legal education or po liti cal exile, and 
they wrote poems about planning never to return. All casually avoided men-
tioning slavery.104
As scholars demonstrate in nearby republics, republican universalism 
both “enabled and constrained” debates over po liti cal belonging. Even as 
elites in the Dominican capital had to subdue overt racism in governance, 
it circulated in normative language, po liti cal rumors, and private sphere.105 
Travelers observed, “It is clear that the whites and the sons of Spain have 
the most influence, even if they have a touch of color.”106 Antiblack rhymes 
betrayed the limits of so- called civil discourse, and prejudices restricted pat-
terns of settlement, as they did in neighboring islands.107 Writers in the capi-
tal  were unabashedly bold in their phenotypic hierarchies:
For a  woman to be a total beauty, she has to have:
Three white  things;— Her skin, teeth, and hands.
Three black;— Her eyes, eyelashes, and eyebrows.
Three red;— her lips, cheeks, and nails . . .  108
“Spanishness” offered them a useful, and vague, vocabulary to articulate 
distance from Haiti. They authored  battle hymns, urging, “Rise Up in Arms, 
O Spaniards.”109 El Dominicano’s journalists sometimes called the eastern 
troops Spanish, sometimes Dominican, within the same piece.110  Actual 
connections to Spain  were few, of course, as Spain refused to recognize the 
republic for more than a de cade. Elite affinities extended to regular adula-
tion of the south’s semirecent French connections. The richest Dominicans 
toasted “à votre santé,” sent their  children abroad for education, and contin-
ued, actively and constantly, to entertain French protectorate prospects.111 
French tutors advertised in the capital.112 Responding uneasily to a foreign 
observer at a dance, a columnist wrote, “Come on, speak franchement (openly) 
with me ( because as you know, Sirs, in addition to the Gallicisms we do all 
the time, we love mixing in a few French words, damn custom)!”113 The most 
regular and impor tant connections of the capital, meanwhile,  were with 
nearby islands, sites of mahogany and  cattle trade. Not a single Eu ro pean 
ship came to Santo Domingo’s port in the first six months of 1848.114
Elite narrators remained purposefully elusive, maintaining a treacherous 
silence on racism in public policy. From the first months of the republic, 
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columnists highlighted what they assessed as a  labor shortage, an implicitly 
antiblack strategy shared by elites in neighboring islands.115 “Depopulation 
is the principal cause of our misery,” a columnist wrote in 1845, calling for 
an immigration commission in each province.116 Lawmakers passed a colo-
nization law in 1847 offering land, advances, tools, and an exemption from 
military ser vice for arriving mi grants. Legislators wanted them to be white, 
even as they had cautiously avoided mentioning race. Rather, officials sim-
ply blocked plans for mi grants of color individually.117 Similarly, individuals 
privately lobbied for French support, the consul alleged, by slandering the 
British flag as “the flag of the blacks.”118 Agents from the United States re-
ported similar race- based, closed- door entreaties.119 So did the Spanish.120 
As they excoriated Haiti, then, they maintained a deafening silence on race 
thinking domestically. Privately, Báez warned the Cuban and Puerto Rican 
governors that Dominicans feared foreign occupation and slavery, and that 
most Dominicans would not hesitate to call on Haiti for help.121 Publicly, 
however, he blamed outside agitators, “slavery propagandists,” for  these 
fears. The archetype of the “slavery propagandist,” or of “denaturalized” or 
“Haitianized” Dominicans, stood in for any elite ac know ledg ment of popu-
lar discourses about foreign threats and dismissed Dominican antiracist 
discourses.122
Elites challenged the legacy of the recent Haitian past and, along with it, 
emancipation. Legislators affirmed commitment to a  free- soil republic; in 
fact, at popu lar vigilance, they affirmed it many times. In practice, however, 
they made and  imagined bargains that would have imperiled  free  labor if they 
had been realized, from colonization schemes to protectorate appeals to 
slave powers. They did so repeatedly, even as they observed, evidently dis-
passionately, the popu lar opposition that such plans provoked.123 Writers 
set about anti- Haitian mythmaking si mul ta neously, anxious to create dis-
tance from a nation, the target of so much hemispheric aspersion, which 
had only very recently been their own. Given the almost total lack of writ-
ten patrimony— Thomas Madiou’s Histoire d’Haïti was the only history book 
to circulate in the Dominican capital— the story of Dominican difference 
was an “extremely urgent necessity,”  these columnists deci ded.124 Capital 
city journalists veered to the openly didactic, taking pains to explain anti- 
Haitian slurs for their audience with an asterisk.125 They worried the pub-
lic did not heed them. “No one writes  here  because no one reads, and no 
one reads  because no one writes,” one paper’s motto fretted.126 Even elites 
who  were enthralled with nationhood felt deeply pessimistic of aggressive 
international interests and their own po liti cal opponents. “Civilization! Is 
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the favorite word of 1855,” one columnist observed, “[but] it has shielded 
rapacious politics on bayonet  point.”127
Anti- Haitianism, beyond appealing to North Atlantic powers, offered 
elites a proxy to exorcise their anx i eties about their own po liti cal predica-
ment, an outlet for impatient and proscriptive visions of development, for 
scorn  toward popu lar religious and marriage practices, and for their own 
racism. It facilitated “raceless” republican fictions and maintained a puta-
tive domestic unity with rural and poor Dominicans, especially of color, by 
invoking a target that was simply, elusively, external.128 Elite unease  toward 
rural Dominicans— over whom they had precious  little influence— was usu-
ally oblique, but it was constant. Columnists criticized small farming plots 
as an “excuse for laziness,” critiqued poor Dominicans’ work habits, and 
praised the “absolute obedience” of soldiers.129 Adopting a script of a Hai-
tian “other,” they made accusations of “relaxed habits,” a supposed lack of 
religion, “libertine” cohabitation, and so on, hoping to discipline common 
Dominicans si mul ta neously.130 Legislators passed vagrancy laws, although 
they  were prob ably as unenforceable as  those of the Unification period.131 
Authors argued that domestic vagrancy was “the seed of so many vices” and 
a deterrent to both local development and international investment.132 They 
urged the creation of civic honors for productive domestic laborers, a practice 
the Haitian government already embraced.133 When discussions veered to 
leisure and religion, tensions mounted perceptibly. Anxious commentators 
tried to “deport” merengue back to Haiti, calling it “horrible” and “loath-
some.”134 One columnist described the dance: “When a merengue starts, 
¡Holy God! One man grabs the other one’s partner, the other one runs around 
 because he  doesn’t know what to do, this guy grabs the arm of a young 
 woman . . .  every thing is confusion. . . .  Could that be agreeable to any-
one?”135 Columnists acknowledged familiarity with unease. In one  imagined 
Spanish- Kreyòl dialogue, a Dominican character remonstrates a Haitian 
man for allegedly allowing himself to be abused by his leader. At the close 
of the conversation, the Dominican man bitterly rejects the latter’s offer of 
a guangá (a “disgusting talisman . . .  of  horse hair, salt and ashes,” the char-
acter claims derisively), but the bilingual conversation—in all its po liti cal, 
religious, and linguistic context—is perfectly understood by both parties.136
Poorer Dominicans lived alongside the wealthy in the capital, which was 
as isolated from the north as “two diff er ent countries” but tied to  cattle plains 
and woodcutting in the nearby south.137 The town was materially poor, with 
few stores and paltry regional trade.138  Because foreign merchants could 
only be  wholesale traders, however, a local market did flourish.139 Traders 
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brought inland products— fruit, corn, root vegetables, and small amounts 
of tobacco, raw sugar, and coffee— downstream by two- person canoes for 
consumption in the capital and shipped logwood out of the country. On the 
banks of the Ozama, a small market bustled for hours.140 In Santo Domingo 
and other towns where individuals confronted prejudice and structural in-
equalities, it is prob ably true that some individuals sought to assimilate the 
privileges of whiteness and anti- Haitianism, but it is also certainly true that 
residents of color proffered explicit discourses of esteem, including total 
rejection of  these norms, in direct response. Dominicans of color some-
times used “white” as a  simple shorthand for “foreigner,” similar to usage 
in Haiti.141 During Unification, anonymous poets celebrated the upending 
of racist order in the capital.142 Another unknown poet offered reassurance 
to black Dominican listeners who endured in equality, promising that some-
day, “the omelet would flip to the other side.”143
A number of distinct Afro- Dominican organ izations  shaped the capital 
landscape. The black regiments remained a separate force years  after in de-
pen dence, receiving a “large number” of men escaping from slavery in Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and other islands into their ranks as soldiers and officers.144 
Churches, brotherhoods like the Cofradía of San Juan Bautista, and mutual 
aid socie ties blossomed.145 African American mi grants, who arrived in the 
1820s at the invitation of President Boyer, maintained a sizable mutual aid 
society and English- language Methodist church in the capital in the 1850s.146 
The small capital outlay required to participate in the market meant that 
African American  women from Baltimore and other sites integrated them-
selves easily into the public space of the town as vendors, selling fruits and 
other wares. They joined  others on the streets of the town who  were curious 
about news from abroad and ready to debate with travelers about slavery. 
They asked visitors for news of their former homes, but they also informed 
witnesses of the horrors they had suffered  there.147 Travelers reported that 
black Dominicans  were loath to serve as servants, and that when elites 
sought replacements from Saint Thomas and other islands,  these individu-
als promptly chose in de pen dent living as well. One white U.S. traveler called 
them “impertinent.”148
Unlike the group in po liti cal power, most capital residents felt a deep 
wariness  toward Eu ro pean powers. Spanish warships had demanded that is-
landers salute their flag in the 1830s, and many residents felt an uneasy “fear 
of the uniformed” (miedo a los uniformados).149 When a Spanish ship docked in 
1846—on its way to Cap- Haïtien to demand reparations— townspeople left 
“joys of mardi gras to watch in somber silence,” distrustful of the few Spanish 
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authorities who disembarked, an observer remarked.150 Spain’s slaveholding 
proj ects  were always close to Dominican shores. The French consul main-
tained that foreign interference would inspire “serious re sis tance,” fears of 
slavery, and calls for Haitian reunification in the capital.151 Years  later, the 
British consul reported much the same.152 At least since the 1820s, men and 
 women from Puerto Rico are on rec ord as having reached the Dominican 
capital; how many elusively crossed the Mona passage in smaller crafts to 
other sites, perhaps with their  whole families, is difficult to estimate.153 Se-
cret antislavery socie ties, or ga nized by Ramón Emeterio Betances and other 
Puerto Rican activists, may have ushered an increasing number to Domini-
can shores. An unknowable number of Cubans arrived, too, on the northern 
coast and in the capital. The British consul remarked in 1861 that many had 
“enjoyed liberty for many years.”154 One Chinese tailor slipped out of Cuba 
on a passport to Jamaica, heading instead to Santo Domingo.155 The gover-
nor of Puerto Rico warned that mi grants of “very advanced po liti cal opinions 
and of very dangerous tendencies” sought out Dominican soil, prob ably 
precisely to win this freedom.156
Outside the capital, the landscape bore witness to a long history of sugar 
slavery and of in de pen dent black settlement. San Carlos, an extramuro com-
munity less than two kilo meters northwest of the old city, lodged many 
traveling day laborers and  others passing through to the southern wood mar-
kets, Baní, and other towns.157 The settlement had a small wooden church 
and about a hundred huts made with palm leaves, distinct both in their man-
ner of construction and in their purposeful arrangement amid vegetation. 
As much for its distinctive construction as for the residents’ skin hue, the 
community had “the most marked aspect of an African  people of Zambeze 
[sic] or Lake Nianza [sic],” a Spanish soldier supposed.158 Its “original and 
happy” arrangement contrasted with the “Eu ro pean taste and aspect” of the 
nearby capital.159 To the west, five small rivers converged to San Cristóbal, long 
a site of large estate sugar production. In 1822, residents seized a plantation 
that had enslaved 145  people, transforming it into small- scale production 
of raw sugar and rum, which they continued to trade in Santo Domingo, 
along with vari ous foodstuffs.160 Los Mina, chartered as a  free black town in 
the late seventeenth  century to receive  people fleeing slavery from Saint- 
Domingue, was just east of the capital. Monte Plata, to the north,  housed 
one of the black regiments whose members had opposed Separation. For 
 those returning to the capital from Monte Plata, foreboding landscape lay 
ahead: the Pass of the Dead and then the Cold Sugar Mill (Yngenio Frio). 
Maroon settlements endured farther west. Afro- Dominican residents of La 
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Vereda, a settlement outside of Baní, preferred and cultivated selective iso-
lation throughout the colonial period and all of the nineteenth  century.161 
A small, fairly endogamous elite lived in town.162 North of Baní, members 
of a maroon enclave founded San José de Ocoa. Paths  were so tight and ar-
duous that animals could barely pass, much less rest. “One false step or the 
twist of a girth would have thrown us into eternity,” a traveler marveled.163
Almost a week’s  ride distant was the Cibao valley, the most populous, 
prosperous, and agriculturally intensive Dominican region. Travelers took 
pains to assert the whiteness of the  people they spoke to in the Cibao, and 
the often- repeated pronouncements of “whites of the earth” also emanate 
from their reports.164 The largest town, Santiago de los Caballeros, boasted 
a bustling artisan and retail class that had benefited from Haitian protec-
tionism.165 A small urban elite, la gente de primera, claimed roots in Spanish 
colonial families, even if their prosperity was quite recent. Pedro Francisco 
Fig. 1.2 Detail from Wm. M. Gabb’s “Geological Map of the Republic of Santo 
 Domingo,” 1872.
38 | chapter 1
Bonó reflected that his grand mother, “of one of the richest classes of plant-
ers [of Saint- Domingue] . . .  drank to France with  every pore”  after she ar-
rived to Santiago in exile.166 Elites lived in the town center but also in rural 
areas, alongside poor families. Lack of capital meant that landowners ac-
quiesced to informal sharecropping or squatting rather than waged work.167 
In the towns, liberal writers  imagined isolated, noble, bronzed peasants, 
the poorest of whom  were “ugly, but strong and healthy.”168 Mythical fig-
ures like the black comegente (“ people eater”) haunted public consciousness 
in the Cibao valley, embodying the wealthy region’s troubled and inchoate 
relationship to the island’s revolutionary past.169 Residents had strong com-
mercial ties, mostly via the north coast but also overland, connecting them 
to Cap- Haïtien, a richer city than most Dominican port towns. Wealthy men 
like Teodoro Heneken traveled regularly to the commercial and po liti cal cen-
ters of the island, Santiago de los Caballeros, Puerto Plata, Cap, and the two 
capitals.170
Cibao politicians, easily richer than many in the southern capital, felt 
Santana’s and Báez’s subjugation acutely, but they could not easily rally 
popu lar support. Báez dismissed the province, writing, “El Ozama thinks, 
Cibao works.”171 A flourishing literary culture grew in Santiago and other 
towns, along with progressive socie ties and Masonic lodges.172 The members 
 were men educated in Havana, Paris, London, and occasionally Philadel-
phia; they took a dim view of what they perceived as the provincialism and 
antidemo cratic impulses of Báez and Santana and southern oligarchs gen-
erally.173 Anti- Santana songs, stories, sayings, and décimas (short poems) 
abounded. The presidents’ repeated printing of paper money caused deflation 
that devastated tobacco merchants.174 Markets, roads, and rivers led north, 
to the línea noroeste (northwest line) of settlement and trade of tobacco, fine 
woods, and other products. Recueros (muleteers) and prácticos (guides) man-
aged to travel  these routes well enough, but urban Cibao residents’ integra-
tion even with surrounding tobacco cultivators was not extensive.175 Tobacco 
production led to centripetal settlement patterns in the surrounding coun-
tryside. Farms could be scattered around the areas of best soil; tobacco was 
light, transportable, and slow to rot. One historian estimates that an indi-
vidual cultivator could produce anywhere from four hundred to two thou-
sand pounds of tobacco a year, with fairly rudimentary technology.176 The 
material culture was meager, and most rural cultivators prob ably relied on 
 horses to counteract the physical isolation, even in Santiago’s immediate 
surroundings. Overland travel south, meanwhile, was so arduous that most 
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news from the capital reached, circuitously, from the northern coast.  There 
 were no places to sleep except for “the big bed” (the ground) or a hammock, 
and many  horses, already expensive, could not weather the trip.177
Residents of Puerto Plata  were a keenly cosmopolitan public. Mi grant 
and commercial networks linked them regularly to Eu rope, the north coast 
of Haiti, the Turks and Caicos, Saint Thomas, southern Florida, and other 
sites. A  free port since 1756, Puerto Plata earned the nickname “la Novia del 
Atlántico” (the Bride of the Atlantic) for the town’s intense macroregional 
connections. Many residents  were bi- or trilingual.178 Germany dominated 
the tobacco trade, but the roster of ships that sailed in and out of the Puerto 
Plata— which funneled lumber and Cibao tobacco to Denmark, Bremen, 
and other primarily Eu ro pean sites— was considerable. At about two or 
three ships per day, it amounted to nearly ten times the traffic of the south-
ern capital.179 For regional trade, British and Danish vessels traded vari ous 
goods for Dominican foodstuffs. The Turks and Caicos, which traded salt, 
depended completely on this exchange.180  People came, too. Mi grants from 
Saint Thomas, Tortola, Nassau, Providenciales,  Grand Turk, Jamaica, Saint 
Kitts, Nevis, Martinique, Guadeloupe, the United States, Germany, France, 
and elsewhere trickled into Puerto Plata, Monte Cristi, and other north 
coast towns. A profusion of monikers like “el Inglés” (the En glishman) or 
“la isleña” (the islander) highlights the ready manner with which  these mi-
grants  were received, and visitors described black mi grants who earned a 
steady living in town as boatmen, laundry  women, carpenters, and other pro-
fessions.181 Hundreds of African American émigrés came to Puerto Plata, es-
tablishing multilingual schools, churches, and mutual aid socie ties. Groups 
came at Boyer’s invitation, through  waters long familiar to Franco- Haitian 
corsairs.182  Others escaped to freedom in following years. Individuals arrived 
from South Carolina and Georgia, often through the Keys, leading book-
keepers to rec ord all of them as Floridian.183 Trade and travel united the 
north coast. Cap- Haïtien was just one day’s sail away. Monte Cristi residents 
sent wood along for resale in Puerto Plata, but they also engaged in an intense 
 cattle and goat trade westward, to northern sections of Haiti.184  People some-
times relocated along the coast  after major life events. Theresa Smith, for 
example, moved back to Cap- Haïtien from Puerto Plata  after her husband’s 
passing.185
Regional mi grants fleeing slavery also built communities alongside Do-
minicans in the Samaná peninsula. Faithful groups established an African 
Methodist church as early as the 1780s. When President Boyer issued an 
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invitation for African American émigrés in 1824, hundreds made a perma-
nent home in Samaná, in settlements like Protestant Heights,  Free Fort, 
and Palenque.186 Where the mi grants to many other sites had eventually 
moved to nearby towns, on the peninsula, many chose farming, shipbuild-
ing, and other activities.187 In relative isolation, they made a community, 
working on sixteen- acre plots. By midcentury, the peninsula was sparsely 
populated— fewer than two thousand  people— but it boasted a healthy 
trade of foodstuffs to the Turks and Caicos.188 Like Puerto Plata, the com-
munity was actively multilingual. Town residents and visitors conversed in 
En glish, Spanish, and Kreyòl.189 Prob ably the most regular regional news 
arrived from the nearby British islands, although the healthy salt- cowhide 
trade and a small stream of mi grants connected them to Puerto Plata as 
well. Residents kept in contact with  family and pastors in Philadelphia and 
other North American cities. Community residents remained Protestant, 
sometimes marrying with Turks and Caicos Islanders. They wrote to U.S. 
congregations praising the freedom of religion. “We enjoy our home-
steads, and our freedom of worship, in neighborly peace,” one parishioner 
reported.190
Filibuster intrigue, slave ship traffic, and imperial threats made north 
coasters very attentive to regional politics and vigilant about anticolonial-
ism and antislavery. Puerto Plata authorities rushed into action when a 
suspected slaver docked in their harbor, for example. Against the protest of 
Spanish merchants, town officials immediately embargoed the vessel and 
sent the captain to Santo Domingo to stand trial, where he and his crew  were 
convicted.191 Despite their relative isolation, Samaná residents  were keenly 
aware of foreign designs on the peninsula percolating in the capital and 
nearby  waters.192 An 1822 French expedition betrayed interest in the strategic 
peninsula that was de cades old.193 In the 1840s, French diplomats argued that 
a series of specious debts  ought to justify their occupation of the peninsula, 
and they sent warships on numerous missions  there.194 By the 1850s,  U.S. 
envoys angled for plans of their own. They very nearly negotiated for per-
petual rent and a  free port. The British and French sent warships; negotiations 
summarily ceased.195 More than a few recent community members— like 
“Norberto [Ebora] el isleño, María la isleña”— became mixed up in antico-
lonial organ izing in Puerto Plata and elsewhere.196 Many maintained their 
first citizenship. In 1854, a group of Samaná residents traveled all the way 
from the peninsula to the capital to oppose a proposed U.S. treaty. Santana 
meant “to trick the population of color to subjugate them to slavery,” they 
warned.197
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New Terms for the Dictionary: Rural Identities and Politics
Many, if not most, Dominicans resided far from the coasts and towns, where 
they lived in rich autonomy and material paucity. Perhaps 8,000 lived in the 
capital, per one estimate, and about 12,000 lived in the rest of the towns 
of the country.198 About 200,000 other Dominicans, more or less, lived dis-
persed in expansive rural areas, with perhaps just 7.4 inhabitants per square 
mile in 1860, compared with Puerto Rico’s 169.199 Almost everywhere but 
the Cibao, land pressure was very low. “The population of the African race 
are so spread out at points that one can travel large distances without the 
one hut in which to take refuge from the sun,” a Spanish traveler complained 
in 1860. Few roads, dense vegetation, and rain- choked waterways made his 
travel even more difficult.200  Little long- distance overland transport meant 
that most rural communities thrived in relative isolation. Since the colonial 
period, Dominicans of color sought respite from exploitation through rural 
pursuits, including ranching.201 Scholars like David Barry Gaspar have 
emphasized the separate social and psychological space carved out even in 
the most intense modes of plantation slavery by the enslaved. This in de pen-
dence and selective impenetrability would have been even more pronounced 
in the autonomous rural contexts of postslavery Santo Domingo.202 Narra-
tives of national identity and difference forged in the capital amounted to a 
foreign construct, or simply an additional lexicon. In describing themselves, 
rural Dominicans throughout the territory might have invoked a discourse 
of relationship rather than describe a unitary identity.203 More likely still, 
within their community they  were endowed with plural histories and plural 
identities.204 Mostly, they governed themselves.
Rural Dominicans, even the most poor, lived semi- independently. Even 
near the capital, just one month’s work woodcutting afforded three months’ 
leave.205  Others took  cattle- trading paths leading west into Haitian territory, 
as they had for more than a  century. In highlands, rural dwellers subsisted 
on vari ous tactics of slash- and- burn farming, animal grazing, capture of 
semiferal pigs and other animals. Semisedentary monteros, who lived in this 
way, might also work for a  family who raised  cattle without dramatic strati-
fication.206  Those who lived in ser vice to a landowner did so in exchange for 
land use and other rights, rarely for salary.207 Some looked to wealthier fami-
lies for credit, employment, or godparentage. In the south particularly, large 
landowners involved in lumber and  cattle held considerable influence over 
poorer area residents.208 Even in  those areas, however, the extent of available 
land greatly eased de pen dency. Residents had  free- ranging pigs and  cattle 
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of their own, and they often cleared diff er ent lands  every few years. Some-
times  women managed farm plots as men traveled.209 Common lands  were 
usually not clearly delineated, but negotiation and the idea of community 
belonging and usufruct  were ave nues of access.210 The system of common 
land use rights, terrenos comuneros— which had flustered President Boyer in 
his attempts to commercialize agriculture in the 1820s— remained well into 
the twentieth  century.211 Only products near natu ral ports or small- scale 
transport of rivers moved longer distances. Pack animals could carry to-
bacco and cacao, light but valuable, and livestock moved themselves. Sugar 
in Azua and lumber in northern and southern pockets  were the other prod-
ucts that traveled by mule or small boat, without refinement. Agriculture did 
not transform substantively from the early nineteenth  century, nor would it 
for de cades.212
In their obligations, eastern rural residents prob ably behaved similarly 
to rural residents of other islands, leaving jobs when they felt they could live 
in de pen dently for a while.213 Rural dwellers’ party allegiances may have been 
more stable than party politics in towns, as land patronage was readily avail-
able.214 As other scholars have argued, although caudillo lit er a ture has shied 
away from personalistic explanations,  there was nothing at all illogical about 
 either president’s personal appeal, as far as the influence of  either actually ex-
tended. Reciprocity, mythogenic appeal, and the language of “moral preser-
vation” sustained them.215 In decentralized and capricious circumstances, the 
idea that a power ful individual, not a distant state, might disseminate justice 
was an appealing recourse.216 Fear also governed, as rivalry led to displays of 
public vio lence. “Santana was very popu lar among rural leaders and the masses 
of the countryside. . . .  Many thousands viewed him with re spect and even 
more saw him with fear, true terror,” observed Alejandro Guridi, a onetime 
supporter of Santana.217 In center- island areas, rumors circulated that Báez’s 
supporters, too, had superhuman capacities, including magical bullets.218 
In  every situation, however, the relative abundance of land abated in equality 
and increased rural Dominicans’ leverage. A general aversion to state 
interference— only irrelevant and possibly costly or disruptive— prob ably 
typified the attitude of many. While some might have been caught up in the 
to- and- fro of caudillo anglings,  others likely abstained from the enterprise. 
“He did not follow any government at all,” several neighbors  later observed 
of a day laborer who had been accused of rebellion.219
Rural residents constructed for themselves a diff er ent moral universe, 
with diff er ent po liti cal imperatives from the politicians of the capital. They 
embraced an epochal and moral sense of time: the Haitian Revolution, for 
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example, ended “the time of the whites”;  others remembered “when the 
whites hung” or made a  future prophecy, “when the whites hang.”220 Simi-
larly, villains and heroes could transcend temporality. The legend of Don 
Melchor, greedy slave owner from San Cristóbal who met his end falling 
from the sky as he tried to reach heaven, endured from the 1500s as a caution-
ary tale.221 Fighting, emancipation, natu ral disasters, migration, illnesses, 
drought, pests, famine, and the arrival of strangers punctuated po liti cal be-
liefs and epistemologies, even as  labor modes and technologies remained 
fairly constant. Interpersonal connections ranged from autarky, to ties be-
tween extended  families, to bonds of formal patronage. Some communi-
ties may have valued periodic re distribution from their more prominent 
members.222 Authority sprang from multiple reserves, from the geo graph i-
cally close to the celestially distant. Settlements may have remembered their 
found ers with special veneration; it is likely, furthermore, that residents based 
their claims to local belonging on a genealogy of kinship.223
Distinctiveness and in de pen dence  were fundamental to the language of 
everyday life. Dominican residents of southern coast towns  were fascinated 
by what they saw as the extreme, even super natu ral, solitude of the nearby 
mountain areas. Town residents claimed to have captured biembienes— several 
maroon individuals so isolated that they supposedly had no language—in 
the 1860s.224 One traveler to the center of the island marveled at distinctive 
rural vocabulary: “New terms for the dictionary!  Here, to say  there  were a 
bunch of  things or many  people: había pila. For a gathering of troops, embar-
bascáos. For saddlebags, cerones, for jacket, celeque, to say that anyone could do 
something, esgarita, to do something on purpose, expresmente, for rolls, güal-
imones, for the flies in  these areas, prieta, to catch someone by surprise, they 
caught him nete.”225 French and Kreyòl loanwords and regionally specific 
rural vocabulary demonstrated wholly distinct cultural inflections, from re-
gion to sparsely populated region. One scholar has argued for as many as 
eight diff er ent regions whose geography and agriculture all distinguished 
them from the next in the center of the island alone.226 Well beyond endur-
ing maroon settlements in the central mountains, rural residents believed 
that biembienes populated the hills, sometimes characterized as ominous 
creatures, sometimes  human. Biembienes’ name evoked an invitation of the 
 people who had escaped slavery in de cades past: “Come! Come!”
The administration’s reach was small. Although the constitution called for 
five regional courts, just two existed, in Santo Domingo and Santiago de los 
Caballeros, and their rec ords  were minimal. No one translated the civil code 
out of French  after Separation, and given the dispersal of the population and 
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the costs of traveling, many cases dragged on extensively.227 Most rural resi-
dents likely resolved their disputes beyond formal proceedings. The wealthy 
administered justice extrajudicially as well, “without soiling our hands with 
 these expensive nuisances— courts and prisons.”228 Government legislation 
was similarly informal. In the capital, charisma and military prowess had 
supplanted written dicta since the days of Juan Sánchez Ramírez (“all seems 
to have been by [his] verbal order,” a con temporary observer marveled in 
1811).229 Buenaventura Báez and Pedro Santana, similarly, governed largely 
by decree. As the earliest arriving Spanish- Cuban officials lamented in 1861, 
“no fixed legislation” ruled, leaving citizens in the hands of  these authori-
ties.230 The executive dictated law according to his inclinations, even as he 
paid lip ser vice to popu lar  will.231
Military authority reached somewhat further. Most served irregularly, 
often by conscription, which many resented.232 “Al pobre no lo llaman para 
cosa buena” (the poor person is never called on for good  things), one writer 
 later ventriloquized.233  There  were few funds to pay soldiers, so local admin-
istrators rewarded men with rank and commissions.234 Borrowing structure 
from the Haitian National Guard, regional divisions  were self- ruled and de-
centralized, and soldiers still used some French commands.235 “Each division 
general is a  little president of his own province, and pronounces any odious 
decree, ‘in virtue of Article 210,’ even though that power is only conceded to 
the president,” an observer claimed.236 The Dominican army boasted at least 
330 officers by 1861, prob ably many more, and officers had special rights, 
both for logging and to distribute  wholesale goods brought in by foreign 
merchants.237  Those at the highest ranks at times ruled abusively in towns. 
“He  doesn’t re spect married  women, girls, maidens, nor honorable men nor 
any class of person,” read one complaint about a habitually drunk general, 
“and he is a disturber of the peace wherever he arrives.”238 Rank- and- file sol-
diers prob ably enjoyed much less prominence. They prob ably made claims 
to military sacrifice as a mode of po liti cal belonging, rather than a language 
of rights.239 As with other armies, however, po liti cal elites valued their obedi-
ence.240 “Our former life was the life of a soldier, or the life of a citizen who 
armed himself,” one journalist in the capital remarked, “but  here on out . . .  
that should change.”241 Journalists frequently lamented the burden of mili-
tary expenses on the administration’s meager bud get.242
Spiritual knowledge informed Dominican life intensely. Pop u lar religious 
practice differed from the doctrinal “fervent Catholicism” of urban elites, but 
it was by no means less integral to daily life.243 Religious brotherhoods, in fact, 
 were an impor tant rural social network, and members administered them 
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largely outside of clergy supervision.244 In homes, popu lar practice prob ably 
had more of what some sociologists have termed a “matriarchal core,” which 
not only venerated female figures such as the Virgin Mary but also afforded 
spiritual importance to female prac ti tion ers in general, as devotees, ritual 
experts, or simply  women of faith.245 The practice of promesas and personal 
altars, wakes and pro cessions for deceased community members, and reli-
gious festivals and pilgrimages connected individuals directly to divinities 
and to each other. Collective rites and the veneration of a regional patron 
saint  were impor tant organ izing princi ples.246 Annual pilgrimages to the 
Virgin of Altagracia in Higüey united the faithful across the territory.247 All 
of  these modifications of priest- centric practice— from the authority of re-
gional brotherhoods to practices of divination— disseminated alternative 
authority among community members. Like Obeah in other islands, Domini-
cans embraced epistemologies of justice that  were parallel to and in de-
pen dent of bourgeois discourses of legality.248 Religious fraternal socie ties 
(cofradías) existed as rural  orders just as they did in towns, like the black 
Brotherhood of Saint Antoine in the Cibao valley. “ These blacks have always 
lived in a state of in de pen dence . . .  which has never permitted [officials] 
to collect any goods from them,” an official complained in 1806.249 Scholars 
would judge the 1844 invocation “Viva la República Dominicana y la Virgen 
Maria!” to be a “naive and charming cry,” but the marriage of the two was 
not surprising.250
In their faith, Dominicans and Haitians shared overlapping lexicons, in 
a connection so fundamental that Dominicans and Haitians venerated the 
Virgin of Altagracia together for centuries.251 Call- and- response  music and 
liturgy, an emphasis on the Holy Spirit, and emotional conversion experi-
ences characterized practice across the island. All- day dances on saints’ days 
and other festivals embodied joyous or mournful expressions of faith.252 
Drumming added an impor tant ritual ele ment in some areas, including 
palos de muerte (to commemorate the deceased) and fiestas or bailes de palo (to 
celebrate saints’ days).253 Disapproving outsiders remarked that Dominican 
cele brations became raucous and that “singing and shouting”  after baptisms 
was common.254 One might seek to clean up or improve one’s luck, bind a 
spouse or lover, gain protection from a resguardo, and seek the aid (or ven-
geance) of the deceased.255 Many faithful performed special veneration for 
saints, like San Miguel, whose importance crossed pantheons, and Erzulie, 
Ogou, and marasa twins also appeared.256 Especially in center- island areas, 
one might have appealed to papabocó or papalúa ritual experts, and some 
eastern faithful accorded special authority, or “generative potency,” to western 
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prac ti tion ers.257 That authority might transcend time and space, even in-
dividual bodies, in what one scholar describes as “traveling spirithood.”258 
Dominican families’ mourning rituals— nine- day funeral vigils and rites like 
baquini for deceased infants— evoked  those in Jamaica, Colombia, Puerto 
Rico, and elsewhere.259 The repetition of  these rites, one year and seven 
years  after the death, underscore the central importance of ancestors. Fig-
ures like la jupia and la ciguapa (taína spirits who roamed the fields), nimitas 
(glowing firefly- like creatures who watched over the living), and potentially 
malevolent creatures like barsélicos, galipotes, zánganos, and bacás all embodied 
the vibrant connection between the Dominican countryside’s  human in-
habitants and other life.260 At harvest time, Dominicans performed  labor in 
some areas with the collective help of neighbors and extended  family. Their 
collective work songs, convite, echoed konbits of the west.261
In diff er ent commercial and familial cir cuits, Dominicans traveled to 
Haiti often. Whole families traveled regularly from Puerto Plata and Santiago 
to Cap- Haïtien, for example. José del Carmen Rodríguez’s wife was Haitian, 
and she had  family throughout Haiti, whom she had not seen in eigh teen 
years. José, his wife, their four  children, and “un peón” made the trip to visit 
her relatives, perhaps to stay.262 Some had left spouses and parents in Haiti 
and hoped to return. One fourteen- year- old boy, Rudolfo Ovidio, wanted to 
meet his  mother’s  family. Nicasio Jiménez reported that his wife’s  mother 
and  sister had been living in Haiti “ever since the Separation,” when he in-
tended to visit them nearly twenty years  later.263 Some moved multiple times 
in their life, like José Maria Sanchez, who moved from Higüey to Cap, over-
land, via Dajabón, as a child. He  later settled elsewhere in the center of the 
island, farther to the south.264 Southern residents traveled to the northern 
coast by ship, as Anna María LaPlace did, leaving Santo Domingo for Cap- 
Haïtien, for reasons of  family.265 Haiti’s government paper published acts of 
naturalization. Dominican  women could contract their own naturalization 
in the west.266 North- coast commercial trade in both directions was brisk. 
Meanwhile, small- scale Haitian merchants, pacotilleurs, regularly traveled all 
the way to Higüey, selling their goods to country  people along their route.267 
In the porous southern center- island region, migration was as old as the ma-
roon communities that had welcomed fleeing slaves in the colonial era and 
the  cattle trade that still burgeoned. Settlement patterns amounted to living 
geographic memory of the semirecent past.
Residents of the border or, more accurately, the center- island region in 
the south,  were aware of but strategically removed from po liti cal proj ects of 
the island capitals. Relatively less direct travel connected the island capitals, 
life by steam | 47
which could take as long as two weeks in unfavorable conditions. News of 
Santo Domingo often arrived in Port- au- Prince via relay in Saint Thomas or 
Turks and Caicos Islands, and vice versa. By contrast, bustling  cattle and 
wood trade connected the “deep south” (sur profundo) with the west, and 
coffee came eastward. By midcentury,  there may have been some interna-
tional enclaves of individuals and families engaged in wood selling on both 
sides of the island for de cades.268 “ Free trade across the border” continued to 
be a primary negotiation concern in 1850s treaties.269 In some center- island 
areas, settlement was shifting. In the nearly ninety years since the Treaty of 
Aranjuez had fixed borders on the island, decades- long demographic shifts 
blurred the bound aries of ethnicity and community. Hinche or Hincha, in 
the north- central area of the island, slowly transformed, becoming more 
Haitian, a pacific shift that became obvious at Separation. Several de cades 
 later, a man recalled that Separation had provoked something of a land grab, 
with wood sellers quickly coming forth with specious titles to continue to do 
business as they had before.270
In the center of the island, both governments had a collection of military 
outposts, but  little more. In areas of so much commingling, “nation” was as 
much a tactic as it was a community. Residents’ identity and filiation 
Fig. 1.3  A grave in Jacmel. Biencité Santana’s given and  family names suggest he was 
one of many who had  family from both sides of the island.
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overlapped, intermingled, and transformed. Travelers and residents regu-
larly negotiated differences, perhaps through humor, where they  were not 
irrelevant.271 Towns like Neiba  were founded on a centuries- long history 
of marronage from the west. Expressions for the fundamental language of 
every d ay life— words for hunger, fear, markets, scandals, and so on— easily 
blended center- island Kreyòl and center- island Spanish.272 Town residents 
of San Juan de la Maguana, and  others to the north, lived off  cattle trade 
to Haiti. For  cattle traders, Port- au- Prince was much closer than Santo Do-
mingo.273 Not particularly loyal to the east (much less “anti- Haitian”), peasants, 
 cattle rustlers, and military men of central and central- southern regions of 
the island presented a direct challenge to po liti cal authority. Whole towns 
had reputations for fluid and charged allegiances. Neiba was of “well- known 
poor disposition,” a French consul observed in 1847.274 Neiba’s “denatural-
ized citizens . . .  threaten the country with anarchy,” one Dominican paper 
warned, a de cade  later.275 Haitian authorities also conceived of the region as 
a space for criminals, and they accused the Dominican government of sup-
porting  cattle rustling.276 Dominican authorities returned the accusations, 
and they repeatedly complained that lower- level Haitian military officials 
sought to spread “letters of seduction” to Dominican military officials and 
other residents.277
Po liti cal schemes in the center- island area never ceased. Santana’s oppo-
nents repeatedly fled to the area to regroup.278 Local military men espoused 
goals that ranged from personal military ambitions, to vague declarations 
of subregional autonomy, to outright opposition to the Dominican state 
and proposals of reunification with Haiti. Capital city papers described 
their actions as “criminal” or “denationalized.” Some became infamous; their 
nicknames— “el Quirí,” “Cabulla,” and so on— well known to authorities and 
the public alike. Their goals  were similar to  those of the ambitious separatists 
and prominent local leaders in Haiti and other state periphery sites through-
out the Ca rib bean. Officers invoked national rivalries for their own purposes 
and argued that their ser vices, rather than any ethnolinguistic claim, af-
forded them belonging in the national structure they chose to support.279 
Historian Ismael Hernández Flores argues that the youth of the region moved 
on from any rancor that had touched the region in 1844, quickly returning to 
centuries- old patterns of community, trade, and po liti cal collaboration.280
Provocation, Instability, and Revolution
Economic crises, diplomatic aggression, popu lar discontent, and po liti cal 
vio lence constantly plagued the new republic. France, Spain, and the United 
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States all withheld recognition, seeking leverage for concessions, especially 
the cession of the Samaná peninsula.281 Britain, the first to recognize the 
republic in 1850, actively sought to stymie other treaties. To forestall  U.S. 
influence, collect debt, or simply  because it did not please their sensibilities 
that two “negro states” be divided, both British and French agents occasion-
ally lobbied for reunification of the island.282  These authorities  were nakedly 
interventionist in Dominican local politics, too. Their  favor fell to the cau-
dillo they perceived to be more receptive to concessions. The French tended 
to  favor Báez for his repeated (although far from exclusive) annexation en-
treaties. U.S. agents deci ded Santana would give them the concessions they 
sought, and one Spanish diplomat initiated a citizenship scheme that of-
fered tantalizing (and disruptive) po liti cal immunity. Commercial agents 
from the United States, a growing presence, fantasized about large- scale 
land speculating and colonization. As they became more ambitious,  these 
agents complained that the Dominican Republic was too “semicolonial” even 
to contract concessions without Eu ro pean nations intervening.283 Sometimes 
the agents’ machinations proved so outrageous that Dominican authorities, 
in exasperation, arrested them.284 Dominican officials and other prominent 
figures, anxious, responded with annexation and protectorate overtures. 
Chaos grew.
By the close of the 1840s, the capital city administration was in crisis. 
The trea sury was empty, despite ten printings of paper money.285 The French 
consul alleged that a protectorate plan had near- unan i mous support; indeed, 
the Dominican Congress may have secretly passed a resolution.286 Haiti’s new 
president, Faustin Soulouque, looked on, with French worries of his own. His 
po liti cal opponents  were demonstrating for demo cratic reforms, along the 
lines of the revolution that had occurred in France the previous year. De-
spite repression and executions, their opposition continued, and rumors of 
the French- Dominican protectorate provoked him further.287 He insisted on 
the indivisibility of the island. The British consul egged him on, proposing 
a plan that would re unite the island while leaving Dominican governors and 
military forces intact.288 Although his overtures  were mostly bellicose, Sou-
louque also tried to appeal directly to Dominicans, highlighting the racism 
of Santana’s administration.289 He invoked the memory of General Joaquín 
Puello, killed by Santana for his opposition to early Separation plans.290 He 
reminded Dominicans, too, of the disastrous incident of the men fleeing 
Puerto Rico and the pro- slavery complicity of Santo Domingo officials.291 He 
called Dominicans “our  brothers of the east,” which journalists particularly 
loathed and resented.292
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A few months into the French treaty negotiations, Soulouque launched 
an ill- fated campaign in Dominican territory. He held Azua for a  little more 
than two weeks; his subordinates engaged in smaller conflicts in several 
center- island towns.293 Santana met him near the southern town of Baní, 
soundly defeating him. The aggression was so unpopular in Port- au- Prince 
that Soulouque’s opponents  were purposely  silent, ex pec tant that the mobi-
lization would bring his downfall.294 Tightening his grip instead, Soulouque 
named himself emperor. Dominicans led a small naval offensive against 
Haiti in 1849, burned Anse- à- Pitres, and attacked one other town, but both 
sides quickly demobilized.295 The French consul was not chastened in the 
least. He dreamed of a “white trade” to Samaná, in new French settlers, and 
wrote to Dominican legislators promising it.296 French authorities contin-
ued to lobby for both administrations to pay Haiti’s indemnity, and they did 
not recognize the Dominican Republic for several more years.297 British and 
French diplomats intervened as “mediators” in the peace that followed. Do-
minican ministers found few complaints too small to report.298
Santana’s victory, easily won, gave him a temporary burst of popularity, 
but he quickly squandered it. He persecuted po liti cal rivals and eviscerated 
constitutional reforms. An “infernal party spirit” reigned.299 Some journal-
ists asserted Santana was a “magic name for the country”;  others, that he 
was “fratricidal and ferocious.”300 “What a country we live in!” a columnist 
complained, when Santana exiled another newspaper editor.301 Authors of a 
new paper, La Acusación— perhaps the most roundly critical of all antidemo-
cratic tendencies in the city— leveled themselves squarely at Santana, ac-
cusing him of appropriating 16 million pesos fuertes and warning that the 
“thieves” might soon spirit away the remaining 300 million. The editor 
earned himself a beating.302 Papers turned to satire and allegory. El Domini-
cano mocked a fictional “Don Chameleon,” who threw his allegiances wher-
ever jobs  were to be found.303 A play, entitled “The Conspiracies, Seen from 
One Side,” depicts characters motivated by jealousy, arrogance, ignorance, 
and self- interest.304 In a satirical dream sequence, El Oasis depicted a society 
where a “Pueri- Cracia” ruled, with a constitution ordering the deportation 
of all men and  women over age thirty, polygamy, continuous revolution, the 
beating of foreign consuls, and constant conflict between legislative and 
executive branches. Meanwhile, military men had license to “do absolutely 
what ever they wanted.”305
U.S. filibusters soon came to the island in earnest, joined by a diplomatic 
corps who supported their ambition. Although Dominican officials sup-
ported white American migration, incoming proposals  were not agricultural 
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proj ects but rather armed filibuster operations, intending to attack Cuba. 
One Georgia operation associated with a failed Narciso López expedition 
offered “8,000 mi grants” for Dominican settlement. President Báez was so 
suspicious that he warned the outfit that Spanish troops  were prepared to de-
fend the northern coast if necessary. The French consul also offered ships.306 
Tensions ran high. The French consul predicted that north coast residents 
would “revolt and unite with Haiti” if French troops, meant to forestall 
U.S. filibusters, arrived precipitously.307 Báez passed regulations restrict-
ing mi grants’ ports of arrival, preventing the disembarkation of guns, and 
demanding proof of employment within two months.308 New proposals con-
tinued cropping up; the Dominican government opposed them, one by one, 
and sent secret agents to investigate.309 Several years  later, swashbuckling 
Texas veteran William Cazneau arrived aboard the uss Columbia, intending to 
draft a recognition treaty. He followed his ardently pro- filibuster wife, Jane 
Storm Cazneau, to the republic. Both harbored  eager and aggressive settle-
ment plans. Jane Cazneau wrote effusively that Dominican land for sugar 
and coffee could be had for just three dollars an acre, compared with forty or 
fifty dollars in Cuba.310 Privately, she suggested armed colonization.311 In ex-
change for recognition, William Cazneau demanded cheap rent of Samaná. 
British, French, and Spanish agents worked furiously to oppose him, dock-
ing warships in Samaná and the capital.
Dominican popu lar opposition to  U.S. plans was acute and growing. 
Cazneau’s proposal was so wildly unpopular in Samaná that demonstrators 
traveled to the capital to make their opposition plain. A Spanish observer 
remarked, contentedly, “Samaná has not been sold  because  there is a fear of 
revolution of the  people of color.”312 In the capital, the treaty collapsed, too. 
Controversy about Article 3,  under whose provisions Dominicans would be 
subject to U.S. laws, ostensibly put Dominicans at risk for enslavement upon 
visiting Baltimore and other southern ports.  Under intense public pressure, 
the Dominican Congress soundly rejected it, Cazneau refused to alter it, and 
the negotiation was brusquely dropped.313 Cazneau blamed opposition in 
Santo Domingo on “ adept . . .  and malicious” Haitian propaganda, trying to 
minimize or dismiss the obvious discontent in the town.314 The “liberty . . .  
to treat the colored Dominican Consul as it treats any other negro, was too 
large a bone for the Dominican Congress to swallow. . . .  General Cazneau 
is distressed, Mrs.  Cazneau is mortified,” the New York Times reported.315 
The Spanish consul expressed satisfaction that joint diplomatic action had 
helped to block the treaty negotiations. “I hope that the Dominican govern-
ment  will be demoralized,” he wrote.316 They  were not. Diplomats continued 
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talks for a naval station in Samaná as the United States sent warships to Port- 
au- Prince on the pretext of private debt collection.317
In this tempest, Soulouque mounted a second, final, disastrous campaign 
in late winter 1855, opposed by his own troops and the majority of the Haitian 
public. He imprisoned southern peasant activists, and as opposition popped 
up in other towns, he restlessly looked eastward.318 Dominican newspapers 
knew he was trying to occupy restive high- ranking opponents.319 The French 
consul in Haiti, Maxime Raybaud, goaded Soulouque in  favor of unification. 
Raybaud then menaced Dominican officials with the suggestion that forced 
reunification or U.S. occupation was imminent.320 Santana promised a fight 
to the death.321 Capital city journalists furiously refuted Soulouque’s propa-
ganda about solidarity and unification, but they  were much more calm.322 
Soulouque was “pumped up by a  little devil, by sycophants, or maybe by liars 
who wanted to see his downfall,” Dominican paper El Oasis asserted drily.323 
Other than a six- day occupation of one center- island town, Soulouque and 
supporting generals made few gains. Haitian soldiers hated the expedition, 
and they chided the emperor in song, “ça pa zaffair a nous” (it’s not our 
cause).324 Even before a second and final encounter, Dominican journalists 
reported confidently that “perfect tranquility reigns on the borderlands” 
and warned Soulouque he would soon lose power.325
Soulouque’s last foray into Dominican territory did not disrupt Domini-
can domestic strug gles very long, nor did it forestall growing U.S. aggres-
sion. A major uprising challenged him in Les Cayes, and U.S. adventurers 
claimed a small, uninhabited island off the coast for their own guano ex-
ploitation.326 News of filibuster aggression in Nicaragua filled Dominican 
and Haitian headlines.327 Dominican capital city officials, undeterred, never 
relented to  U.S. negotiations, as  U.S. officials demanded more coaling 
concessions. Meanwhile, Santo Domingo residents protested nightly in the 
capital at the  house of U.S. agents. Cries of “Down with the Yankees!” could 
be heard on the streets. The U.S. flag had to be raised out of reach of  those 
throwing rotten eggs. The Dominican capital was in disorder.328
Revolution brewed. By the summer of 1856, papers lamented that Santana 
was exiling  people “by the thousands” and executing  others without trial.329 
He made a spectacle of having the condemned dig their own graves.330 One 
poet ventriloquized Santana: “Blood, always seeking blood! . . .  Men hate 
me: I hate them!”331 Other authorities, including the archbishop, threw their 
support to his rival.332 Spanish consul Antonio María Segovia allowed Báez 
supporters to register as Spanish citizens in order to claim po liti cal asylum. 
In a popu lar rhyme, an anonymous person celebrated:
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I’m not scared of Santana
Or the Alfau  brothers
Just of Segovia
’Cause I’m matriculated.333
Critics lamented their impotence to quell the disorder as Santana lost his 
grip. The country was “lost to disorder and anarchy, plagued by hypocrites 
and demagogues,” one writer argued, gravely, and he observed that common 
 people  were suffering the most of all from the unrelenting disorder.334 The 
economic crisis continued unabated, as inflation brought nearly 80  percent 
devaluation each year on average, from 1847 to 1855.335 A priest lamented, 
“Whoever . . .  looks at the history of our country . . .  will cry over its 
disasters.”336 Santana hurriedly retired to his ranch, ending a term he had 
originally claimed would last another ten years.  After a brief interlude, Báez 
again ascended to the presidency. He, too, filled the Senate with his sup-
porters, ordered his rivals’ arrest and exile, and called for multiple printings 
of millions of pesos.  Eng land, France, and Spain refused the new exchange 
rates. Adopting the voice of a foreign lender, an anonymous Dominican au-
thor penned a poem called “Another Pirate”:
My till is my trea sure
My God is interest
My happiness is when I calculate
Five  percent each month.337
Dutch creditors  were so unpopular that one was nearly murdered on the 
street in the capital, just steps from the British consul’s door.338 Baez’s print-
ing of paper money had left the exchange rate at 4750 pesos to one dollar.339 
Particularly for tobacco merchants of the Cibao valley and northern coast, 
inflation made prices intolerable.340
In the summer of 1857, merchants and liberals of Santiago de los Caballe-
ros and surrounding towns of the Cibao valley threw their lot into revolution. 
“revolution! conspiracy!” screamed El Eco’s headlines in the capital.341 
Delegates drafted a constitution in Moca, calling for an end to the death 
penalty, extensive civil liberties, more government control of the army, term 
limits, and other reforms. They named a provisional president, to serve in a 
new capital, Santiago.342 The leaders could not easily mobilize local cultiva-
tors, who favored Báez’s paper money policies. Cibao’s agriculture- intense 
valley had less of a tradition of military mobilizations, anyway, even if local 
peasants had been supportive.343 Only one man could mobilize a familiar 
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and loyal following, and, so, the Cibaeño leaders called on Santana to com-
mand a siege of the capital. France and Britain docked warships in the har-
bor, and Spain clamored to do the same. The British consul in the capital and 
the vice consul in Puerto Plata openly supported the rebels.344 The Moniteur 
Haïtien published a letter from the besieged capital that read, “We do not 
know when this war  will end, nor what the result  will be; . . .  The picture of 
every thing is so sad, my pen cannot paint it. Dominicans are divided among 
themselves. The dead! The injured!” Famine and pillage  were coming, the 
writer warned.345  After months of desperate standoff, Báez capitulated and 
fled the country. A “bloody strug gle divides us,” he inveighed.346 The Cibae-
ños lost, too, however. Santana easily wrangled power back from them, re-
placing the reform constitution with a familiar, draconian one.347
Unrest and the Eve of Annexation
Patience for the constant foreign intrigue wore thin. “Fulano [that guy] (and 
 there are lots of  those guys)  today is involved in French politics, tomorrow 
he’s En glish, and the next day you have a Rus sian,” a writer complained.348 
Furious editorials railed against the Spanish matriculation scheme. One au-
thor commented acerbically, “Where are fraternity, equality, and liberal laws . . .  
where one must craft a document of limpieza de sangre?”349 Nearly eight hundred 
in the capital had taken Spanish citizenship, opponents claimed. Supporters 
dismissed opponents as “Boyerists.”350 “It has been a long thirteen years . . .  
[and] if  people are demoralized, it is not by the matriculation, but  because of 
the country’s failures,” another writer countered.351 Writers tired of escapist 
Europhilic sentiment amid the disorder and chaos. In an editorial entitled 
“Spirit of the Times,” an author condemned the frivolities of his small read-
ership for their “damned craze . . .  to do every thing by steam and in accor-
dance with the fashions of overseas.” He warned them, “Well, if by some 
misfortune the course of  things  doesn’t change, and becomes more laugh-
able, then  we’ll just also have to live by steam, so that we can leave this treach-
erous world as fast as pos si ble and go enjoy all the good stuff of the next in 
the sky.”352 A poet mocked Santo Domingo elite citizens who pretended to 
Eu ro pean birth, similarly:
Upon seeing my friend Lola
With a fancy black skirt and a fan
I asked her, ¿are you Spanish?
And the manola answered me
Yes, me born in Potorico353
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Many residents of the Dominican capital continued to demonstrate their 
opposition to U.S. interests. They detested the U.S. commercial agent, Jona-
than Elliot. For some months, he had been suffering daily harassment; the 
final straw, he reported, was a young man menacing his wife at her parents’ 
home. Before the end of the year, he wrote hurriedly to request a passport 
to leave with his  family and servants, “by first opportunity that offers.”354 
Capital residents continued to protest, however. In the summer of 1858, 
a U.S. commander condemned “nightly mobs” issuing “abuse and threats” 
about their “inimical feelings against the Agent and the flag of the United 
States.”355 He demanded a twenty- one- gun salute for the “public abuse” before 
leaving. The next year, a U.S. outfit tried to seize an island off the coast for 
guano exploitation, the second to have done so in as many years. The  matter 
caused a massive uproar in the press.356 Across the island, Jane Cazneau de-
scribed constant unrest in Puerto Plata. She blamed annexation rumors on 
town residents of color.357
Despite popu lar opposition to colonization and protectorate plans, San-
tana’s inner circle pushed forward. Columnists continued to support the 
idea of colonists for cash- crop products, and Dominican officials reached a 
migration agreement in Paris in April 1857.358 When mi grants arrived in Sa-
maná that fall, the Dominican government sent some shipments of food, as 
promised.359 The attempts  were disastrous. Illness killed many of the new ar-
rivals, and French authorities advised the remaining colonists that it would 
be wise to forfeit the proj ect.360 An even more ambitious coterie neverthe-
less dreamed of larger transformations. Santana’s vice president, General 
Antonio Abad Alfau, and his  brother, General Felipe Alfau, lobbied for both 
a protectorate and an indenture revolution si mul ta neously. The Alfaus and 
their supporters wanted contract laborers from India and China.361 They 
wrote enthusiastically about the hundreds of Canary Islanders and Span-
iards who arrived from Venezuela, fleeing social unrest.362 The Spanish con-
sul added his approval, noting that they had begun setting up plantations 
near the capital.363 In a secret meeting with Cuban authorities in 1860, Anto-
nio Abad Alfau argued that Dominicans loved Spain— especially the “most 
notable”— and suggested that Santana was considering declaring annexa-
tion unilaterally. Santana’s machinations for Spanish annexation  were an 
open secret.364
Conditions continued to deteriorate. Santana soon printed 10 million more 
pesos; the public refused to accept them. British, French, and Spanish warships 
all threatened military action.365 Santana responded by printing millions 
more.366 His officials rushed to sign long- term mining, wood, and guano 
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concessions with French companies in exchange for up- front payments.367 
A flood of po liti cal exiles arrived in Haiti, Curaçao, Saint Thomas, and 
Venezuela as censorship and repression continued. Some men cited their 
Spanish matriculation to avoid military ser vice, long  after the  whole affair 
had ended;  others deserted to British ships.368 Santana used his army to pur-
sue Báez supporters in Azua.369 In an 1860 debate, participants made veiled 
judgments about Santana through a debate about Julius Caesar. “Some 
say the  great crime of Caesar was to have killed the Republic,” one partici-
pant observed, testily. “A fairly specious paradox. Can a cadaver be assassi-
nated?”370 “The life of a tyrant is never long,” a poet warned. In front of San-
tana, a liberal priest gave a defiant sermon, threatening, “The  people always 
begin with a murmur, and end by toppling their tyrants.”371 December 1860 
began with an attempt on Santana’s life.372
Libertad, Igualdad . . .  
At the close of the 1850s, echoes of the 1843 mobilizations rumbled across 
the  whole island and in rebel networks as far as Venezuela, Saint Thomas, 
and Curaçao. Port- au- Prince burned in 1857, inflation soared, and open re-
bellion began in the north.373 Rebellion spread from Gonaïves as foreigners 
evacuated. A collaborative Dominican and Haitian surge supported the 
anti- Soulouque revolution. “Dominicans recently made a revolution, or 
what they more pompously called a combined movement among the island resi-
dents,” to instate General Fabre Nicholas Geffrard, a hostile Spanish official 
recorded.374 A  career officer, Geffrard had participated in Soulouque’s 1856 
campaign. Among his Dominican supporters in the center- island area and 
in exile, all was obviously forgiven. Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, himself a 
veteran of 1844 Separation strug gles, allied with Geffrard to overthrow Sou-
louque. Rumors abounded about Emperor Soulouque’s assassination, and 
in January 1859, he departed for Jamaica as Boyer and Rivière had done.375
Geffrard’s republicanism electrified the public. Citizenship language was 
everywhere. The Moniteur promised that the revolution would “regenerate 
the country and make it retake its place among the  peoples who are friends 
of civilization,” reestablishing liberal institutions immediately.376 Lawmakers 
took to wearing special hats to emphasize that civilian rule would replace 
military power at last.377 Town politicians praised Geffrard’s demo cratic 
commitments. “We promise to bury ourselves beneath the ruins of the country before 
living in slavery.— We furthermore promise to obey nothing but the empire of law and 
never to the despotic  will of any individual,” one group of citizens effused.378 The 
new president offered immediate conciliatory gestures to the east. He con-
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demned his pre de ces sor’s aggressions in ringing terms. Quickly, his minis-
ters drafted a five- year treaty. All the while, po liti cal refugees fled Santana’s 
repression. Often their first stop was Port- de- Paix or Cap, both easy to reach 
on the northern coast. Occasionally, they continued on to the Haitian capi-
tal to seek audience with high po liti cal officials.379 By 1860, Sánchez was in 
exile in Saint Thomas but organ izing opposition to Santana. He and other 
activists had Geffrard’s frank support.380 Geffrard praised the rebels publicly 
and urged that they sought “fraternity and conciliation.” He also warned 
that many  were discussing annexation rumors, raising the alarm as far as 
Curaçao.381
Anti- Santana figures, military authorities, their families, and allies mobi-
lized, meanwhile, in the center of the island. They celebrated the new demo-
cratic regime in the west and opposed mounting rumors about annexation 
in the east.382 News that center- island residents and  these po liti cal figures 
wanted “indivisibility of territory” quickly reached the Dominican capital, 
and the border percolated with “unusual intensity.”383 Authorities mandated 
that all communication between the two nations cease. Already that spring, 
Dominican officials tried to restrict the travel of any foreigner who had 
been in the west, a mea sure that irritated the foreign consuls.384 Gen-
eral Valentín Alcantara, a Dominican officer who had switched to serve 
the Haitian army ten years earlier, found a new “denaturalized” ally: Do-
mingo Ramírez y Parmantier.385 In a manifesto with a handwritten Spanish 
heading of the Haitian motto, “Libertad- Igualdad,” Ramírez addressed his 
compatriots:
Our efforts have as their goal
1.  To remove ourselves from the ferocity of Santana, whose bloody 
character  pardons neither  women nor  children.
2.  To extricate ourselves from the shocking misery in which his igno-
rant administration has submerged us.
3.  To return to their destiny an infinite number of noble Dominicans 
kept in cruel ostracism by his tyranny.
4.  To break the chains of the  great mass of our co- citizens, shackled 
by that despot.
5.  To impede Santana, whose relationships with foreigners, enemies 
of our race, threaten to alienate our territory from us and compro-
mise our liberty and po liti cal existence.
6.  To unite ourselves  under one sole flag, so that the country can be 
indivisible and strong through the fusion of all of us.
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 These goals, as you see, are not just laudable; rather, they are the funda-
ment of our common prosperity— the fate of our  family— the guarantee 
of a  future for our  children!
Co- citizens, you have nothing to fear!386
Santana himself rounded up loyal men to crush the movement.
Santo Domingo’s officials refused to acknowledge the rebels’ po liti cal 
goals. They dismissed the rebels as “ambitious men,” “robbers,” or “traitors,” 
and they demanded that the Haitian government provide restitution for the 
 whole affair. To foreign consuls, the Dominican foreign minister insisted 
that a total ban in communication with Haiti would prevent further disor-
der.387 He claimed a “general mobilization in all of the Republic” had crushed 
Ramírez’s “totally infamous and criminal treason,” and that “the Dominican 
soldier . . .  was always ready to fight the Common  enemy,” a willful misun-
derstanding of Ramírez’s own identity.388 Another minister admitted, uneasily, 
that the movement was Dominican.389 Puerto Plata’s residents warned each 
other that slavery was to be reestablished.390 Capital city officials responded 
to the growing unrest only by declaring that spreading slavery rumors was a 
capital crime.391 The common  enemy was not very clear at all.
At eight in the morning on 18 March 1861, a small group of Dominican offi-
cials lowered the national flag from government buildings in Santo Domingo 
as a few hundred observers, mostly Spanish, watched. “Españolismo lives,” ef-
fused a Spanish diplomat.1 Although the republic had been separated from 
Spain for nearly forty years, Pedro Santana insisted that the annexation was 
voluntary. The Spanish official with whom the Dominican president had 
been most closely in communication—an activist governor of Cuba, Cap-
tain General Francisco Serrano— emphasized his agreement and support. 
Only  after the ceremony did both officials send word to the governor of 
Puerto Rico and to Queen Isabel II and her ministers in Spain. Annexation 
was a fait accompli. Preparations had been the talk of Havana for months. 
“This proj ect is discussed publicly in cafés, paseos, in  every  house; . . .  no 
one doubts its quick and total completion,” a Havana resident remarked. He 
was unreservedly ambitious, bragging, “Spain should not limit her aims to 
the Dominican Republic; it needs the  whole island, and the Haitian Repub-
lic  will be invaded before long.” He urged Spain to be inspired by its recent 
victory in northwestern Africa  toward more wars of conquest. “The deplor-
able po liti cal situation of the United States,” where southern secession had 
already begun, offered a par tic u lar opportunity for other powers. The man 
predicted more Spanish expansion imminently, boasting, “soon it  will be 
Mexico’s turn.”2
Santana and his ministers had a fair amount in common with supporters 
of French intervention in Mexico, which unfolded almost si mul ta neously. 
Both  were a small, mainly conservative elite who  were tired of po liti cal 
t wo
Soon It  Will Be Mexico’s Turn
CA RIB BEAN EMPIRE AND DOMINICAN ANNEXATION
60 | chapter 2
fighting, wary of the populace, and  eager for outside military resources to 
secure order. They hoped a foreign monarch would centralize the po liti-
cal administration, defeat opponents, and offer strong defense to external 
threats. They shared ready economic extroversion, but also strong local po-
liti cal commitments.3 They  were nationalists  after a fashion, believing that 
po liti cal order,  under a foreign monarch, might create more local merito-
cratic government appointments than successive fractious administrations.4 
The strategy of asking for a protectorate in exchange for limited territorial 
concessions was nothing unusual, of course; it was an emergency recourse 
for embattled leaders throughout the hemi sphere. The exaggerated po liti-
cal chaos of the Gulf, however— where U.S. power was entering rapidly— 
made both annexation proj ects real.5 Their ease with monarchism was 
nothing uncommon,  either. From Haiti to Brazil, it was a common state- 
making strategy of the moment, one that was challenged by republicanism 
but had ample liberal language of its own.6  After succession  battles in the 
1830s, Queen Isabel II herself initially represented a symbol of the victory 
over absolutism in Spain, where moderate liberals enjoyed electoral power.7 
Observers, meanwhile,  were surprised but hardly shocked about  either an-
nexation, which occurred with the United States deeply preoccupied. Most 
predicted the Spanish would move into Haiti, too.8
This chapter details how Spanish officials, working with Santana and his 
allies, came to incorporate Santo Domingo as a  free- soil Spanish province. 
For more than fifty years, Spain’s remaining overseas possessions— Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines— had been in  legal limbo, outside of 
constitutional rule. Centralized, militarized government ruled the islands 
instead, and “special laws” to reincorporate them never materialized, fore-
stalled both by po liti cal divides on the peninsula and by the question of 
slavery.9 Cuba’s governor, a power ful Spanish authority, believed Dominican 
incorporation might precipitate liberal reforms throughout the empire. 
Vari ous Spanish politicians and writers, meanwhile, toyed with unstable dis-
courses about federation, sometimes racial, sometimes moral, sometimes 
po liti cal, sometimes all of  these. They intermingled fraternal and racist mis-
sives  toward Santo Domingo, always with added aspersion for Haiti. “Blacks 
are in Haiti and not in Santo Domingo,” a Madrid journalist insisted.10 Do-
minican elites indulged and reciprocated them. Beyond  these inconsistent 
narratives of inclusion, real pragmatism drove Spanish officials in the Ca-
rib bean. They envisioned a territory that could forestall U.S. advances and 
host new proj ects of  labor indenture, already dawning in sites around the 
Atlantic.
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Antillean Geopolitics and Spanish Empire, 1840–1861
By the mid- nineteenth  century, both the newly in de pen dent states of Span-
ish Amer i ca and Spain had definitively emerged from the wake of the wars 
of in de pen dence. The American republics  were increasingly integrated in 
global markets, and their administrations grew.11 In Spain, General Leopoldo 
O’Donnell led the moderate Liberal Union Party, which won a majority in the 
Cortes and presided over a period of po liti cal peace. Si mul ta neously, penin-
sular liberals fi nally succeeded in centralizing colonial administration,  after 
years of debate. In 1851, legislators created the General Overseas Director-
ate (Dirección General de Ultramar), which  later gained full ministry status 
as the Overseas Ministry (Ministerio de Ultramar).12 Cuba’s captain general 
post was a power ful and impor tant one; multiple Spanish generals solidified 
their po liti cal  careers in Havana to return to top positions in Spain. Cuba 
was Spain’s most impor tant possession and the economic heart of Spanish 
empire.
An unsteady diplomatic rapprochement between Spain and its former 
colonies grew across the Atlantic, fueled by a transforming imperial climate 
in Latin Amer i ca and the Ca rib bean. As direct investment, loans, and mili-
tary intervention increased, politicians of the new republics responded col-
lectively to strengthening outside threats in a manner that sometimes drew 
them, at least discursively, closer to Spain.13 As the U.S. presence in the re-
gion grew stronger, Central American liberal elites called on racial solidar-
ity in murky but insistent terms. They extolled raza hispana’s putative racial 
inclusion (although, crucially, not qua equality but rather via miscegena-
tion) and as a loose aggregate of cultural attributes through which to insist 
on difference from a potential aggressor, “the Yankee race.”14 Participating 
republics invited Spain to the 1847 Lima Congress that pondered defensive 
federation, and Spain fi nally signed treaties of recognition and peace with 
a number of the new nations.15 Journalists of El Museo de Ambas Américas and 
La Revista Española de Ambos Mundos sought to tighten Atlantic relations.16 
Spanish politicians embraced the miscegenation tropes, invoking them as 
a “white legend” for their colonial endeavors.17 Privately, Spanish diplomats 
 were often derisive about the new states, mocking their civil strife. The po-
liti cal opponents in Venezuela  were “more atrocious than savage tribes,” the 
Spanish consul in Santo Domingo reported derisively.18 In public, however, 
Spanish commentators waxed poetic about the fraternal possibilities. “Yes, 
we have lost our rich colonies in Amer i ca, but  there are still millions of men 
that  ought to be our natu ral allies, given that they are united with us by the 
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intimate and solid ties of religion, custom, language, and civil legislation,” 
the consul argued, concluding, “Spanish politics should impede at all costs 
that the raza ibero- americana be absorbed by the raza yankee.”19
Near Spain’s Ca rib bean possessions,  U.S. expansion was growing both 
incrementally and through dramatic aggression. Many islands bought food-
stuffs from the United States, and U.S.- bound exports also increased. By mid-
century, U.S. markets consumed two- thirds of Puerto Rico’s sugar.20 The 1850 
Clayton- Bulwer treaty, which negotiated canal rights through Nicaragua, 
seemed to signify the peaceful consolidation of joint U.S.- British commer-
cial hegemony in the Gulf region. Britain avariciously consumed cotton 
from the  U.S. South, its financiers supported railroad proj ects expanding 
westward, and many eagerly predicted growing U.S. influence, even even-
tual control, over its nearby neighbors.21 Massive watershed events, like the 
War of  U.S. Intervention (the “Mexican- American War”) and filibustering 
in Nicaragua, posed dramatic military threats. Even po liti cal overtures bore 
aggressive and meddlesome undertones. Presidents Polk and Pierce tried to 
buy Cuba, and some northern politicians supported the plans, despite the 
complications that expansion posed.22 Pro- slavery advocates gleefully cal-
culated that new slave states could be carved out of the acquisition, despite 
Spanish officials’ defiant reply that they would “rather see the island sink.”23 
Outright extralegal expeditions plagued Cuban authorities during the 1850s. 
The filibuster efforts of Narciso López— whose third invasion attempt ended 
in defeat in November 1851— enjoyed minority support among some Cuban 
elites. Disappointed supporters attacked the Spanish consulate in New Or-
leans when he was captured and executed. Faced with commercial and mili-
tary aggression, the Spanish Crown was outraged. “Anglo- Americans easily 
put down roots wherever they manage to get a foothold,” a Spanish diplomat 
complained.24 “Two rival races are fighting for the new world,” Madrid’s La 
América agreed.25
Massive domestic in equality on the islands— the contests of plantation 
slavery— made Spanish officials all the more paranoid about retaining con-
trol. The conspiracies they feared reflected the ubiquity of the resentment 
they  imagined, their unwillingness to afford agency to domestic re sis tance, 
and their preoccupation with what they  imagined to be race imperialism. Au-
thorities warned colonial whites that “race war” would result from domestic or 
international conflict; they  imagined “machinations . . .  of destroying the 
white race” at  every turn.26 Authorities feared that individuals  were plotting 
in Curaçao, Jamaica, Saint Thomas, Trinidad, Venezuela, and elsewhere to 
join Haiti in an unnamed “Machiavellian abolitionist plan” or in de pen dence 
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conspiracy.27 Years  later, the Spanish minister from Washington reported 
that  free and enslaved blacks of vari ous socie ties from New Orleans (includ-
ing some Dominican émigrés), New York, and Philadelphia and “ those who 
had been expelled to Mexico”  were planning a “simultaneous strike” on 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, also aided by the British government.28  Others wrote 
credulous reports of Haitian emperor Faustin Soulouque receiving aid from 
Africa and Britain, organ izing thousands and thousands of troops for an as-
sault on Cuba.29 Ca rib bean officials petitioned constantly to increase Cuba’s 
and Puerto Rico’s military defenses. A “certain tone of anguish” character-
ized their repeated letters to Directorate officials in Madrid.30 In response 
to a number of real and perceived threats, Puerto Rican and Cuban officials 
pleaded for more troops and argued that the islands’ defenses  were woefully 
insufficient. Undisciplined troops, lack of supplies, poor infrastructure, 
meager funding, and a lack of ships usually topped the complaint list. Their 
refrain— a “permanent complaint,” in the words of one historian— rarely 
met with satisfactory response from the metropole.31 In response to filibus-
ter threats, Cuban officials relied on secret agents in a number of U.S. cities 
for counterintelligence. Governor Juan de la Pezuela re- formed the militia of 
color in the island, disbanded since 1844.32 Power concentrated in the office 
of the captain general, and conservatism reigned.33
 These same Ca rib bean authorities lent a sympathetic ear to Domini-
can petitions. Peninsular Spanish officials had virtually ignored Santo Do-
mingo in its last days as a colony, sending paltry funds just twice between 
1809 and  1821. Their attitude reflected, in the words of Luís Álvarez, “the 
politics of manifest indifference.”34 Authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
however, periodically considered reannexation, sending exploratory mis-
sions without directives from Madrid. In the de cade  after Santo Domingo 
joined Haiti in in de pen dence, an official traveled from Cuba several times, 
taking a small del e ga tion to Port- au- Prince to discuss the possibility of the 
devolution.35 Haitian officials must have greeted the entreaty exceedingly 
coolly, but the envoy leader hoped for “further friendly negotiations” in the 
 future.36 The Puerto Rican captain general sent along a letter of approval 
with a Dominican annexation petition to Madrid in 1847, and the next gov-
ernor, General Juan Prim, also wrote to Madrid to suggest that annexation 
would be a strategically sound policy.37 Madrid officials  were slower to be 
convinced. Spain had virtually no commercial interests in Haiti or the Do-
minican Republic, and peninsular authorities generally viewed protection 
requests with a mixture of distaste and disinterest. Too many international 
complications— and  little material gain— would arise from annexation, they 
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concluded. In response, Dominican envoys appealed directly to Ca rib bean 
officials, making entreaties in Cuba from 1843 through 1845, to Puerto Rico 
in 1845, again to Puerto Rico in 1846, and so on. So many of  these island- to- 
island missions  were conducted that the queen passed a royal order insisting 
that the Ca rib bean officials consult with the peninsula before they took any 
actions whatsoever.38
 After the massive U.S. expansion of the late 1840s, however, peninsular 
authorities began to direct their attention more acutely to growing U.S. in-
terests on Hispaniola. The northern Dominican coast— Puerto Plata and 
Samaná Bay in particular— was a likely center of filibuster organ izing. The 
Puerto Rican governor sent an alarmist report in 1852 that a massive filibus-
ter immigration scheme to Hispaniola was underfoot.39 A coded royal order 
authorized the governor of Cuba to work with Báez and the governor of 
Puerto Rico to disembark Spanish troops in the republic should it be nec-
essary. Spain would have to take  great precautions in mounting a military 
response, the report cautioned. If they seemed like an invading force, the 
“emancipated  peoples from both sides of the island, fearing the reestablish-
ment of slavery, would rise up against the government itself and call on the 
Haitian Empire, thus establishing race war,” the author fretted.40 “Rare is 
the boat that enters [Curaçao] that  doesn’t bring adventurers of all nations 
seeking passage to Haiti or Santo Domingo,” another informer reported.41 
Spanish authorities named a secret agent to keep an eye on the republic, 
commissioned major reports on the state of the island, and ordered further 
news to be sent regularly to Washington, DC, and Cuba.42 Spanish officials 
sent home reports that filibusters planned to take Haiti as well and sug-
gested it would be done easily.43 The rumors  were inchoate: that the French 
might help reunification (this one was plausible), that reunification would 
make the island into a “refuge” to thousands of U.S. filibusters (this one 
was far less likely), and that Haiti would mount some sort of filibuster cam-
paign of its own (this one tapped old fears of  imagined Haitian imperial-
ism).44 Officials worried that the Haitian government itself was “making 
 great sacrifices” to attract Dominican émigrés and other “adventurers of all 
nations” for unspecified anticolonial ends.45 With just three hundred men 
and propaganda, Haitian agents could “revolutionize the island of Cuba,” 
authorities fretted.46
With U.S. treaty attempts in 1854, Spanish authorities considered the U.S. 
threat even more concrete. The U.S. diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo had 
impeccable filibuster credentials, and they  were dedicated and aggressive. 
Jane Storm Cazneau reached Santo Domingo in 1853  after more than a de-
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cade of pro- slavery and pro- expansion advocacy, as well as tours and boost-
erism in Texas, Mexico, and Cuba. She wrote for the United States Magazine and 
Demo cratic Review, the New York Sun, and a number of other periodicals  under 
a pen name.47 She knew infamous filibusters Narciso López and William 
Walker personally and used her connections with Secretary of State William 
Marcy to secure her husband’s position as special diplomatic envoy to the 
Dominican Republic.48 The British and French consuls conspired to oppose 
Cazneau’s 1854 treaty proposal; even though it collapsed, Spanish authorities 
sprang into action. Spanish secret agents to the Dominican Republic began 
to report directly to Cuba as well as Madrid, and Cuban and Puerto Rican of-
ficials chose diplomatic staff for Santo Domingo at long last.49 Spain’s first 
commercial agent, Eduardo San Just, arrived in Santo Domingo in 1854. Re-
cent events had only “awoken the Spanish spirit and lively enthusiasm of the 
inhabitants to repel all the hordes of adventurers from the North who invade 
this privileged soil,” San Just rhapsodized confidently; he added, “The North 
American question is totally dead for now.”50 Still, concern over the United 
States’ pending treaty (and the alleged concession of the Samaná peninsula) 
spurred Spain into signing a treaty of recognition in 1855. The treaty authors 
remonstrated that the territory— the “favored jewel of Columbus”— must 
be “kept in the command of the raza that  today populates them, never 
passing, in  whole or in part, to the hands of foreign razas.”51
Spain fi nally recognized the republic in 1855 and sent diplomatic staff to 
both parts of the island, without recognizing Haiti. For all its coercive fra-
ternal language, Spanish diplomacy was totally brusque and tactless. The 
Spanish consul in Santo Domingo intervened so aggressively to disrupt on-
going negotiations with the United States that even the British consul, him-
self only recently opposed, expressed chagrin. Privately, San Just permitted 
even more hostility. He wondered if Santana’s administration could “even 
be called a government” and claimed he was surrounded by “blacks from 
Seybo, half- naked.” The “Dominican government, if you can even call it that, is 
totally demoralized,” he reported, with some satisfaction.52 He was so rude 
to Dominican officials that they registered a complaint with the Spanish sec-
retary of state.53 The newly named emissary to Haiti, Manuel Cruzat, was 
far worse. Besides being involved in British intrigue that supported Haitian 
reannexation of the Dominican Republic— “even though I blush to admit it,” 
he managed— his approach was generally blundering and malicious.54 Seek-
ing an audience with the emperor, Cruzat instead sent his secretary, who 
“barely [spoke] French, and not a word of Creole,” and who subsequently 
refused to take off his hat in Soulouque’s palace when ordered to do so by a 
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functionary.55 Cruzat demanded reparations by Haiti’s foreign minister for 
what allegedly happened next: the emperor himself appeared in the win dow, 
Cruzat claimed, and allegedly insulted the secretary, “What a person, that 
fucking white man  doesn’t want to salute my palace!”56 “Haitians hate the 
entire white race,” Cruzat complained.57 The Spanish secretary of state, 
irritated—he had explic itly told Cruzat to take pains to avoid incident, given 
the sensitivity of relations between the slave power and Haiti— instead rec-
ommended Cruzat’s decommission.58
The first Spanish consul, Antonio Maria Segovia, reached Dominican 
soil in late 1855, marking a new escalation of Spanish intervention. Fear-
ing that po liti cal divisions in Santo Domingo would inevitably invite  U.S. 
intervention, Segovia proposed a protectorate scheme in which military 
and foreign policy  matters would be  under Spanish control.59 A protectorate 
was a fairly typical po liti cal construction, one that Spanish contemporaries 
praised. Just a few years  later, proponents compared Mexican protectorate 
plans favorably with Britain’s protectorate in Greece and Belgium. Forfei-
ture of sovereignty might actually “secure . . .  in de pen dence” by bringing 
po liti cal order and preventing  U.S. aggression, Spanish writers argued.60 
Felipe Fernández de Castro, the same official who had made missions from 
Cuba to regain Santo Domingo from Haiti in the 1820s and 1830s, penned 
“Proyecto de pacificación de los Estados Hispanoamericanos” from London 
in 1857, with the idea of a Hispano- American confederation. He was heartily 
in support of Dominican annexation, arguing that forfeiture might combat 
ambitious opportunists within the country and also help reduce poverty.61 
Segovia’s proposal in Santo Domingo gained no traction, but his matricula-
tion of Dominicans as Spanish citizens did. El Oasis, a capital city paper that 
was fiercely critical of sitting president Santana, ran advertisements for the 
matriculation throughout the spring and summer of 1856. The consul dis-
missed all opposition in the capital as mere “calumny.”62
Through the late 1850s, a number of incidents rattled Spanish nerves 
about U.S. intent and collaboration on Hispaniola. Diplomatic ties brought a 
more regular flow of information to both neighboring islands. In the spring 
of 1859, the newly arrived Cuban governor, Francisco Serrano, warned other 
authorities that a thirty- five- person expedition of U.S. filibusters had ar-
rived in Haiti with their eyes trained on Cuba, and the Haitian navy seized 
a Spanish ship suspected of trafficking slaves.63 News followed that another 
handful of Cuban exiles arrived in Port- au- Prince the following month.64 
Serrano, meanwhile, was listening attentively to pro- annexation advocates. 
Mariano Álvarez, the new Spanish consul in the Dominican Republic and an 
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advocate of annexation, submitted an extensive report that piqued Serrano’s 
interest; the two officials corresponded throughout the year. “ There is no 
country in which nature offers more resources, nor where inhabitants are in 
a worse state,” Álvarez proclaimed.65 Álvarez saw tremendous prospects for 
trade and regional strategic advantage, extolling the virtues of Samaná Bay 
as a fueling station and suggesting that agriculture and the  cattle trade— 
particularly with the plantations of Cuba— could be easily stimulated.66 
Lumber and fine woods (especially mahogany), coal, cotton, tobacco, sugar, 
coffee, cacao, and mineral resources might all follow, he argued. A hand-
ful of wealthy Dominicans, Canary islanders, and Venezuelan émigrés  were 
already planning “large plantations of coffee, sugarcane, and other seeds” 
on the riverbanks near the capital, he continued.67 He estimated that an-
nexation could be realized with just two thousand troops and a number of 
civil servants.68 Other reports echoed his.69 For the moment, however, the 
Crown remained impervious. “We consider all in de pen dent republics our best 
friends,” it demurred to one such entreaty in 1859, “so I  will limit myself to 
wishing that your republic might prosper.”70
Mythmaking of a Faithful Populace
As negotiations between the Cuban governor and Dominican officials es-
calated in 1860, Santana and his ministers offered a streamlined, two- part 
annexation argument: the threat of Haiti and fidelity to Spain. Serious re-
visionism was necessary. In previous de cades, Dominican annexationists 
had been wildly omnivorous in their petitions. Dominican foreign minister 
Manuel Joaquín Del Monte was as ready to sign away sovereignty to a French 
protectorate in 1843 as he was to support Spanish annexation in 1861, for 
example.71 In the interim, the French consul reported, quite reasonably, that 
Santana was “a man of a very French heart.”72 An annexationist minority in 
the Cibao valley steadily preferred the United States, but they  were simply 
too distant from the southern machinations.73 U.S. speculators  were close to 
impor tant officials in the capital, too. Lobbying with her husband, Jane Caz-
neau bribed officials regularly. The Cazneau  house was “always so full of of-
ficers that he seems almost a member of the Government,” one journalist observed.74 
Despite professions of fidelity, Santana was not particularly close with the 
Catholic Church,  either. He kept its lands, seized during unification, to dis-
tribute to his allies, and he battled with the archbishop. The new interim 
archbishop, Fernando Arturo de Meriño, hated annexation and Santana 
equally.75 Nor was  there anything like an imminent threat from the west. 
Years  after Soulouque’s resounding defeat, Geffrard had sought a treaty 
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for peace and trade between the two states the very moment he  rose to the 
presidency, roundly critiqued the policy of his pre de ces sor, and redoubled 
his dedication to domestic reforms.76 Dominican reporters knew this, and 
they had long since turned their attentions to domestic po liti cal instability 
and pressing economic concerns. “Haiti is not thinking of invading the Do-
minican Republic, nor any similarly exaggerated idea,” the Spanish consul 
in Haiti confirmed.77
Both Santana’s allies and local Spanish officials  were invested in new nar-
ratives. As his presidency was collapsing, again, in 1860, Santana’s petitions 
sounded desperately urgent. Haiti was “an oppressor who made it its task to 
destroy [Santo Domingo],” he insisted.78 The new Spanish consul, Mariano Ál-
varez, was an indefatigable ally, colluding closely with both Santana and his 
vice president, Antonio Abad Alfau. As Alfau’s  brother, also a high- ranking 
general, traveled to Madrid to lobby for guns and material support, the an-
nexationist coterie focused their attention on the Cuban governor, escalat-
ing a letter- writing campaign that lasted all year. In a secret meeting with 
Cuban authorities, Alfau suggested that Santana was considering declaring 
the annexation unilaterally.79 Meanwhile, Consul Álvarez produced a mas-
sive report. Like other Spanish officials in Cuba and Madrid, he emphasized 
annexation as a means to forestall U.S. aggression, an argument that was 
almost totally absent from Dominican elites’ petitions. He readily accepted a 
general paradigm of race war, however. His report described the whiteness 
of Dominicans (“eight- tenths” and “all Catholic,” he specified, except for 
“one miserable Methodist church for the black Americans”) alongside the 
strategic value of the territory itself.80 “Two  enemy races covet this precious 
Antille,” he maintained.81
On the question of Dominican fidelity to Spain, extensive rewriting was 
necessary. Álvarez and Alfau discussed the history of the country at some 
length. Together, they rewrote the previous forty years, arguing for an ever- 
faithful populace who remembered Spain’s “paternal affection” fondly. Both 
of them insisted that the country’s unique in de pen dence pro cess demon-
strated Dominican faithfulness to Spain. The 1821 “Brief In de pen dence” (in 
which a junta in the capital simply declared Santo Domingo to be part of 
Gran Colombia, several months before the 1822–44 unification with Haiti) 
had been the work of an “ambitious and traitorous” few, both argued. Unlike 
other young republics that had broken violently with Spain, the Dominican 
Republic had, “on the contrary, been the model of fidelity and love to the 
afflicted Metropole,” Álvarez told the Cuban governor.82 If the 1821 in de-
pen dence, which lasted two months, was treason or a fluke, neither man 
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could easily account for unification with Haiti, which lasted peacefully for 
twenty- two years.  There was no space for the Unification period in annexa-
tion history, so both men ignored it. The Spanish consul jumped ahead to 
an entirely fanciful account of 1844 separation from Haiti, alleging that Do-
minicans hoped “it was an opening for the return of Spanish sovereignty 
that they had so desired.”83 Forty years  after in de pen dence, many expressed 
“constant desire to tighten relations,” he asserted.84 Alfau added a hint of 
elitism to  these claims, praising the “most notable of the population” for 
their Spanishness.85 Álvarez continued to write letters to the governor and to 
meet with Cuban officials through the end of 1860 and the beginning of 1861, 
capitalizing on short visits of Cuban ships.86
To cement support for annexation, Governor Serrano commissioned 
another report from a high- ranking officer in Havana, who submitted a 
hyperbolic tale of Dominican Spanishness, with ample racist marginalia.87 
Brigadier Antonio Peláez y Campomanes began the memoir with (what he 
considered to be) praise, reporting, “ There are sons of Spain  here who pre-
serve our customs with purity.”88 Even as Peláez tried to emphasize what he 
perceived to be laudable aspects of Dominican society (i.e., loyalty, whites, 
anti- Haitianism), he could not contain explicit antiblack venom. The report 
continued with the traditional narrative of the republic’s 1821 separation— but 
Peláez embellished his version to make José Núñez de Cáceres, the principal 
author of Brief In de pen dence, not just an ambitious traitor but a “miserable 
black.” He assured Governor Serrano that the population was “half white” 
and insisted that they  were “noble, hospitable, proud of being Spanish.” 
Segovia’s  mistake in allowing some Dominicans to matriculate as Spanish 
citizens in 1856 was not the policy itself, Peláez argued, but having allowed 
black Dominican men to register for Spanish citizenship.
Seasoned in Cuba, Brigadier Peláez indulged extensively in tropes and fan-
tasies of black submission. The idea of Dominican loyalty played easily into 
elite loyalist fantasies in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the idea that affective bonds 
of “Spanishness” could override and sublimate massive social inequalities. 
Although Dominicans  were overwhelmingly  free  people of color, the officer 
rushed to emphasize that  these Dominicans shared deep and visceral affin-
ity for Spain. “I have heard el derly  people [of color] recall, on the brink of 
tears, the happiness and tranquility that they enjoyed with Spain,” he rhap-
sodized.89 He in ven ted a servile “poor, black man,” who carefully saved a 
Spanish coat of arms through all the years of Haitian rule. “Valiant, doc-
ile, and submissive, they recognize in whites more capacity and knowledge 
for leadership and only aspire not to be repressed,” he fantasized. “Despite 
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twenty- two years of unification with Haiti, the pardos and morenos of Santo 
Domingo preserve the language and customs of their former masters,” he 
continued, as though black Dominicans  were recently arrived from Africa.90 
He insisted, too, on a common “hatred” for Haiti.91 Pleased with the briga-
dier’s report, Governor Serrano charged Peláez with leading the forces into 
the newly recolonized territory.92
One last figure remained for reinvention: Santana himself. Santana, 
the same head of state who had been “far too horrible, even for ridicule” and 
surrounded by “blacks from Seybo, half- naked,” according to the former 
Spanish consul, became a capable collaborator.93 Consul Álvarez cast him as 
a pliant partner who listened to Spanish advice; he was an “astute and wise 
campesino,” he remarked with satisfaction.94 Santana was “the guarantee of 
security for the country” in a critical situation, the consul concluded, and 
other authorities agreed.95 A subsequent report in Madrid summarized San-
tana’s arguments, calling the risk of Haitian and U.S. incursion “more criti-
cal each day.” Although not ignorant of Santana’s claims to military heroism 
and amenable to his narratives about the “constant threat” of Haiti,  these of-
ficials made their security priorities clear. The “more formidable  enemy . . .  
appearing as a disarmed friend” was the United States, the official assessed: 
“[U.S.] success, sooner or  later, cannot be fought . . .  even if all the Domini-
cans are Spanish at heart.”96
Santana’s annexation address of 18  March  1861 cemented narratives of 
sanguine fidelity. “Our national glories are inherited from the  grand and 
noble lineage to which we owe our origin,” he began. He continued, “Nu-
merous, spontaneous, and popu lar missives have arrived in my hands; . . .  
 today you hope that what your loyalty has always desired might come to pass. 
Religion, language, beliefs, and customs, all we preserve with purity . . .  ; 
and the nation to which we are so tied  today opens her arms as a loving 
 mother who gathers up her son, lost in the tempest in which his  brothers 
have perished.” The entire weight of annexation now lay on Núñez de Cáce-
res’s shoulders alone. “Only the ambition and resentment of one man sepa-
rated us from the  mother country,” Santana announced. Before becoming 
enveloped in civil war like “ those other disgraced republics . . .  [Spain]  will 
give us the civil liberty that her pueblos enjoy [and]  will guarantee us natu-
ral liberty,” he argued. All laws of the former republic  were to be respected. 
In the new state of peace, “She  will protect us . . .  making one  people, one 
united  family, as we always  were . . .  raising the flag next to the cross that 
Columbus dug in  these unknown lands,” he concluded. “Long Live the 
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Queen! Long Live Liberty! Long Live Religion! Long Live the Dominican 
 People! Long Live the Spanish Nation!”97
Annexation in the Shadow of Slavery
By the 1850s, the idea of po liti cal federation, including protectorates, circu-
lated throughout the Spanish empire. The Cuban elites’ dissatisfaction with 
exclusion from power had drawn a significant minority into support of U.S. 
annexation in the previous de cade. One plan from 1851 proposed local au-
tonomy  under a reduced Spanish authority in response.98 One Puerto Rican 
author called for a partial decolonization of sorts, an evolution of Ca rib bean 
holdings into a loose moral Spanish federation; authorities prevented his 
work from circulating on the island.99 Federation was a common plan on the 
peninsula as well. Contemporaries proposed renewing po liti cal federation 
between Spain and Portugal, constructing binational infrastructure and 
education.100 Liberal commentators, in support of Dominican annexation, 
pointed out that Cuba and Puerto Rico’s lack of integration into the Spanish 
constitution was a “most dangerous in equality.”101 When General Serrano 
reached Cuba in 1859, he married the  daughter of a rich Cuban  family, re-
vived the idea of white Cuban repre sen ta tion in Madrid, and hinted that his 
own executive post might at long last be curtailed.102 The Cuban governor 
hoped that Dominican annexation would be the first step in a more cen-
tralized  legal regime and a transformation of the Ca rib bean empire from 
“ simple colonies that produce benefits, more or less,” to a resurgent, united 
Overseas Spain.103 Spain would make Ca rib bean residents feel “truly Span-
ish,” on the path to “total assimilation . . .  slowly and gradually procured,” 
Serrano urged. He had “profound conviction” that the humiliation caused 
by  legal differences prevented pro gress.104 With a stronger moral and cul-
tural foothold, Spain could move beyond the three largest Antilles to extend 
its influence to “the bosom of Mexico” and beyond.105
Proponents of Dominican annexation vacillated between narratives of 
inclusion and exclusion in the same work, even in the same sentence. Mari-
ano Torrente’s Política ultramarina (Overseas Politics, 1854) argued hard for 
Dominican annexation to preserve Spanish familial ties in the Ca rib bean, 
even as the author viciously condemned emancipation and distanced him-
self from Dominicans themselves.106 A longtime official in Cuba, Torrente dis-
missed the British and French islands as failures and was bald in his antiblack 
racism and support for imperial aggression in Africa. “In  every emancipa-
tion system,  there are the same evils, the same vices, and inevitable ruin,” 
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he spat.107 He unequivocally condemned Dominican subsistence  labor and 
cast doubt on individuals’ capacity to transcend it. He warned that the ma-
jority of Dominicans— “who are all of color,” he interjected— demonstrated 
“the laziness typical of proletarians,  because one cannot obligate them to work.” 
He mystified material scarcity in the territory, complaining, “They prefer to 
go around in rags, eat nothing more than sugar and plantains, which are 
obtained with very  little  labor.”108  After reviewing at some length the chang-
ing dynamics of power and commerce with the United States and Britain, 
Torrente clearly supported annexation of the Dominican Republic, even as 
he periodically claimed neutrality.109 Just three hundred men would be nec-
essary if the government  were to want to take Santo Domingo as a protector-
ate, he urged, dismissing the idea of international opposition. “Our rights 
over that country are undeniable,” he wrote. “No nation could justly allege 
that it had the right to intervene in what can be called purely a  family ques-
tion.”110 Quickly, his language shifted from familial meta phors to possessive 
ones. “Anglo- Americans . . .  cannot detain us in any way, “ he persisted, “as 
it is only a  matter of the legitimate owner of an errant or lost resource com-
ing back to collect it in light of his indisputable right to do so.”111
Torrente reconciled Dominican annexation with the imminent end of 
the slave trade and new controls of  free  people of color. “The slave trade 
debate . . .  has taken . . .  the direction of speculation and politics,” he 
began, in his report for Dominican annexation. The trade had already effec-
tively ceased, with some exceptions, to Puerto Rico. More than a thousand 
enslaved Africans and Afro– Puerto Ricans  were sold from Puerto Rico to 
Cuba in the late 1840s. “An island with only 50,000 slaves . . .  will not fall 
apart,” the governor announced. He did not tolerate open abolitionist dis-
course on the island, but he felt fairly confident about the island’s potential 
course. “ There are enough  free workers  here to replace them,” he wrote, “I 
hope the exodus continues.”112 An expanding coffee economy raised prices 
on the coast and drove rural Puerto Ricans to formerly uninhabited interior 
lands. Their participation in coffee cultivation slowly tied them into systems 
of credit that bound them more to the coast and the colonial state.113 Author-
ities and planters used vagrancy decrees, meanwhile, to push  others onto 
export- oriented farms. Workers  were supposed to carry a passbook (libreta) 
that established their occupation, listed their debts, and attested to their 
conduct.114 Spanish authorities and planters in Cuba also sought to control 
 free Cubans of color, whose numbers doubled from 1846 to 1861.115 East 
Asian contract laborers first arrived in Cuba in 1847; nearly 125,000 arrived in 
the next two de cades.116 Torrente’s proposal for Santo Domingo, similarly, 
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was indentured African and Asian immigration, to be supervised by Spanish 
settlers. The indentured workers could “cover the most urgent cultivation 
needs,” while the abolitionists “could calm down and be sure their wishes 
had been fully realized,” he wrote.117 White colonists would oversee every-
thing, and would  settle as a “bronze wall” against Haiti and U.S. filibusters. 
“The greatest degree of prosperity would soon result,” he urged.118
Six years  after Torrente’s report, Governor Serrano placed heavy empha-
sis on Dominican consent as annexation began precipitously. A royal order 
from December 1860 authorized Serrano to take what ever mea sures nec-
essary to protect the Dominican Republic from foreign invasion. Despite 
condemnations of annexation from Madrid, the governor felt the order gave 
him ample leeway to proceed.119 Another military del e ga tion brought back 
reports of annexation’s “voluntary” nature  after discussions with Santana’s 
officials.120 Meanwhile, Santana wrote to Governor Serrano announcing 
that he planned to effect the turnover to Spain no  later than February 1861; 
 later, one of his ministers pushed the date to March.121 At Serrano’s direc-
tive, Santana’s officials solicited signatures of approval in a number of towns 
throughout the territory. Thirty- three towns and two military posts remitted 
signatures, totaling about 4,000 signatures out of the republic’s population 
of about 200,000, or about 2  percent of the country’s citizens.122 A total of 
636 men signed in the capital. By contrast, only 140 did so in Santiago de los 
Caballeros. The majority of the proclamations, twenty- two out of the thirty- 
five,  were straightforward ac know ledg ments of reincorporation with  little 
 else added; they amounted to a pro forma ac know ledg ment of Santana’s 
coup. Just seven of the thirty- five statements mentioned Haiti— allegedly 
Santana’s primary reason to seek Spain’s protection— whereas  others fo-
cused on agriculture, po liti cal peace, and  legal reform.123 Significantly for 
annexation’s  future, two towns, distant from each other— Barahona and La 
Vega— reminded the Crown of their promise to leave the republic’s laws in-
tact, mentioning explic itly the continued abolition of slavery.
In Puerto Rico, the governor acted altogether startled by the news, which 
was sent not by the Cuban governor but preemptively in the form of a let-
ter hand delivered by a Dominican official.124 Santana “has told me the de-
tails . . .  and asked for forces and money,” Rafael Echagüe noted. But, he 
continued, distinctly irritated, “As the Governor of Cuba has been the au-
thority elected by Her Majesty to deal with General Santana relative to this 
delicate negotiation, as the circumstances [of the  matter] have been com-
pletely strange . . .  , and as I have received no communication, neither from 
the Government of Her Majesty nor from the indicated Governor, not even 
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in case an eventuality of this sort might pres ent itself, . . .  I cannot adopt 
any resolution whatsoever.”125 He declined to send aid to Santana but re-
solved to write the Cuban governor immediately.
Although news had not yet reached Madrid  either, the annexation proj ect 
was quickly expanding. From Santo Domingo, Mariano Álvarez wrote to the 
Ministry of State immediately, and Serrano did so as well. The Cuban gov-
ernor’s 26 March letter to Spain emphasized security; Spanish troops must 
move in immediately in order to solidify authority, he argued. He urged 
metropole officials, “Now that we are involved,  isn’t our honor at stake?”126 
In the summer of 1861, he sailed to Santo Domingo himself to confront first-
hand the po liti cal realities of the newly annexed territory. In fact, Serrano and 
his Havana- based officials threw themselves immediately into the details of 
the annexation. All Spanish officials involved in the initial annexation and 
occupation accepted  these basic premises that Dominican envoys had laid 
out: that the laws of the republic be respected, that the rampant and almost 
worthless paper money be amortized, and that slavery remain absolutely 
abolished. The task at hand was to reconcile  these stipulations— particularly 
the slavery clause— with Spanish overseas law, and to do so quickly. In June 
1861, Governor Serrano named José Malo de Molina, an auxiliary (suplente) of 
Havana’s municipal government, as a special commissioner charged to sub-
mit a report on the government and social or ga ni za tion of the extinguished 
republic; he finished less than a month  later and presented it to the governor 
in Havana in September.127 Malo de Molina averred that he had gathered data 
as best he could given the constraints of time and the immensity of the task. 
“If the subject  were not so urgent, perhaps I would tear up  these smudged 
pages,” he wrote.128
Both Malo de Molina and Governor Serrano pondered the issue of legis-
lative reform for the new colony. As the Madrid newspaper Crónica de Ambos 
Mundos asked, “If it is true that the same special laws that govern Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and the Philippine Islands [ will apply]— that is, dictatorial ones— how 
 will Spain respond to the votes and wishes of the residents, who, according 
to the letter of general santana, want to adopt the liberties of the Spanish  people 
as their own?”129 “It is beyond doubt that the Dominicans are anxious to estab-
lish Spanish legislation as soon as pos si ble: but which legislation should this 
be?” Malo de Molina asked.130 Another writer suggested that Havana be the 
capital of a three- island federative government.131 Havana’s elite would have 
supported such a plan. In anticipation—or at least desire—of more legisla-
tive power in the empire, Cuban authorities had gone so far as to name four 
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potential senators to Madrid in the event that their repre sen ta tion might be 
recognized.132
None of the federative options answered the question of  legal freedom 
in Santo Domingo. “ There is no doubt that the princi pal desire of  those in-
habitants is to be equal to the Peninsula, not just  because they solicited 
it at the time of incorporation, but also  because it would be positive and 
infallible proof that slavery would not be reestablished, as some suspect, 
and as the Haitians have tried to convince the  people of color and  others 
who are discontented [with annexation],” Malo de Molina wrote.133 Serrano 
concurred that Cuba’s code would not do,
with the supposition that the race of color has limited civil rights, and ab-
solutely no po liti cal ones, . . .  applied to a country where pardos and even 
pure morenos have occupied and occupy high posts in administration and 
the military, and in which the every thing for every one of liberal governments 
has been known  here for so long. . . .  Is it feasible to establish, for ex-
ample, a personal legislation that allows the sentence of flogging for one 
race, the law that excludes all participation in public office, and all their 
ramifications, in a country whose social dictionary has erased the word 
servitude, and in which  there is a perfect and absolute leveling among its 
inhabitants, no  matter what their origin?134
“The Majesty’s wish is that . . .  the province be ruled by the same laws as the 
other overseas dominions, especially by  those of Cuba,” Serrano wrote, but 
he warned the sovereign that “if such a  thing  were to happen, it would be to 
introduce an ele ment of distrust, motivating malcontents . . .  to make false 
interpretations.” The “most essential difference” between the island and its 
colonial neighbors lay in its social norms; the “same strong and numerous 
race . . .  kept in constant domination” by the laws of Cuba was “interlaced 
with the white in Santo Domingo, making it impossible, or at least not with-
out  great difficulty, to mark the dividing line that law and custom maintain 
in Cuba and Puerto Rico,” Serrano argued.135
Despite royal edicts from May 1861 to the contrary, therefore, both Gov-
ernor Serrano and Commissioner Malo de Molina concluded that metro-
politan law should rule in the newly annexed territory. Peninsular law would 
suit the territory just fine, Malo de Molina insisted, advising Serrano to 
disregard earlier recommendations he had made to the contrary. Without 
slavery and a “diversity of castes,” the issue would not arise, he asserted.136 
Serrano was equally optimistic, even pointed, in his recommendation for 
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metropolitan law. “I see the annexation of Santo Domingo as a providen-
tial event that pres ents Spain with the necessity of thinking of the means to 
resolve for itself the grave question that is  today being aired in the United 
States of Amer i ca, and whose solution must have a very direct influence on 
the destiny of Cuba,” he wrote.137 The application of the civil code of Spain 
in Santo Domingo, “already published so that it may be practically studied, 
 will be perhaps opportune,” Serrano argued. “I do not think  there would 
be a big prob lem with testing them. . . .  Few times has such an opportune 
situation emerged for a test of this kind: Santo Domingo is a totally virgin 
populace in this aspect.”138 “Sooner or  later the laws with no po liti cal char-
acter have to be made extensive to [Cuba and Puerto Rico],” he continued. 
Colonial reforms already made Cuban law so similar to metropolitan law, he 
asserted, that “just one step would produce perfect equality.”139 Certainly, 
 there existed “incon ve niences” in Cuban and Puerto Rican society, he ad-
mitted (with wild understatement); testing the law in  free territory would 
be the perfect first step to reforms in all of Spain’s Ca rib bean islands.140 The 
mood among the Cuban officials was euphoric.141
The First Jewel in the Spanish Crown: The Debate in Madrid
Noble and humanitarian work! How much blood and money the overseas 
possessions have cost Spain! How many sacrifices Spain makes even  today 
in the deadly islands of Africa! How much did the continent of Amer i ca cost 
her, and how liberal and giving has Spain been! How much has Spain been a 
true  mother to  those who gather at her lap in the shadow of her glorious flag!
— francisco serrano
For several de cades, Spanish imperial policy had grown more ambitious by 
increments. In 1844, Spain reclaimed the west- central African island of Fer-
nando Po (Bioko) from the British. A handful of unsuccessful settler proj ects 
to the island— including a small group of illegally transported African men, 
 women, and  children (emancipados) who sought to leave Cuba— followed 
shortly thereafter.142 Members of the O’Donnell administration  were ready, 
even  eager, to launch joint imperial military expeditions. Spanish troops 
fought alongside French forces in Cocinchina (Nam tiến) beginning in 1858. 
They  were involved in the joint expeditionary force that arrived in Mexico in 
1862 as well, although the expeditionary leader protested  after Napoleon III’s 
plans to instate the Austrian archduke became clear. Spain was unilaterally 
aggressive as well. The so- called War of Africa (1859–60), a one- year conflict 
with Morocco over the borders of the North African Spanish towns of  Melilla 
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and Ceuta, enjoyed wild popularity in Spain. Other confrontations stopped 
short of conquest; Spanish warships aggressively demanded reparations for 
their merchants or for other perceived slights in Port- au- Prince, Monrovia, 
and other ports.143  After Dominican annexation, similar conflicts over recla-
mations escalated to the seizure of the Chincha Islands as putative payment, 
bringing outright conflict with both Peru and Chile.
In April 1861, however, when news of Dominican annexation first reached 
Spain, official reception was initially tepid. Despite repeated entreaties from 
Dominican officials, both members of the Unión Liberal government and 
the queen herself had explic itly rejected the idea of annexation in late 1860, 
the latter suggesting a one- year moratorium on consideration of the  matter 
 until November 1861.144 In fact, the queen denied Governor Serrano’s request 
to send more troops to fortify the island, although the news reached Havana 
 after Cuban boats had already sailed.145 Prime Minister Leopoldo O’Donnell 
also had Ca rib bean government experience: he served as governor of Cuba 
from October 1843 to February 1848, during the height of the repression 
of antislavery mobilization. He had resolved near the end of his tenure in 
Havana that Spain should avoid even the smallest reforms, “even  those that 
appear insignificant.” “Alarming concessions have been obtained by  simple 
reforms [that have been] exploited in ways that  were not foreseen,” he in-
sisted; rather than open up any win dow for such dangerous reforms, Spain 
 ought merely to send its “most capable and active governors.”146 Any sort 
of social disorder would yield “the triumph of the colored castes, but if the 
evil is certain and the danger possibly imminent, the remedy is easy and 
known[;] it is enough to conserve the status quo with the most scrupulous 
mea sures,” he insisted.147 O’Donnell had opposed Dominican annexation 
entreaties since the 1840s, arguing that Spain should merely cultivate good 
sentiment in the republic, while “avoiding compromises of any kind.”148
Madrid’s vibrant newspaper sphere reflected only tepid interest in repeated 
Dominican entreaties throughout 1860. The progressive and demo cratic 
press did not even consider that annexation was a possibility and discounted 
it entirely.149 When news arrived of Santana’s and Serrano’s actions, a num-
ber of journalists expressed literal disbelief at the event, insisting instead 
that the Cuban governor must have been merely protecting Spanish soldiers 
in the area.150 Journalists voiced serious doubts about the strategic wisdom 
of the proj ect. The moderate newspaper El Contemporáneo noted, “The news 
that we have about the origin and unfolding of such an impor tant event is so 
scarce . . .  we do not know the role of the Spanish government, nor has any 
information at all been gathered that guarantees us the una nim i ty of the 
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movement.”151 Moderate La Época published a number of condemnations, 
fretting that relations with other Latin American republics would become 
“impossible” if they, too,  were to fear any such usurpation of sovereignty.152 
The government should take necessary “precautions and guarantees to 
make clear that the annexation is not an act of ambition by Spain,” another 
writer opined.153 The moderate paper La España suggested that some sort 
of a confederation would be a cheaper, more optimal option for Spain, a 
position it continued to hold for months, even  after the debate had been 
resolved by the queen.154 Fi nally, writers at El Clamor Público worried about 
the cost of such a proj ect and reminded their readers that Spain needed de-
velopment of its own. An author argued that Spain  ought to direct all its 
resources to internal development “before thinking of extending its territory 
with acquisitions of dubious utility.” Spain’s own industry was “meager and 
backward,” the author argued, and domestic infrastructure should be the 
primary focus.155 Nearly two- thirds of Spain needed colonization of its own, 
another concluded.156
Journalists cast pointed skepticism on Santana’s motives and demanded 
more proof of una nim i ty on the part of the Dominican  people. The issue 
of popu lar consent was key. The Dominican leader was being pragmatic, 
not sentimental or nationalist, and he had acted  because he had “no other 
means of salvation,” they argued.157 La Época warned that the move might 
have stemmed from party intrigue.158 A number of periodicals, then, sug-
gested that a plebiscite  ought to be effected before Spain accept the annexa-
tion as  legal. Not surprisingly, vocally skeptic La Época urged O’Donnell’s 
government not to take “any definite steps in the question of annexation, 
nor even protectorate, . . .  until the sentiments and needs of the island are 
perfectly clear.”159 The Correspondiente de España optimistically assured its 
readers that a plebiscite would  settle the  matter, writing, “In no way  will 
Spain reject the annexation, when they have the conviction that it is the re-
sult of a general and spontaneous vote of the  people and their legitimate 
authorities.”160 It must have seemed, of course, that no such mea sure was 
forthcoming. Demo cratic La Discusión complained scathingly, “ There is an 
extremely impor tant difference between president Santana cheating the 
liberty and in de pen dence of a  people for his advantage and the Dominican 
 people themselves asking for annexation.”161 Even  after the queen made 
an official decree recognizing annexation on 19 May, La Discusión persisted 
in demanding approbation by universal suffrage. “That way  future complica-
tions would be avoided,” the editorial insisted.162 As the fact of the queen’s 
approval sank in, such complaints fell on deafer ears.
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As the fact of annexation set in, Spanish papers became pragmatic, echo-
ing the uncertainty of Cuban officials about the legislative status of the new 
colony. The progressive press, clearly unacquainted with Santana’s strong- 
arm po liti cal style, wondered aloud if annexation would curtail po liti cal lib-
erties in the former republic. They hoped instead that the annexation might 
foster more self- government and repre sen ta tion in the region, perhaps even 
repre sen ta tion in the Cortes. Colonial reform was absolutely on the agenda. 
La Discusión urged that the former republic be admitted with all the same 
rights as a Spanish province and observed, “If this requires us to be more 
liberal with Cuba and Puerto Rico, let’s be so, the time has come.”163 Las 
Novedades concurred, arguing that annexation marked a “propitious occa-
sion” in order to make metropolitan rights more general in the Ca rib be an.164 
The moderate press, however, toed a more conservative line. Authors  were 
very much opposed to po liti cal reforms, citing not only the pre ce dent of 
past in de pen dent movements but also the authors’ own investment in the 
plantation economies of Cuba and Puerto Rico.165 More po liti cal rights to 
Cuba and Puerto Rico “would reduce them to the miserable state in which 
the Mexican state finds itself  today,” editorials argued. Rather, Spain should 
just send its best and brightest legislators, La España concluded, echoing 
O’Donnell’s own proclamations from the Ca rib bean more than a de cade 
before.166 As for Santo Domingo, moderate papers urged that a protector-
ate status  ought to be conferred instead. Any liberal tendencies would thus 
be detained on the island, and slavery, a “social necessity,” would meet far 
fewer  legal complications.
As 1861 progressed, the Spanish press nevertheless soon stirred from 
its relative ambivalence on the Santo Domingo question to proffer increas-
ingly enthusiastic support. Narratives began to depict the territory as an 
untapped resource: Santo Domingo was a “magnificent portion of the New 
World” whose generosity, nobility, and patriotism “overshadowed Spanish 
ministers’ recalcitrance.”167 Its natu ral resources and strategic Samaná Bay 
would render it not only an impor tant Spanish stronghold against grow-
ing U.S. interests but also a potentially profitable one, Madrid newspapers 
argued. Many cited the annexation as an act of mercy  toward a threatened 
state destined to be swallowed by Haitian or— “worse for us, though not 
for the Dominicans”— Yankee imperialism.168 Not to accept the annexation 
offer would be to invite U.S. incursion and imperil Cuba.169 El Contemporáneo 
now found the annexation to be a “necessity” and urged “Columbus’s is-
land should not be abandoned again by Spain.”170 Despite their misgivings 
in April, the bulk of the press became largely supportive of the apparently 
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“spontaneous” nature of the event.171 Revisionism came full circle in an ar-
ticle by La América, which argued that not to accept Dominican annexation in 
fact would be a violation of liberal princi ples:
The novelty of the annexation, was neither as unexpected nor as unfore-
seen as some think. . . .  It is very strange that the liberal theories that 
predominate  today in educated nations are not being applied to the Do-
minicans’ resolution. . . .  It is clear that the Dominicans are fully within 
their rights to rid themselves of their sovereignty. . . .  Spain would be 
unjustified in the eyes of humanity, if it  were to ignore the cry for help 
from a  people in whose veins the same blood runs, whose religion and 
language are the same as ours, and who is nothing more, in effect, than a 
ramification of our own  family.172
Echoing Félix de Bona’s aspirations of cultural confederation, the papers 
brimmed with optimism about the possibilities of the remarkable pre ce dent.
In quick succession, the “African War” in Morocco and Dominican an-
nexation caused something of nationalist fervor to be whipped up over the 
prospect of new imperial gains for Spain.173 Florid elegies of Spain’s past 
achievements and the language of heroism and civilization permeated the 
national press. The “drunkenness of a war in Africa [and] a new adventure 
in Mexico on the old and glorious routes of Hernán Cortes” sparked roman-
tic reveries about Santo Domingo, the “Land of Columbus,” as well.174 Dis-
courses about  these exploits, of course, lent themselves to exaggeration and 
fancy; historian Francisco Febres- Cordero Carrillo argues that their “rhe-
toric of action” was intended principally to “anesthetize the  middle class, who 
lacked the means of effective po liti cal participation.”175 Nonetheless, bor-
rowing from the British lexicon of empire, one newspaper reported thusly 
on the new annexation of Santo Domingo: “The event could not be more 
felicitous, and we congratulate the Queen of Spain, the Nation, and the 
Ministry. . . .  In just over a year, the Monarchy in which [once] the sun never 
set, dismembered by revolution, has considerably broadened its limits in Af-
rica and Amer i ca.”176 Politicians envisioned nothing less than an adjustment 
in the balance of power in the hemi sphere.
A number of Cubans— creole and Spanish born— offered to serve in the 
Morocco campaign, petitioning for passage from Cuba with “the ardent 
desire . . .  to march into  battle for the holy Spanish cause.”177 One specta-
tor from Havana urged the creation of a voluntary battalion of  free men of 
color, a plan that he saw as “eco nom ical” but also in the interests of “the 
aggrandizement of the Spanish name,” particularly “should the war take on 
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another aspect  after Tetuán’s occupation.”178 A pamphlet from Barcelona— 
which would  later circulate in newly annexed Santo Domingo— proclaimed, 
“The Africa War is one of the most glorious pages in the history of the Spanish 
nation in the pres ent  century. Every thing is  great and memorable: the jus-
tice of our cause, the enthusiasm of all the classes of the country, the valor 
and suffering of our soldiers, the intelligence and bravery that guide them 
to victory, which is the triumph of the Christian Civilization over Islamism 
and barbarity.”179 The Times says Haiti  will soon be annexed, we say “let it be 
so,” La Época proclaimed. “With all of la Española, discovered by Isabel I and 
recuperated by Isabel II, the strength of the Spanish in the Antilles is un-
matched.”180 Dominican elites praised the Morocco campaign, too. Rhap-
sodized the official Spanish paper in Santo Domingo, “ Every Spanish bullet 
carried an idea.”181
On 19 May 1861— a  little more than two months  after Pedro Santana pro-
claimed annexation and ordered a 101- cannon salute to the Spanish flag in 
Santo Domingo— the Spanish Ministry of State officially approved the mea-
sure.182 “Her Majesty’s Government could not ever be indifferent to the fate 
of the Spanish part of Santo Domingo,” the decree read. “To abandon her to 
foreign intrigue, expose her to the invasions of an  enemy race, would have 
been a very grave po liti cal error, and a total forgetting of honor and even hu-
manity.”183 Assured that the act was “spontaneous,” “unan i mous,” “in perfect 
harmony with the sentiments of all of the population,” and even “against the 
 will” of its closest collaborator, Francisco Serrano, the Crown promised to act 
“for the growth and prosperity of its overseas provinces, benefiting from the 
benefits of peace and institutions in harmony with modern civilization.”184 
“Señor Santana” (who was in fact acting governor from the outset) should 
announce the news to all the authorities and influential  people of Santo Do-
mingo, the report concluded. When the Spanish Parliament convened  after 
a six- month recess in November, the queen reiterated the same now- familiar 
arguments: that annexation was spontaneous, that a glorious role awaited 
Spain in the former republic and the rest of the Spanish world, that po liti cal 
in de pen dence had wreaked dangers in young republics, and so on.185 Some 
representatives bristled at the fact that annexation had been declared in 
their absence, but news of the event had already been circulating in Cuban 
and Puerto Rican newspapers for months. Thus, one of the “first Jewels in the 
Spanish Crown” was officially incorporated by a vote of 200 to 80.186
On the issue of legislating the new colony, a royal decree announced a 
compromise: the criminal and commercial codes of Spain would provisionally 
rule, but the civil code was to continue to be governed by laws from the 
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former republic, admitting custom and traditional practice.187 Of slavery, 
the Crown wrote that it was “one disastrous  thing of many that afflicts socie-
ties, but a necessary one in some regions. It  will not be extinguished in Cuba 
nor in Puerto Rico, but neither  will it be established in Santo Domingo nor 
consented to in any form. Santo Domingo finds itself between two Spanish 
provinces governed by special laws as per the Constitution of the Monar-
chy.”188 Some modifications might be necessary, the proclamation admit-
ted, but it insisted that the constitutional distinctions would remain firm. 
In Santo Domingo, Pedro Santana’s response, passed along to the Ministro 
de Guerra y Ultramar together with Governor Serrano’s and Malo de Mo-
lina’s reports, seemed to presage a peaceful transition to this new admin-
istration.189 The “too- embarrassing case” of Dominican legislation being 
written in a “strange language” necessarily called for its replacement by 
Spanish law, he agreed.190 So, too, did the glowing missive of the newly 
named regent of the Real Audiencia, Eduardo Alonso Colmenares, laud the 
changes in government at  great length; he announced that the legislative 
body would take up the Supreme Court cases of the “extinguished republic” 
right away.191
Félix de Bona, president of the  Free Society of Po liti cal Economy in Ma-
drid, rushed to publish a text that announced a new era in race- based federa-
tion. Believing the annexation to be voluntary, he called the reincorporation 
“of extraordinary importance . . .  the only example in history . . .  [with] 
immea sur able transcendence” and with the potential to spark “a moral 
confederation . . .  of the Spanish race on both continents.”192 He proposed a 
convention of Spanish American nations, where Spain could have “a pacific 
and conciliatory influence, an honorary presidency, and without threatening 
in the least the autonomy of each State . . .  an economic  union” that would 
in turn foment “the strength of the raza.”193 “Races, like nations and indi-
viduals, have an instinct for their self- preservation,” de Bona argued, and 
would gain both freedom and strength through confederation.194 “Races, 
like nations and individuals, benefit from the right to live and exercise their 
industry,” he continued.195 This utopic fraternity was not based on imperial 
dominance, de Bona claimed; “it does not suit us to enlarge our dominions 
in Amer i ca,  because it does not suit us to dominate anywhere,” he insisted.196 
He continued, “We  don’t have the strength to dominate, and even if we did, 
it would be insanity to spend it on an unproductive and hateful domina-
tion.”197 Spain would be a guarantor of justice and security, beginning in 
Santo Domingo.
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International Reception of Dominican Annexation
By February 1861, Haiti’s government paper, Le Moniteur Haïtien, began pub-
lishing alarming annexation rumors circulating from neighboring islands.198 
L’Abeille de la Nouvelle- Orléans reported that it seemed Spain had purchased 
Santo Domingo and predicted that Spain would be a “dangerous neighbor.”199 
In the weeks that followed, the Port- au- Prince papers published responses 
from Paris, Liverpool, London, Jamaica, and a number of U.S. cities. The 
Massachusetts legislature passed a resolution unanimously condemning the 
annexation. From Jamaica, the Morning Journal impugned an “unscrupulous” 
Dominican president and decried, “The news presages nothing less than the 
annihilation of the Haitian nationality.”200 Haiti’s Moniteur reprinted critical opin-
ions that predicted French and British opposition, as well as early signs of 
confusion from Madrid papers.201 President Geffrard issued a formal protest 
when news of the annexation definitively arrived; Kingston’s Gleaner repub-
lished Geffrard’s protest in its entirety. “Haiti and Jamaica are the only two 
countries in the world where blacks and their descendants are permitted to 
exercise their rights,” the paper asserted, gravely. Absent other foreign inter-
vention, they urged Geffrard to resist.202
Less than one month  after Dominican annexation was declared— surely 
the news had barely reached  U.S. shores— a Confederate attack on Fort 
Sumter summoned an ever- increasing conflagration. It was in this moment 
of circumstantial opportunity that Dominican annexation slipped onto the 
international stage; Spain hoped it would cause as  little disturbance as pos-
si ble. Given their impossible preoccupation,  U.S. complaints “might as 
well be directed at the sky,” one Madrid newspaper exulted.203 Anyway, the 
annexation fit with the aggressive colonial imagination of the moment. A 
French paper, La Presse, found Spain’s “voluntary” premise a bit disingenu-
ous and predicted some opposition, without summoning much outrage.204 
Observers even speculated that Spain might subsume Haiti  under the Span-
ish flag as well. “It  will now be for Spain to prove the sincerity of its pledges 
and to develop the riches of this noble island,” one British observer wrote, 
blandly.205 Le Siècle concluded that France might have just as much claim to 
the island and supposed Spain “might soon [have] a tour of Mexico!”206
On the ground in Santo Domingo, members of Santana’s government 
marked annexation without a hitch. The French consul was not invited, and 
the Spanish consul awaited instruction. In fact, the act of annexation bore 
Santana’s signature alone; he did not solicit a single consul signature. The 
French consul allowed as how his only instructions had been to prevent 
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cession to the United States, and he predicted immediate recognition from 
Paris.207 Even  U.S. opportunist and sometime commercial agent Joseph 
Fabens considered that the proj ect had “begun well.” He felt his commer-
cial pursuits might even be abetted by the change in flag. He praised the 
idea that they might be inviting in U.S. settlers: “How suggestive  these facts! 
What amazing significance in them! Young Spain, breaking through her 
traditional meshes of intolerance and oppression, at one bold leap . . . !”208 
British consul Martin Hood admitted he was sober, remaining “perfectly 
quiet” in the  matter.209 He was skeptical of popu lar reception of the change 
of flags in the capital, which took place “in complete silence, it was  really a 
melancholic spectacle: men and  women  were crying; no applause or even 
an audible whimper . . .  and no one shot guns,” he claimed.210 He predicted 
the territory’s difficult economic situation was likely to continue and re-
marked with concern that he would continue to verify the status of any resi-
dents of the territory who had escaped from slavery from neighboring Cuba 
and Puerto Rico.211
From Union officials and observers, reception of the annexation was re-
soundingly chilly but ultimately muted. Annexation represented a flagrant 
violation of the Monroe Doctrine and directly opposed U.S. interests in Sa-
maná, authorities observed. New secretary of state William E. Seward took 
office in March 1861 and urged Lincoln to stir from the inaction of President 
Buchanan on the Dominican  matter. He submitted strongly worded memos 
from the president to Spain’s representative in Washington, Gabriel Tas-
sara.212 Nevertheless, President Lincoln explic itly forbade him from issuing a 
direct ultimatum to Spain.  U.S. officials in Madrid did issue protests, but 
no action whatsoever was taken.213 “I say, fix your own  house,” the former 
consul to Santo Domingo reported from New York, smugly.214 A number 
of newspapers— the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times among them— 
expressed disbelief at the events and called for action in defense of the 
Monroe Doctrine.215 James Redpath’s Pine and Palm gathered protests from 
readers and news of opposition elsewhere, protesting that the event was “of 
 great importance not only for American commerce, but for the interests of 
freedom in general, and more particularly, of the races of color in the Amer-
i cas.”216 Despite Seward’s urging and popu lar opposition across the  U.S. 
press, however, the Union was simply too occupied in the secession strug gles 
at hand. Other times, the occupation did not figure into press coverage at all. 
In a largely disparaging article from 1862, the Atlantic Monthly called Spain’s 
exploits in Morocco “a silly affair” and bristled at Spain’s “entitlement” 
 toward its former colonies, even as it assessed that Spain was “now demand-
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ing for their country admission to the list of the  Great Powers of Eu rope.”217 
Although published nearly a year  after annexation, the article, inscrutably, 
did not mention Santo Domingo at all. At least if Spain retook Mexico, the 
territory might be a bulwark against the “lawless spirits of the South . . .  
only one step below the devil,” the author supposed.218
Disgraced Spanish diplomat Manuel Cruzat—he of the Haitian diplo-
macy debacle in 1855— provoked a strong reaction from the British consul 
several weeks  after annexation. Serving as the diplomatic secretary to Rear 
Admiral Rubalcava, who had arrived with military forces from Cuba, Cru-
zat spoke cavalierly to British consul Hood. Spain did intend to reintroduce 
slavery, he remarked casually, and  owners of fugitive slaves from Cuba and 
Puerto Rico escaped to the former republic would have “a perfect right” to 
reclaim them as property.219 Hood was flabbergasted. “If Spanish rule is en-
forced of considering all  children of slaves as the property of their masters, 
 there  will hardly be a single black or coloured person in the country who  will 
be safe from persecution,” he wrote. A flurry of high official communication 
was exchanged, including repeated promises from Spanish prime minister 
O’Donnell himself, and British officials’ fears  were allayed somewhat. “His 
Excellency further said that public feeling in Spain was against the Slave 
Trade,” even if O’Donnell claimed its suppression could not be effected 
“before mea sures for substituting other  labor  were matured,” Lord Russell 
reported.220 As a country “naturally inclined to peace, and systematically 
addicted to commerce,” Britain’s main concern was to avoid foreign con-
flict, Russell averred.221 “The formal and repeated declarations of Marshal 
O’Donnell that  under no circumstances  will slavery be introduced . . .  have 
removed the main cause which would have led hmg to view the proposed 
annexation with dislike and repugnance,” the British consul agreed. Given 
that the other major powers also seemed to be quiescent, and that Britain 
held itself “as a Power naturally inclined to peace, and systematically ad-
dicted to commerce,” the consul concluded that peaceful recognition was 
undoubtedly the best route.222
As weeks passed, general response grew more and more positive. British 
journalists  were sanguine about the prospect for an emancipated Spanish 
Ca rib bean empire. The Quarterly Review, a London journal, outlined a bright 
 future for Spanish government and economy in which imperial proj ects such 
as the annexation of Santo Domingo played an impor tant part. Constitu-
tional government and a growth in national revenue in the 1850s  were ample 
evidence of Spain’s upward trend, the author praised.223 He disapproved of 
Spain’s recent military expeditions into Morocco—an acquisition of territory 
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that the Review judged superfluous to Spain’s economic advancement— but 
was enthusiastic and effusive about the annexation of Santo Domingo.224 
Clearly unfamiliar with the history of the republic, the writer made a number 
of errors in describing its recent history; nonetheless, he concluded that the 
annexation—as Spanish officials insistently claimed— had been a “ free and 
spontaneous act of the President and  people” and as such was “one of the 
most remarkable events of an age full of startling changes and surprises.”225 
The Spanish government has given the most satisfactory pledges that slav-
ery  shall not be reintroduced, he concluded; “indeed, the re introduction 
of slavery . . .  is morally impossible.” This  free  labor experiment reflected 
the growth and optimism of Britain’s ally, the journal argued. “It  will be for 
the Spanish Government now . . .  to develop the riches of this noble land. 
A  great experiment  will soon be in pro gress in the attempt to raise tropi-
cal produce by  free  labour. We believe it  will be a successful one. It must, 
should it so prove, effect an entire revolution in the pres ent colonial econ-
omy of Spain.  There  will no longer be even a pretext for conniving at the 
slave trade, and the gradual extinction of slavery within the Spanish do-
minions  will be assured.”226 Of Spain’s role in the emancipated republics 
of Latin Amer i ca, the author writes, “It is natu ral that Spain should, in her 
renovated strength, turn her thoughts  towards  those vast countries. . . .  
The resumption of her ancient dominion [in Mexico],  after the recent an-
nexation, . . .  may appear to be within her grasp.” He predicted Haiti might 
follow.227
In the face of such limited opposition, it seemed that all was well with 
the new annexation proj ect. Santana and Cuban officials echoed choruses 
about the event’s spontaneity and support. The Gaceta de la Habana reprinted 
 these promises and marveled at annexation’s auspicious nature for Span-
ish empire.228 Congratulations arrived from Spanish authorities in Manila 
by midsummer, praising, too, the voluntary demonstration of fidelity by 
the Dominican  people.229 U.S. influence was at an ebb; only eight U.S. ships 
reached Dominican ports from January to November 1861, and William Caz-
neau wrote to Secretary of State Seward that Spanish officials planned on 
controlling the Mona passage tightly.230 Elsewhere, hemispheric observers 
watched the developments with concern. Peru issued a formal proclamation 
condemning the annexation, and petitioners gathered more than thirty- 
seven hundred signatures in Jamaica.231 President Geffrard of Haiti would 
soon follow with a statement of condemnation. For the moment, however, 
it seemed that a new era in Spanish colonialism—of the “utmost satisfaction 
and glory”— was at hand, beginning in the Ca rib be an.232
As they reached Santo Domingo from Havana, a Spanish naval commander 
took pains to issue a reminder to his troops as they disembarked from the 
steamship:
1.  As slavery does not exist  here, and all citizens are equal in rights, the 
class of color enjoys the same consideration as the white.
2.  As a natu ral consequence of the above: that in the island  there are 
men who are generals, leaders and officials who are colored and 
white; but they must all be given equal re spect and consideration that 
royal  orders and the respective hierarchies afford them.
He admonished his troops to observe “prudent and caring conduct with 
the residents, avoiding disputes, and winning, at all cost, the affections and 
admiration of the Dominicans.” He urged that high officers  were to be ab-
solutely inflexible in inculcating their subordinates with the gravity of this 
responsibility.1
A  simple edict, of course, could do  little to alter the mentality of arriv-
ing Spanish troops, authorities, and would-be colonists disembarking from 
Cuban ships. The  whole proj ect, precipitously realized, was somewhat hap-
hazard. They “embarked, with no  orders, no proclamation, like filibusters 
sneakily united for some awful escapade,” one general wrote, retrospec-
tively. “Neither officer nor soldier knew if that territory was  enemy or friend, 
if they arrived as masters, allies, or conquistadors,” he described, “no rule of 
conduct, no policy warning of any of the contingencies that might immediately 
arise from the sudden interchange of peninsular soldier and that population 
three
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of color.”2 Officials called the territory “the extinguished republic” (extin-
guida república), awkwardly, and authorities even inquired of archivists in Se-
ville as to what the island most appropriately was called: Santo Domingo, 
La Española, or Haiti.3 In the days following annexation several foreigners 
briefly raised flags of their own nations in one small southern town, to the 
consternation of authorities.4 Nevertheless, Spanish high authorities stayed 
on message: rule of law and its equal application  were to reign in the new 
colonial experiment. “Individuals of this race are very sensitive to their treat-
ment by public authorities; Your Excellency should keep this in mind,” the 
Crown reiterated.5 Soldiers  were less guarded, writing home about their 
shock at the spectacle of black troops and the material deprivations of the 
territory.6 Among themselves, ministers  were also less circumspect. “ Under 
the auspices of Spain, in my  humble judgment, the white race is destined to 
occupy this ever- green tropical island, enriching it and animating it with the 
triumphs of science, industry, and art,” the overseas minister predicted.7
Authorities maintained that Dominican annexation presented a new di-
rection in Spanish Ca rib bean rule: a jurisdiction without slavery or legislative 
distinctions of race. Despite a veneer of fraternity, however, Spanish offi-
cials felt that the annexation was an act of charity, a “generous act of the 
 Mother Country”  toward an impoverished and inferior territory.8 That the 
reestablished proj ect was to be a  free- labor “experiment”— and a province— 
complicated Spanish intent further. The newly arrived authorities reveled at 
the prospect of the “inexhaustible riches” from the “virgin land,” but Do-
minican coffers, which had been in a state of more or less permanent eco-
nomic crisis for de cades, offered no immediate help.9 In effect, the Spanish 
sought to jump- start a market economy where  there was almost none and 
to rule with Dominican local officials and Spanish high authorities; their 
endeavor amounted to an early effort at “hegemony on a shoestring.”10 They 
floundered for means to make it profitable, or at least less of a drain on the 
coffers of Cuba, whose authorities sent 150,000 pesos in July 1861 alone.  After 
his brief stay in the capital and several hours in the port of Samaná, the Cuban 
governor ordered a “complete reor ga ni za tion of a tattered [desquiciado] . . .  
administration” and left.11
Forced  labor, transformed once by the Haitian Revolution and by sec-
ond slavery, was on the precipice of another fulcrum, in which expanding 
markets for tropical goods intersected with a sudden crisis in the southern 
United States and new international proj ects of migration and  labor control. 
As secession and warfare decimated U.S. cotton production, industrialists 
schemed for new sites to fill the void.12 Well prior to war time disruption, in 
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fact, cotton’s high prices made Manchester merchants impatient to foment 
production in more territories, an ambition that neatly reinforced imperial 
expansion.13 British joint- stock cotton companies in the Ca rib bean prolifer-
ated overnight, including an Anglo- Spanish com pany in Cuba.14 Haiti’s new 
president, Fabre Nicholas Geffrard, committed to cotton production plans, 
sending officials to conduct a vast survey of potential production sites.15 
The government facilitated credit to private buyers to purchase cotton and 
sugar machinery and offered bounties for production.16 Cotton was highly 
sought  after, could be planted on all types of terrain, could be produced with 
reasonable start-up capital, and would improve the country’s trade balance, 
Geffrard urged.17 High war time prices made cotton bounties unnecessary. 
Haiti’s production soared from less than 700,000 pounds in 1860 to more 
than twice that by 1862, and samples  were displayed at the  Great Exhibition 
in London that year.18 Meanwhile, Manchester cap i tal ists sent cottonseed 
to Trinidad, Tobago, Antigua, British Guiana, Barbados, Dominica, Tortola, 
and a plethora of other semitropical sites.19 Investors and authorities em-
braced a “myth of tropical exuberance,”  eager and confident that they could 
profit in new locations.20
New programs of cash- crop export and  labor control, rather than being 
a departure from slavery,  were eminently legible to Caribbean elites. In 
conjunction with imperial offices across the Atlantic, Ca rib bean officials 
mobilized new programs of indenture. Beginning in the 1820s, more than 
430,000 predominantly young men and  women arrived as contract laborers 
in the British Ca rib bean, more than 76,000 to the French Ca rib bean, and 
more than 125,000 to Cuba.21 They arrived from dif fer ent sites in  Africa, 
only just released from having been kidnapped onto slave ships, and by con-
tract from diff er ent Indian states, China, and Madeira. Britain occasionally 
jealously opposed the importation proj ects of other empires, but programs 
thrived.22 Across the islands, in Brazil, Peru, and elsewhere, the men and 
 women  were bound to an individual employer, faced criminal charges for 
civil offenses (including  labor discipline), and had to  labor for as long as 
ten years to earn return passage.23 Planters intentionally tried to isolate 
the newly arrived into a “cycle of coercion.”24 The very language of  labor 
scarcity was one of division and control, of course, directed as a weapon 
against the in de pen dence of the emancipated. On islands where land was 
available, the formerly enslaved had tenaciously carved out small plots, de-
spite all manner of restrictions.25 Low wages, surveillance, intolerable dis-
cipline, and an aversion to economic dependence, not any sort of absolute 
demographic shortage, had hastened freed  peoples’ exodus and planters’ 
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ire si mul ta neously. On smaller islands with no available land, the balance of 
power tipped hard to planters (or, in the case of Turks and Caicos Islands, 
salt mine  owners).  Here, elites colluded with authorities to try to prevent the 
formerly enslaved from leaving the island at all.26
Even authorities who explic itly promoted cotton as a chance to “acquit” 
 free  labor looked to immigration proj ects and to expand control over rural 
 labor. Haiti’s secretary of state, François Jean- Joseph, concluded that both 
state and private plantations needed foreign agricultural laborers, and he 
proposed immigration bureaus domestically and in the United States.27 
Geffrard invited African Americans to immigrate;  U.S.- based abolitionists 
James Redpath and James Theodore Holly served as formidable allies who 
promoted the plan widely.28 The administration awarded  free passage to 
 those who would  settle on larger plantations as sharecroppers; artisans 
 were to repay travel costs in three months’ time. About two thousand Afri-
can Americans arrived, but the program dwindled  after 1862; the families 
reported poor conditions, unsatisfactory land distribution, and other con-
flicts. As many as a third quickly bought return passage.29 An isolated scheme 
to populate Île- à- Vache quickly collapsed not long  after.30 Disappointed but 
not deterred, Geffrard hoped Haitian peasants would also flock to the cot-
ton industry, out of personal interest and an abstract patriotism. “Rural 
populations, I like to think,  will not remain deaf to  these exhortations,” he 
remarked, “and  will know to enter in a path which, while taking them indi-
vidually to well- being,  will bring the country to an elevated position . . .  , 
through their industriousness and the importance of their production, . . .  
[and  will] make them indispensable.” Authorities urged district generals to 
encourage, without requiring, cotton production, and to submit regular re-
ports.31 Wealthy Haitians approved of  these mea sures and called for sugar 
production, too, and even suggested seeking contract laborers from India.32 
All around the island, an elaborate geography of  labor restrictions, contract 
 labor, and other restraints emerged alongside emancipation and slavery, a 
map that was well known to Ca rib bean residents.33
This chapter details the quotidian details of Spanish reoccupation of 
Dominican territory as they planned to remake the Dominican landscape 
and to reorder the way its residents labored and lived. Authorities intended 
to make Dominicans into “productive” subjects, to formalize and commer-
cialize peasant  labor, and to bring them  under the authority of the colonial 
state. Spanish authorities focused on the investment of new industries and 
public works, and individual cap i tal ists brought them numerous petitions 
for cotton plantations, railroads, and a series of other proj ects, which ranged 
Map 3.1  Map showing emancipation dates, with major proj ects of indenture,  labor 
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from the mundane to the outlandish. One merchant even proposed camel 
transport.34 The Crown supported  these proposals, ordering land surveys 
and abrogating tariffs on the import of machinery. Authorities predicted 
that Dominicans might be willing to grow export crops for low wages.35 
Confidentially, the Crown suggested that Dominicans might be impressed 
into public works proj ects for a small wage, too, as they had “been obliged to 
live arms in hand and ready to serve for so long.” The administration should 
pay for, or at least promote, proj ects of Spanish migration, early edicts de-
termined.36 A handful of established planters asked for liberated Africans 
or other foreign indentured laborers instead. Meanwhile, the queen passed 
a royal order in June 1861 that banned the arrival of  free  people of color to 
the island, intending to prevent enslaved  people from Cuba and Puerto Rico 
from reaching the island and escaping to freedom. Santo Domingo, as a 
province of Spain, had a diff er ent status than its neighbors— with Domini-
can civil code and Spanish criminal codes set to rule— but separation from 
the plantation states proved immediately and fundamentally troublesome.
In Santo Domingo as in Haiti and elsewhere, discourses about  free peas-
ant  labor ranged from paternalism to outright moral panic. Authorities 
harbored didactic fantasies that “instruction” would make emancipated or 
peasant individuals behave as was eco nom ically and po liti cally con ve nient; 
they  were particularly obsessed with inculcating respect—or, at least, the 
per for mance of re spect— for the rule of law.37 In Haiti, authorities codi-
fied an archetype of the rural agricultural worker (habitant agriculteur) as a 
national symbol, unequally integrated into the state. They celebrated 1 May 
as “la fête de l’agriculture,” with equal parts pomp and moralizing. “ Fathers 
and  mothers, prepare your  children from their youth for the love of work, the 
submission they owe the law, and the re spect they owe to the authorities of 
the Empire!” Soulouque exhorted.38 Geffrard’s first promises  were to amend 
the Rural Code to create a stronger rural police, local inspectors, and stronger 
antivagrancy strictures.39 Authorities fretted about  labor control through the 
lens of moral formation. “In [Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo] immorality 
and the lack of religious education deprive men of the essential bases to keep 
them in line with their duties,” Puerto Rico’s governor asserted.40 White is-
land residents fantasized that German, Irish, French, and other white laborers 
might “model” agricultural wage work; it was a common enough reverie that 
combined the preservation of a white plurality and the dream of a subordi-
nate and docile sector of color, all at once.41 As coercive reform “experiments” 
eroded in some islands, moral panic grew, about sexuality, marriage practices, 
religion, medicine, and all manner of  imagined deviance.42 Geffrard directed 
his attentions to vodou, making it a central  legal target.43 His minister pro-
claimed “idleness and vagabondage are a leprosy” that authorities would 
“work tirelessly to repress.”44  Later, his opponents would say he did not go far 
enough. “Surely what they are wanting then is the reestablishment of forced 
 labor for the benefit of aristocracy, as with during Christophe,” the president 
retorted, in frustration.45
Among the small southern Dominican elite coauthors of annexation— 
and the commercial class in the Cibao valley— a significant sector entered 
 eager to benefit from Spanish plans for investment and  labor control.46 Do-
minican politicians had long argued that the country’s raw potential was 
undeniable, a “hidden mine . . .  an earthly paradise.”47 A small but enthusi-
astic group of elites in the Cibao mentioned development in their manifesto, 
hoping for an end to the inflation that had crippled the tobacco exports of 
the region for so long (and forced the trade into the hand of Danish and Ger-
man banks). Financial reform, the idea of “sacred property,” and the military 
tools to control unrest appealed to them greatly.48 From the capital, elites 
wrote enthusiastically that reunification should henceforth “never be erased 
in the minds of Spaniards,” and they joined authorities in celebrating Span-
ish arrival with ceremony and pageantry.49 But they also subscribed, enthusi-
astically, to indenture schemes. When a cotton cap i tal ist wrote asking for “ten 
emancipados per caballeria [about thirty- three acres],” Manuel de Jesús Galván 
and other town council members endorsed the proposal. “It is certain that 
[cotton]  will soon thrive in Santo Domingo,” Galván wrote.50 Prominent 
capital residents urged cash- crop development as a means of vindication. 
“The Dominican  people are victims of calumny when they are supposed to 
be lazier than other  people,” Pedro Valverde explained to Spanish adminis-
trators. “Augment [their needs], as one would expect in the course of good 
government . . .  , and their productivity  will grow proportionately.”51 Val-
verde was  eager to discipline rural Dominicans. His antivagrancy proposals 
 were so stringent that incoming administrators thought them too harsh to 
implement.52
Before the end of 1861, major fissures became obvious. The lack of com-
mercial endeavors was “incredible . . .  in a country where sugar cane grows 
by itself, where coffee growers just have to plant the seed and then harvest 
the plants at the right time, [and] where corn grows wild,” a Spanish official 
remarked in disbelief.53 As the new administration floundered from lack of 
funds, authorities sought to privilege literate subjects and disenfranchise 
 others, rigidify the laws in urban centers, rebuild and expand the prison 
system, tighten military discipline, foment  free white immigration and east 
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Asian and African indenture, enforce strict religious reforms, and restrict 
the travel of  free  people of color to the territory. Compounding  these re-
strictions and indignities  were the often blundering, insensitive, and racist 
actions of Spanish authorities themselves, whose actions betrayed their 
experiences in the neighboring colonies and their fundamental unease with 
emancipated subjects. Soldiers and administrators  were “accustomed” to 
 these prejudices, one general observed, and they “did not hesitate to mani-
fest as much.”54 Still, loyalists rallied, with new newspapers and new proj-
ects. Spanish journalists entered the discussions, arguing for open ports like 
that of Singapore to stimulate  free trade.55 Annexation supporters wrote to 
the Queen with breathless optimism, describing “the vehement desire . . .  
to equal, and even to exceed if pos si ble, the pro gress made in neighboring 
Puerto Rico and Cuba.”56 “The Spanish government knows perfectly well that 
Eu ro pean immigration  will not come to fertilize this fertile but hot soil,” 
an anonymous French observer argued, and predicted slavery would soon 
follow.57
Laws Are Absolutely Lacking: Assembling the Spanish Colonial State
Troops arrived quickly. Two thousand from Havana and  800 from Puerto 
Rico arrived in the capital within three weeks. Nearly a thousand of them 
moved from the capital to Puerto Plata by steamship. A few hundred contin-
ued on to the nearby southern town of Azua.58 The next real order of occu-
pation was to set up a new bureaucracy. Colonial governments in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico had multiplied many times in size since the 1830s; colonial sub-
jects paid taxes at rates higher than  those on the peninsula.59 Famously, in-
frastructure was so advanced in the plantation centers of eastern and central 
Cuba that the cap i tal ists had begun a railroad system  there by 1837, twelve 
years before construction began in the metropole itself. Frequent steam 
communication connected the islands to their own coastal extremities, to 
each other, and to the Spanish peninsula. Troops  were everywhere;  there 
 were more than twenty thousand infantry in Cuba and about four thousand 
in Puerto Rico. The mandate for governing, however, resided in Spain and 
its delegates. The centralization of power was an extreme enough retreat that 
one po liti cal aspirant in Cuba complained, “Cuba went from being an inte-
gral part of the monarchy to becoming an enslaved colony.”60 “To be born 
in Cuba is a crime,” complained another would-be delegate.61 The colonial 
governments in the neighboring possessions  were large, professionalized, 
and overwhelmingly Spanish.
The informality of law and government, particularly the lack of rec ords, 
in Dominican territory shocked arriving Spanish authorities from Cuba. 
“The Government has not provided me with the data for which I have asked 
and which are indispensable, public archives have not been at my disposi-
tion, no collection of laws exists, nor even historical books which extend be-
yond the last third of the past  century, [and  there] are no statistics, not even 
approximated ones,” José Malo de Molina complained. He could not procure 
any court rec ords,  either. Even the Catholic Church’s archive was “nothing 
more than a few Council books, almost all illegible, and a few boxes in  really 
poor condition,” another concerned Spanish official wrote.62 The existing 
laws, based on the more recent Bourbon restoration codes, had been only 
inconsistently translated and applied; it was “almost always an imaginary 
 thing, and administration is more often through common sense or custom,” 
Malo de Molina sniffed.63 “Laws are absolutely lacking,” Governor Serrano 
echoed, calling the overlapping  legal codes an “unintelligible chaos.”64 Malo 
de Molina continued, “For all its written laws, the Government nonetheless 
has been  really just verbal, and the highest- ranking officials condescend to 
dictating the smallest details. . . .  The four Ministers of State have just one 
[assistant] of whom they  can’t even ask very much, given the stingy and in-
sufficient state salaries. The employees are such just to avoid military ser-
vice, and even high dignitaries had to dedicate themselves to commerce or 
another occupation to provide them with subsistence.”65 Malo de Molina 
fretted at the lack of credentials required to preside over the courts and 
other irregularities. Serrano hastily appointed the archivist of public works 
in Cuba to a new secretarial post in the capital.66
Royal  orders established Santo Domingo’s Real Audiencia and other parts 
of the administration in October 1861. As promised, the civil code of Spain 
ruled, replacing the French- Haitian civil code that had technically been in 
place since 1822 (Spanish authorities first sought to translate it into Span-
ish, but they repressed the publication of articles about civil marriage).67 
Municipal juntas  were to govern in the small cities of the island, with five 
civilians and three military officials (although just six had been established 
by early 1862).68 Law divided the territory into six military districts; neigh-
boring Cuba had more than thirty.69 The island was linked by weekly steam 
ser vice to Puerto Rico and Cuba, but the ferrying of internal mail was an-
other  matter entirely. The roads throughout the republic, which  were in 
poor condition often to the point of being impassable where they existed, 
presented a significant challenge. Expanding the mail system generated a 
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tremendous paper trail in Spanish correspondence, and the bud get for mail 
ser vices quickly  rose above 10,000 pesos annually.70
General Pedro Santana continued as head of state, and Spanish officials 
explic itly agreed that other Dominican officials would be integrated into the 
new colonial administration. In the first months of the occupation, it was 
so.71 Malo de Molina made recommendations for two Supreme Court judges 
(both Dominicans of “notorious integrity”); in his report, Governor Serrano 
named nineteen more officials, just five of them from Havana.72 Santana’s 
former vice president became a field marshal, and a handful of former min-
isters joined the Real Audiencia.73 Two prominent Dominicans held high 
civil governor positions in the capital and in Santiago de los Caballeros. Still 
 others remained in provisional posts closely linked with Santana.74 Appoint-
ments  were contingent on a number of mea sures to professionalize the po-
sitions. Dominican ministers, at least in theory,  were to be paid more, and 
they  were no longer to engage in other professions while in office. Commis-
sioner Malo de Molina drafted salaries for Royal Audiencia legislators and 
other governors at levels significantly higher than their current pay; even-
tually, the salaries  were fixed to be comparable to  those of Puerto Rico.75 
Judges  were to serve and be  housed in the same building as the Audiencia 
 because in so  doing they would “be more respectable, avoid the trou ble of 
having to find them in their homes . . .  and keep them from [undesirable 
living conditions] and incon ve nient  favors.”76
The loyalist response, particularly in the capital, was effusive. Ten promi-
nent Dominican residents of the capital formed an ad hoc Economic Com-
mittee to advise trea sury officials. Their ac cep tance letters  were gushing. 
Pedro Ricart y Torres wrote enthusiastically:
As a loyal servant of my country and the Queen; as an enthusiastic co- 
participant in the po liti cal transformation that has just taken place and 
that opens to Santo Domingo a vast opportunity to better its luck and 
change the sad situation. . . .  It  will be my true plea sure to cooperate 
with my small component of insight and experience in the noble and diffi-
cult enterprise. . . .  I cannot go without mentioning my feelings of grati-
tude that I, as a son of this soil, feel at hearing the praise you have for its 
inhabitants, whose self- denial, loyalty, and sacrifice  ought to earn that 
estimation from all patriotic and educated Spaniards.77
The “mission was as grave as it was delicate,” admonished Ricart y Torres, 
himself a prominent landowner and former minister of foreign relations 
and finance for the ex- republic. “The transition from one system of govern-
ment to another by the offspring of the same  mother must be conducted as 
smoothly as pos si ble, in the  family,” he wrote. Electing the right high offi-
cials would demand selectivity, he continued, but it  ought to be done “with-
out losing sight of public opinion or of honorable men who have made  great 
sacrifices over many years to regain the autonomy of this brave pueblo that 
owes its name, religion, language and civilization to the same raza in whose 
arms they return.”78
An expeditionary brigade had gathered on the island by late spring 1861, 
which included Spanish soldiers from the peninsula, Cuba, and Puerto Rico; 
 there was also a Militia of Color, origin not recorded. Spanish troops arrived 
in the capital, San Cristóbal, Azua, Samaná, Puerto Plata, Santiago de los 
Caballeros, and Samaná, constituting a standing force of ten thousand. 
Even the capital, however, had housing that was barely sufficient for half 
of a battalion. Soldiers  were forced to split off into the convent, the base-
ments of the court house, fort, and palace, and other temporary shelter. In 
Samaná they stayed in seventeen huts (bohíos); in Puerto Plata, they took ref-
uge in two government  houses and another rented one.79 Provisions  were 
no easier. “They are forced to import every thing, even bricks,” one diplomat 
reported. Flour was imported from the United States, “all manner of mer-
chandise” arrived from Eu rope, and medicines  were exceedingly difficult to 
procure. Prices  were high; a  saddle cost 150 pesos fuertes, “even as the fields 
are full of  cattle,” he observed grimly.80 “The  people of the country maintain 
themselves generally on wild plants [viandas] and  free- range pigs,” an officer 
explained, and “articles of primary necessity are not just in shortage, but the 
few that are around are sold at  really outrageous prices.” The corps sought 
additional supplies from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Saint Thomas, but the official 
asserted “the troops and even the Commanders and Officers have suffered 
hunger and privation without mea sure from this  matter.”81 To incoming ad-
ministrators, the capital city was a sorry sight. Even the archbishop’s  house 
and the Convent of Santa Clara  were in ruins, and the government buildings 
 were  little better.82 Few  houses had much furniture at all; most  people made 
do with very  little.83 Coconut- oil lighting had only barely been introduced 
the year before; outside of the capital, most of the rest of the cities and towns 
prob ably went dark at sundown.84
Dominican Soldiers and the Classification Committee
Regulation of the military presented a particularly thorny prob lem for arriv-
ing Spanish authorities. Working- class men from all over Spain comprised 
the incoming troops, many of whom had already been stationed in Cuba 
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and Puerto Rico for a number of years. Discipline for common infractions— 
misspending petty cash, drunkenness, gambling, sleeping outside of the 
barracks, insubordination, fighting, and other common misdeeds— was 
strict.85 An anonymous letter from a soldier of the King’s Regiment pleaded 
with Brigadier Antonio Peláez to review the harsh punishments its com-
manding officers inflicted. “It is a  matter of nothing less than killing us or 
making us desert,” he implored.86 A circular forbade beating the soldiers 
with palos; it “humiliates rather than corrects the soldier,” authorities ad-
monished.87 About ten thousand troops ultimately arrived from the neigh-
boring islands and from Spain. Authorities stationed the steamship Tetuán 
in Samaná, and temporarily deployed eleven other warships to the east of 
the island.88 If the militia of color  were among the troops recently arrived 
from Havana, it seems that they did not stay long, and it is evident that Gov-
ernor Serrano halted their commission very quickly.89
For a few months, the status of Dominican soldiers remained uncomfort-
ably indeterminate alongside the newly arrived Spanish regiments. In the 
eyes of Spanish authorities and colonial troops, the Dominican army that 
 these Spanish soldiers encountered could hardly be called an army at all. “All 
Dominican men  were soldiers” in the conflict- ridden period of the First Re-
public, Spanish authorities observed grimly, and their discipline— relative 
to that of the Spanish regiments— was poor.90 The regular practice of leav-
ing ranks to attend to home duties irked officials so much they offered a 
ten- peso reward for remission of  these men, whom they considered desert-
ers.91 Military titles  were effectively honorary, the arriving officials asserted. 
“Dominican generals  didn’t know anything other than to rise up against one 
another to take power of the government,” a general sniffed.92 Immediately 
lurking  behind Spanish resentment was their dismay at seeing men of color 
in positions of authority. “The soldier of the Spanish race  couldn’t compre-
hend that a black or a mulato was  really a general or col o nel,” he observed, 
and a “ great number of generals and chiefs”  were men of color.93 Some fought 
with Santana in the border conflicts that broke out in May and June of that 
year. The campaign proved to be a taxing first meeting between the two 
groups of soldiers. High- ranking officials perpetually praised the Spanish 
troops for their exemplary conduct; they had faced difficult conditions with 
“superior discipline . . .  fraternizing with the residents and in every thing la-
boring with such prudence and tact,” the Cuban governor claimed.94  Behind 
 these reports, however, a number of incidents prob ably caused officials to 
scramble to reform the Provisional Guard during the hot summer of 1861. 
Plans to create a standing army of Dominicans collapsed by August.95 It is 
likely that Spanish officers never wanted to integrate Dominicans into the 
forces at all,  unless as separate standing militia of white and nonwhite regi-
ments (as in Cuba and Puerto Rico). More likely still, they had not consid-
ered the prospect at all.
During the summer months— while the status of Dominican soldiers 
remained in limbo— conflict between Spanish officers and the rank and 
file proliferated. The regiments seem to have been led separately during 
the summer campaigns of 1861, but a few Dominicans appear to have been 
integrated directly into Spanish regiments in auxiliary roles.  There, the harsh 
discipline of the Spanish officers— likely in a climate of racist distrust— 
created a volatile atmosphere. Harsh punishments, in par tic u lar, grated on 
observers. Twenty- year- old Enrique Padilla, a young, literate Dominican who 
was serving as a porter for the military command stationed in Azua, faced 
charges of “speaking heatedly to vari ous soldiers of the Provisional Guard, 
trying to influence them with princi ples contrary to subordination,” for ex-
ample.96 The young defendant had intervened when he saw an officer from 
the Crown Regiment punishing a bugle player, prob ably a Dominican. The 
brigadier accused Padilla of walking up to the soldiers and
bitterly criticizing the punishment, saying among other  things that he 
would have liked to have seen [the guard] try that with him, and that 
soldiers  shouldn’t have to suffer like that, adding some more insults 
to said officer of the Crown. The [brigadier himself ] approached them, 
unsure of what he was hearing, sure that  there could not possibly be such 
irresponsible nonsense being said. But he heard [Padilla] repeat them, 
loudly so that he would hear it; in fact he started shouting as he tried to 
leave. At that time the [brigadier] told two soldiers to arm themselves to 
arrest him.
“I saw him give the bugle player a big smack [plantazo] with a sword,” Padilla 
explained defiantly, admitting to all the charges. “If it had been me treated 
like that, I would have reacted very differently,” he continued. Another wit-
ness had come to his support, Padilla testified, exclaiming, “May God let 
that sword break!”—to which a defiant Padilla added, “May his heart stop 
instead!” (¡que había de ser el corazón y no el sable!). Spanish authorities felt un-
sure how to adjudicate Padilla’s insubordination. The prosecutor (himself 
a lieutenant of the Crown Regiment) reserved judgment on the case, pass-
ing it on to Captain General Pedro Santana. “He should be severely pun-
ished according to royal law, but as we must consider him ignorant of  these 
laws . . .  it could not have been out of malice,” the fiscal concluded. Another 
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officer, also in Azua, wrote to the Spanish officials to complain about a cer-
tain Agustín Feliz (whose alias, “Prieto,” prob ably indicates he was dark- 
skinned). Spanish superiors  were frustrated with Feliz, who “never wanted 
to obey his officers . . .  and has just been rebellious.”97
By the fall of 1861, Spanish military authorities demoted the  great bulk 
of Dominican soldiers. First, authorities separated Dominican soldiers into 
a new body, the Provincial Reserves. A Classification Committee began to 
review Dominican soldiers’ rank and status. In order to be in the active 
reserves, an individual had to pres ent to the commission a ser vice sheet 
(hoja de servicio) describing his military feats and any other supporting docu-
ments. The decision would be based on “aptitude, ser vice, and other cir-
cumstances,” the commission announced vaguely. Authorities assiduously 
avoided mentioning race in any written description of the committee, al-
though it could not have escaped notice that all of its own members  were 
white.98 As the committee continued its revisions, it expanded  those dis-
qualified to include  those of “advanced age or poor health, [with] lack of 
instruction, poor capacity, more civil than military.”99 Of the first 227 ap-
plicants the commission reviewed— mostly captains and other subordinate 
officers, but some generals as well—it gave fewer than half active status. The 
committee declared the rest “passive,” usually  because the men could not read 
or write. This decommissioning extended to  those who asserted they had 
been active soldiers since the 1840s, some of whom retired rather than suffer 
declassification.100 On a very selective basis, high- ranking officers from the 
reserves could apply to Madrid to solicit integration into the principal corps 
of Spanish forces.101 For his part, Santana faithfully related all the gener-
als and other high- ranking officers in the diff er ent provinces. In a diff er ent 
handwriting, however, someone added three generals’ names and the follow-
ing observation: “de color.”102
In a  matter of months, Spanish officers created a three- tier hierarchy: 
Spanish troops, active reserves, and passive reserves. All members of the 
reserves  were prohibited from wearing Spanish uniforms. Active reserves 
earned twice as much as  those who had the misfortune of being made 
“passive,” but Spanish men of the equivalent rank earned considerably 
more. Authorities published the (de)classifications from the “old Domini-
can army” (antiguo ejército dominicano) on the front pages of the Gaceta de Santo 
Domingo for months in late 1861 and 1862, which must have been embarrass-
ing for  those who  were being publicly decommissioned, even as the loyalist 
press celebrated the regularization effort.
Good Subjects, Honorable Citizens: Catholic Religious Reform
Santana claimed it was a “dear wish of the Dominican  people to fix the dis-
graceful situation of religious practice,” and arriving officials agreed.103 A 
perceived lack of formal religiosity among rural residents should not have 
surprised  these officials, who  were themselves arriving from a prosperous 
but relatively impious plantation state. In Cuba, outside of urban centers like 
Havana and Matanzas, residents also lacked brick- and- mortar churches, in 
part  because plantation  owners sought to be  free from the church’s meddle-
some influence.104 “The country  people of Cuba . . .  are not very religious,” 
a traveler passing through Cuba in the late 1850s wrote. He allowed himself 
some condescension: “Most of them learn a few prayers by heart, which they 
repeat without understanding their import. This does not prevent, however, 
images of the Virgin and of saints being in  every  house.”105 The material 
culture of the most remote areas of Santo Domingo might have been more 
barren still. The Dominican Catholic Church was in a state of disarray. It 
had been without an archbishop since the spring of 1858. Just twenty- eight 
parishes served the entire territory, of which five  were totally vacant for lack 
of funds. Only three— Puerto Plata, Santiago, and San Cristóbal— had act-
ing high officials.106  There was no church council, no convent, and “no hope 
of one,” the acting ecclesiastical governor reported grimly.107 The Domini-
can clergy displayed an “exaggerated superstition. . . .  [and  were] poor and 
ignorant generally” but with significant power over the populace, another 
wrote. He and other Spanish observers described rural priests who shirked 
their duties, demanded large fees for travel and ser vices, practiced free-
masonry, openly had mistresses, and married.108 Dominican writers, long 
in irreverent dialogue with  these men, crafted tales that  imagined the assas-
sination of intractable priests.109 The priest who held Mass in the capital to 
celebrate annexation prob ably had  children.110 Officials conceived prosely-
tization and the regularization of Catholic practice essential. Promoting 
Catholicism was promoting Spain, the Cuban governor observed; peninsular 
officials agreed.111 In the capital, loyal prominent citizens felt  eager to lend a 
hand; Don Miguel Lavastida even ceded some of his property to the church 
to construct a chapel commemorating the first Catholic Mass on the island.112
Authorities fretted that Dominican families lived in “tremendous liber-
tinism.”113 Most Dominicans living outside of towns  were not confirmed, 
and young  children went without clothing.114 One general claimed that 
“adolescents strolled nude on the streets of the capital, and . . .  illicit  unions 
abounded.”115 The be hav ior of  women in the capital especially troubled 
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him. “Young  daughters of the  family enjoyed a  grand liberty to leave the 
paternal house— which would in Spain be inconceivable— going about 
with whom they wanted most and who seemed the most opportune,” he re-
marked in horror.116 Single  women, he continued, “ were not embarrassed to 
live maritally with a man,” and “the word infanticide had no application in 
Santo Domingo.” He disapproved heartily of civil marriage. Polygamy, even 
incestuous marriages, revealed how “relaxed and perverted” the nation was, 
he accused.117 Drinking, prostitution, and “rampant immorality” plagued his 
flock, a priest reported.118
The Protestant population, especially in Samaná and Puerto Plata, trou-
bled Spanish authorities. As many as one- third of all the residents of the 
Samaná peninsula  were Protestants of color from the United States.119 Con-
gregations maintained contact with Methodist and Anabaptist churches in 
the States, as well as British Wesleyan missionaries.120 When the minister 
in Samaná died, parishioners sought a U.S. replacement (although he did 
not stay long). Samaná congregants had built a large, wooden chapel atop a 
small hill, where they met multiple times a week. In Puerto Plata,  there  were 
diff er ent sects, which also met regularly on Sundays— all- day services— and 
one or two midweek nights, and they held baptisms, marriages, and pub-
lic burials regularly. Their public meetings and  house visits brought them 
into close contact with Catholics, a cleric wrote, contemptuously, and they 
freely offered Spanish- language books, pamphlets, and flyers “to pervert 
them.” The pastors “have worked and continue to work to spread their er-
rors among the Catholics, inviting them to listen to the sermons and take 
part in their ceremonies, impregnated with error and Heresy,” the official 
concluded. “Most painfully,” he noted, they had a public school “to teach 
Heresy to the innocent  children.”121
Authorities proved deeply divided on how to treat open practice of Prot-
estants and  Freemasons. Catholic- only territories  were “a fundamental law 
of monarchy . . .  with no exception whatsoever,” the acting church head 
noted, suggesting that open practice disrespected Spain’s “historical glories, 
our venerated traditions, our habits, our customs,” and that it could lead to 
“dangerous ideas . . .  and insurrection.”122 He promised that he would  labor 
tirelessly to abolish the “ grand abomination” from Dominican soil, replac-
ing it with “the unity of religion for which our  fathers fought.” “Since Spain 
has retaken this country, the old order should dis appear,” he insisted, in-
cluding “tolerance of cults.” Other authorities  were more circumspect, not-
ing that prohibition could provoke prob lems of international relations and 
public order. The  matter remained undecided for two years—at one point, 
superior Spanish authorities even declined to comply with church officials. 
As “one of the most delicate issues of all consequences of annexation, I can-
not comply [with banning the public cele bration of non- Catholic faith],” the 
governor wrote. He cited the intervention of the British consul in Samaná 
as evidence of international complications.123 In the last months of 1862, 
 orders from Spain arrived to persecute Protestant practices; again, officials 
on the ground in the capital quickly deci ded against it and wrote to northern 
town officials to that effect.124 More word came in February 1863 insisting 
that all subjects should be Catholic; banishment or imprisonment loomed 
for infractors.125 For the moment, however, the residents could continue to 
practice openly. Masonic lodges received no such consent, and authorities 
ordered them closed.126
A new archbishop, Bienvenido Monzón, arrived with a certain amount 
of pomp in the summer of 1862. The Gaceta Oficial republished the dual- 
language— Latin and Spanish— royal order that celebrated his disembar-
kation. Like- minded men accompanied him; individual clerics resident in 
Santiago de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Cartagena, and Spain solicited passage and 
assignment in the new colony.127 Monzón ordered honors distributed to 
local prominent Dominicans, but he refused to assign them to positions of 
high authority. Of the eleven proposed high church officials, all  were Span-
ish, and only three had experience from the neighboring islands. Monzón 
urged authorities to copy recent reforms in Puerto Rico in its new Span-
ish neighbor.128 Even before his arrival, a few Dominican officials wrote for 
permission to marry; Monzón was not satisfied.129 “I soon realized that the 
institution of the  family, the primary ele ment of  every society, was being 
degraded and illegitimized by the remnants of the so- called civil marriage 
of the French code ( adopted during the republican era) and also by the prac-
tice of keeping concubines,” he wrote.130 The leading story in June’s second 
installment of La Razón announced the end of civil registries for marriage 
and the nullification of all parts of the French civil code to that effect.131 For 
the first time in de cades, the church was relatively flush with cash for re-
pairs; the archbishop’s salary alone was 14,000 pesos fuertes.132 The reforms 
promised to forge “good subjects, good heads of  family, and good and hon-
orable citizens,” one official observed.133
 Labor, Capital, and Profit
“ There is no country where nature offers more resources, nor where the 
inhabitants are in a worse state,” one Spanish official wrote in the year be-
fore annexation.134 When the Cuban governor Francisco Serrano arrived 
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from  Havana in the summer of 1861, he agreed. “The  people are living in 
such a way that it can even be called miraculous,” he marveled. “Unculti-
vated lands, virgin forests with plants still just as the explorers found them, 
sparse population, barely any production, industry dead, commerce al-
most unknown . . .  [and] miserable paper money.”135 Serrano’s parting 
recommendations— fortification of the Samaná peninsula, regularization 
of the government, and economic reform— signaled a fairly ambitious plan 
for state reor ga ni za tion of the former republic intended to orient it  toward 
commercial agriculture. “It pains me to see such magnificent terrain, much 
more fertile than  those rightly praised in the Island of Cuba . . .  without one 
generous heart to rebuke the unhappy Dominicans,” wrote another Havana 
official paternally.136 Authorities began a flurry of small proj ects in early 
months, including new wooden  houses in Monte Cristi, a new dock in Santo 
Domingo, and the groundwork for more infrastructure proj ects.137
Officials implemented a mixture of Cuban and Puerto Rican legislation. 
They deci ded that direct taxation of residents would be too onerous, opt-
ing for sales and other indirect taxes instead, including the lottery, which 
they noted was popu lar.138 Dominican goods became “national” products, 
along with goods from the rest of the empire.139 Serrano and other officials 
urged the regularization of rural landownership, creating registries where 
pos si ble.140 Officials looked into the idea of cargo shipments between Cuba, 
Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico, and special attention was given to plans 
for strengthening the defenses of Samaná, which was to be a  free port.141 A 
steamship connected Santo Domingo to Saint Thomas twice a month; Sa-
maná was linked into a Veracruz– Puerto Rico– Havana route by early fall.142 
Twice- monthly ser vice was supposed to connect the island to Cuba and 
Cádiz.143 Travel to Havana on the Pájaro del Océano or Cuba was available to 
all  those who could buy a ticket on their biweekly voyages. While the lack 
of pharmacies meant that prohibitively high prices of medicine persisted, 
military health officials offered civilians basic medical training.144 Joaquín 
Manuel del Alba, intendente of Puerto Rico, assumed the position of comisario 
regio, where he would serve for the next two years, charged with assessing the 
financial status of the island and the extent of paper money.145
News of the annexation caused a relative stir of excitement among resi-
dents in other Spanish territories, mostly over the idea of new investments, 
large and small, that might be made in the colony. Even as Serrano, Santana, 
and Molina waited for approval from Spain, news of annexation produced 
immediate interest. A handful of priests requested transfer to Santo Do-
mingo from Sevilla, Puerto Rico, and Santiago de Cuba, and at least sev-
eral individuals requested that their pensions be transferred to Santo Do-
mingo.146 A handful of wealthy Venezuelans, fleeing po liti cal unrest, set up 
plantations on the Ozama River.147 A British subject sought to profit from 
“abandoned” lumber in the center- island region.148  Others proposed canals, 
light houses, a bridge over the Ozama River in the capital, and gas lighting 
for all the towns of the island.149 One wealthy man proposed building a café 
in the ruins of the capital city theater; another proposed a submarine tele-
graph cable; Don Vidal from Santiago de Cuba proposed a covered market; 
and vari ous British cap i tal ists proposed diff er ent railroad developments (at 
least one of which was approved).150 Some small- business  owners applied 
for licenses for businesses that  were already  running— suggesting perhaps 
greater official scrutiny—as Dr. Guillermo Gothburg did for his small phar-
macy in Puerto Plata.151 Other small- scale plans abounded: fabric making, 
an ice house (nevería), printing presses, and so on. Not  every small proj ect 
gained approval; officials denied a rum maker license on moral grounds, for 
example, despite the “extremely backward” state of distilling.152
Large- scale proj ects like coal mining, cotton production, and the fo-
menting of tobacco cultivation generated huge amounts of official documen-
tation as officials responded to the proposals of interested cap i tal ists and 
Fig. 3.1 Industrialists sent many pamphlets, like this one about shelling coffee beans, 
to Spanish administrators. Journalists at La Razón regularly published on industry 
proposals.
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directed their own surveys.153 Spanish authorities  were very interested in 
Samaná’s coal, and they sent teams of military engineers to inspect pos si ble 
mining sites. The standards and licenses  were to mirror Cuban legislation, 
but experts arrived from Puerto Rico and Spain as well.154 Several financiers 
competed for rights to introduce new cotton- processing technology, and 
the Cotton Association of Manchester offered to send numerous informa-
tional leaflets, translated into Spanish.155 Another individual requested re-
imbursement for importing strains of tobacco into Puerto Plata, as had been 
requested by royal order.156 Repeated royal  orders directed officials to ex-
plore the possibility of cotton cultivation, compared agricultural conditions 
with  those in Puerto Rico, and so on.157 Enthusiastic planters recopied and 
sent Cuban edicts back to Spanish authorities, asking for the same conces-
sions and promising  future profits for Cataluña’s cotton mills.158 Well into 
the thick of conflict in 1864, mining development efforts and other fomenta-
tion schemes, particularly cotton, never ceased.
Immigration and Indenture
Most export agriculture proposals to the Crown involved immigration, too. 
The plans of new colonists in Santo Domingo in 1861 involved semifree 
contract  labor, moralization schema, and, invariably, white supervision. 
The Spanish media wrote approvingly of such plans, suggesting that “freed 
blacks, African prisoners, Chinese coolies, and Irish settlers” would all be 
ideal laborers for the colony.159 Specifics varied. A cotton cap i tal ist sought 
tools and emancipados to  labor on his land; he deferred to the “wisdom of the 
government” on how to proceed. His own land, already planted, could be 
“a small example of the richness and fertility of this virgin land,” he urged, 
adding that “with a  little manpower, the land could produce torrents of rich-
ness.”160 The proposal of another cotton planters’ association urged, “the 
island was a source of inexhaustible riches that only needed the strength 
of . . .  colonization based on the princi ples of morality, police, and order” to 
thrive.161 The proposal suggested that black laborers  were adapted to the hot 
climate and that,  under watchful white rule, they would bring the province 
prosperity. “One thousand or more apprentices of the African nation . . .  
are the only race who can make Antillean soil productive,” the letter writer 
argued.  These “apprentices” would be signed “of their own spontaneous 
 will” to ten- to fifteen- year contracts cultivating cotton and tobacco, “ under 
the same conditions and regulation that Asian colonization has taken place 
in the neighboring island of Cuba.” To oversee the indentured Africans, the 
com pany promised to bring in one “Spanish head of  family . . .  individuals 
of good customs, morality, and intelligence” for  every ten contract laborers. 
The association could pay for machinery and nominal taxes for each Spanish 
colonist, he boasted, as long as land was provided for ten years for  free.
One individual’s ambitious railroad proposal to connect the Cibao val-
ley forty miles to the northern coast exemplifies the “racial knowledge” that 
typified the proposals authorities received. The railroad industrialist effused 
antiblack sentiment and fantasies of “coolie” docility. For the hard  labor of 
construction, he called for ten thousand indentured men and  women “from 
Calcutta, Hong Kong, or Cuba,” specifically  because of the perception that 
Asian laborers would stay separate from black Dominicans and would also 
thus serve as a racial bulwark against Haiti.162 He maintained that  these sub-
jects would be more adapted than Eu ro pean emigrants to the climate, and 
that they might have “convincing moral and po liti cal influence” for the 
entirety of the colonial endeavor, not just the proposed regional railroad. 
In Cuba,  these laborers had “consistently demonstrated that they are not 
to be confused with the enslaved African race,” one high official insisted, 
concurring.163
From the very first days of the reoccupation, Spanish officials and pri-
vate white industrialists called for large- scale white immigration, too, most 
often to oversee indentured nonwhite laborers. Authorities liked the idea 
of Spanish immigration particularly. Individual Spanish settlers might apply 
for support, and authorities passed laws welcoming white settlers identical 
to Cuba’s.164 The Spanish consul to Haiti proposed a proj ect of immigration 
of two to three thousand white individuals from within the “Spanish” com-
munity of the  U.S. South, especially Florida and Louisiana. He suggested 
that the government award each  family a substantial plot of two to three 
hundred caballerías of land— ostensibly vacant— along with materials to 
build  houses, the state honors afforded to colonizers, and a ten- year reprieve 
from any kind of tax. The government should also furnish Asian contract 
laborers as aides, “given that they are already acclimated.”165 The Overseas 
Ministry quizzed Santana on which professions might be the most useful 
for potential Spanish émigrés. Authorities felt no compunction telling San-
tana, himself a man of color, that the white race was  going to be the motor 
of the colony’s pro gress. It was “of utmost necessity that the population be 
increased: luckily, the conditions of the country allow that the white race 
fulfill this most impor tant need,” one official informed him.166
Outside cap i tal ists proposed similar schemes of white immigration. Wil-
liam Cazneau, the U.S. agent, proposed a colonization plan of one thousand 
white families  under ten to fifteen years of indenture. “ Under the direction 
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of proper superintendents,” they would cultivate sugar, cotton, tobacco, and 
rice, “ those species of tropical products for which the fertile soil of Santo 
Domingo appears so remarkably adapted.”167 The laborers—to “be of an 
orderly and well- disciplined class”— would follow Spanish law, Cazneau as-
sured his readers. The settlers should be  housed on “unappropriated public 
lands” near the capital, with one square league afforded to each one hun-
dred male laborers between the ages of sixteen and fifty. The advantages of 
a white settlement proj ect  were not just economic, Cazneau wrote, “but also 
a  wholesome example to the existing population of the province . . .  able, 
industrious, and well disciplined.” López and Com pany was one of the com-
panies that sought compensation from the Crown for individual passengers, 
although they  were remonstrated to seek individual approval first.168 Spanish 
authorities expressed suspicion at U.S.- led proj ects, however, and it does 
not seem that any came to fruition.169
Discipline and Leisure
In addition to immigration and indenture schemes, authorities  were cen-
trally concerned with inducing Dominicans to  labor. Vagrancy preoccupied 
Spanish authorities and their loyalist allies. In a letter to the arriving authori-
ties, Pedro Valverde described the “drunken scandal and disorder” caused by 
male vagrants and of “prostitutes and corrupt  women whose licentious life 
significantly affects . . .  public morale.”170 Vagrant men eluded prosecution 
by citing their occasional (weekly or monthly) day  labor gigs; the  women 
usually hid  behind claims of being washerwomen, pastry sellers, cooks, or 
servants, Valverde complained.  Under the existing laws, vagrants spent a few 
days in jail in lieu of the fine (that they could not pay); then they returned to 
the streets once more. New laws proposed that all vagrants be presented to 
the police, where they would be given work, provided they  were of age, and 
beggars  were to seek a license proving disability.171 Valverde sought harsher 
sentences still. He wanted three- time vagrants to be deported to Samaná 
for one year. Valverde also argued that foreigners should have a guarantor 
to vouch for them, just like in Puerto Rico, followed by steadily renewable 
provisional licenses— available at a small fee— for the first year of their resi-
dence. They should be deported outright for vagrancy, he continued.172 
Valverde’s zeal was praised by other authorities, if not the specifics of his 
plan. Sending vagrants to nearly deserted Samaná would “simply put them 
in a place where they could not work, rather than inculcate in them the de-
sire to do so,” one reply concluded, expressing caution about the rights of 
foreign residents who antedated Spanish reoccupation.173
In August 1861, Santana signed into law an extensive antigaming bill, 
which legislators borrowed directly from codes in the neighboring islands. 
“It has come to my attention . . .  that  there are frequent meetings of  people 
of all classes to engage in the pernicious vice of game playing,” the bill began. 
“I am responsible to Her Majesty Our Queen (God protect Her) . . .  to repress 
and correct this vice.” The ordinances banned all games, even  legal ones, 
from most public businesses, on the penalty of a fine of 250 pesos. Public 
officials, civic or military, faced the same stiff fine;  others owed sixty pesos, 
all doubled for repeat offenses. Loss of businesses and even exile loomed 
for three- time offenders. Fi nally, the bill laid out explicit instructions for 
registration of the offenders’ names and steps to prosecution.174 The fines 
had to be paid in pesos fuertes, not paper money, authorities emphasized.175 
Other provisions extended the ban to all games of luck, rayuela (hopscotch), 
dogfighting, gaming during work hours, prostitution, and even boisterous 
be hav ior during theater per for mances. Some new provisions, like the ban-
ning of clothing to impersonate public officials or of masks (outside of fes-
tivals), represented clear security concerns. Other strictures sought control 
of leisure, especially in public and semipublic spaces. Cockfights could only 
be held with a license. Dances, too, required licenses, and the holandés, da-
nois, tango, and tambulá dances  were of par tic u lar concern. Along with jodú, 
they caused “frequent scandal,” authorities alleged, and  were to be held by 
permission only.176 Jodú remained totally prohibited. Some provisions, like 
Article 69— which banned “using dress that pertains to another sex, class, 
or category that is not one’s own”— arguably implied  legal distinctions that 
 were not supposed to be operative in the colony at all.177
New statutes created new costs, supervision, and the threat of fines. 
School administrators, merchants, street vendors, and other small enter-
prises required licensing. Female cooks, washerwomen, and sweets and 
fruit sellers  were to register with their local municipality.178 Midwives who 
wanted to continue to practice their skill  were to pres ent themselves to the 
newly formed Medicine Committee, where they would pay twenty pesos 
for the title. In addition, the  women  were expected to report the sex of the 
baby, the address, and other details immediately or face a stiff fine.179  Family 
heads  were expected to in de pen dently report their  house hold numbers as 
well. Even visiting sailors  were expected to register with authorities.180 
Residents  were further expected to adhere to a number of public health pro-
visions (from dampening their stoops twice daily during dry spells to adher-
ing to a ban on throwing laundry  water into the street), and public nudity, 
even for small  children or when bathing animals in the river, was explic itly 
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prohibited. Architects  were to vet blueprints with authorities. The new, al-
beit small, force of watchmen in Santo Domingo and other towns imple-
mented  these laws and increased state contact with town residents. In Santo 
Domingo, they enforced minor rules (such as one stating that doors to the 
street should open inward), announced the time hourly, and conducted a 
rudimentary census of the city center, counting 686 brick  houses and 767 
huts.181
Authorities intended to rebuild and expand the colony’s prison system. 
The first change was literally nominal, as town jails across the island acquired 
names like “The Royal Prison of Azua.” The conditions in the territory’s few 
prisons  were atrocious, reflecting their absolute lack of resources since the 
republican period; the arrival (and imprisonment) of Spanish soldiers ex-
acerbated the prob lem of space, conditions, and supplies.182 In Santo Do-
mingo, prisoners complained of the rations, which  were only a half pound of 
raw meat and five platanos a day amid gloomy, humid conditions and terrible 
smells.  After repeated inquiries, authorities nominated a full- time commis-
sioner to monitor the conditions.183 In Santiago de los Caballeros, prisoners 
had survived during the period of the republic on fifty papeletas (the devalued 
paper currency) and  family aid.  After 1861, prisoners received one peseta 
daily, but the amount was wholly insufficient for imprisoned peninsular sol-
diers, who had no  family to bring them meals. Officials observed that they 
 were obliged to beg for money as they cleaned the streets and performed 
other menial tasks.184 After months of delay, the allocation was increased.185 
Blueprints for new prisons, civil and military, arrived from Madrid for Sa-
maná and other sites.186 Still, officials continued to ask that money for pris-
oners’ upkeep be paid in advance, so paltry  were the rations and unhealthy 
the conditions of the jails, and complaints continued into 1863 and 1864.187 
Some individuals languished for a year or more in detention with no trial.188
Slowly, the population transformed to include a segment of prisoners 
serving long sentences from elsewhere in the Spanish empire, ideal candi-
dates for the re introduction of prison  labor on public works proj ects. The 
Cuban governor ordered a brigade of a hundred prisoners to rebuild gov-
ernment buildings in the capital almost immediately.189 The Samaná pen-
insula in particular— strategic as it was for ships arriving from Spain and 
Havana— became a veritable center of prisoners from vari ous corners of the 
Spanish empire. It  housed prisoners from Cádiz, Puerto Rico, and Cuba 
serving long sentences; they  were destined to work in mines and on the forti-
fication of the bay itself.190 The first East Asian prisoner ordered to Samaná 
was prob ably twenty- three- year- old “Antonio” from Macau, who had already 
begun to serve a ten- year sentence in Cuba for the murder of another man 
on a plantation. He was transferred to Santo Domingo in the fall of 1861.191 
More Chinese prisoners arrived in groups of twenty or thirty.192 The East 
Asian prisoners in Samaná did not have enough to eat, especially given the 
“rude” nature of their prison  labor, Santana wrote.193 A handful escaped im-
mediately  after they arrived, and their capture often entailed serious bodily 
harm.194 In Azua, as in Samaná, sometimes foreign prisoners fled together 
with Dominican nationals, who likely  were able to serve as guides for the 
group; Spanish officials gave pointed phenotypic descriptions of such es-
capees.195 Documentation is sparse regarding the specific public works proj-
ects on which prisoners  were made to work, but it is clear that officials in 
the capital, including antivagrancy champion Pedro Valverde, came to rely 
on prisoners’  labor and even squabbled over their allocation to diff er ent 
proj ects.196 More than six hundred prisoners crowded Samaná’s prison by 
fall 1863.197
A General Organ of the Interests of the Country:  
Dominican Loyalists and the New Press
Authorities and supporters of annexation collaborated on two publications 
that  were meant to inform and propagandize to the public about the Spanish 
presence. The first, La Gaceta de Santo Domingo, published official govern-
ment proceedings and decrees and announced the arrival of “illustrious” 
Spanish authorities (although it was printed by private presses for months 
 until the state printer became operational).198 Although the Gaceta’s journal-
ists primarily reprinted perfunctory summaries of official business, certain 
government proceedings received par tic u lar attention. The Gaceta’s editors 
painstakingly reprinted in biweekly installments all of the civil code that had 
been approved for Santo Domingo, for example, and it was so voluminous 
that it filled more than six months’ worth of columns.199 Likewise, they re-
printed the “Decree of Police and Governance” over more than a month’s 
time. The back page informed  those interested of steamship comings and 
 goings, books for sale, or other minor commercial activities. For five pesos 
fuertes, one could purchase the French civil code; the Spanish penal code 
cost just one peso fuerte. Other leisure reading included an illustrated War 
in Africa, detailing Spanish exploits, and The World as It  Will Be in Year 3000, by 
Émile Souvestre. A short one- week loop connected inhabitants of four dif-
fer ent stops in Cuba and three in Puerto Rico, Saint Thomas, and the capital 
of Santo Domingo on steam liners such as the Pájaro del Océano and the Cuba. 
The three islands  were more connected than they had been in forty years.
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The second official paper, La Razón, was decidedly more polemic. The for-
mer El Oasis editor, Manuel de Jesús Galván, billed it as “the General Organ 
of the Interests of the Country,” and its pro- annexation stance was aggres-
sive.200 La Razón’s writers followed an official line: that annexation was the 
spontaneous  will of the Dominican  people, that Spain was generous to ac-
cept them back into her maternal arms, that Haitian provocation was the root 
of Dominican instability, and that annexation promised a new era of pros-
perity for the colony and its residents. The “deplorable state” of the coun-
try had made it “absolutely impossible to conserve . . .  our sick and poorly 
realized nationality,” La Razón argued, and articles focused in par tic u lar on 
internecine strug gles in republican Venezuela as an analogy.201 Echoing of-
ficial proclamations, the paper promised major public works and urged soli-
darity with the colonial proj ects in Cuba and Puerto Rico, “ brother” islands 
in the shared Spanish  family.202 Journalists published “Noticias Nacionales” 
that  were often news tidbits from Málaga and other Spanish cities. Beyond 
fraternal hispanidad, annexation was a motor of pro gress, columnists argued. 
Other prominent Dominicans joined the pro- Spanish effort. Wealthy writer 
and businessman Francisco Javier Ángulo de Guridi asked to publish a “po-
liti cal, industrial and literary” journal in Santiago de los Caballeros.203 A pri-
vate citizen asked (and was granted) permission to print and sell copies of 
major Spanish edicts.204
La Razón’s writers sought to make polemic links between Spanish iden-
tity, pro gress, and a community of “civilized nations.” Writers extolled Span-
ish imperialism elsewhere, celebrating that the “unhappy blacks of Manila 
[had been] brought to Chris tian ity” and praising Spain’s victories in North 
Africa.205 The paper republished José Ferrer de Couto’s reincorporation mis-
sives in weekly installments that lasted well into the spring. De Couto, a 
decorated Spanish authority living in Cuba by the time of the occupation, 
was a tenuous ally at best—he would  later write scathing condemnations 
of the colonial proj ect, Dominican government, and  people of color more 
generally— but in his early pamphlets, his enthusiasm was unbridled. Adjunct 
to the pro- Spanish missives, writers at La Razón took up a familiar central 
objective, that of distancing Dominican identity from Haiti. Just as Galván’s 
and  others’ newspapers had done in the First Republic, the journal repeat-
edly took aim at Haiti. Once again, Haiti’s perceived exclusivism— limiting 
foreign residents to coastal cities, preventing them from acquiring controlling 
amounts of Haitian land— distanced them from the community of civilized 
nations (including Spain), editorials argued.206 Haitians  were “governed by a 
tyrannical, exclusivist, and savage constitution, have convinced themselves 
that conviviality [el trato social] is a violation of  human rights,” one writer 
accused, “without ever realizing that that isolation, that incommunication 
deprives them.”207 It amounted to nothing less than “ingratitude . . .  an 
inhospitable instinct  toward the rest of humanity,” the author scoffed. La 
Razón taunted President Geffrard for his opposition to annexation and insisted, 
“We are sons of Spain!”208
A Sacred Decree . . .  A Categorical Prohibition
For all of the public proclamations about Santo Domingo as the “ free” Span-
ish colony, not only was isolating the colony from slavery difficult, but the 
attitude of some Spanish authorities was chillingly cavalier. For example, 
the Spanish consul in Haiti allegedly suggested not only that fugitive slaves 
from Cuba and Puerto Rico would be sought out and apprehended but that 
slavery would be reestablished, and even the descendants of slaves could be 
reenslaved. Although his statements flew in the face of the  actual annexa-
tion statutes, they reflected the ease with which some Spanish authorities 
 imagined such an eventuality.209 Other Spanish authorities wrestled— often 
secretly, in classified documents— with the prob lem of unequal status be-
tween their three Ca rib bean colonies. They deci ded that Santo Domingo 
should be kept as separate as pos si ble from its plantation neighbors. 
Meanwhile, repeated public decrees promised that abolition was a “sacred 
guarantee . . .  a categorical prohibition.”210
In June 1861, fearing that enslaved men and  women might flee to 
Santo Domingo, the Queen issued a royal order banning the entry into Santo 
Domingo of  free  people of color from Cuba and Puerto Rico. Such self- 
emancipation was a very reasonable fear for Spanish authorities, given the 
rec ord of  people  doing just that from Puerto Rico, Martinique, British islands, 
and the U.S. South during the previous several de cades.211 A local commit-
tee to verify a person’s status would likely have been unpopular, impossible, 
or both. In fact, a secret edict insisted that  under no circumstances could 
any search be conducted for escaped slaves who might have taken refuge in 
Santo Domingo,  because it would stir tremendous panic among Domini-
cans.212 Initially, Dominican authorities did not support the new prohibition 
of  free travelers of color, arguing that the race- based ban was unnecessary 
and even alarming. Santana argued that the  matter was “of utmost transcen-
dence and offensive to public morality, [capable of ] causing all manner of 
distrust.”213 Allowing  free  people of color to enter the colony would “give 
the men of color of this Province a better guarantee by calming the spirits 
of the suspicious,” he urged, “whose fears, even if they stem from la men ta ble 
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ignorance,  were no less easy to spread by malevolent men among the  simple 
masses of that part of the population.” At the Dominican governor’s insis-
tence, it does seem that the provision was temporarily suspended in the fall 
of 1861.
Quickly, however, the prohibition proved necessary to prevent a practice 
that officials had not foreseen: wealthy colonists and authorities, arriving 
from Cuba and Puerto Rico, trying to sneak enslaved  people into Santo Do-
mingo, one by one. Government officials and Spanish officers often arrived 
with their families, and sometimes they brought domestic servants whose 
status was questionable.214 One such case, of María Lucas Soto, reached the 
desk of authorities. Soto, abused by her female mistress  after their arrival 
from Puerto Rico, fled and sought help. Upon examination of her case, au-
thorities determined that “a number of other families have subsequently 
arrived in the capital with individuals of color as maids. . . .  A [pos si ble] 
pretext for better hiding slavery.” Authorities averred that it was “essential 
that authorities redouble their zeal and adopt strict mea sures on a  matter 
of so much transcendence.”215 Soto’s abusive mistress managed to have her 
case dropped for lack of evidence, but Dominican officials observed that Soto 
was to “enjoy the full rights of liberty and the  legal guarantees of all  people 
sui generis” in Santo Domingo.216 Authorities all over the island received a firm 
reminder that both men and  women of color  were strictly prohibited from 
entry and that all maids  were to be presented to authorities as soon as they 
disembarked, so that officials could examine their passports. A royal order 
from Spain on 4 December 1861 reiterated the ban. Nevertheless, incidents 
continued in which slave  owners employed “noticeably altered passports” 
in attempting to sneak in enslaved  women as  family members.217 Domini-
can officials responded with concern. Sometime in the fall of 1861, Santana 
changed his position to support the ban himself; in fact, he even argued that 
it should be extended to include  people of color arriving from Curaçao.
Violations, however, continued occurring at the very highest levels of 
colonial administration. Malo de Molina himself— the same commissioner 
charged by the Cuban governor to study and ingratiate himself into the tran-
sitioning administration— flagrantly ignored the law. Civil governor Pedro 
Valverde, a Dominican of some standing, who had received royal honors for 
his role in annexation, protested that Malo de Molina and another Cuban 
official had traveled with maids without notifying authorities.218 When 
Valverde sent word to the two men to send the  women to the government of-
fices for paperwork inspection, Malo de Molina responded defiantly: if Val-
verde wanted to meet his maids, he retorted, he should come to his  house 
personally.219 Valverde, himself a prominent man, bristled at this hostile com-
portment. “I would have punished this discourtesy and the disrespect that 
it represents as it merits, if it had not fallen on no less than the Fiscal of Her 
Majesty,” he protested. He was indignant of the challenge to his station. “I 
know how to fulfill the job with which Her Majesty the Queen (God protect 
her) has deigned to distinguish me, and I  will execute it even at the price of 
my life, which I would happily sacrifice as long as it  were in the fulfillment 
of my obligations and respecting the highest authority,” he insisted. Santana 
delicately encouraged Valverde to persist in inspection, although the resolu-
tion is not clear. The  matter was handled quietly, and the prohibition against 
 free  people of color definitively reinstated.
It is difficult to determine how the expanded travel ban was or was not 
enforced; prob ably, it was targeted primarily at white Spanish travelers ar-
riving in the capital with an entourage, or at individual mi grant travelers of 
color reaching the northern coast. Certainly it could not have been directed 
at  every Dominican of color who traveled to and from the island; it seems 
likely that the regular travelers to Saint Thomas and Curaçao must have been 
granted some sort of individual pass, for example, or  were other wise able 
to easily establish their residence and status. Poorer, more infrequent, and 
more inexperienced travelers must have had a more difficult time, however. 
In one such instance, Julieta Enriquez, described as a parda originally from 
Curaçao, discovered to her dismay that she could not return to her  children 
in the fall of 1862. When attempting to return from a sojourn in Curaçao, 
she was detained upon arrival in Puerto Plata. Subsequently, she was sent 
to Mayagüez— a Puerto Rican town, where she likely knew no one, far from 
her  family, and where slavery persisted—to wait for nearly a month for per-
mission to reenter Santo Domingo, while officials verified the existence and 
whereabouts of her two  children. Although she was fi nally allowed to re-
unite with them and return to her home, the ordeal must have been arduous 
and traumatizing for the entire  family.220
As 1861 wore on, high- ranking officials wrote missives that betrayed their 
hostility. Spanish authorities arriving in the colony should be men “already 
proven in  these countries,” of good reputation but also “without or cured 
of  those reservations . . .  commonly held against  people of color, for the 
repugnance they inspire in us when we arrive from Eu rope . . .  to consider 
them inferior and despicable,” one official wrote. Betraying his own biases, 
he urged arriving Spanish authorities to be ready for “the customs and ten-
dencies of the inhabitants, be experienced in the evil arts of some, know 
how to animate and bear their carelessness, their laziness, [and] their 
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lethargy.”221 Such “indigence” highlighted “a most desolate inertia, the most 
total indifference to the joys and benefits of a social life that spurs advance-
ment, and the natu ral delay and passive re sis tance to all improvements as a 
result,” the Cuban governor echoed.222 They had lost “their habit and love 
for work,” an incoming governor claimed, “leading the fields to be so aban-
doned, that it is difficult to find more than pure forests designated for  cattle 
and pig raising.”223 His report made his plans and prejudices evident: “If the 
cultivation of tobacco and cotton are to be fomented on a large scale, many 
hands are necessary,  because the natives are more deplorably apathetic than 
can be  imagined.”
For the new administration to have any chance at survival, one major obstacle 
loomed: Haitian opposition and anticolonial organ izing on Dominican soil. 
President Fabre Geffrard’s connections with republican idealists, anti- Santana 
figures, and center- island generals made his immediate military mobili-
zation a real possibility. Among Geffrard’s Dominican collaborators was 
Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, who was a self- taught  lawyer, military man, 
and one of the few men of color in the foundational Trinitario society of the 
Dominican capital. An idealist, Sánchez was no stranger to Santana’s ire. 
Released from prison in August 1859, he quickly traveled to Saint Thomas. 
In January 1861, he and  others issued a proclamation from Saint Thomas 
condemning annexation.1 At some point, he returned to Hispaniola, tak-
ing refuge in Port- au- Prince. In late spring, he fi nally arrived at the center 
of the island. Santana could not know the specifics of Sánchez’s months of 
communication with President Geffrard, but he almost certainly recognized 
the center- island campaigns for what they  were— a collection of republican, 
nationalist, anticolonial alliances, with capable military leadership— and he 
was determined to crush them. With all the might of Spanish forces, San-
tana relentlessly pursued the small rebel groups. Within a few weeks, he 
overtook Sánchez and executed him. Santana blamed Haiti alone for the 
mobilizations, and the capital city paper agreed. “The dark propagandists of 
the Haitian idea . . .  who try to justify or exculpate the invaders are wasting 
their time,” La Razón insisted.2
The massive demonstration of Spanish military power effectively silenced 
open collaboration and re sis tance for a time, and months of apparent peace 
four
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followed. In the capital and other towns, some prominent individuals weath-
ered the po liti cal transition without much interruption, perceiving immedi-
ate financial and po liti cal opportunities. As property  owners, they benefited 
by renting buildings to the administration, continued to forward develop-
ment proposals, and sometimes served in the local administration.3 The 
most optimistic speculated that Spanish rule would bring respite from party 
politics and, along with it, pro gress, peace, and order. Capital city writers 
pointed to the unrest and bloodshed in nearby republics and counted them-
selves lucky that po liti cal peace might fi nally be at hand.4  These individuals 
liked Catholic orthodoxy and the language of order. They used a familiar 
vocabulary to condemn domestic and foreign opponents of the new regime, 
calling opponents disorderly, uncivilized, traitorous, or Haitian, just as they 
had in previous de cades. Without writing about it explic itly, they embraced 
Spanish racial taxonomies. As months passed, some whites in the capital 
and other towns began to indulge their prejudices more openly.5 A handful 
of prominent Dominican families drafted limpieza de sangre documents for 
 daughters who married Spanish officials.6 Poets wrote odes to Cuba.7 When 
they condemned and ridiculed Geffrard that spring in the columns of La 
Razón, Spanish journalists joined them, producing an effusion of antiblack 
invective that reverberated on both sides of the Atlantic.8
Many residents of towns across the territory, on the other hand, hated 
the occupation from its first moments. In Sabaneta, a man cut the Spanish 
flag into  little pieces at once.9 The officer who announced annexation in the 
capital was assaulted a few days  later.10 In Puerto Plata, preannexation alarm 
gave way to immediate tension. It was the last town in the territory to wit-
ness a transition ceremony; officials waited, cagily, for hundreds of troops 
to arrive the night before.11 A priest absconded with and hid the lowered re-
publican flag. The next day, someone raised Haitian colors; just as quickly, 
they also dis appeared.12 An observer noted Puerto Plata’s residents treated 
the arriving troops “with the utmost coldness and marked disgust, [and] they 
contemptuously gave them the nickname ‘the whites.’ ”13 In and outside of 
the capital city, a Spanish soldier provided a similar account, describing 
 whole black communities— “the descendants of . . .  slaves,” he deci ded— 
who manifestly demonstrated their distaste at the change of flag.14 “ These 
are not the Spaniards I knew: they are very white,” another capital resident 
remarked, disapprovingly.15 As more troops arrived quickly, fugitivity was a 
central tactic. Samaná residents wrangled approval to worship in the woods, 
for example, and the governor even gave them lumber to build the chapel. 
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Other opponents to the arriving officials  were left watching and waiting, 
furious.16
As months passed, paltry infrastructure, lack of funds, and interpersonal 
conflicts dealt successive blows to the loyalties of many  others. From declas-
sification to the daily comportment of Spanish administrators and soldiers, 
racism, scarce resources, and disenfranchisement contributed centrally to 
public discontent. Spanish appointees replaced Dominican interim officials, 
and Santana could not exercise patronage as he had promised. Meanwhile, 
many active reserve soldiers remained faithful to superior officers, who 
took up a  career with the Spanish. As months passed, relationships dete-
riorated, however, sometimes violently. In the Cibao, the military governor 
was so hostile that he became legend. “¡Más malo que Buceta!” (Worse than 
[Brigadier] Buceta!) became an invective for a particularly cruel, arrogant, 
or volatile authority; every one hated him, and even other Spanish authori-
ties  were galled by his be hav ior.17 Spanish officials tended not to participate 
in the daily life of towns, even public ceremonies and church festivals.18 In 
the capital, one  woman’s florid poetry praised the occupation, but observers 
claimed that  there was “no cordiality” between Spanish and Dominicans, 
and that many in the capital  were distressed and fearful.19 They  were “sadly 
submitted” in the capital, one observer claimed, explaining that with all of 
the shortages and unrest of recent years, “the  people  were of an ill humor to 
start with.”20 Still, an apparent calm persisted.
Summer, 1861
Although Spain still refused to recognize Haiti, President Geffrard issued an 
official protest against Spanish occupation on 6 April 1861. “Our  brothers of 
the East have been tricked,” he wrote, observing solemnly, “[and] the sur-
vival of one  people is intricately tied to the survival of the other.”21 Santana 
had broken treaty mandates, Geffrard warned, giving Haiti “a complete free-
dom of action,” and a duty, to restore the island’s security. “We . . .  declare 
that we continue to have feelings of brotherhood and our most sincere sym-
pathies for this population,” Geffrard wrote, carefully explaining that the 
Dominican  people had been “surprised and tricked.” In Spanish, he warned 
Dominicans directly: “Santana is disposing of you en masse.”22 Weeks passed, 
and Geffrard’s condemnations continued, which Port- au- Prince journalists 
published alongside extensive coverage of outside disapproval. Geffrard 
considered Santana a cynic and a traitor. He referred specifically to the 
deep roots of “antinational designs” in the east, citing de cades of intrigues. 
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Santana was a criminal by his own constitution, the president argued, and 
he proceeded to cite all seven constitutional articles in question.23 Some 
weeks  later, Haiti’s government paper printed excerpts of a Dominican an-
nexation pamphlet, which also detailed a litany of crimes. The pamphleteer 
called on fellow Dominicans to unite in common cause with Haiti. “The 
interests of the two  peoples are compromised . . .  it is time to fight with 
what weapons remain,” the Dominican author urged.24 Slavery rumors 
spread in Port- au- Prince and other towns.25 Geffrard issued a simultaneous 
call to arms: “To arms, Haitians . . .  Freedom or Death!”26 “Our climate, our 
geo graph i cal and po liti cal position vis- à- vis foreign [powers], our preservation, 
our needs and our hopes are the same,” another Haitian writer commented. 
“This annexation, it is the cannon of alarm, it is the poison, it is death: yes, 
it is death.”27
Si mul ta neously with Geffrard’s call, a handful of veteran Dominican 
generals launched coordinated campaigns that they had been planning for 
months. Francisco del Rosario Sánchez praised Haiti’s “wise and just Repub-
lican cabinet” in his proclamations that spring. “I am persuaded that this Re-
public, against whom yesterday we fought for our nationality, is  today just as 
dedicated as we are so that we might preserve it,” he wrote.28 A small, mixed 
group of rebels gathered in the tiny center- island town of Las Caobas, not 
far from Mirebalais. Some had only recently returned from Curaçao, Saint 
Thomas, and vari ous towns in Haiti, where anti- Santana organ izing had 
gained  great urgency. General José Maria Cabral, veteran of partisan politics 
and exile, addressed his followers with an exhortation, which the Moniteur 
Haïtien promptly published: “The country is in danger, and we cannot save 
her without a revolution. [The president] has sold the Republic. . . .  ¡Tomor-
row we  will be slaves! . . .  We must rise up in the name of liberty, to the cry 
of ¡Viva la nación!”29 As the rebels mobilized in the center of the island, 
Santana himself went  after them, leading several thousand Spanish soldiers 
in hot pursuit. Two battalions of Spanish troops from Puerto Rico, two from 
Spain, a number of Spanish volunteers, and a militia of color from Cuba ar-
rived to join them.30 Cabral and his followers retreated into Haitian territory, 
but  others  were not so lucky. Near Las Matas, Santana ordered the execution 
of Sánchez, whom he knew very well. At Santana’s  orders, and despite the 
protest of Spanish officers, troops executed nineteen other men in a hor-
rible manner on the after noon of 4 July 1861; some  were shot,  others beaten, 
and  others killed with machetes.31 “The first stories of the atrocities . . .  
are beyond belief,” the French consul reported. “ These poor men asked to 
be judged before a military tribunal made up of Spanish soldiers and wrote 
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a plea to the Queen. All was denied.”32 Authorities in Madrid  were just as 
shocked.33
It is difficult to determine exactly who participated in the small cam-
paigns, although it seems to have been Dominican officers, a number of 
Haitian soldiers, Dominican refugees living in Haiti, and center- island resi-
dents, who both expected and warmly received the arriving troops.34 Do-
mingo Ramírez, who had proposed reunification in 1860, was on the front 
lines.35 Of the very few firsthand documents that survive from the rebellion 
itself, one is a  simple letter from a  woman in Neiba, Ramona Recio, to a 
certain “Juan Florian” in Haiti. Her “suspicious” letter, seized by Spanish au-
thorities, and the subject of her interrogation, referred cryptically to a “burro 
that  ought not be sold, but rather be turned over to her  brother”— code for a 
firearm, perhaps?— but the  matter was dropped  after a brief interrogation.36 
Other surviving clues are more explicit. Segundo Mateo was prototypical 
of residents’ alliances, general mobility, and support for the anti- Spanish 
campaign. Mateo had been born in Dominican territory but resided twelve 
years in Hincha (or Hinche), then governed by Haiti. He worked both with a 
local Haitian commander, carry ing weapons, and for Cabral, as a spy against 
Spanish authority in San Juan de las Matas. The arriving troops, he report-
edly confessed,  were composed both of Haitian regiments and of “Haitian-
ized Spaniards” (españoles haitianizados).37 Geffrard may have pressured some 
Dominican refugees to make their way to the campaign or lose the salaries 
they had been collecting from the Haitian state.38 Someone got hold of a 
Spanish flag that had been seized in the center- island fighting and brazenly 
dragged it through the mud in front of the Spanish del e ga tion in Port- au- 
Prince.39 Families trickled back into the center- island towns only slowly. A 
total of 207  people returned over the next eight months. Most  were “Trini-
dad,” “Acosta,” and “Pérez,” but  there  were a number of “Divals” and “Dilils” 
as well.40 Many  others stayed in Haiti, perhaps fearful of reprisals.41 Despite 
Spanish persecution, a few ethnic Haitians did return to their homes in the 
east; the el derly Borni Beliard and his  family came back to Guayubín, for 
example,  after his conduct was universally vouched to have been “good.”42 
The residents “do not want to be Spanish citizens,” the Crown complained.43
Delighting in a narrative as old as the republic, annexation authorities 
repeatedly insisted that the rebellion was only Haitian. “The Haitians fled 
Neyba and Las Matas like cowards!” a writer at La Razón proclaimed.44  Those 
few Dominicans who had been involved in the “humiliating defeat,” jour-
nalists argued,  were “merely a handful of misfits with the exaggerated pre-
tentions of the descendants of Toussaint.”45 Cabral, Sánchez, Ramírez, and 
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their followers “are, [like Judas], Haitian men who have renounced their 
faith, honor, and country,” the writer of another editorial continued accus-
ingly, arguing that they sought the destruction of the country and should be 
disowned.46 Pro- annexation journalists followed up with an indulgent, racist 
press offensive. A writer rhapsodized about an unnamed young Dominican 
who had been canonized as a Spanish patriot for having saved a Spanish flag 
from the “Haitian hordes.”47 Madrid journalists  were even more overt, un-
leashing a torrent of slurs.48 The defeat of the “cowards” had been easy, loyal-
ist writers concurred. “We  will see if the Haitians doubt now the spontaneity 
of Dominicans in the annexation,” one editorial exulted.49 La Razón writers 
went so far as to embrace rumors of French reoccupation of Haiti— albeit 
dubious, they admitted— with glowing prose.50 Dominicans  were “work-
ing energetically with [the Spanish] . . .  to reject the invasion of their black 
neighbors,” Madrid papers agreed.51 “Let us throw up our voices to give most 
fervent thanks to Divine Providence!” a proclamation attributed to Santana 
exhorted. “We are  children of the same August  Mother of all Spaniards . . .  
of all Spaniards born in Eu rope, Amer i ca, Asia, and Africa!”52
Military reprisal was fast and brutal, directed squarely at Port- au- Prince. 
Spanish agent Manuel Cruzat arrived in late April and tried to force his way 
into having an audience at the presidential palace.53 He demanded that Gef-
frard immediately renounce opposition, recognize annexation, expel any 
conspirators, and pay an indemnity for his call to arms. In fact, the Span-
ish actions of that summer very nearly destabilized the government in Port- 
au- Prince. On 5 July 1861, six Spanish steamships appeared in the harbor of 
Port- au- Prince, causing “ great sensation.”54 General Joaquín Rubalcaba, the 
commander of Havana’s naval forces, demanded 200,000 pesos fuertes, one 
hundred cannon shots in salute of the Spanish flag, and assurances of no 
further disturbances within the Haitian territory, all to be satisfied within 
forty- eight hours. Geffrard refused his demands and declared martial law. 
As hours passed, citizens became frantic, storing valuables and heading 
miles outside of the city.55 The situation was so tense that Spanish authori-
ties urged foreigners to evacuate; the Spanish press wrote almost gleefully 
about the terror and the tension of the peasant residents of the surrounding 
area.  After five days of mediation with the British and French consuls, Gef-
frard consented to saluting the Spanish forces and negotiating compensa-
tion.56 One month  later, Spanish authorities demanded an additional 25,000 
pesos fuertes as indemnity for damages caused in the Dominican towns of 
Las Matas, Neiba, and Cercado, a “most moderate” sum, the Spanish Crown 
announced.57
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Seeking to protect his republic, Geffrard acquiesced to all signs of con-
ciliation. He ordered Cabral and a handful of  others out of Haiti, and they 
quickly absconded to Saint Thomas.58 In Port- au- Prince, residents quietly 
criticized both Geffrard’s capitulation and his quick recourse to martial law, 
and they feared more Spanish aggression was to come.59 The Moniteur Haïtien 
was forced into silence. A report on Jamaicans’ opposition to annexation 
was buried on the second page of a July paper, and a  later issue praised Gef-
frard for having navigated “difficult and delicate” negotiations with Spain.60 
Months  later, a journalist nearly echoed the Spanish line: that 1861 border 
trou bles had caused “complications,” he wrote, but that they  were “smoothed 
out by the wisdom of both governments.” The writer pointedly returned to 
domestic questions of agricultural development and education.61 The “in-
demnity” the government was to pay received passing mention.62 Geffrard 
was in a difficult diplomatic position, and he faced increasing domestic 
opposition. He clung to constitutionalism and pronounced clemency to 
conspirators who cropped up in vari ous towns, but he also warned that unau-
thorized small vessels, milling about the coast, would be treated as pirates.63 
In the Dominican capital, meanwhile, the summer executions had chilled 
the populace. Santana’s brutality ruled tenuously once again.64
Alarming Reports, Not at All Satisfactory:  
The Erosion of Spanish Optimism
Although calm was reestablished in late summer, Spanish frustration grew. 
General Santana, author of annexation and Spain’s first collaborator, proved 
a troublesome and frustrating proxy who rarely fulfilled his duties as Span-
ish authorities would have liked. Publicly, Cuban governor Serrano referred 
to him positively, but in an “internal and most confidential report,” he re-
counted a very diff er ent opinion. “Alarming reports, not at all satisfactory,” 
had been arriving about Santana’s cruelty, and soon the Cuban governor 
himself became convinced that the Dominican caudillo was “an almost in-
superable obstacle to the or ga ni za tion of the territory.”65 Through maneu-
vering and vio lence, Santana was in command of a “completely loyal” party 
of followers on whom he rained patronage. He and his followers “have so 
exaggerated their pretensions . . .  and ambition for salaries and posts, that 
it constitutes a  great obstacle for continuing to or ga nize [the administra-
tion],” the visiting governor reported. “They want the top posts and refuse 
the lower ones that have been generously offered them,” he complained.66 
Furthermore, Santana was implacable with his Dominican enemies. He tried 
to block former opponents from government posts, even denying their reentry 
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to the country on an individual basis.67 Serrano had arrived in Santo Domingo 
determined to declare total amnesty, a mea sure that he quickly learned San-
tana opposed.68 Santana’s favoritism and strong- arm tactics extended as far 
as the clergy; Santana urged that prelate Moreno del Cristo be removed for 
being anti- Spanish, but Serrano determined his motivations to be wholly 
personal.69 “Underhanded machinations [stemming] from po liti cal enmity 
and envy,” Serrano concluded, disapprovingly.70 The regente of the Real Au-
diencia, Eduardo Alonso y Colmenares, was even more critical. He accused 
Santana and his coterie of purposely provoking conflict with officials in 
order to regain lost popularity; he was uncooperative and narrow- minded, 
Alonso accused. The be hav ior and corruption  were alarming, he continued, 
and advocated that Santana’s replacement should be immediate.71
 Whether Santana’s resignation in mid-1862 was due to fevers and rheu-
matism, as he claimed, or to increasing Spanish pressure is not clear. He 
was obviously unhappy; he had tried for months to resign, writing repeated 
requests. A critical observer remarked that he had profited from the sale of 
supplies to Spanish troops in hard currency and sought to retire to the east 
with his earnings.72 Certainly, too, he was no longer the pragmatic  Spanish 
choice for captain general. Spanish authorities admonished Santana to 
defer to Governor Serrano regarding any foreign policy concerns, includ-
ing Haiti.73 Santana retreated from official business—as he had been wont 
to do throughout the First Republic. “Off with his  cattle,” one Spanish gen-
eral sneered.74 At other times he was irascible and withdrawn, “complaining 
about  every decision that is not his,” one confidential report accused, observ-
ing, “He only wants to govern with the arbitrariness, vio lence, and exclusivity 
of the Republican era, with diff er ent names.”75 To remove him without con-
troversy, Serrano suggested he be called to Madrid, “ under a plausible pretext 
of meeting his August Sovereign.”76 Not long  after Serrano’s visit, Santana 
retired to his Seibo ranch permanently, anyway. “If his ailments  were in part 
responsible for his resignation, it is no less certain that his impotence ver-
sus the near absolute control of . . .  an upstart bureaucracy in the pro cess 
of replacing his intimate collaborators was a decisive  factor,” historian Luis 
Álvarez observes.77
As 1862 proceeded, so did a progressive increase in Spanish replacements 
for government positions. New captain general Rivero acknowledged that 
a dramatic replacement of partisan and problematic appointments would 
be “extremely impolitic in the eyes of the country,” but he proposed to neu-
tralize the appointments by adding army officers “of recognized skill and 
talent” as secretaries.78 Other professionals faced new restrictions. Prior to 
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the Spanish administration, public defenders in the republic had needed 
only proof of upstanding status and a two- year apprenticeship. Spanish com-
missioners suggested that the  legal ranks be weeded out significantly. Only 
 those who had been practicing law for fifteen or more years could con-
tinue;  others would need to pass an examination, and in some cases, an 
additional apprenticeship.79 Authorities disqualified three former members 
of the Dominican Supreme Court in this manner.80 A handful of promi-
nent letrados sought licenses to continue in their public clerk (escribano pú-
blico) posts, but candidates arriving from Puerto Rico supplanted them.81 As 
the administration stabilized, Spanish authorities methodically purged the 
prominent Dominicans who had overseen the transition. Spanish bureau-
crats Victoriano García Paredes and Mariano Cappa replaced Fernandez de 
Castro and Miguel Lavastida in their high- ranking posts, leaving them only 
a semiofficial advisory capacity.82 Manuel Cruzat— former consul in Mobile, 
Galveston, and disastrously in Haiti— became the director of mail. Eduardo 
Alonso y Colmenares, a Madrid- educated  lawyer, became the regente of the 
Real Audiencia. Dominican officials Pedro Ricart y Torres, Miguel Valverde, 
Pedro Curiel, and  others  were ousted in subsequent months.83
Logistical and economic prob lems plagued the new administration. Few 
public works proj ects began. As an interim mea sure, authorities instructed 
local officials to use proceeds from fines for municipal funding, but they 
 were insufficient, onerous to citizens, and only slowly disbursed.84 The ad-
ministration never repaid wealthy loyalists for their out- of- pocket support 
in crushing the 1861 revolts. Salary complaints  were common.85 “It seemed 
like the [Spanish] government had forgotten the town,” a frustrated ob-
server proclaimed in one center- island town, citing repeated requests for 
military supplies and nearly six months in pay arrears.86 Administration 
costs mounted: thousands to repair the few standing government buildings, 
payments for renting of private homes and furniture, and other start-up ex-
penses. Some of the expenditures highlight the formalistic costs of Spanish 
return: 81 pesos to celebrate the entry of the royal seal, 27 pesos for new 
flags in Puerto Plata, 430 pesos to relocate a  woman living near a sixteenth-
century chapel marked for restoration, and other incidental costs.87 Of-
ficials proposed purchasing the land on which the island’s first Mass was 
celebrated and finding and restoring Columbus’s  house in Santo Domingo, 
historically dubious but symbolically significant proj ects.88 The new watch-
men forces cost 14,000 pesos in the capital alone and almost 34,000 pesos 
island- wide.89 Trea sury authorities, meanwhile,  were frustrated with the 
difficulty of organ izing First Republic documents, and could not precisely 
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ascertain what constituted state property.90 Madrid officials  were very criti-
cal of the accounting  going on in Santo Domingo generally.91
Slow official responses aggravated every thing. The lack of regular steam-
ship ser vice made governing difficult, officials complained.92 Mail took 
about a week to arrive from the east to the capital, and about the same 
amount of time to get from the northern coast to the capital by boat, but it 
took almost two weeks to reach Santo Domingo from the territory’s most 
impor tant town, Santiago. Authorities in Santiago de los Caballeros com-
plained about the slow speed of correspondence.93 Mail from Santo Domingo 
to Madrid regularly took as long as two months. Santana asked Spanish 
authorities to send ships directly to the capital, as the roads  were so poor 
crossing the island to Samaná that dispatches took a long time to arrive. 
His request was denied on the basis that the route amounted to too much of 
a diversion from Havana, obviously a priority destination.94 Administrators 
waited on funds and instructions, but the chief postal administrator, like 
 others, quit to find more lucrative employment.95
Some posts simply went unfilled. Try as they might, officials could not fill 
the position of minister of justice. Although notification of the post’s creation 
was mailed to the colony’s mayors in January 1862, a number of them replied 
that they had never received word, even six months  later. Exasperated, capi-
tal city officials reissued a thirty- day call: baptized Catholic men with robust 
constitution, twenty- five years or older, and “certified of good morality and 
conduct”  were welcome to apply, it urged, and the edict was to be read and 
repeated in impor tant public places. “We read the edict,” the Azua mayor re-
ported months  later in late summer, “but  there is absolutely no person who 
could possibly be a candidate.” The Puerto Plata mayor also complied, “but 
no one solicited the post,” he regretted. The post was provisionally filled— 
more than a year  later—by a French citizen living in the capital, who  later 
deserted, leaving for Saint Thomas  under an assumed name. Anyway, funds 
 were short and would have to be borrowed from Puerto Rico. No further 
rec ords suggest what exasperated officials did next.96 Even the prized port 
of Samaná— where a new mayoral position was tentatively created in late 
1861— could not find any notaries at all to perform secretarial duties  there.97 
In the capital, meanwhile, the Royal Audiencia begged the Crown for more 
money— repeatedly arguing that the administration of justice could not 
possibly be administered with so few personnel.98 Elsewhere, officers criti-
cized the pace of public works proj ects. An officer in Azua complained of 
the impossibility of finishing barracks  there, “ whether  because of the loss of 
materials, or the slowness of the laborers who are not sustained by anything 
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other than the Government’s ration.” He asked for funds to be able to pay 
them according to their pro gress, with the hope of speeding  things along.99
Spanish troops  were not prepared for the conditions  under which they 
met the rebels in the spring of 1861, and conditions  were difficult gener-
ally. With more troops arriving in Azua from Havana in mid- June, conditions 
during the summer campaign “against Haiti”  were unimaginably bad, the 
Cuban governor reported. According to authorities on the ground,
It is impossible from all  angles to form a worthy idea of the difficulties 
one fights against in this country for the simplest  thing. I  will leave out 
the housing of troops in a town composed of insufficient barrack- huts, in 
such poor condition that when it rains it is as if one  were in open country. 
I  will not tire Your Excellency by describing the Hospitals where it has 
been necessary to put two sick men in the same bed for days, nor  will I 
report the scarcity of articles of the first necessity, nor the high cost of 
living, not even how it is necessary to travel three leagues and more amid 
heavy rainfall and overflowing rivers to provide forage for the  horses. 
Your Excellency  will easily understand every thing when I simply tell you 
that since the moment of arrival I have been buying burros at any price, 
and despite Santana’s presence and help, it has not been pos si ble for 
me to buy more than forty— and that  after having left Santo Domingo 
twenty- five days ago.
The  horses  were tired, he reported, and oxcarts difficult to find. “With re-
spect to the depopulation of the country and the poor condition of roads I 
 will just tell Your Excellency, that in more than twenty leguas from Azua to San 
Juan de la Maguana,  there are just six miserable huts [bohíos] in three spots, 
hours apart on the road. . . .  Often  there is no other remedy than sleeping 
on the ground, and the forest is too dense for hammocks,” he lamented.100 As 
always, however, Spanish authorities  were  eager to underscore the harmony 
between Spanish troops and the Dominican peasants they encountered. 
The Spanish soldiers had faced the adverse conditions with such “superior 
discipline . . .  fraternizing with the residents and in every thing laboring 
with prudence and tact, that it is the admiration of the country,” the Cuban 
governor insisted.
Arriving Spanish settlers fared worst of all.  There was confusion over who 
would cover the costs of arriving Spanish families, especially if their deals had 
been struck before annexation was official. They arrived in small groups from 
port cities like Cádiz; often, expeditions of larger groups failed in planning 
stages.101 Officials agreed that white  labor was necessary and resolved to 
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adhere to pro- colono statutes from the neighboring islands, but they quib-
bled on land allowances and other costs.  After the settlers arrived, they 
fared overwhelmingly poorly. Some of them sought government aid im-
mediately;  others tried to return to Spain.102  Widows, orphans, and the sick 
 were left stranded. A number who  were reported to be  dying in Samaná had 
no money to return to Spain.  Future colonists must not be sent in the height 
of the summer, which had caused so high a mortality rate “that they  were 
terrified of all the island residents,” one report warned.103 The proj ects  were 
so unsuccessful that a royal order in March 1863 allowed  widows to return 
to Spain.
Spanish authorities endeavored on a good faith mission to redeem the 
paper money of the republic for pesos fuertes, just as Dominican politicians 
had negotiated. Authorities began the program slowly, however, and they 
quickly ran into prob lems.104 First, the Classification Panel found that it 
was difficult to know if the paper bills they  were receiving  were real; they 
considered it simply impossible to validate them all.105 In fact, the Crown 
issued paper ious of its own, papers that  were themselves subject to ram-
pant falsification and inflation.106 When redemption began, the panel of-
fered to redeem paper currency with copper. As paper money was already 
not accepted, small merchants scrambled to exchange the copper for silver 
or gold, often at unfavorable rates.107 Just one year in, Puerto Plata was abuzz 
with discontent. The state of the town was “alarming,” Santana reported, 
and the discontent centered on the paper money. The tone of the pam-
phlets circulating— railing against the “Despotic Spanish Government” and 
demanding “the blood of the traitor of he who sold us as vengeance”— gave 
ample reason to make him ner vous.108 Poorer individuals often could not get 
authorities to accept their money, sometimes in so deteriorated a condition 
that it was in multiple pieces. One anonymous letter writer  later observed, 
“This disgusted the masses, as the mea sure, on top of being arbitrary, dis-
credits their limited means.” 109 Currency gained some stability, but the cost 
of living  rose along with it, raising the price of daily goods in the capital by 
20  percent almost immediately, and more in the long term.110
At the end of Santana’s tenure, the colonial government was in dire fi-
nancial straits. Railroad, canal, highway, and bridge plans  were on hold, and 
Samaná’s mine awaited an engineer. Even Santo Domingo’s port could not 
be dredged  until further notice, nor could a much- needed railroad connect-
ing the tobacco fields of the Cibao to port cities be constructed.111 The public 
works department had only an inspector at pres ent and an annual bud get of 
fewer than 40,000 pesos. Money was “a delicate subject”— there existed a 
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“total lack of capital . . .  to make large- scale industry”— and so contribu-
tions from Cuba  ought to continue for a time, the incoming governor ar-
gued. He would study the tax system as ordered— but in the meantime, it 
was vital that the stipends from Cuba came with “strict regularity, as in this 
island  there is not a single resource, nor a merchant to whom one could ap-
peal in the case of urgency.” Santo Domingo officials asked the Cuban trea-
sury to cover its summer costs in 1862, but neither the 120,000- peso stipend 
requested for August nor the 200,000 pesos for September arrived.112 The 
captain general of Santo Domingo would have to take a pay cut by 1863, the 
overseas minister warned.113 Cuban governor Serrano was gone, too, retiring, 
as Santana had, for health reasons.
As the new captain general, Felipe Rivero, began his tenure, however, of-
ficial Spanish sentiment was stubbornly optimistic. Rivero himself assured 
the Spanish Overseas Ministry that he was taking careful notes and reading 
the reports of “very authorized  people who have had the chance to study 
and learn the nature and character of the inhabitants.”114 Religious reform 
would continue apace. Despite early failures with Spanish settlers, he urged 
that more rural laborers  and Asian laborers ought to be drafted. General 
Santana retired with laurels and a healthy half- pay salary, honored with 
the “ Grand Cross of the Royal American Order of Isabel the Catholic” and 
the title of “Marques of Las Carreras,” recalling an 1849  battle with Haitian 
troops.115 Dominican officials also wrote approvingly of Santana’s replace-
ment by Rivero.116 Apart from a few minor incidents, the country was tranquil, 
authorities wrote. “Dominicans, embrace your new  father!” Santana wrote 
before taking leave of the capital. “Peace and happiness await,” the arriving 
Spanish governor reminded the public, arguing that a new era of prosperity 
was to be gained through their voluntary obedience.117
Conflicts with the Spanish State
To the average Dominican resident living somewhat near a larger town, the 
arrival of the Spanish troops and administrators steadily impacted daily 
life. Spain’s first visibility was military; nearly three thousand troops had 
arrived by 5 April. The larger state— government spending grew in Santo Do-
mingo from 241,000 pesos in 1860 to more than twice that figure within 
two years— brought Spanish priests, Spanish civil and military governors, and 
new Dominican authorities to the payroll.118 Although much of the bud get 
was funded by Cuban coffers, at least some of it came from residents them-
selves; the income exacted from Dominicans doubled from 1860 to 1862.119 
Merchants felt the impact first. It was they who suffered new licensing fees, 
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 faced difficulties exchanging the paper currency from the former repub-
lic, and—as rebellion broke out—saw  few of the capital improvements for 
which they had so greatly hoped.  Those authorities who had served in Cuba 
in par tic u lar  were arriving from a colony with a large civil and military struc-
ture. “You can go nowhere in Cuba without meeting soldiers,” a resident of 
the neighboring colony complained.120 While residents of the biggest urban 
centers— the capital, Santiago de los Caballeros, Puerto Plata— prob ably felt 
the expansion most immediately, therefore,  others received Spanish alcaldes 
and low- level Dominican officials (alcaldes pedáneos) charged with spreading 
Spanish law to the smaller towns.121
Few authorities  were as famously unlikable as Brigadier Manuel Buceta, 
charged with governing the Cibao province from its capital, Santiago de los 
Caballeros. Buceta was irredeemably heavy- handed, authoritarian, and con-
descending, driving even prominent, loyal Dominicans to disgust. Alejan-
dro Ángulo Guridi, the son of Dominican parents who had left the island in 
1822, raised and educated in Puerto Rico and Havana, was such a subject. 
Guridi had returned to the island in 1852, involving himself in liberal politics 
and pro- immigration schemes, and supported annexation on the grounds it 
would usher in peace, with prosperity soon to follow.122 When Spanish offi-
cials began arriving, therefore, he and other loyalists made ideal transitional 
authorities; in fact, a number of them constituted the municipal govern-
ment (ayuntamiento) that was to collaborate with Buceta in Santiago, prob-
ably the wealthiest and most impor tant city of the east. Faithfully, Guridi 
and  others labored to establish a new town hall, in a large  house with a side 
room. “We decorated the  tables and floors of the meeting room, made a 
carpet- canopy for the President’s place, and hung a painting of our August 
Sovereign,” Guridi reported. Of the result, he wrote, “Well, it is clear, Excel-
lent Sir, that the location  doesn’t look like the Ayuntamiento of Madrid nor 
that of Havana; but every thing is relative in this life,” explaining, “And we 
are satisfied in having done every thing within our means to create a meeting 
room for decent men who have seen  those of other countries.”
The conflict between Buceta and Santiago’s municipal government esca-
lated quickly. Buceta’s response was indecorously haughty. Guridi explained: 
“Well, Excellent Sir, the first day that Sr. Brigadier Governor saw it fit to 
attend our meeting, he said that it was an indecency, and that it was not fit 
even for troops to sleep in; and why  were we meeting at that time anyway, if 
it was not the set hour.”123 Buceta exited, threatening jail for anyone who was 
not pres ent again at seven that night. When the meeting convened that 
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eve ning, Buceta refused to listen to the members’ reasoning on a number of 
legislative decisions. Guridi and  others tried to remain calm. “Excellent Sir, 
we continued carry ing out our duties without complaining, without the tini-
est bit of venting escaping from our lips,” he reported, both composed and 
exasperated. Buceta’s supercilious manner was not placated. Unsatisfied with 
the contractor chosen by the Ayuntamiento for trash collection— neighbors 
had simply left refuse in the wrong street, “unused to the ser vice,” Guridi 
insisted— the Spanish commander ordered the trash to be piled at the door 
of the municipal meeting house, blocking its entrance entirely. Residents 
 were abuzz— some surprised, some furious. The Ayuntamiento members, 
for their part, felt humiliated, and they wrote individual scathing letters to 
the captain general directly. “I would not be worthy of my parents’ name or 
even my own . . .  please let me quit, and tell the governor not to oppose my 
passport,” Guridi pleaded. Governor Rivero, perplexed at the events, wrote 
to Buceta for more information, but it was too late. Guridi left the country 
again in 1863; he published the oppositional pamphlet Santo Domingo and 
España anonymously from New York the following year.124
Town residents often resisted paying fines to the new Spanish state, es-
pecially if they  were men of military rank. In the town of Guerra, a group of 
a dozen men  were interrogated about a game of juego del monte (a card game 
similar to poker). Town officials detained the owner of the  house, Pedro 
Pineda, and ordered him to pay sixty pesos; the rest  were to pay a smaller 
amount or spend some time in jail. Pineda refused to submit to his sentence. 
His re sis tance flummoxed authorities, who  were unused to enforcing such 
statutes. The mayor— whose own secretary riddled the ensuing correspon-
dence with numerous chirographic errors— was bewildered. “I am relating 
this to Your Excellency so that you might answer us as quickly as pos si ble, 
saying what should be done on the  matter; of course the sentence should 
not be illusory  under any context,” his report read.125 Pineda escalated his 
opposition, now claiming to be a “Spanish Col o nel” and insisting that he 
would listen only to military authority. “No  matter what, [that authority] 
falls to me,” the army commander Miguel de los Santos wrote, urging, “so 
I hope Your Excellency can tell me what I can do to oblige him to pay, as he 
has been too abusive and even now continues abusing the authorities. . . .  
I hope that you  will have the kindness to answer me on the  matter using the 
same porter.”126 Officials in the capital replied sternly; not only was Pineda 
not exempt, but the fines for all the infractors should actually be double or 
 triple the original amount.  Under some confusing circumstances, Pineda 
132 | chapter 4
himself defiantly delivered this order of punishment from the capital back 
to the town. Guerra’s army commander balked and asked Pineda only to pay 
the original amount, in installments.127
Passports proved complicated. A larger administration prob ably caused 
more  people to worry about official passports than before, although it is 
difficult to state conclusively that this is so. It does seem like making one’s 
resident status official became impor tant, as was the case for a Bavarian mer-
chant who applied for naturalization, despite having already been a resident 
for more than ten years.128 Some individuals, like Blas C. Jiménez, had served 
in the military in both countries, with long-term residency both places. 
Jiménez had moved to Port- au- Prince without any intention of returning to 
the east, and  there he married a young Haitian  woman and raised a  family, 
all the while as a Haitian military officer, even traveling abroad  under the 
auspices of a Haitian passport. Authorities  were perplexed as to  whether he 
should be admitted as a Spanish citizen again.  After the fighting began, first 
in 1861 and then steadily in 1863, travel became even more fraught. Spanish 
authorities insisted that the families who had left in the earliest rebellions— 
which they characterized as “invasions” from Haiti— had been forcibly re-
located westward, for example, and they bid the eastern residents return 
quietly to their homes. Despite their reportedly destitute conditions and 
official prodding, however, they  were slow to return to Spanish jurisdic-
tion.129 Petitions to travel westward persisted long  after the fighting height-
ened scrutiny; residents’ commercial and familial interests  were simply too 
impor tant. Ana Maduro asked for a passport to travel to Port- au- Prince to 
recoup a sick  daughter she had left  there in 1864, for example, and  others 
applied for  cattle trading and other business interests.130 Dozens, if not hun-
dreds, of ethnically Haitian residents in towns like Las Matas Cercado and 
Sabana Mula did not return east  after fighting erupted, as both scrutiny and 
chaos grew.131
Animal impressment grated on every one. Given the extraordinarily poor 
condition of the territory’s roads and a lack of Spanish pack animals, the 
governor created a system of bagajes in September 1862 authorizing Spanish 
commanders to impress oxen, burros, and  horses to carry supplies, often 
without recourse for their Dominican owner. An anonymous letter writer 
described the rude manner with which impressment was effected: “The 
arbitrary bagaje system: suffice it to say that they threw what the  horses  were 
carry ing into the  middle of the street (the loads of the campesinos), saying 
that the urgency of Royal Ser vice demanded it, and that the beasts, thus em-
bargoed,  didn’t always make it back to the hands of their  owners.”132 In San 
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Cristóbal, Spanish troops  were encroaching on residents’ farms and seiz-
ing the animals they encountered. Not even prominent area residents  were 
safe. One of the accusing vecinos was prominent military officer (and  future 
in de pen dence fighter in Cuba) Modesto Díaz, another a former senator.133 
One reservist complained that he had waited more than three months for 
repayment (108 pesos) for his  horse, which the Spanish forces had seized 
with no indication of forthcoming payment. The Spanish captain was ex-
traordinarily curt in his reply to the query, even as he took advantage of his 
letter to complain of the disorder of Spain’s collection of pack animals. Of 
forty animals borrowed, he could locate only twenty- five, he admitted, and 
 didn’t know what  else to say.134
With new civil codes ruling the towns, other costly daily irritations 
emerged. Where some locals had appealed to their town officials (usually 
an alcalde ordinario) for redress during previous years, now they sometimes 
had to travel to court in the municipal capital, a prohibitively costly propo-
sition.135 In the capital, building codes seemed punitive to  those who tried 
to set up new public establishments, and homeowners had just one year to 
bring their  houses up to architectural and hygiene codes.136 Merchants seek-
ing licenses (derechos de patentes) in smaller towns grumbled at the fact they 
 were to pay the same rates as the capital.137 The revenue from fines was suf-
ficient that in the small town of Guerra officials proposed building a church 
from the proceeds.138 As months passed, authorities became well aware of 
how onerous the fees  were for much of the population, and they admit-
ted that they had too closely modeled the police and government codes 
 after Cuba’s ordinances.  After the first year, the Consejo de Administración 
proposed some reforms. They called on the governor to relax or suppress or-
dinances about  house repair and painting, animal tethering, clothes hanging, 
 children’s dress, licenses for small- time vendors, and animal impressment. 
Demanding a license from nearly destitute, small- time vendors “would be the 
same as taking away from them the only means they have from not  dying of 
misery,” the council noted, empathetically, arguing that even  free licenses 
 were a prob lem.139
Protestants in Puerto Plata and Samaná, as well as other towns, faced state 
discrimination. Spanish officials at the highest level vacillated on the issue of 
religious tolerance, and lower- level authorities bungled local relationships. 
In Samaná, the army seized a Wesleyan chapel that served a number of Brit-
ish subjects for use as an infirmary, for example, only to hastily retract their 
occupation at the behest of the British consul and the Spanish governor.140 
The following year, authorities in Samaná found themselves defending the 
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Protestant population, refusing to enforce newly restrictive mea sures  unless 
they heard directly from the governor.141 As policymakers vacillated, resident 
Americans felt extra hostility; they suspected Spanish hostility to their com-
munity was an extension of imperial pro- Confederate sentiments.142 The 
 father of a  free black Methodist  family of five from New York— who had been 
living in Samaná since at least the 1850s and who worked in the custom house 
as a bookkeeper— sought protection from Spanish persecution by hoisting 
a British flag, but British consul Hood acerbically dismissed him.143 Some 
residents fled scrutiny, even to Turks and Caicos.  Others appealed to the 
British consulate, or even President Lincoln, for intervention and protection 
of their churches, schools, and civil marriages. Even the smallest day- to- day 
dealings, like opening a small pharmacy, became problematic for Protes-
tants who refused to swear a Catholic oath. Archbishop Monzón was hostile 
to their appeals; the prac ti tion ers amounted to “diverse and contrary sects,” 
he replied scornfully.144 Only their central importance to the Puerto Plata 
merchant community, long roots in other northern towns, and the threat 
of international incident with the British unevenly protected them. Samaná 
officials  were acidly critical of the Catholic priests who served the area; they 
also demanded more funds.145
Invigorated Catholic orthodoxies  were widely unpopular. Santana himself 
opposed inquiry into masonry in the territory, for example.146 Some of the 
territory’s most prominent men  were masons; they too faced censure from 
the pulpit. Authorities even forced some to hand over secret documents 
to church authorities.147 Parishioners of local Catholic churches resented 
new fines. Marriage in the church, which had been at once fairly uncom-
mon and  free, was now an expectation and cost an onerous 250 pesetas.148 
In one instance, a local Neiba official attempted to intervene on the part 
of the area residents, arguing that infractions like child nudity  were inno-
cent. The incoming cleric’s repression had left  children “marooned in their 
 house,” the sympathetic writer urged, and he testily pointed to the priest’s 
own shirking of his duties.149 Even the regional authority, Eusebio Puello, 
concurred. The commanding clergyman was absolutely curt and unsympa-
thetic in response. “Your protests are useless and in vain,  because I  will still 
correct the scandalous be hav ior of nudity and common- law marriage, not 
just in the church, but in the street, plazas and montes. . . .  It is diabolical,” 
he replied.150 Meanwhile, the archbishop muted complaints about priestly 
abuses, like Bonao’s drunken cleric, who had wandered the streets, naked.151
The mea sures divided local religious authorities. While some prob ably 
 adopted the hardline stance of the incoming archbishop, other town clergy, 
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even  those who had initially supported Spain’s arrival, resented their new-
found role as tax collector for vari ous sacraments.152 Spanish authorities la-
mented the loss of their “impor tant support,” and retrospective accounts 
point centrally to the harsh actions of the archbishop as a source of discon-
tent.153 A few Dominican- born priests vocally opposed annexation from the 
outset, and the most prominent faced unwanted repression and deporta-
tion.  Father Fernando Antonio Meriño, a longtime opponent to Santana and 
interim ecclesiastical governor, was an immediate opponent. He attacked 
the proposition at an in de pen dence day Mass in February 1861, even before 
Spanish arrival, and refused to take a loyalty oath to the queen or to add a 
prayer for the life and health of the kings at the end of Mass. His open dis-
sent earned him immediate censure and expulsion by mid- June 1862; subse-
quently, he spent time in Venezuela, Puerto Rico, and Spain lobbying against 
annexation. In frustration, he wrote in his diary, “Damn the Spanish Govern-
ment, may the Devil take them!”154
 Women confronted all manner of new mea sures, civil and religious. It 
is likely that their low- capital ventures— fruits, vegetables, alcohol, and so 
on— fi nally gained official exemption from licenses with the code reforms of 
1863. Other ordinances  were not as easy to elude. Spanish zeal for reformed 
Catholic marriage was “double- edged empathy,” as administrators sought 
to instill a sense of “shame” and gender differences through marriage and 
restricted ideals of female propriety.155 In towns and rural areas through-
out the republic, most  women lived informally with their partners, a posi-
tion known locally as mancebinas. Many poorer town  couples had their own 
small- scale commercial enterprise, but usually both partners  were very cash 
poor. One Neiba  couple, in which the man sold small amounts of tobacco 
(among other endeavors) and his partner sold diff er ent kinds of liquor (or 
sometimes traded it in kind), was perhaps typical.156 Spanish priests of vary-
ing disposition arrived in towns across the territory. Few archival traces re-
flect how  women might have received and responded to their strictures. The 
licensing of midwifery—at a prohibitive twenty pesos— must have been an 
obstacle that many tried to avoid, for example.157 Other decrees, like that re-
quiring clothing for young  children, might have been simply troublesome, 
frustrating, and impossible.
The logistical demands of thousands of new residents in the capital, how-
ever, presented opportunities that a number of  women eagerly took. Very 
few wealthy families had domestic servants in the capital; it was “notorious, 
domestics are im mensely difficult to find and charge very high day rates,” 
authorities observed. Also,  water was hard to come by. The town council 
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recommended that cooks, washerwomen, and ironers not have to seek a li-
cense.158 Although some of the highest- ranking officers brought with them 
domestics from Cuba and Puerto Rico—as the enslaved maid scandals 
proved early in the occupation— most arriving Spanish personnel prob-
ably entrusted their laundry to enterprising local  women. The occupation 
sanctioned an impor tant public presence and source of income for urban 
 women, and the multiple- day turnover demanded considerable interac-
tion with their clients in towns and army outposts.159 Port cities like Puerto 
Plata attracted  women mi grants from other islands, like the young Josepha 
Debra, from Turks and Caicos, who moved to Puerto Plata when she was 
very young and “perfectly understood Spanish.”160 She and other  women, 
usually unmarried, moved again from Puerto Plata down to the capital as 
washerwomen and sweets sellers, prob ably to capitalize on the troop and 
governmental concentration  there. Often they moved in with other unmarried 
 women of greater means, including Spanish residents of the capital. Some 
struck up relationships with the soldiers that  were subject to considerable 
scrutiny  after fighting began.161
Call on Me, I’m No Coward!
Even for  those citizens who did not find themselves on the wrong side of 
any gaming law, commercial code, or sacrament, the presence of Spanish 
troops marked a novel quotidian real ity. In smaller towns, their profile was 
likely minimal. However, as the troops settled into larger towns across 
Santo Domingo, their comportment proved to be volatile. General and  later 
governor of Santo Domingo José de la Gándara praised the “admirable 
instinct . . .  and inalterable discipline” of the Spanish troops for avoiding 
incidents as they disembarked, even as he cryptically alluded to “irregu-
larities” in how  they first treated Santana.162 Rank- and- file soldiers and 
officers alike met taxing conditions— difficult travel, poor housing, make-
shift hospitals— and many of the soldiers  were very young, just eigh teen or 
nineteen years old, unused to their new assignment.163 Officers and rank-
ing soldiers alike  were frustrated that their transfer to Santo Domingo had 
restarted se niority clocks for promotion; often, too, their abrupt transfer 
meant that they had been separated from families they had already estab-
lished in Cuba or Puerto Rico. A new theater com pany in the capital, whose 
directors had been excited for a new public, closed when arriving officials 
simply did not fill the seats as they had  imagined.164
With its extremely sparse material culture, Santo Domingo was not 
the most agreeable place for transfer. In their downtime, troops  were often 
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bored. Higher- ranking officers held social events like masked balls, os-
tensibly with well- off Dominicans (or, at the very least, with Dominican 
 women). “Given that in this town [Santiago]  there is absolutely nothing to 
do, sometimes the officers got together to eat dinner or lunch [sometimes 
with two Dominican pharmacists],” one officer testified during an inquiry 
about socializing. The  matter was resolved without any discipline.165 Spanish 
rank and file and Dominican town residents clashed over the former’s bored, 
and hostile, misconduct. Some incidents  were as innocent or thoughtless as 
soldiers leaving open farm gates as they exercised, repeatedly allowing local 
farm animals to escape.166 Infantrymen wandered to towns’ outskirts, often 
for extraofficial reasons. In one criminal case, seven Spanish soldiers from 
three diff er ent regiments, apparently friends,  were arrested on a variety of 
charges: patrolling a  house without  orders to do so, having an unlicensed 
firearm, and stealing coconuts and sugarcane. They  were “skulking about,” 
the official reported.167
An excess of enforced leisure and alcohol frequently bred conflict. In 
Puerto Plata, a few drunken soldiers tried to crash a  family baptism party in 
the early morning of 18 August 1862, for example, demanding beer and say-
ing “lots of crazy stuff ” (muchos disparates), witnesses claimed. The  house’s 
owner informed them that the party had ended, but the soldiers proceeded 
to trash the home, looking for its female residents. At some point, the 
 women of the  house did emerge and began throwing rocks at the intruders. 
“I told them that they had no authority to enter . . .  not even my husband 
did,” Juana Silberia testified. A soldier threatened her, telling her not to “get 
involved in men’s affairs, and that if she  didn’t be quiet he would break every-
thing in the  house [and] kill her.” Bravely, Juana responded by pushing the 
menacing soldier out of the  house, but when the soldiers pried the door open 
again, she fled to her  sister’s home. A policeman arrived and began to beat 
Juana’s husband, at which point her  sister María threw herself on him, rip-
ping his uniform in several places. With several rocks in her hand, she threat-
ened the officer, “Kill me or I’ll kill you!” It seems unlikely the  women ever 
received justice. One soldier freely admitted that the band of soldiers had 
been partying— three sergeants, three policemen, and two Dominican men 
had been drinking, then six more had joined their group, he testified. More 
tellingly, however, another soldier dismissively referred to the incident as a 
“dispute with some morenos in the street,” and the case was never resolved.168
Sometimes conflicts caused a public spectacle, as when a low- ranking 
Dominican officer from the reserves got into a drunken fight with a Spanish 
sergeant in Cotuy.  People poured out of the town church into the street. “All 
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the locals who  were in ser vice for Holy Friday became very upset [se alboro-
taron], and all the  women went  running in the streets to their  houses,” Span-
ish officials reported.169 In the southern town of Baní, a fight between “vari ous 
officers” of Battalion Vitoria and several local men— “a wholly personal 
 matter, without the smallest mention of politics,” one observer argued— 
was resolved with minor disciplinary mea sures.170 Bored and prone to over-
react, soldiers at times became violent. A soldier roughly disciplined a local 
child for fighting, bruising the child in the pro cess; officials admonished 
him not to repeat the incident.171 One soldier was accused of a very brutal 
beating of an el derly shoemaker  after he refused the soldier a drink.172 Sol-
diers felt the division between Santana and Spanish officials acutely. One 
Dominican lieutenant asked Santana, snidely, “How many Captain Generals 
are  there in the island?”173
Interpersonal relationships between the soldiers sometimes soured. A 
fight during a card game won one Spanish soldier two months in prison.174 
When a Spaniard got in a squabble over which of his fellow soldiers was to 
give him a shave—he spoke heatedly to one, in whispers— the resulting 
melee caused the death of a bystander from a stray bullet. A military judge 
sentenced the soldier to be shot.175 Military judges came to doubt Span-
ish accusations. One Spanish sergeant testified, for example, about how a 
Dominican soldier, Manuel Martínez, had behaved flippantly in a church— 
dumping drinking  water into the holy  water basin and defiantly refusing to 
remove the cup. The sergeant described how another Dominican volunteer 
had joined Martínez and made physical threats against him, adding to the 
insubordination. Based on evidence unclear in the testimony fragment, 
however, the Spanish military commission was not convinced of the Span-
ish commander’s accusations. “The superior officer forgot his responsibility 
not to abuse power . . .  [The commission determines] that  there was nei-
ther irreverence nor insubordination,” the report concluded.176
For the numerous Dominican men who found themselves expelled from 
the military by declassification, the sight of Spanish troops must have been 
even more difficult to bear.  Those who  were disqualified from active ser-
vice in early fall 1861 received a small pension, one half of what active re-
serves earned. Hundreds of  others  were demoted, however, not just to the 
Provincial Reserves (where “active” Dominicans served) but out of military 
ser vice entirely.177 They  were forbidden from wearing military uniforms. For 
soldiers used to the privileges of rank— where pay had been inconsistent in 
the years of the republic, title had compensated— these expulsions threat-
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ened their livelihood and dignity. One former general reported that he had 
presented his papers directly to the Cuban governor Serrano, only to wait 
eight agonizing months to hear of his declassification. It was “a  great shame 
for me,” he wrote, and he swore “that if the Spanish Government would call 
me to ser vice, I would not serve,  because according to them I was not worthy 
of attention, nor merit, nor appreciation for classification, then she could 
not be worth serving.”178 Gratingly, too, favoritism reigned. Some former 
soldiers  were integrated, but mostly  those who had direct connections 
to Santana. Members of his immediate coterie received classification, some-
times  after only a few years of ser vice, and Santana was put in charge of the 
troops arriving from Puerto Rico. Even  those who had been classified into 
the reserves felt the indignity of separation, however. In a distinct uniform, 
they  were clothed, literally, as second- class soldier- citizens. Observers com-
mented widely about the resentment the mea sure caused. It was a blow to 
the amor propio of the men, an anonymous report observed.179
Conflict erupted between active reservists and decommissioned men. 
General Marcos Evangelista had been classified as passive— certainly a tough 
blow for a thirty- eight- year- old, and a general at that— and, indeed, the in-
sult was almost too much for him to take.180 When the local government of 
Seybo called on all soldiers to report, he did so, ignoring that his passive sta-
tus disqualified him. Upon arriving in the town plaza, he was dismissed by 
the military commander— “ There is just a lot of enmity between us,” Evan-
gelista insisted, alluding to prior disagreements— and the general became 
positively irate. “The authorities of Seybo are cowards, what ever their status, 
and muy habladores, too!” he reportedly said. “When  things are bad, call on 
me,  because I’m no coward!” he allegedly yelled, drawing a machete. He re-
fused to leave the plaza. Waving the machete, he shouted, “No one come 
close to me!” “My  brother, drop it, let it go,” another Dominican officer 
urged. Evangelista pushed him and raised his hands as if to strike. “I’m  every 
bit a man,” he insisted. “You think  you’re the only one?” queried another on-
looker. Still enraged, Evangelista retreated, protesting that he was leaving of 
his own accord, not  because he had been ordered to do so. Santana and the 
Spanish  were losing popularity anyway, he allegedly muttered. He originally 
had been sentenced to deportation, but his sentence was commuted in the 
amnesties granted by the queen that spring.181 Other declassified officers— 
Evangelista among them— joined the armed opposition to the Spanish. At 
least twenty- seven ranking passive officers  were suspected in Puerto Plata 
disturbances in 1863, and some of the passive generals— Jacinto de Lora, 
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Gaspar Polanco, Pedro Florentino, and  others— became leaders in the Res-
toration forces, where they joined countless more who had been demoted 
from the infantry and other ranks.182
Active Dominican officers received abuse as well. Santana himself, 
General Juan Suero, and General Gregorio Lora  were all belittled by diff er-
ent individuals—in the presence of their subordinate troops— for not being 
white. One incident caused Suero, then governing Puerto Plata, to resign 
his post, and the offending soldier was only minimally disciplined.183 Span-
ish generals  were aware of the lack of fraternal sentiment, and they read-
ily admitted that rank- and- file Spanish soldiers “denigrated or refused the 
com pany of men of color.”184 One Spanish soldier— a young man who had 
served in the “African War” in Morocco— loudly insulted Santana and other 
Dominican authorities as he was expelled from a dance, protesting drunk-
enly, “Who has seen blacks govern whites?”185
Which Party Are You?
Spanish aggression  toward Haiti reverberated everywhere.  After the “indem-
nity” demands, Spanish authorities dropped the pretense of conciliation and 
became aggressive about reclaiming central territories that had been settled 
by Haitian residents since the last treaty, nearly ninety years earlier. The Spanish 
warship Don Juan de Austria arrived at Port- au- Prince’s harbor in March 1862. 
Haitian foreign minister Victorin Plésance was “disconcerted . . .  , and his 
countenance revealed deep feeling for a moment; recomposed a bit he an-
swered me that as soon as the President and the rest of the Ministers arrived, 
they would take up the  matter and give me a response,” the Spanish consul 
Mariano Álvarez reported, gleeful at the minister’s discomfort.186 Given that 
 there had never been revisions of the 1777 treaty to reflect the shifting demo-
graphics in the communities of Las Caobas, Hinche, and San Miguel, “Spain 
 will get what no other nation has been able to obtain from  those blacks [ces-
sion of territory],” the consul gloated.187 The Spanish emissary’s invective 
grew daily, and his viciousness harbored ambitious territorial resolve. Ac-
cording to him, the “country of barbarians” had won its in de pen dence ille-
gitimately. “This is the right by which the white race can assert possession of 
the west side of Hispaniola,” he exulted, “and with such pre ce dent, who can 
dissent against the reclamation that I have just proposed?” In his strong- arm 
tactics, Álvarez was in close communication with the French consul but not 
the British vice- consul Byron, who had married a Haitian  woman. “I imag-
ine he listens to  those  people more than the nation he represents,” Álvarez 
sniffed.188 His communiqués from Haiti  were so vitriolic that they often pre-
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cluded any meaningful reporting at all. He openly and frequently fantasized 
about conquering the  whole island.189
Spain’s threatening imperial posturing came at a particularly critical time 
for President Geffrard. Already saddled with the complicated po liti cal posi-
tion of official neutrality on annexation, the president faced numerous po-
liti cal rivals. Some opponents agitated against proposed reforms to Article 7 
of the Constitution; some decried conciliation with Spain (without present-
ing evident alternatives);  others represented ambitious military families 
and more opportunistic po liti cal complaints. The president’s opponents 
blocked each new mea sure he sought to pass through Congress.190 A small 
revolt broke out in Gonaïves, and the wealthy Salomon  family rallied peasant 
opposition in the south. Spanish diplomats  were well aware that Spain was 
tightening the legislative bind on Geffrard and his party. The opposition 
also exploited the border reclamation conflict, Álvarez happily reported.191 
Geffrard sought conciliation, pardoning a number of generals involved in 
recent po liti cal intrigues, and even an individual suspected of collaboration 
in the murder of his  daughter, Cora Geffrard, four years prior.192 “Despite all 
this, it seems like any day now the tranquility  will be broken,” Álvarez con-
tinued, “the conditions for unrest exist and the enemies of the government 
are numerous.”193 Recent unrest promised to repeat, and the president had 
support only from his National Guard. “The enemies of the administration 
are advising the  people to resist [both the Spanish presence and Geffrard],” 
a Spanish general observed from Port- au- Prince.194 The president sent his 
 family to France that spring, anticipating po liti cal turmoil.195
At once provocative and conciliatory, Spain’s actions spread fear for Hai-
ti’s territorial integrity and the prospect of reenslavement in Dominican soil. 
Haitian observers speculated that Samaná Bay would help with illicit slave 
trading to the other Spanish possessions.196 Confederate fighting reached 
the island’s shores— such as when the aptly named Confederate steamship 
Havana docked outside of Port- au- Prince with seventeen Union prisoners.197 
Debt anxiety and foreign aggression fed off each other. Troubling rumors 
 were spreading: the first, that the Spanish government had ceded the  whole 
island to France in order to  settle Haiti’s debt; the second, that Geffrard was 
also in talks to cede the island to a foreign country. Santana blamed  these 
rumors on Geffrard’s enemies and the French consul in Santo Domingo, 
M. Landais, “an open party loyalist.”198 “To maintain the favorable opinion 
of the blacks of Haiti, and even also a part of  those of this Province,” Santana 
suggested that Spanish- Dominican newspapers  ought to address  these con-
cerns directly. Spanish diplomats warned that the language used to discuss 
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Haiti in La Razón should be “as moderate and prudent as pos si ble,” and avoid 
accusing Geffrard of complicity. Port- au- Prince’s citizens  were interested 
and troubled by Spanish coverage, and they  were “noisily disturbed,” the same 
diplomat advised.199 The Spanish governor was intransigent, however, and 
did not recoil from making new threats. He wrote to Spain, asking for more 
forces to defend the Cibao valley from its “600 legua frontier with this  enemy 
race.”200
Rebellion continued to brew in the center of the island and in other 
sites, and authorities could do very little.  There  were hushed rumors that 
opponents  were pondering concessions to the United States for naval back-
ing, or that Dominican rebel agents sought a new alliance with the Haitian 
state.201 Through the fall of 1861 and into the next year, disquiet in center- 
island areas continued. Captain Manuel Feliz (“Quirí”) and Lieutenant Man-
uel Feliz (“Cabulla”)  were disturbing public order in the region, authorities 
complained, perhaps responsible for the rumors that revolution was  going 
to break out in Cibao, that the queen was seeking to jail Santana, and that 
Báez would soon return.202 Authorities scrambled for more information on 
 these men. Spies along the border predated annexation, and they remained 
on the payroll as the new regime began.203 The data they managed to gather 
 were minimal, however. Supposedly Quirí had a girlfriend or wife in a place 
called Juan Herrera; his nearly eponymous fellow rebel had been involved 
in skirmishes with the authorities near Neiba at least since June, but both 
men continued to elude capture well into the fall.204 Intermittent shows of 
“good faith” by the Haitian government that entailed expulsion of frontier 
groups only served to contribute to chaos in the region, a Spanish general 
asserted.205 The men regularly took refuge in Ouanaminthe, la Visite, and 
other center- island towns.206 It is “of utmost importance to be vigilant of 
Hincha,” an 1862 report insisted, continuing, “Hincha is the place where all 
the bad men of the east and the west of this island have gathered.”207
Even as Haitian authorities,  under pressure, collaborated in the cap-
ture of suspected conspirators, anti- Spanish alliances surfaced steadily. 
In Jacmel, western authorities detained a small group of travelers who had 
arrived from the interior of the island, claiming that the purpose of their 
voyage was to sell wax and buy fabric. The accused came from all corners 
of the eastern territory: Neiba, Santiago, Las Matas, and Higüey; they even 
had in their com pany a man from Puerto Rico. Authorities accused them of 
meeting up with Domingo Ramírez and his forces— rumored to be as many 
as four thousand—of Dominican expatriates, recent rebels, and Haitians. 
Their intent was revolutionary. One of the defendants, Pedro Curro of Neiba, 
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was allegedly seeking a literate man to write a proclamation of loyalty (to 
Haiti) for another small town, Petritut. Curro may not have known how to 
read or write passably enough to draft the document himself, but other wit-
nesses testified that he spoke capable French, had some sort of association 
with power ful Ramírez, and had coordinated the group’s travel to Jacmel. 
Furthermore, other witnesses reported that he grilled a number of individu-
als whom he encountered: “Which party are you, Haitians or the whites?” 
“That’s a strange question, you know I serve the Spanish,” one reportedly 
answered, deflecting. “Haitian or Spanish?” another witness reported. Span-
ish authorities, unable to prove that the defendants  were not in fact on a 
commercial venture, jailed the men for months for unauthorized travel, but 
party loyalties  were deepening.208
Do you not hear the terrible stampede that shakes the earth?
— manuel rodriguez objío, “War” (August 1863)
On 9  February 1863— forty- one years to the day after Haitian Unification 
and emancipation began in the Dominican capital— a group of day laborers, 
farmers, and other residents from the outskirts of the center- island town of 
Neiba deci ded to overthrow the Spanish administration. One of the ring-
leaders, Cayetano Velázquez, grew up in the capital during Unification, but he 
moved to the interior some years  later. To the  others in the assembled group, 
which came to be about thirty or forty  people, Velázquez and another man al-
legedly suggested that Haitian help would soon come, and that they “would 
become Haitian” (se harían haitianos).1 Not every one supported that par tic u-
lar proposal, arrestees  later testified. Nevertheless, the group gathered with 
a range of  battle cries: “ Free Dominicans!” and even a “Long live Santana!” 
 After paying  house calls and amassing a paltry collection of machetes, the 
group marched an hour or so into the town, shot off the cannon, took over the 
jail from its four Dominican guards, and went  after the military commander, 
also Dominican, managing to take him captive. They tried to convince the 
priest, a Spanish man from Tarragona, simply to leave town, but he refused. 
 After just seven hours, the rebellion collapsed that same after noon, over-
powered by the town’s own small outpost of reserve soldiers. One of  these 
soldiers testified that the  whole disturbance had been “a drunk’s affair.”2
A  little  later in February, however, the residents of two towns in the Monte 
Cristi province  rose up as well.  These rebellions  were slightly larger.  After 
five
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overcoming the loyalist forces in Sabaneta— really just a symbolic number 
of troops— about eight hundred area residents marched  toward Guayubín, 
about thirty kilo meters away.  There was plenty of forethought to  these 
campaigns. More than twenty- two hundred men arriving from Haiti joined 
them: Haitian soldiers, area residents, and Dominican refugees. Together, 
they or ga nized three informal regiments. The rebels successfully appropri-
ated a Spanish munitions stash in the second town.3 Other north- central 
towns witnessed short, nearly simultaneous local disturbances; guerrilla 
fighting predominated. The fighting reached Santiago, which was a diff er ent 
campaign proposition entirely: a large Spanish and Dominican loyalist gar-
rison, nearly eight hundred men, guarded the city.4 Pitched hand- to- hand 
combat began in the city at nightfall. Spanish troops and loyal Dominican 
reservists, however, managed to crush Santiago’s fighting first. Next, troops 
 were able to pacify the northwestern movement. Many fled into Haiti, but 
no rebellions followed.5 As quickly as the February fighting began, it was 
crushed again. Authorities warily pronounced victory. Late spring and summer 
1863  were exceedingly tense.
By late summer 1863, fighting began again, however, and this time the 
 whole landscape exploded. Center- island towns  were again the staging site 
and one of the early hearts of mobilization. In Haitian Capotille, a group of gen-
erals and five hundred men issued an official statement, the “Cry of Capotillo,” 
naming a president of a revolutionary provisional government that had yet to 
exist. Even as Spanish authorities dispatched troops to chase them, however, 
revolution took hold in the Cibao valley and the northwest.6 The fighting 
spread everywhere, and for the next two years, the  battles amounted to nearly 
total social war.  Later dubbed the “War of Restoration,” widespread guerrilla 
activity took up more than three- fifths of the entire territory.7 Weapons  were 
in constant shortage. In most areas the fighting involved blocking roads and 
access to rivers, avoiding open spaces, and even hand- to- hand combat.8 In 
larger towns, the rebels devised trenches to face off with the large stand-
ing regiments. They went further, burning Santiago de los Caballeros and 
Puerto Plata to the ground. The rebels regularly faced regiments of as many 
as five thousand men, led by prominent Spanish and Dominican generals 
alike.9 And yet, the fighting only spread. Families left their homes and re-
fused to return. The fighting, nearly general from its earliest days, sealed the 
fate of annexation as early as summer 1863. It was a “simultaneous and total 
uprising,” a general  later wrote, noting, soon, “the vacuum was complete.”10
A tiny fraction of the fighters,  those who  were unlucky enough to get ar-
rested, left imperfect rec ords of rebels’ heterogeneous complaints and aims. 
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 Under duress, they told Spanish jailers and judges information they hoped 
would be exculpatory, or simply as  little as pos si ble. Some recounted stories 
of poverty and frustration. “It seemed like the [Spanish] government had for-
gotten [habían botado] the town,” a frustrated soldier testified in one small 
town, citing repeated requests for supplies and describing being nearly six 
months in arrears on pay.11 Some wealthier, literate town citizens wrote 
anonymous protest letters that  were positively staid, focusing on po liti cal 
appointments, salaries, and the like.12 The Provisional Government, as it 
came into being in the midst of the fighting, made pronouncements that 
 were overwhelmingly nationalist in grievance. The government represen-
tatives also spoke of daily indignities, however. “The customs of a  people 
 free for many years have been tactlessly  violated,” their Proclamation of In de-
pen dence read. “Mockery, disdain, marked arrogance, unmerited and scan-
dalous persecution, and even execution are the final result.”13 Traveling rebels 
proudly represented their region. “¡Viva el Cibao!” shouted one group, far 
from home, as they surrounded pro- Spanish reservists in an eastern  battle.14 
In the earliest fighting, it seems that residents had to rouse, even threaten, 
prominent citizens to take up arms. They did so in Guayubín, before firing 
cannon shots and proclaiming “¡Viva la república!”
Most salient of all to the bulk of the population, and what drove them 
from their homes, was a fear that was more than a sum of any grievances: the 
fear of enslavement. To the despair of Spanish authorities, “false ideas and 
abundant rumors” of renewed chattel slavery emptied  whole towns and rural 
areas, well before fighting became widespread.15 As authorities tried to keep 
residents calm in the intermittent early fighting, they soon discovered that 
the slavery prediction was durable, electrifying, and everywhere throughout 
the territory. The warnings  were specific: fleeing Dominicans discussed ex-
plicit predictions of where boats might be docked, waiting to abscond with 
 those captured by Spanish troops; they discussed who might be targeted and 
where the unfortunate ones would be sent. Such rumors  were per sis tent and 
prevalent, and they held tremendous weight in the desperate anticolonial 
strug gle. In their interpretation, they  were discussions of the probable, 
the pos si ble, and the potentially disastrous.  These debates rested, in the 
words of Luise White, on “a store of historical allusions” about slavery in 
Dominican soil— and discussions of slavery in Haiti— that gained rein-
vigorated urgency with the loss of Dominican control.16 In places like the 
northern coast and elsewhere, accounts about slavery and postemanci-
pation restrictions reinforced the news that Dominicans received regularly. 
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Conflicts with the new administration itself made the slavery discussions 
more acute. As the fighting began, the hostility of the Spanish troops in 
 battle electrified the debates, which spread everywhere.
In their practical expression, what the Spanish called slavery “rumors” 
 were functionally the scaffolds, and justification, of a plan to revolt. “As [in] 
the preamble of any rural uprising,  there was a true ‘ silent war’ ” that pre-
ceded the Dominican rebellion, one historian observes, an “unease” that 
continued to grow.17 In the countryside, Dominicans prob ably held gatherings 
and discussions about the perils and promises of re sis tance for weeks, even 
months. Groups may have gathered to recruit, to plan, even to train.  Free 
spaces abounded, if weapons did not. Outside of Neiba, the conspirators 
had gathered at the wake of a young child. Weddings, funerals, saints’ days, 
major farm  labors, even the pursuit of a criminal: all of  these  were collec-
tive activities.18 The lack of weapons alone required a pooling of resources. 
In this collective mobilization, an intense field of speculative debate arose 
in which group dynamics and trust  were expected and paramount.19 In 
occupied towns, tensions  were high. Even a cautious pro- Spanish reply to 
watchmen on the street could cost a ner vous pedestrian an arm, one un-
lucky Puerto Plata man learned.20 With incredible speed, fighting enveloped 
entire communities and rural landscapes. It was relentless and urgent not 
only  because of the stakes but  because  those fighting knew they could not 
count on the formal army to help them. The rebels committed arson, de-
stroyed rec ords, scavenged munitions, moved on, and remained fugitives. 
They  were prepared for total war.
As Aisha Finch establishes in rural antislavery insurgencies in Cuba, 
 women “shared and helped or ga nize larger critiques” of colonial abuses, they 
had a direct, personal relationship with the targets and geographies of re-
sis tance, and their lives  were also directly at stake.21 In the Dominican con-
text, outside of plantation surveillance, loyalist generals tried to appeal to 
Dominican men that  women and  children swept up in the uproar  were ex-
periencing  great hardship. They need not have bothered,  because  women 
committed to the mobilizations in de pen dently. During the fighting, many 
rural  women continued to manage homestead agriculture;  these  labors rep-
resented continuity from peacetime practices but  under circumstances for 
provision that  were much more desperate. In  battle- torn areas near towns, 
some left to forts, but even  those who remained  behind  were involved in the 
fast- moving developments of guerrilla confrontation. As participant wit-
nesses to an itinerant strug gle,  these same rural  women and town dwellers 
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created the neural pathways of revolt. Their information sent armed fight-
ers from town to town, warned of loyalist troop movement, and speculated 
on the prospects, and consequences, of rebel fighting. As Stephanie Camp 
notes, again in a plantation context,  women’s in situ collaboration, and 
small flights, facilitated male mobility and vital information networks in the 
face of vio lence and serious provision shortages.22 That is not to say that 
the  women got equal recognition, even in the midst of their strug gles. As in 
other contexts, discourses of armed heroism, and citizenship in the nation 
they contested,  were the realm of male entitlement.23
At the highest levels of administration, authorities tried to dissuade and 
defuse the opposition movement. Although they privately discussed the re-
bellion as a race war, in public addresses, authorities meticulously kept to fra-
ternal language. The arriving captain general, Felipe Rivero, made all outward 
signs of conciliation, firing a number of offending civil ser vice figures, offer-
ing amnesty, and trying to strike an affable tone in his public correspondence. 
Santana returned to the armed forces when fighting began, and a number 
of prominent Dominican generals, like General Juan Suero, joined him. Al-
though Suero had resigned  after conflicts that included a racist insult, when 
the fighting resumed in the spring of 1863, he returned to loyalist lines.24
No conciliatory discourse could possibly diminish the dynamics of war, 
however, as military tribunals tried the rebels, sent prisoners in chains to 
the capital, and on ships to Havana and other sites. Repeatedly, Spanish sol-
diers threatened and insulted the citizens they encountered. “On occasion 
some white man would tell a black that if he  were in Cuba or Puerto Rico, 
he would be a slave and would be sold for a certain price,” a general  later re-
called, dispassionately.25 Soldiers dropped all mask of civility, and they told 
anyone who would listen that the government was  going to send black Do-
minicans to work on coffee and sugar plantations.26  Every Dominican in the 
capital and other towns knew that Madrid papers  were printing  bitter, racist 
missives from administrators writing home.27 Despite Spanish authorities’ 
frequent dissimulation, rebels  were clearly mindful of the dynamics at hand. 
One popu lar song exulted:
The whites have already left
from Yamasá
What a beating they got!28
Beginning in late summer 1863, the fighting never stopped. A rebel passport 
was just as succinct: “The Dominican Republic still lives— liberty or death— 
and a war of extermination to all Spaniards and their blood.”29
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Never More Slavery!
The first rebellion explic itly over the threat of reenslavement took place deep 
in the Cibao valley, only weeks  after annexation began. Col o nel José Con-
treras rallied with him a group of men, mostly day laborers, from the town 
of Moca. Contreras and his allies warned of reenslavement, not of a meta-
phorical nation, but of friends and neighbors. Spanish observers described 
the incident as “a mutiny of morenos.” “If Spanish troops  were to withdraw, 
the pillage and assassination of whites would begin immediately,” one con-
cluded.30 A firing squad shot Contreras and three  others on 19 May, the same 
day the annexation was officially recognized by the queen. On several oc-
casions in  later weeks, La Razón vehemently reminded its readers “never 
more slavery” while repeating the Spanish promises of annexation, pro-
tection, and prosperity.31 All the talk that first summer was on the “Haitian” 
mobilization in the center of the island, which had taken place almost si-
mul ta neously with Contreras’ attempted revolt. A Dominican general, loyal 
to the Spanish, assured the Crown that the fears of Contreras and his allies 
 were “completely isolated” and wrote, “The state of our troops could not be 
more satisfactory, and their comportment is unbeatable.”32 “Dominicanos- 
Españoles” should be “alert to the deceitful suggestions of treason, and trust 
in your authorities,” a Dominican official  chided.33
Center- island residents’ reluctance to return to their homes  after Sánchez’s 
and Cabral’s simultaneous mobilization that summer demonstrates how 
widespread  these assumptions about slavery  were, however, even as annexa-
tion was only a few weeks old.  Those families uprooted from border towns in 
the first rebellions of 1861  were terrified to return from Haiti, “continually given 
false news by the enemies . . .  about the poor treatment that  those of their class 
 were being given in this territory,” an official argued.34 Hundreds of  people re-
mained across the border, anxious about returning, even  after an amnesty was 
announced. Even  after the administration offered small amounts of money, 
appropriated from the indemnity that officials had demanded from Geffrard, 
residents  were only slowly returning.35 Whole families had fled to Haiti and 
endured months of dislocation.36 They continued to trickle in through early 
spring 1862, nearly one year  after the short disturbances.37 Some parts of the 
border  were quite desolate. “ There are barely any resources for housing and 
subsistence [near Las Matas]; the towns are in a calamitous state,” a Spanish 
official reported.38 A large handful of men allegedly involved in the 1861 Moca 
rebellion still languished in the poorly supplied jails a full year  later; commis-
sioners advised that they should be tried or released in the short term.39
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Slavery discussions continued unabated throughout 1862. A slow boil of 
unease simmered on the island. As soon as Santiago’s military governor had 
left town, “revolutionary enemies of Spain” immediately tried to sway the 
morale of the city’s residents, “especially the  simple country  people,” the 
governor complained.40 He described the provocation: someone, or a group 
of  people, pointed out that the reserves  were not being paid and claimed 
that high- ranking officials had been arrested in the capital. They  were telling 
 people, he alleged, of new policies of “all sorts of sacrifices” and “the absurd 
ideas of slavery.”41 The general mood in the Cibao is “alarming and hostile 
to the highest degree,” the governor reported in December.42 He blamed 
“revolutionary enemies” for the rumors that disturbed public order. Warn-
ings of slavery and other abuses proliferated. The four thousand petitioners 
from Jamaica who opposed annexation— explic itly  because they predicted 
Spain would bring slavery back to Dominican territory— fell  silent, but re-
gional eyes  were still trained on the island.43 Journalists in Port- au- Prince 
compiled and republished accounts of Confederate ships as they stopped 
at nearby islands; the Confederate Alabama regularly docked at Dominican 
ports.44 Geffrard’s opponents stoked anxiety, suggesting that Spain might 
offer Haiti to France, and that slavery would take root all over the island.45 
 People discussed  whether Spain would demand disarmament so that black 
Dominicans could be enslaved.46 In Puerto Plata, slavery rumors had cir-
culated for several years. As months of Spanish occupation passed, public 
signs and graffiti escalated rampant discussions about slavery and direct 
threats of vio lence. Fully three months before fighting began in other towns 
of the north, one prisoner warned his jailers that “this February, the streets 
 will run with Spanish blood.”47 A massive illegal slaving vessel, which almost 
certainly passed the northern Hispaniola coast, made headlines in Havana 
that same month.48 In the capital, authorities continued to check passports 
of  women arriving as domestics, vigilant of slavemasters’ attempted smug-
gling practices.49
 After the February 1863 uprisings, Rivero suspended civil law and pro-
claimed the entire island in a state of siege, and a long spring of repression 
began. In the Cibao, no gatherings larger than three  people  were permitted 
 after dusk, on the penalty of being shot.50 The governor created military tri-
bunals to adjudicate the fate of alleged conspirators.51 As the commissions 
handed out sentences— hefty jail time and the death penalty— some offi-
cials felt uneasy. For one, some of the alleged participants  were being con-
demned in absentia. “It is impossible to defend men I  haven’t even met,” the 
Spanish defensor, a lieutenant, noted with concern.52 Sabaneta was “new and 
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unenlightened [sin luces] . . .  only recently introduced to the law,” another 
defender argued; he insisted that even the town council members  were “rus-
tic and  simple laborers” with no formal education.53 In the capital of the 
Cibao, Santiago, officials  were in a less lenient mood. Members of the city 
council itself had clearly been involved in the conspiracy, and authorities ar-
rested a number of them as they tried to board ships in Puerto Plata. Military 
officials decreed that active members of the Reserve Forces caught with sus-
pected rebel conspirators would be shot.54 A firing squad shot five Domini-
can men at seven in the morning on 26 April, “in perfect order . . .  despite 
the large crowd of both sexes who had gathered to witness the execution,” 
an authority grimly noted.55 Authorities executed two more reservists the 
following week. Martial law, instead of restoring order, caused panic; Cibao 
residents who had returned to their  houses  were so alarmed that they fled 
again. “The towns are practically deserted,” Governor Rivero admitted.56
Spanish administrators did not raise the specter of race- based conflict 
openly; they merely called for all Dominicans to remain calm and wrote 
dismissively of popu lar fears. Authorities argued that the February 1863 
 battles  were of  little importance, and that the country was on a “progressive 
march.”57 Privately, however, Spanish observers perceived the conflict as a 
race war. In court cases that summer, a Spaniard claimed that among the 
“acrimonious enemies” of Spain  were implacable race enemies. A certain 
Santiago “el Francés” reportedly received a promotion in the rebel ranks 
for “having killed many whites,” the witness insisted.58 In the Cibao val-
ley, “prominent citizens” resisted the incoming rebels, Spanish authorities 
claimed, and they  were violently assaulted, burned, targeted, and killed. “It 
is supposed that the current rebellion is a race one, since the rebels who 
have been seen are black, and  those against whom the excesses have been 
committed are whites, counting among  those victims some whites: but the 
lack of details on the  matter impede me from confirming this,” their report 
speculated.59 Governor Rivero pleaded for more troops. He also asked for a 
new bud get for secret police, but funds from Havana arrived very slowly.
The slavery rumors gained further strength and specificity that spring. 
Many of Santiago’s citizens fled to the countryside, where they remained for 
weeks,  until a decree offered amnesty. In one specific incantation, rebels 
told each other that the Spanish were first slitting the throats of Domini-
can men and then capturing Dominican women and children, selling them 
into slavery. Nearly three hundred  people hid from authorities on the bor-
der. Rejected from asylum in Haiti, they had built a makeshift fort out of cut 
wood, ready to defend themselves to the last. Luckily, the Spanish officers 
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took note that many of the families  were unarmed and dispersed the group 
instead by diplomatic means. “El derly  people,  women, and  children, truly a 
disconsolate portrait,” an official reported of the return march, appalled.60 
The Dominican loyalist general in Santiago, José Hungria, sent an envoy to 
talk specifically with the prominent black landowners of the northwest, the 
Fermin  brothers, Furey Fondreu, and a handful of  others. Using them, he 
hoped to convince rural Dominicans not to fear reenslavement.61 Another 
Dominican leader urged Santiagueros “of all colors and conditions” to obey 
Spain. “Let us reject such vile rabble [canalla] and group together, blacks and 
whites, in the shadow of Law . . .  and have some patience,” he insisted.62 
June edicts repeated slavery’s total abolition. Hungria was satisfied with the 
pacification.
Meanwhile, Santiago’s military tribunals of spring 1863 created greater 
tensions in the city. Authorities insisted on a profound racial taxonomy. They 
grilled witnesses about the “condition, class, and color of the insurrectionists” 
and sometimes borrowed terms (like criollo) that made  little logical sense in 
the Dominican context. The form of the  trials produced another very specific 
stratification; as a  matter of practice, Spanish officers and wealthy merchants 
testified first, then any Dominican reserve soldiers, then common Domini-
can men, and fi nally, any  women. In the Santiago  trials, the most prominent 
witnesses against the rebels  were prominent Dominicans. Some, like the 
Grullón  family,  were wealthy merchants.  Others, like Pedro Francisco Bidó, 
 were part of the Spanish government itself.63 Often Spanish authorities re-
corded reservist soldiers within proceedings as “laborers,” suggesting that 
the latter category was a blanket categorization for many Dominican men, 
whose “condition” (as  free men), in the scribes’ view, also merited constant 
notice.64 Following this ontology, Spanish witnesses and wealthy Domini-
can merchants encouraged dichotomous and color- specific interpretations 
of the participants. They  were “almost all day laborers from the countryside, 
blacks, with the exception of a few dark mulatos,” one such observer testi-
fied.65 Spanish authorities diminutively referred to one witness, Dionisio “el 
Inglés”— prob ably a  free man of color from one of the British islands—as 
“morenito.”66 When a white man stood accused of joining the rebels, the 
Spanish officer who reported the incident expressed doubt at his origin. “We 
have caught a white man, who says he was born  here,” the officer reported.67 
As the  trials concluded, a royal order granting sweeping amnesty reached 
the Cibao.68 The captain general dissolved the military commission of San-
tiago and declared the state of siege lifted. He promised to be “humane but 
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upright . . .  judge me yourself,” he urged. General clemency, he warned, 
could be offered only once.69
At the same time that  these  trials ended in partial conciliation, racist vio-
lence escalated in Santiago at the hands of Spanish authorities. Alexander 
Merriman, a black British subject and resident of Santiago, met the brunt 
of racist frustration at the hands of Spanish soldiers. Municipal authorities 
summoned him over a minor  matter, but, as they notified him on a Sunday, 
he did not go. Subsequently, he lodged a complaint with authorities that the 
police  were threatening him. The authorities’ response proved profoundly 
hostile. They told him, “The police have a right to act as they please,” and 
one officer proceeded to beat Merriman with the flat side of a sword on a 
public street, drag him, prone, to jail, and throw him into a cell, where he 
continued abusing him. The mayor himself threatened to order the police to 
“cut him to pieces and kill him, as it was his wish to finish with all the negroes,” 
a distraught and injured Merriman reported. Nor did officials re spect his 
claim to protection as a British citizen; the jailer persisted in national and 
racial slurs, stuck him in stocks, and continued to beat him severely with 
a stick as he was bound. Afterwards jail staff locked him in a windowless 
cell, even as Merriman was bleeding profusely. Only hours  later, seeing how 
much blood he was losing, did the jailer send Merriman to the hospital, then 
in a critical state. His  family brought him every thing, as the jailers did not 
even supply him with  water. Weeks passed, and officials filed no charges. 
British ambassador Hood quickly found himself frustrated at the efforts of 
local authorities to obstruct inquiry into the incident. More than a month 
passed— Hood sent the vice- consul from Puerto Plata to Santiago to inves-
tigate the  matter himself— before Spanish authorities opened an inquiry. 
Merriman barely survived.70
Confidentially, Governor Rivero expressed concern for the long- term 
stability of the colony and asked for a massive increase in forces and fund-
ing. He called for “a very large army, capable of occupying even insignificant 
sites” in order to “suffocate” re sis tance on difficult terrain. At a minimum, 
a heavy presence on the frontier, improved troop transport by  water, and 
at least six infantry divisions  were of utmost necessity.71 Two vessels, real 
steamships,  were needed, he explained, to replace the small frigates cur-
rently fulfilling the postal tasks, most of which could not even dock sat-
isfactorily at Dominican ports, much less quickly reach Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. Chronic supply and trea sury shortages suddenly seemed more ur-
gent. Funds  were so short that the municipal government of Puerto Plata 
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used 760 pesos of private money and borrowed 4,000 more for expenses.72 
The reserves  were  behind in their pay, and public works— “which should be 
what drives agriculture and commerce in the territory”— were in a “laugh-
able state; they have not even been begun yet,” the governor admitted.73 The 
colony’s needs so greatly outpaced funding and supplies that he found him-
self pressed to send a special envoy to Spain.74 It was impossible “to sustain 
the interests of national decorum . . .  and of the Queen” without addressing 
money prob lems, especially given Cuba’s slow remission of funds, he main-
tained. Furthermore, many local officials  were not of the “necessary apti-
tude,” he argued grimly, although he conceded that replacing them would 
cause alarm. While totally decommissioning them would be impolitic, pay-
ing them a similar “passive” salary, giving them “some special commission 
of  little importance,” or pairing each with an officer of the army might pro-
vide a temporary solution, he mused. And the priests  were  either “totally 
uneducated . . .  or not faithful to the Spanish cause.”75 More land and navy 
forces  were an “absolute necessity,” he repeated fi nally.76
A chaotic and volatile scene brewed in the center of the island as rebel 
leaders, refugee families, residents, and outlaws mingled in the frontier re-
gions and northern Haitian towns. Despite the superficial peace and general 
amnesty, many did not return to their homes as the authorities intended.77 
In fact, families continued to flee to the countryside, frustrating officials 
who believed that  enemy rumors  were more likely to reach gentes medrosas 
(fearful  people) outside of urban centers. “I ordered the police to stop the 
emigration as much as pos si ble without alarming  people and to spread news 
about the rebels,  whether or not it was true, that  will put a stop to the non-
sense stories [paparruchas] that they tirelessly sow,” one official attested.78 
A number of “the guiltiest and the most compromised” stayed around the 
center- island region, “uselessly pursued” by the Spanish troops, another 
general lamented.79 Some of  those freed from jail in the February distur-
bances in Santiago  were reported to be robbing residents that spring— 
committing “all sorts of robberies, from jewelry to  cattle”— and at least one 
murder.80 The criminals themselves encouraged the families to remain in 
the highlands, “out of the fear that they  will be persecuted and jailed,” the 
governor lamented.81
Santiago authorities, frustrated, dispatched a group of sixty the next 
month to disperse or capture  these alleged criminals, as well as to patrol the 
province for “bums, drunks, scandalous  women, pickpockets,” and other 
undesirable individuals.82 Haitian officers at Fort Liberté promised coopera-
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tion. This banditry was the “true source of alarm” in the region, authorities 
concluded, although they si mul ta neously acknowledged that area residents 
 were sheltering some of the suspects. Rebel leaders, meanwhile, had gone 
farther than many of the families likely did, spending months of hiding in 
Cap- Haïtien and other Haitian towns, where military officers offered them 
supplies, and at least one officer accompanied them to start the fighting 
again.83 Chasing them, without any specific leads, the Spanish governor 
resolved to station troops at the northern border and in Cap- Haïtien.84 Still, 
conditions  were so unpredictable along the north- coast border that subse-
quent reports arrived via Puerto Plata and only  there, despite Monte Cristi’s 
more central location.85 Two power ful officers, Buceta and Hungria, traversed 
the north of the island, leaving troops in Dajabón. Aided by collaborating 
Haitian authorities, they speculated about the whereabouts of Gregorio Lu-
perón and other rebels. North- coast towns grew hostile; unnamed individu-
als ambushed a man named Jeronime, who had been serving as a translator 
for the visiting Spanish envoy, and shot him in his home.86 By any index, 
revolutionary energy was intensifying.
They  Will Brand Us with an Iron!
When fighting fi nally exploded again in August 1863, the  whole northwest 
was already alight with insurrection rumors. The Cibao governor knew of 
the Grito de Capotillo weeks before it happened, and he described, prob ably 
accurately, that a thousand Haitian guns  were distributed among residents 
in the northwest in preparation.87 Area residents apparently hoped for even 
more help. As one official reported, “Around  here the very hot gossip . . .  that 
is agitating the families living  here . . .  is that on Monday, a fleet of twelve 
American steamships carry ing war supplies and American and Haitian 
troops  will arrive. Your Excellency: every one says that this information has 
come from reliable sources, via letters from Haitian residents [of Monte 
Cristi].”88
As the fighting started, Governor Rivero declared a state of siege again, 
Puerto Rican authorities quickly sent another battalion of troops, and the 
steamship Lealtad mounted a partial naval blockade of Cap- Haïtien. However, 
a number of northern towns  were quickly enveloped. Guayubín burned this 
time, causing the brutal death of vari ous townspeople.  Every day the num-
ber of rebels in the hills grew, and the fighting again reached Santiago. 
On 6 September 1863, the rebels set the richest town in the entire territory 
ablaze. A terrible fire raged through the streets. The Spanish troops began 
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a rapid retreat  toward Puerto Plata. An observer of the blaze in Santiago 
wrote, astounded, “By nightfall,  there was already nothing left but rubble 
and ashes.”89
At last, Puerto Plata exploded into fighting. Facing five hundred Span-
ish troops and more reserves, and more arrived to the fort from Santiago, 
town residents, despite their anticolonial commitments and alarm over 
slavery, had been slow to erupt. Officials knew almost a week in advance 
of the impending disorder, and a small volunteer militia of town residents, 
foreigners, resident Spanish merchants, and Dominicans added to the 
standing forces.90 Known troublemakers had been arrested, although one of 
them, Gregorio Luperón, managed to make a dramatic jail break. The rebels 
fought with no uniforms, some with no shoes, using weapons stolen from 
the Spanish or ferried across the border from Haiti. They sal vaged a cannon 
by diving in a nearby shipwreck.91 The rebels raided government buildings, 
stole most of the letters and documents therein, and trashed the remaining 
offices. Hundreds and hundreds took up arms as the Dominican flag was 
raised over the governor’s residence.92  After the arrival of reinforcements 
from Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Rico, and  after two days of heavy fight-
ing, Spanish forces arrested dozens. Dominican general José Hungria him-
self oversaw the destruction of rebel trenches in a part of the town called 
Cafemba. He had been dispatched by a high- ranking Spanish general, with 
the admonition that residents of the town  were the “most insolent and  those 
who think they are invincible.”93
Describing why they fought, one Puerto Plata rebel spoke of the fear that 
the Spanish intended to “brand them with an iron, to enslave them and 
shackle them with iron collars that restricted their head movement, to which 
a light would be attached to undertake their  labors.”94 In light of the collars 
imposed on men and  women laboring in work house gangs in Jamaica,  these 
explicit details proved well- founded.95 The mayor of Puerto Plata called on 
the help of the Alcalde Pedáneo and “all honorable  people” to counteract the 
slavery propaganda. “The malcontents . . .  are just enriching themselves 
from the disorder as the country becomes poorer and destroys itself,” he 
pleaded.96 Spanish authorities worried that “the tall tales would excite their 
spirits and make Dominicans fight to the death.”97 Alarming rumors in the 
surrounding countryside of Puerto Plata reported that the Spanish  were kill-
ing every one and burning every thing in their path. The families of the town 
 were fleeing not only to the countryside but to nearby islands as a result, the 
mayor reported.98 On 4 October, Puerto Plata burned as Santiago had done. 
For three days, the fire raged, burning twelve hundred  houses to the ground. 
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Homeless families scattered to the countryside or to the fort, held by the 
Spanish.99 Spanish officers wrote in awe of the rebels’ commitment.100
Townspeople joined the roving small guerrilla bands that traveled from 
town to town, disrupting Spanish administration where they could. It was 
often  women who spread the news of coming insurrection; they traveled 
from  house to  house and on the roads at the edge of towns, calling on their 
neighbors to flee to the countryside, often just hours before the fighting 
began. Likewise,  women spread other information that one side or the 
other had already won, and when it was safe to return. Still  others warned 
 those fleeing along one route to take another, as  there  were Spanish soldiers 
poised to ambush. Sometimes individuals ignored these warnings (and 
 were subsequently apprehended).101  Those groups on the move also relied 
on their knowledge of the surrounding countryside for tactical advantage, 
often heading off the Spanish at rivers where they might seek to  water their 
 horses. Reported a Spanish official with frustration, “The movement counts 
on leaders who know the terrain perfectly. And in such a mountainous coun-
try, too, one can only conclude that the immediate presence of a much larger 
number of troops can paralyze the pro gress of the revolution.“102 With lim-
ited evidence, it seems like  these slavery warnings might sometimes have 
traveled as documents with the rebels from place to place. Cayetano Ve-
lázquez, the leader in the first, tiny Neiba uprising, was the only one in the 
group of townspeople who knew how to read.103
Beyond slavery warning letters, documents threatened and intimidated in 
other ways. When rebels arrived in towns, their first target was often the mu-
nicipal building, where they would destroy Spanish rec ords, and sometimes 
set the building alight. This action was a symbolic and concrete mea sure to 
destroy colonial authority, leaving officials scrambling to reestablish criminal 
cases and other paperwork.104 “Given that the fire in Santiago has reduced 
it completely to ashes, it is presumable that the criminal cases, papers, and 
other documents of the cir cuit court have been destroyed,” officials noted.105 
In Puerto Plata, rebels did the same, annihilating not only the files but even 
the furniture of the governor’s offices and the town council.106 So well known 
was this tactic of archive destruction that the queen issued a royal order com-
manding their reestablishment in reconquered municipalities in January 
1864.107 Other rebel tactics had more symbolic significance; someone killed 
the much- hated Brigadier Buceta’s  horse, for example.108 Often, someone 
lowered the Spanish flag and cut it to pieces. In Guayubín, rebels confis-
cated an image of the Virgin Mary from the town church and paraded it about, 
“with the fanatic idea it might help them,” the Spanish witnesses critically 
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observed.109 In the early 1863 Santiago uprising, too, someone took a Virgin 
of the Rosary and carried it through the streets.110
Within two months rebellion spread well to the east. In Hato Mayor, 
rebels proclaimed the restoration of the Dominican Republic at four in the 
morning on 2 October, without so much as a drop of blood spilled. Residents 
 were convinced that the Spanish had chains and stocks sitting off the coast 
at the ready, and that defeat might mean the Spanish would enslave them 
for life.111 They asked for volunteer reinforcements to arrive as military aid, 
“as friends and good Dominicans.” The rebels’ reclamation of Hato Mayor 
lasted barely five days, but fighting raged elsewhere.112 Authorities wrote 
to the capital reporting heavy losses. Dominican guerrilla groups cut off 
Brigadier Buceta so completely from the rest of the Spanish forces— having 
retreated from Dajabon to somewhere deeper into Haiti— that the other 
Spanish commanders could only speculate about his whereabouts for nearly 
two weeks, and he barely escaped with his life. The valley town of Moca fell, 
trapping eighty Spanish troops inside the fort. La Vega soon followed, with 
rebel ranks  there swelling as high as two thousand. In Santiago, outside of 
the reserves, anyone who had a weapon of any kind— even a machete— had 
only  until noon the same day to turn it in at the fort, in exchange for a re-
ceipt.113 Spanish authorities opened military courts in Santiago and in the 
capital.
Rural Dominican camps filled with Spanish captives, collaborators, and 
escaped prisoners. Editors of the Boletín Oficial proudly printed the names 
of forty Spaniards who had defected to rebel Dominican citizenship,  either 
freely or  after arriving at camp as prisoners of war.114 One Spanish soldier 
reported that in his five- month captivity, he was verbally mistreated but paid 
the same wage as  every other rebel soldier, in exchange for trench digging 
and other noncombat tasks.115 The rebels also did not abuse the nearly five 
hundred other Spanish captives, he noted, although conditions did not bode 
well for the injured. A remarkable letter in Cantonese survives in the Cuban 
archive describing how some entered camp:
The three of us walked along . . .  [ until] we met a wu kwai officer. We  were 
glad to meet him [and] he was happy. . . .  [The second] camp has Chinese 
 people as well, and the three of us are very good  here. You guys do not 
have to worry about us, now the wu kwai have 16,000  people. They eat a lot 
of pork and beef  here. Now, we are writing you this letter to tell you that 
if someone comes near this area, come in the daytime and do not come 
at night! Please hold a green leaf stick so the wu kwai officers  will know.116
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Not every one integrated into the camps peacefully. Some of the escaped 
prisoners  were themselves quite violent men. Chinese laborer Macsimo Se-
gundo, jailed for murder in Havana and subsequently transferred to Samaná, 
repeatedly assaulted other prisoners. In the Dominican camp, he refused to 
work, and some wanted to kill him.  Under the cover of night, he fled back 
to the Spanish to turn himself in. Authorities remitted him back to prison in 
Samaná briefly, but then dispatched him to Puerto Plata to work on the fort.117 
 Others continued to flee the Spanish. Another Chinese prisoner, Roberto, 
critically injured a Spanish prison guard in his escape to the Dominican lines. 
(Along with Segundo, he accounted for a total of four cases of laborer convicts 
fleeing in just a few weeks’ time.)118
Santo Domingo was the stronghold of the administration. In the spring, 
the governor confidently announced that residents condemned rebellions 
with “reprobation and disgust,” and he publicized the establishment of a 
volunteer militia in the capital composed “of good Spaniards from both 
hemi spheres.”119 However, small acts of insubordination proliferated. One 
low- ranking Dominican officer, drunk, began insulting Spanish soldiers, 
as nearby townspeople leaving Good Friday ser vices flocked to witness the 
disturbance. The priest tried to disperse the crowd. “This blind po liti cal pas-
sion of some, more or less drunks and disturbers of the peace in any time, 
[has transformed into] ranting against the Spanish and their government,” 
an official warned.120 Someone stole all the decrees that had been affixed to 
signs in the public square, leaving only the two closest to the guard post un-
touched.121 Some of the early spring rebels had been brought to the capital 
city to work on chain gangs; although  there is no rec ord of their reception, 
the group was likely a startling sight.122 By late spring, the Spanish  were so 
on guard that soldiers  were ordered to walk around with weapons loaded 
and swords tightly adjusted.123 It was a long, hot summer in the capital; the 
prices of many food staples  rose by 300  percent.124
Fighting reached near the outskirts of the city, as Dominican general 
Pedro Florentino faced off with Spanish general José de la Gándara. An ar-
ticle in La Razón urged calm:
Gossip.  There is no lack of it in the city, but it is absolutely rampant in 
the countryside. . . .  Do not be fearful, our peasants, show yourselves 
to be deaf to the tall tales of  those apostles of gossipry [chismografía], and 
come to the city without fear to sell your fruits and vegetables. Every thing 
is calm  here. No one is being detained, nor are they seizing anyone’s 
packs, and men,  women, and  children enter the City daily, buy, sell, and 
Fig. 5.1  Letter, in Cantonese, from a man who escaped a Spanish prison on the island 
(prob ably Samaná). He describes the meat- heavy rations, black officers, and welcoming 
conditions of the Dominican camp.
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speculate, and go back to their homes calm and satisfied. Come, come 
without fear,  because no one is impeding your entry or exit.125
In areas of traditional black settlement around the capital and the center- 
island south, Spanish troops met determined, defiant re sis tance and tales of 
 great heroism. Word around the old sugar plantations and southern maroon 
communities held that Restoration fighter General José Melenciano, from 
Haina, “lado de los Naranjos,” had a resguardo that prevented him from being 
killed by bullets.126 Melenciano took his men into the Cibao region. His 
group was one of the few that traveled in this direction.127 “[The division of 
race] is nowhere more prevalent than in the Santo Domingo Province,” the 
Spanish governor reported, confidentially, “in the jurisdictions of San Cris-
tóbal and Ozama, where the old sugar mills  were on the Island and where 
the African race has the largest population.  Those who  were enslaved are 
still alive, even if el derly. Their  children who knew their parents as slaves 
have black  children of their own, and they cannot but look at the pres ent day 
with horror.”128 Many around Azua and Baní burned sugar plantations, took 
their animals, and headed into the mountains.129
Men outside the capital mobilized in brazen proximity to authorities. 
Spanish soldiers reported “large groups of blacks” gathering at the city walls, 
armed with machetes.130 Spanish authorities suspected one black Dominican 
man, a resident of the old extramuro community of San Carlos, of being “Hai-
tian” for reasons of his dress and skin color. It seems he had donned his 
uniform from the Unification period. “A suspicious man, a black . . .  with 
a Haitian- looking hat,” Spanish officials recorded of the sixty- year- old 
Francisco de los Dolores.131 Interrogated about where he had gotten his uni-
form, he insisted that it was from when he was a soldier in the time of the re-
public, but neither his age, his marriage, nor his “very good Spanish” could 
free him of Spanish suspicion.
As 1863 closed in a whirlwind of fighting, loyalists to Spain blamed pro-
pagandists, agitators, Haiti, and anyone they could for spreading slavery 
rumors. The authors of the branding rumor on the north coast had been 
“voices against whites and the Spanish,” an official concluded.132 In one 
instance— several years into the occupation— a young Baní man corrobo-
rated stories that claimed rebels  were reading letters about slavery to the 
public. “They read it to most of the  people in town, that the whites  were 
 going to enslave the blacks, and seeing that most  people in town  were leav-
ing, I left, too,” he reported.133 Officials of all statures attempted to squelch 
the rumor. A colony- wide decree read: “Unauthorized men, false interpreters 
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of public opinion . . .  have transformed the rich and fertile comarcas of this 
island into a theater of horrible crimes. . . .  Dominicans, listen to the voice 
that is not trying to deceive you, the one that is most interested in prosper-
ity for this beautiful land:  those who tell you that it is pos si ble to reestablish 
slavery  here are knowingly lying, once the Queen declared it abolished once 
and for all in this Province.”134 “The war has taken on an aspect of race, leaving 
aside po liti cal discontent or nationality,” the governor wrote, “and  those in 
Seibo and  those in the Cibao have formed a common defensive mass.”135 
Men and  women, young and old, felt this way. “The rebellion is of the black 
man against the white man,” he concluded.136 “The  people of Puerto Plata 
are very  eager to fight, even though they have few munitions and are receiv-
ing even fewer,” one foreign resident confirmed. “They wrap themselves in 
the idea that if the Spanish beat them, they  will make them slaves.”137
Forced to Fight against Your  Brothers
Spanish authorities scrambled to  counter the guerrilla offensives. Brigadier 
Buceta, humiliated, described a fantastical— and prob ably apocryphal— 
account in which he claimed he had thrown gold coins at approaching Do-
minicans to distract them (or at least purchase his escape).138 Disorder in 
the northern valleys, the portal for tobacco commerce, deeply affected the 
Cibao. Merchants and growers alike suffered from the lost profits, despite 
a four- month debt reprieve. Authorities scrambled for prison  labor to 
rebuild and improve area roads.139 In Puerto Plata itself, all governing was 
para lyzed— surviving documents had been sequestered to the fort— but the 
town was largely empty, anyway.140 A Dominican general, José Hungria, as-
saulted insurgent encampments, leaving piles of corpses of his countrymen 
in his wake.141
Spanish authorities and loyal Dominicans argued that the fighting sprang 
from factionalism or banditry. Some rebel officers  were former Buenaventura 
Báez loyalists, and Santana heartily encouraged this interpretation.142 Báez 
himself was actually in Spain (and had come to support the annexation), 
but pro- Spanish pamphlets excoriated him just the same.143 Governor Rivero 
referred extensively to internecine party competition of the in de pen dence 
period.144 “Disgraced generals, sold to Haiti and  later bribed by Báez, . . .  
wanted to create discord,” Dominican official Manuel de Jesús Galván con-
curred, disapprovingly.145 In simultaneous aspersion, authorities called the 
movement anarchic and argued that rebels  were merely following their urges 
for personal gain, excess, and disorder.146 A Razón editorial challenged: “The 
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monster of rebellion has reared its head, and we ask it anxiously: what is your 
goal? What do you want? What princi ples do you proclaim! Ay! Too soon 
we have the reply. . . .  the goals and princi ples of the rebels who infest the 
Cibao can be reduced to this horrible formula: killing and destruction.”147 
Rebels  were “without cause or motive,” the governor concluded. “In their 
vandal acts and impotent rage, they have burned the town of Guayubín . . .  
and they have killed unarmed and injured men . . .  humanity and civiliza-
tion condemn it.” He appealed to the public, “ These criminals— can they be 
called your  brothers? No,  because you are  simple and honorable and could 
not be associated with arsonists and assassins. . . .  You desire good for the 
country,” he argued, concluding, “and the rebels only want to exterminate 
all prosperity.”148 Another loyalist urged gratitude: “Remember how afflicted 
we  were when we sought the help of the Queen and of Spain.” Of the queen’s 
 pardons in the spring, the writer chided, “The ink has not even dried on 
the generous amnesty decrees.”149 Santana called for “brotherhood” with 
peninsular soldiers and called “bravery and loyalty . . .  always our only cur-
rency.”150 He urged, “Soldiers, sons of Dominican soil, you who have always 
heard my voice . . .  you  will not waver in following me!”151 “Dominicans: 
when someone passes by your homes and tries to fool you, treat him like an 
 enemy,” the governor implored.152
The loyalist press of the capital scrambled to scold insurrection, encour-
age order and obedience, and sanction male responsibility. Imaginative edi-
torials lavished praise on loyalist acts. An editorial in Razón praised “some 
gravely injured veterans” who offered their only mount, a “skinny  horse 
or burro,” to an ailing  woman on the road from Santiago to Puerto Plata. 
Their masculine- heroism- cum- selflessness did not stop  there; the veterans 
had defended a number of other  women and even carried their infants, the 
writer recounted. A nameless soldier (“who died before we could know his 
name”) carried a six- month- old all the way to the northern coast, the colum-
nist continued. “It is comforting, in the presence of the extreme crimes that 
have been and are continuing to be committed in the Cibao, to contemplate 
the contrast that such a spectacle makes with the noble and humanitarian 
conduct of the defenders of order . . .  , confident in their magnanimity,” he 
concluded.153 “ Women and  children have fallen at the mercy of the sacrile-
gious bullets of the rebels,” another journalist proclaimed, scandalized. One 
poor child was shot in the arm; another “ woman had an infant to her breast, 
and was killed exercising one of the most sanctified tasks of nature!”154 
“Mass murders, the destruction of entire towns by fire, plundering of fields, 
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unjust imprisonment, and all acts of vio lence [tropelias] against all types of 
property, have deprived  women,  children, and the el derly of sustenance and 
reduced them to indigence, making it impossible to live if they do not seek 
help from the government,” the governor announced in a public decree.155
Spanish entreaties to the rebels  were similarly gendered. In Puerto Plata’s 
diaspora,  women kept families together and fed. Of the Dominicans who 
sought refuge in the fort in the following months, almost all the families 
 were headed by  women. Just ten adult men joined the 253 families gathered 
 there.156 Loyalist Dominican Antonio Alfau made a plea to a rebel general, 
citing his own “gentlemanly” instincts, the mothering impulses of the 
Spanish queen, and the familial bonds that supposedly tied the island to its 
former metropole:
You are still in time to save yourselves, your beloved country, your  women 
and  children, who you have in the montes and who  will very soon die of 
hunger and misery if you do not take the loyal hand I am extending to 
you. Spain is not an  enemy of ours. . . .  She is our most tender  mother, 
who sacrifices for our happiness. . . .  remember the Queen is the grand-
daughter of Isabel the Catholic, who gave us the religion we profess, who 
gave us our language, our gentle laws, who made us every thing that we 
are. . . .  Remember the unhappy  women and  children who you have in 
misery, forgotten by God;  here they  will be given food to eat and every-
thing they need. . . .  [But if you reject us] . . .  expect nothing.157
To underscore his points, Alfau had his missive delivered by a  woman.
La Razón and government edicts announced pro- Spanish victories and 
bravery as they excoriated rebel cowardice. “I rush to put  these reports in 
your hands, for the satisfaction of all the loyal inhabitants of this Spanish 
Province,” the notes often concluded, and Rivero preferred to sign off as 
“Your Captain General.”158 Government decrees  were inane in their detail, 
announcing even the smallest spoils of war. One account of a victory reported 
that forces “made the insurrectionists flee in all directions, leaving us one 
ox and one pack  horse, complete with supplies.”159 A number of Domini-
cans received official recognition from the Crown for their efforts. “For your 
loyal and noble conduct, I give you thanks in the name of the Queen, her 
government, and with all my heart,” Rivero’s decree read. He reminded the 
Dominicans of the queen’s “untiring generosity . . .  as the  Mother of all 
Spaniards”; as for the Spanish nation itself, it was a “ brother.” He reiterated 
promises of peace and profit from the beginning of his tenure and urged 
Dominicans to “gain a love of work, the source of all public wealth.” Jus-
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tice would be swift but effective for the rebel leaders, he promised. “The 
rebellion  will be defeated and punished. . . .  Stay tranquil and loyal,” Rivero 
appealed.160 He wrote empathetically: “I am sorry for what has happened: 
authorities can never look at blood nor tears with indifference, but when 
they have a duty to carry out, they do so, even at the price of their emotions. 
This is the sad mission that social good demands of me, and I  will fulfill it in the 
least painful way pos si ble.”161
Loyalist Dominicans included prominent island- born generals fighting 
alongside Spanish troops: José Hungria, Antonio Alfau, Eusebio Puello, 
Juan Suero, and Santana himself, among  others. The Crown awarded Hun-
gria the  Great Cross of Isabel as recognition for his military feats; Santana 
had been similarly showered with laurels. Authorities published General 
Antonio Abad Alfau’s victories in national bulletins. “Long live the Prince of 
Asturias! Long live the Queen!” he exhorted.162 Valuing fealty and military 
discipline, loyalist officers  were some of the staunchest Spanish bulwarks, 
and they resented the defection of other Dominican officers particularly. 
General Juan Suero bristled that General Gregorio de Lora had lied to his 
face about fidelity to Spain only the night before an attack (and was given 
weapons); Lora became an instrumental rebel in the Puerto Plata August 
movement. “I consider officers and leaders of the Reserves, who are receiv-
ing a salary  either active or passive, to be defaulting on a sacred obliga-
tion,” Suero penned indignantly.163 Dominican officers’ classification status 
remained a public debate. A general in the reserves took it upon himself 
to forward to the governor a list of former officers who, for “unknown rea-
sons,” had been classified as passive and thus denied military ser vice. The 
men, mostly from Azua and the capital, felt that they had been needlessly 
“stuck with the useless men,” and thus deprived of the means to buy basic 
goods. The petition asked for a restoration of their status and full benefits, 
in exchange for recognition of the “ser vices they have offered and their 
faithfulness in such precarious times,” the general explained. The petition 
was left unresolved.164
Pockets of loyalism to Spain, particularly in the south, buoyed the capi-
tal. Azua seemed wholly tranquil. The all- Dominican, eight- member mu-
nicipal government of Azua condemned the rebels; “We come to deplore 
the scandalous and criminal acts that have just taken place in some parts 
of the Cibao, raising once again rebellion and abusing the generous  pardon 
of our August and generous Queen,” they accused. The period of the repub-
lic was “nineteen years of continual strug gle, ever obstructing prosperity 
and order,” they added.165 The governor alleged that “all of Baní” was loyal, 
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and that  those who had fled “are back tranquilly in their  houses,  under the 
protection of the brave Army.”166 Even in the Cibao, wealthier loyalists, es-
pecially merchants, stood their ground. Some prominent families offered 
buildings for military use. Provincial governors or ga nized militia of volun-
teers to add to the Spanish ranks, even arranging nominal pay; La Vega man-
aged to raise seventy volunteers, for example.167 The municipal government 
of La Vega criticized area rebels as “lazy, perverse, and undeserving of the 
title of citizen” who had “suggested such disloyal ideas” to loyal and obedi-
ent inhabitants.168 In early 1864, Santiago itself was briefly in the power of 
loyalists again.169 Businesses ran at something approximating normalcy; a 
few prominent Dominican merchants, like Don Juan Francisco García,  were 
helping the Spanish extensively. It was his conviction that all the merchants 
wanted the Spanish government back, as did many of the residents of nearby 
Moca, he maintained. The governor was quick to publicly thank town coun-
cils for “loyal and patriotic” sentiments. In the capital, Josefa A. Perdomo 
dedicated an elegy to Rivero, expressing gratitude for his “constant wish . . .  
to return to us peace and prosperity.” Josefa A. Del Monte replied to Per-
domo, calling her lazy and ambitious. “[Queen] Isabel is waiting for you in 
her palace,” the second poet chided.170
A new Spanish official, Carlos de Vargas, replaced Rivero as governor  after 
just more than a year. Loyal observers  were optimistic about his reception, 
despite the very compromised military situation. “ There appears to be a bet-
ter feeling since the arrival of the pres ent Captain General, who appears so 
far to be an honorable and just ruler,” the U.S. commercial agent reported.171 
In a confidential letter, the captain general expressed his grave concerns 
to the Overseas Ministry. “It is difficult for you to imagine, Excellent Sir, 
how far this extremely critical and dangerous situation can carry on,” Var-
gas confided, praising Santana and La Gándara for fighting bravely. “I must 
inspire confidence in the country . . .  as the first step of pacification,” he 
wrote, “and . . .  the show of adherence and cooperation from many influ-
ential men of the country . . .  make me think I can achieve it.” Meanwhile, 
though, the governors of Cuba and Puerto Rico “cannot afford to send even 
one more soldier,” he lamented.172 The incoming governor addressed the 
Provincial Reserves and Spanish forces together: “A few rebels have put this 
Antille, worthy of a better fate, into a terrible state. . . .  They have relied on 
arson, robbery, assassination and horrific destruction to regain a freedom 
they have already been guaranteed.” Protect “the peaceful and honest man, 
and help him immediately return to his home,” he urged the troops.173 About 
seventy soldiers fighting with Santana received special recognition for a 
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particularly brutal 29 September fight at Arroyo Bermejo, and the governor 
promised publicly that order would soon return everywhere.
Strained resources, poor infrastructure, the demands of war, and suc-
cessful guerrilla blockades crippled the administration. Public works every-
where  were in “total paralysis.”174 Azuan authorities reported they had 
“absolutely no funds,” no resources to care for the prisoners,  little security, 
and no way to continue  trials.175 Soon, food was scarce and the town was 
totally empty. Rebels in and around the town burned farms, moved the live-
stock, and blocked supply lines. Only small amounts of food arrived by boat 
from the capital.176 Government documents went unsigned for months. 
When towns became “empty and depopulated,” authorities left some mu-
nicipal posts unfilled, simply to save money.177 Absenteeism was a prob lem 
even where government functioned. Interim regulations created sign-in 
logs for administrators to prove their attendance, and leaves became strictly 
unpaid. Troubled officials acknowledged the new restrictions but com-
plained, in light of food scarcity and fighting, “It endangers  those who are 
truly suffering.”178 Military officials filled empty civilian posts, sometimes 
poorly. When an infantry col o nel became provisional governor of Samaná 
in the late summer of 1863—as other authorities left for the fighting in 
Santiago—he played fast and loose with his authority. To defend the pen-
insula, he selected the hundred or so “Eu ro pean” (presumably Spanish) 
convicts and gave them guns. Chaos ensued. The convicts menaced the 
residents, made racist threats, robbed stores, and caused many families to 
flee.179 The interim governor’s apparent failure to properly punish the trans-
gressors frustrated residents further. He spent his nights sleeping on a ship 
off the coast, diffident and unaccountable. “I  can’t say this was the one and 
only cause of the uprising in Samaná, but I cannot think of another one to 
report,” a reservist observed.180
 Women in loyalist towns navigated increased tensions. As in other Ca-
rib bean towns, laundry work forged noisy, public, feminine spaces where 
 women’s  labor mono poly earned them bargaining power with municipal of-
ficials, but where the public nature of their tasks could also make them targets 
of discursive and physical vio lence.181 Laundry  women found themselves 
before Santo Domingo’s military tribunal. Sometimes, they instigated the 
inquest. In one case in the capital, two  women (émigrées from Santiago) 
turned on a man, Manuel Guerrero, alleging that he had called the Spanish 
“whores,” that he “had a pistol to shoot them all,” and that he was part of a 
suspicious meeting. Guerrero— a bricklayer, just twenty years old, and of 
marginal means— retorted that he had only been detained  because of the ill 
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 will the two  women had for him. He had been attending wake, not a suspi-
cious meeting, he protested, and he proceeded to name a number of  people 
who had also been in attendance. Five washerwomen, divided in their ac-
counts, testified at Guerrero’s trial. Two reported that Guerrero yelled abu-
sive remarks at them for attending a dance with Spanish officers, hosted at 
another  woman’s  house. One of the  women bragged that she had reported 
“the black” the next day to the same Spanish officers, for having “insulted 
her and spoken poorly of the Spanish.” Authorities sentenced Guerrero to 
one month in jail, but he languished for nearly two  until he was freed.182 
Other capital city  women faced death threats for relations with Spanish 
men.183 In the opening fighting of Santiago, rebel men shouted to a small 
group of  women who had remained with the Spanish, “ We’re  going to chop 
off your and the other four whores’ heads”; another  woman was murdered 
for her supposed treason of cohabiting with a Spaniard.184
Throughout the east, rebels engaged in the delicate politics of solidarity, 
secrecy, and trust as they tried to recruit their friends and neighbors. Letters 
suggested that verbal communication was best. “Let’s meet so that I can tell 
you certain very impor tant, secret  things,” one officer urged another.185 Even 
discussions  were not necessarily safe. In Bayaguana, authorities jailed re-
servist soldier José de la Cruz on suspicion of convincing his fellow soldiers 
to join the revolution and flee to the mountains “to meet up with the Cibae-
ños.” One witness, Teodisio Contreras, divulged the entire conversation he 
had with his fellow soldier, whom he knew as Pepe. In the street at the center 
of town, de la Cruz had spoken to Contreras frankly, “Man, I am  going to tell 
you something, and I think as a friend you  won’t give me up. And even if you 
do and they kill me, tomorrow  there  will be another person, who  will kill 
you. I am  going to join up to night . . .  come with me, or if you  don’t want to 
go,  don’t go, and when we arrive, I  won’t shoot you.” De la Cruz had carefully 
thought about his tangled allegiances; he reassured another soldier again 
that “he would not harm Dominicans, just the Spanish,” even if that man 
deci ded to remain loyal to the colonial forces. Unfortunately for de la Cruz, 
Contreras left for his barracks and told his sergeant immediately. Officials 
declared an embargo on de la Cruz’s goods, but five months  later annulled 
it—he had no possessions to embargo.186 Other appeals employed similarly 
intimate terms. “Countryman— Brother and Friend,” another writer began. 
“This letter  doesn’t seek to say anything except to say we hope that you enjoy 
the same feelings, and that as a result of this communication you  will raise 
the Dominican flag. . . .  Here it is reigning with high enthusiasm. Long 
Live Religion, Liberty, the Dominican Republic, and Perfect Union!”187 “In 
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all of the Cibao, the Dominican flag is flying,” the writer reported. The letter 
bore a handwritten letterhead ambitiously announcing the return of in de-
pen dence: “The Dominican Republic— God, Country, and Liberty.”
Fighting threatened to tear communities apart, but rebels  were initially 
optimistic and conciliatory. In some of the early fighting in Puerto Plata, 
rebel commanders gave explicit  orders not to shoot Dominicans fighting 
alongside Spanish troops, for example. Spanish authorities spread stories 
that the rebels  were shooting loyal Dominican families, although the rumor 
never held much traction.188 In Hato Mayor, a rebel letter from 1863 read 
encouragingly, “We have come  here like  brothers, and it is a revolution of 
princi ple for which we need nothing more than unity and fraternity among 
Dominicans.” No one wanted “even a drop of blood to be spread . . .  vivan 
todos los dominicanos,” the letter announced reassuringly.189 A rebel general 
entreated Dominicans in the reserves, “Let us not engage in a fratricidal 
war of hate.” He continued, “I know you come forced to fight against your 
 brothers; put down your arms or come join the ranks of liberty.”190 “Domini-
cans! . . .  do not let yourself be seduced by the vile interests with which they 
try to buy your ser vices, to make you brandish arms against your  brothers 
and your homeland,” another pleaded.191 “Leave the lines who are assas-
sinating your  brothers,” another urged a prominent rebel general.192 “The 
friendship you have always shown me . . .  and Christian obedience . . .  
[and the memory] of your noble fighting in Santiago in 1852 oblige me to 
write this note,” one general publicly addressed General Antonio Alfau. His 
tone was deferential. “Even though I am not worthy of your attention, listen 
to what I am telling you, for no child wants bad  things for his  father,” he 
urged. “But no  matter what, I am a republican, and I can do nothing less 
than fulfill my duties as a citizen,” he continued. “Santo Domingo’s  children 
do not want to fight with you nor General Santana. . . .  We do not want war 
without  fathers . . .  but if you do, we  will fight to the last bullet.”193 A reserv-
ist soldier in an early  battle replied to such sentiments, “Every one in Cibao 
should die for being traitors.”194
As chaos swept to each town— even if it did not remain in the hands of 
the rebels— municipal governments’ prob lems multiplied exponentially. In 
accordance with the governor’s  orders, all officials and prisoners from Azua 
evacuated to the capital city in mid- October, for example. Three months 
 later (December), they returned, but officials from more northern cities 
(including La Vega) fled subsequently to the safety of the capital. Samaná, 
previously peaceful, was almost totally deserted by early December. As 1863 
wound to a close, Spanish troops clung to the southern towns, with their 
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eyes on the rebellious Cibao. Despite heavy fighting in nearby Llamasá, 
the capital remained a Spanish stronghold. Governor Vargas continued the 
practice of publishing victories, although his tone wavered slightly; the 
narrative strayed from “quick and shameful retreats” of rebels to admit-
ting “sustained fighting.” He continued to thank  those loyal to the “cause 
of order,” promising medals and praising loyalist bravery. Privately, he de-
scribed a more complex situation. “Many of color join our ranks, especially 
from Azua and Seybo, but they stay just fifteen or twenty days, and then they 
leave to or ga nize parties of bandits,” he decried.  Those groups troubled local 
residents, he claimed, “who [themselves] are gathered and armed to care for 
their plots and land and cannot be called enemies of ours, but neither can 
their loyalty be counted on.”195 Even in southern towns, flight caused the 
line between resident and rebel to be indistinguishable. “The Spaniards 
are making no pro gress what ever,” one man observed. “Wherever they go, 
the  people get out of their sight.”196
Puerto Plata, strategically vital, exemplified the worst entrenchment of 
the conflict. As fighting cut off north- south communication, news from 
Santiago and Puerto Plata could reach the capital only by boat, and vice 
versa.197 As Spanish forces dug in, their control did not extend much beyond 
the fort. Spanish troops “enthusiastically destroyed  enemy trenches,” Puerto 
Plata’s mayor reported, but they could not sleep outside. Within the walls, 
soldiers celebrated Queen’s Day, “as far as was pos si ble, with good morale 
and monarchical sentiment,” a commander reported; he also reported spo-
radic exchanges of gunfire.198 With just a short cease- fire at Christmas, the 
siege and sporadic confrontations continued. Unlike in some other mu-
nicipalities, officials deci ded that evacuating the port officials to Santo Do-
mingo would be “embarrassing,” and only the mayor made the trip.  Battles 
continued at bayonet point around the ruins of the church. Periodic rumors 
of large numbers of rebels arriving from the west bolstered rebel morale, but 
Spanish troops dug in their heels to cries of “Long live the queen!”
The fighting swept up  whole families, willingly or other wise. Some tes-
tified to military commissions that they had been held against their  will. 
One man who had left Puerto Plata’s limits to find food on his farm was 
captured for two weeks, he claimed, and he suffered constant death threats 
and only barely escaped. Rebels took his clothing and other possessions, 
he lamented.199 Area rebels gathered forces using “threats and terror,” 
Puerto Plata officials accused.200 Concerned parents accused disgruntled 
reservists of attempting to “seduce” their sons. The rebels drafted  whole 
towns. In San Cristóbal, a handwritten decree from “the Junta of this town, 
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in the name of the Dominican Republic” announced that all  those aged 
sixteen to sixty  were to take up arms for defense of the country, to report for 
duty within forty- eight hours.201 Both Spanish and Dominican authorities 
pressured low- level alcaldes pedaneos to help recruit townspeople.202 Rebels 
warned the local authorities to help the Dominican cause or “be subject to 
the same penalties [as traitors].”203 A number of prominent loyalist families 
in the Cibao had to flee. Some traveled with the Spanish forces or fled to be 
with the rebels for protection. Remaining in town was physically danger-
ous but also presented the possibility of sedition charges.204 Exiled men 
pleaded for the right to return, invoking the amnesties of early spring. “All 
are peaceful and honorable men . . .  who want to live quietly in their homes 
with their families,” one letter pleaded.205 Some testified that some of their 
 family— brothers, godfathers, and so on— had been caught up with the reb-
els, causing families to lose contact.206 Given the scattered nature of the 
fighting, Spanish troops could not stay long in any one place, and  people 
worried that “the grave scenes would repeat,” especially pillage, as they left. 
Rebels grabbed what guns and munitions that remained, and then moved 
on themselves. Sometimes they seized the animals of locals suspected of 
aiding the Spanish, like one man suspected of ferrying  water to the Spanish 
holed up in a fort.207
Given the fires that overtook many towns, often  there was  little to which 
 people could return. Puerto Plata had burned nearly to the ground in October 
1863. For the fire and for the pillaging that followed, the Spanish blamed the 
rebels, the rebels blamed the Spanish, and merchants and families simply 
faced destitution.208 Small groups of Dominican vigilantes harassed Span-
ish troops who descended from the fort to protect property, Puerto Plata’s 
mayor reported, chagrined.  Because he believed  there  were many more reb-
els just outside the town,  there was  little to be done.209 Baní burned that fall, 
too, sixty- eight buildings in all, including many of the impor tant stores in 
the town. Only heavy rains saved some  houses. The U.S. commercial agent 
observed, “No  matter where the Spaniards go . . .  , when the Dominicans 
see that they are not able to hold a place, they prefer to lay it in ashes, rather 
than suffer the Spaniards to take possession and hold it.”210 Small towns 
like Guayubín  were just a collection of huts, basically defenseless, and even 
the Spanish admitted that the arriving rebels  were kind and “humanitarian” 
in the early spring.211 As the town was swept into rebellion again, however, 
a number of citizens died in the fires. When Spanish general La Gándara 
arrived in Barahona in early 1864, he found it burned and abandoned. A 
rebel writer lamented, “Fire, the devastation of our towns, wives without 
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husbands,  children without their parents, the loss of all of our livelihood, 
and fi nally misery— these are the fruits we have won.”212
“Santo Domingo  Don’t Want Whites”: Trenches Deepen
Many Dominicans remained away from their homes, and the Spanish could 
neither defeat the rebels nor return to everyday administration. Authorities 
offered a second round of po liti cal amnesty (for all but the accused “ring-
leaders”) in August, and another as the new governor, Carlos de Vargas, took 
power. They bristled at what they saw as the hubris of the popu lar Domini-
can reply: few took it, few returned to their homes, and many continued 
to travel with the guerrilla bands that now traversed most of the country.213 
Prisoners freed by the rebels or during the chaos that swept through  were in 
something of a predicament: they  were unsure  whether they could return 
to their homes.  Because the destruction of court rec ords had erased their 
 legal status, former prisoners preferred the countryside, rebel lines, or even 
flight to foreign countries over the prospect of retrial by the Spanish. And, 
as one official complained, “They can hide themselves for eternity.” Given 
 these “anomalous circumstances,” multiple capital city authorities argued 
that a tabula rasa of sorts  ought to be established— not a published amnesty, 
per se, but rather the policy of reopening court cases only for  those who 
newly committed themselves to the rebel cause.214 Authorities condemned 
prominent rebels to death in absentia, so their exile was more certain. “All 
the reflections, deference, and benefits are totally useless with idiot  people 
who are without education or civilization who have lived for de cades in the 
woods, with only the wildest of occupations,” Governor Carlos de Vargas 
fumed in a confidential letter.215
As the guerrilla opposition spread everywhere, the discipline of Spanish 
soldiers faltered. Newly arriving soldiers described Dominican rebels non-
chalantly as “the  enemy”: “Long live Spain! Long live the Queen! . . .  To 
the bayonets!”216 Among the exhausted ground troops, however, the most 
common infractions came to be insubordination, obscenity, drunken sol-
diers leaving their posts, dereliction in prisoner surveillance, theft, fighting, 
dressing as a civilian, and outright desertion.217 Murder cases occasionally 
gripped the military courts; a December 1863 Puerto Plata murder case, in-
volving two soldiers from the Isabel II regiment, caused official stir as far as 
Havana.218 A fight between a Spanish soldier and a Dominican cart driver in 
the capital proved fatal for the latter, but authorities exculpated the soldier on 
the grounds of self- defense.219 One soldier, so frightened of his sentence for 
having shot a local man, fled the military hospital, only to be apprehended 
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the following day.220 Both robbery and murder seem to have increased as the 
fighting ground on; soldiers stood accused of stealing and reselling provi-
sions, assaults on each other, and robberies against Dominican citizens.221 A 
few of the cases in Puerto Plata and Azua involved massive theft, of the sort 
that might only be effected in a chaotic port town; 500  bottles of wine, 9,732 
rations of galletas, 49,551 rations of coffee, and so on.222 In one instance, a 
 whole trunk of money went missing, in the amount of 9,000 pesos.223
Discipline of the Provincial Reserves also suffered, leaving Spanish au-
thorities exasperated and suspicious. High- profile defection of Dominican 
generals put Spanish nerves on edge; among the rank and file, absentee-
ism was just as destructive, if more inscrutable. A considerable number de-
serted in the early months—in one instance, nearly five hundred  people.224 
As 1863 wore on,  trials for soldiers who had left the lines to return to their 
homes— for sojourns of varying lengths— increased. Often, it was unclear 
 whether lax military discipline,  family obligations, or rebel affiliation was 
to blame, and the soldiers  were frustratingly negligent in the eyes of the 
military authorities. Deserters—in time of war, no less— faced extraordi-
narily strict sentences, even capital punishment. One reserves soldier, fac-
ing eight years, was only  going to see his  family, taking them a squash, “as 
he had done during times of the republic,” his defense observed.225 Towns-
people came to the defense of soldiers.226 Some claimed they had sought 
and gained verbal permission for leave.227  Others claimed abduction by the 
rebels, a defense that could not easily be disproven. The Spanish commis-
sions saw no easy resolution.228 Even officers faced lengthy jail terms.229 
Some tried petitioning for release. San Carlos resident Estanislao Dusablon, 
a young married carpenter, entreated the governor to release him to return 
to his profession in order to be able tend to his  family, “suffering from the 
hardest misery.” “My poor  family,” he repeated.230 Authorities  were exceed-
ingly suspicious of  those who came and left repeatedly, “all while wearing 
the Spanish sash.” “The Provisional militia are  doing no other ser vice than 
informing the guerrillas,” one confidential report concluded bitterly, but 
Spanish officers could do  little to prevent them.231 A Dominican reserves 
lieutenant captured one spy, Daniel Rosario, as he absconded with a mule 
en route to tell rebels about the state of Spanish camps. The two strug gled 
so violently that Rosario  later died from his injuries.232
Despite public decrees that pleaded for peace, Spanish hostility and 
vio lence grew. Consul complaints left a chilling rec ord, as the French con-
sul and the British consul intervened repeatedly in Puerto Plata and other 
towns. One shooting prompted the Jamaican governor to intervene. “If 
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 these details are true . . .  it amounts to premeditated assassination . . .  
please investigate,” he urged, but the query led nowhere.233 Spanish soldiers 
arrested Saint Vincent– born William Henry Abbot, a master carpenter and 
 father of three small  children, in his own  house in Puerto Plata for unspeci-
fied reasons in the midst of fighting. Accusing Abbot of complicity with the 
rebels, a group of soldiers dragged him to the beach near the local Methodist 
church— all protestations of his British citizenship in vain— and murdered 
him without so much as a trial. In fact, Spanish soldiers forced two British 
day laborers to bury his body.234 Americans like Peter Vanderhurst tried and 
failed to seek British protection in Samaná.235 Dominicans, with no pretense 
to such recourse, confronted rising aggression.
Authorities increased surveillance as far as they could. They suspected, 
but could not prove, the gun pipeline from Haiti across the northwest val-
ley.236 U.S. steamships in Cap- Haïtien’s ample port also raised suspicion.237 
Governor Rivero declared the entire island— including Haiti—to be block-
aded. All printed material would be “scrupulously examined,” all passengers 
considered suspicious, all  those carry ing weapons considered enemies. The 
governor asked for aid from the Cuban navy to survey the northern coast of 
the island, from Cap- Haïtien (Guarico) to Monte Cristi, and to sail its cir-
cumference where pos si ble. Authorities sent news of the blockade to Saint 
Thomas, Jamaica, and other neighboring islands.238 The governor declared 
that all  those on ships aiding the rebels would be treated as pirates. Domini-
can citizens who owned gunpowder  were ordered to remit it to area officials; 
arms restrictions varied from town to town. A colony- wide decree, citing 
“public hygiene” prob lems, announced the relocation of some prisoners to 
the peninsula and proclaimed that spies would be shot on sight. “They do 
not have the same rights [as prisoners of war do],” he announced.239
Spanish authorities focused their scrutiny on traditionally black commu-
nities like San Carlos and Los Mina. Officials appointed spies “of absolute 
trust” to investigate rumors of ferment outside of capital city walls.240 In 
more frequent and more hostile patrols, Spanish watchmen pursued every-
one, including priests.241 Spanish soldiers perceived danger in  houses where 
 people of color frequently gathered, reported them to the military com-
mission, and often engaged in outright conflict with town residents, par-
ticularly young men. In one incident, two young men  were detained for two 
weeks simply for having left their neighborhood and returned.242 The fight-
ing itself seemed to make the soldiers more paranoid, more racist, and less 
likely to hide  either of  these inclinations with the mantle of civility that had 
framed the annexation proj ect. In San Carlos once again, Spanish soldiers 
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claimed they  were chasing some “sospechosos” at one in the morning. One 
of the gunshots ended up penetrating a hut and injuring a sleeping child.243 
Spanish soldiers blamed black subjects even for their own desertions; “I was 
kidnapped for the night by two black men with a knife and taken to Los 
Mina,” one Spanish soldier claimed.244 One soldier stationed in neighboring 
Puerto Rico mused acerbically:
Los negros dominicanos
no quieren a los españoles,
y vienen a Puerto Rico
sin camisa y sin calzones
Papá come gato,
Santo Domingo no quiere blanco
Papá come perro,
en Santo Domingo no hay más que negros245
[The black Dominicans
 don’t want the Spanish,
and they come to Puerto Rico
shirtless and pantless
Papa eats cats,
Santo Domingo  don’t want whites
Papa eats dogs,
in Santo Domingo  there are only blacks]
Tensions  were high in the capital; a young man from Samaná took out his 
pistol and aimed it at a watchman’s chest. It was unloaded, but a judge con-
victed the nineteen- year- old nonetheless.246 Other young men, similarly, 
 were detained and released with increasing frequency.
Nicolás Guzmán, a volunteer drummer in the Baní regiment, demonstrated 
how growing tensions over Spanish racism dovetailed with the slavery rumors, 
even in a loyalist town. Guzmán had been drinking with other reservists in 
a store when a paisano officer— unclear if Spanish or Dominican— entered. 
Guzmán offered him a drink, which the man refused on the basis of his “not 
being the same color” as the young drummer. “I said I drink the same as 
blacks, whites, and mulatos,” Guzmán recounted, testifying he left immedi-
ately. The officer told a diff er ent story, reporting that Guzmán threatened 
him: “If you  don’t drink this, I’ll pour it on you.” The officer admitted his own 
attitude was belligerent, saying, “I replied, the only way you’ll be able to 
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pour it on me is if you behead me first.” A third man separated them. In a 
temporary evacuation of Baní subsequently, Guzmán fled for a week with the 
rebels. Defending himself in court, he offered a very deliberate incarnation 
of the slavery rumor: a group of rebels had arrived in Baní from Maniel— 
that is, the historic maroon community— reading a letter about impending 
enslavement. They had read the letter to a gathering of most of Baní’s resi-
dents. “The whites  were  going to enslave the blacks,” he repeated, “and 
seeing as most of the town was fleeing, I went with them.” Other accounts 
reported his exit was not so naive. Guzmán allegedly shouted to fleeing resi-
dents that he would shoot them en route if they joined the Spanish, who  were 
“sin verguenzas,” that he would continue shooting, even if it  were on his knees. 
“Sin verguenzas españoles blancos,” another witness quoted. The military com-
mission ordered him summarily deported.247
In the context of increased tension over Spanish racism, re sis tance became 
more entrenched. Insurgents fought in extraordinarily spartan conditions. 
Writer Pedro Bonó observed of one group, “Barely anyone had uniforms. . . .  
The drummer was in a  woman’s shirt and no pants. . . .  Many  others  were 
shirtless. . . .  All  were barefoot . . .  no  saddles, just plantain leaves covered 
with goat leather . . .  [and they]  were mostly armed with machetes and only 
a few guns.”248  Fathers petitioned for their sons who had been deported, 
as sixty- year- old Pablo Santana did for his twenty- three- year- old son, Pablo 
Santana de los Reyes, languishing in the Morro of Havana. The group of 
men who had been with young Pablo—of fifty of them, only ten had guns— 
could not possibly be considered guilty, his  father pleaded.249 Speculation 
followed  those who had been deported. They  were working in chain gangs, 
perhaps on plantations in Havana, individuals warned.250 Slavery stories 
proliferated further. One reservist sergeant— indigent, despite his rank, 
and claiming to have lost his common- law wife to the rebels— passed on 
an elaborate and alarming warning. He claimed that Spanish promises  were 
not to be believed, that the Spanish planned to burn the towns and enslave 
the  people by embarking them onto ships. They had already taken the resi-
dents of Azua and Santo Domingo, he allegedly claimed. He died in jail.251 
A civilian, Ramón Díaz, excused his initial participation with a guerrilla 
group as involuntary (he joined  because of threats, he alleged, and a Spanish 
council was inclined to agree with him), but he also admitted to becoming 
convinced subsequently that the Spanish “planned to ship anyone they cap-
tured to Havana, to enslave them and make them do agricultural work.” The 
very looseness of the guerrilla ranks precipitated Díaz’s capture; reservists 
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caught him as he returned to his home in search of clothes, plantains, and 
 water.252
Members of a Dominican Provisional Government, newly founded in 
Santiago, denied the Spanish accusation that they  were using slavery as an 
official recruiting tactic. At the same time, they warned of slavery’s salience 
among the  people:
We have never tried to fool the pueblo saying that the Spaniards would 
have them made slaves and sell them, like they do  today to  those desgra-
ciados who they go looking for on the coast of Africa. . . .  But what could 
stop Spain from establishing in Cuba or its other colonies all the prisons 
that it felt like, and send all of the inhabitants of the Dominican Republic 
 there, if that’s what they felt like  doing? . . .  All Dominicans should under-
stand, then, that the Spanish government  will not literally sell them as 
they do in Cuba and Puerto Rico to true slaves; but except for the name, 
the condition  will be worse.253
It was  these fears that lent incontrovertible urgency to the fighting. And so 
government members warned the queen, “The fight, Señora, between the 
Dominican  people and Your Majesty’s army would be totally useless for 
Spain;  because believe it, Your Majesty, we could all perish, and the  whole 
country could end up destroyed by war and the burning of the towns and 
cities, but Spanish authorities governing us again, never. . . .  They clearly 
show that the Dominican prefers homelessness with all of its horrors, for 
himself, his wife and  children, and even death, more than, Señora, depend-
ing on  those who oppress him, insult him, and assassinate him without 
trial.”254 Inexorably, the re sis tance deepened.
The year 1864 dawned with the defeat of Pedro Santana and all his men, in 
fierce fighting in the north. Santana retreated home to the eastern province 
of Seybo with two thousand followers, trying to quell an insurgency that 
had started  there, too. He died that fall, disillusioned and frustrated.1 In a 
massive military escalation, Spanish authorities brought in almost twenty 
thousand new troops to crush the rebellion, three thousand soldiers for the 
capital alone.2 In comparison, only a few hundred Dominicans guarded San-
tiago, where the new Provisional Government operated. Rebels dispersed 
everywhere in campaigns and guerrilla  battles. “Dominican society was 
sleeping on the crater of a volcano,” poet (and Restoration fighter) Manuel 
Rodríguez Objío wrote. “The volcano opened its im mense mouth,” he de-
scribed, “its flame lit up the beautiful country’s sky, and its lava spread 
everywhere.” The destruction was shocking. “Whole cities  were entombed,” 
he observed; “mountains of ash  rose everywhere.”3
As the massive mobilization swept the territory, poor country residents 
and laborers entered the fight decisively and in  great numbers. Although 
documentation on prominent rural men is lacking (compared with the more 
extensive paper trail of wealthy figures in towns), historians suggest that 
many wealthy cattlemen progressed from indifference, to lending money to 
the rebel cause, to trying to benefit from it.4 Like wealthier citizens in town, 
they worried about the popu lar nature of the war. “We feared that the masses 
[muchedumbre]  didn’t have anyone to moderate them,” one admitted.5 Span-
ish officials sought to exploit  these fears, and regional sentiment, with  little 
success. The movement was simply too popu lar. “I was seeking to exploit 
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the antipathy that has always existed between  those in the South and  those 
in the North,” Governor Vargas reported, but opposition was far too strong.6 
Loyalist observers commented extensively on the popu lar nature of the 
war. It was “a headless rebellion . . .  a horrible hurricane . . .  a crazy revo-
lution,” one priest remarked, in fear and awe.7 Tobacco production dropped 
precipitously, an unavoidable blow to rebel revenue. Violent campaigns 
spread everywhere. Relentlessly, however, the rebellion continued to grow.
Two major po liti cal tendencies emerged in the Provisional Government, 
established during the first fall of fighting. The first was a studiously raceless 
republican nationalism, authored by prominent figures, primarily wealthy 
men from the Cibao, who had been part of the reform movements of the late 
republic. Like Mexican opponents to French occupation at the same time, 
they refuted the annexation in no uncertain terms, heartily exhorted repub-
licanism, condemned Spain’s tyranny, and praised in de pen dent American 
states.8 Their discourse was at once anticolonial and civilizationist. In defense 
against the accusation of “banditry,” prominent generals assured their audi-
ences they  were “Christian and civilized.”9 In defense against the accusa-
tion of “race war” (murmured on the island, shouted in Madrid periodicals), 
spokespeople responded with anticolonial missives to Spain that remained 
deafeningly  silent on racism and slavery.10 In  these tracts, they wrote freely 
of Spanish “arrogance” and disdain— “as if we  were serfs, or the indigenous 
conquered in the era of Columbus,” contrived one— but they rarely con-
demned Spain’s plantation pres ent.11 To  these officials, the appropriate frame 
of vindication, the respectable anticolonial discourse, was nationalism. In 
one of Santiago writer Pedro Francisco Bonó’s stories, an insurgent exclaims, 
“ Every day I want to fight more and finish kicking out  those whites”— but 
government members did not echo him.12
Leaders who  were much closer to the guerrilla movements— idealistic, 
active, and violent men— emerged, too, embodying the radicalization of the 
strug gle. General Gregorio Luperón, just twenty- four years old, made a me-
teoric, brilliant rise as a military commander from  humble origins in Puerto 
Plata. He was among the most radical of nationalists and idealists, who, 
like Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, already dead for his efforts, had begun 
organ izing when the occupation was only a wild rumor. Each revolutionary 
general had his own plans, command, and supply lines, leading groups of 
insurgents.13  Others also quickly ascended to military leadership, including 
figures like Gaspar Polanco, who  rose to be head of the provisional national 
army— “an informal mambí troop,” such as it was.14 Fissures between prom-
inent men and  these popu lar leaders grew  until, mid- fighting, they reached 
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fever pitch. In a coup meant to save the revolution, General Polanco ordered 
the execution of the president, a prominent landowner. Observers  were pos-
itively scandalized; Polanco was unrepentant. Claiming the presidency on a 
wave of popu lar support, he initiated a more revolutionary government in 
 every sense. Idealists who had served the previous administration found a 
new voice, too. Polanco’s ministers reached farther, flooding western Puerto 
Rico with pamphlets as well.15 “Citizen Presidents” ruled on both sides of 
the island.16
At the height of the fighting and revolutionary tumult, Haitian authorities 
continued in a bind between overwhelming popu lar support in Haiti for the 
anticolonial rebellion and the threat of Spanish might. Any overt collabora-
tion would ally the Haitian state with a poorly armed faction of an unequal 
and potentially fatal fight, and Spanish warships remained docked in strik-
ing distance. Furthermore, challenges to Geffrard’s hold on power compro-
mised his ability to respond. The president’s opponents called on popu lar 
opposition to his neutrality, sometimes opportunistically, to condemn him, 
and prominent regional politicians plotted opposition movements with 
growing frequency. Meanwhile, Haitian citizens in port cities and center- 
island towns defied all authority to collaborate with the Restoration war. 
Material and moral collaboration across the island was extensive, “frank and 
resolved,” and hostile observers knew it.17 “We cannot understand how the 
Spanish government can believe for one moment that the Haitian  people 
could stay in defi nitely indifferent to an issue that, as they accurately per-
ceive, interests them as much as Dominicans,” one rebel announced.18 The 
northern coast, in par tic u lar, bubbled with collaborative activity, with boats 
hopping from Cap- Haïtien, to Monte Cristi, to Puerto Plata, to Turks and 
Caicos Islands, Saint Thomas, and other nearby sites.
Collaboration accelerated greatly with the demands (and radicalization) 
of the anti- Spanish fighting, which was unlike any military mobilization in 
recent memory. Urgency, opportunism, and po liti cal strife, on both sides of 
the island, multiplied rebel plans. Some anti- Geffrard conspirators called 
for the north of Haiti to ally with the rebel east. The Provisional Government 
called for a  simple treaty of alliance,  later a treaty of federation. Many other 
rebels, short on resources, looked to Haiti for help in any way pos si ble. “We 
protest the abuses of the Spanish government . . .  , impeding Haitian citi-
zens from taking part in the Dominican cause, which is their own cause,” a 
Dominican author chided.19 They sent private letters describing Dominican 
prisoners in shackles.20 Loyalists and Spanish called Dominican guerrilla 
fighters manigüeros, a reference to their strategic flight to rough and unculti-
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vated land. Rebels called the Spanish cacharros (pot carriers), mocking them 
for how heavi ly they traveled.21 Manigüeros  were winning the war. In collabo-
ration on the north coast and in newly radical ele ments of the Provisional 
Government, the egalitarian policies, antiracist patriotism, and solidarity 
forged in strug gle grew to be something very difficult to control.  After more 
power ful men wrested power back from Polanco and his revolutionaries, 
they obliquely referred to a broader “regularization” of the war effort.22 A 
full- blown “reactionary clan” began to coalesce by late 1864, in opposition 
to the ascendant radical leadership.23  These power ful men, already looking 
ahead to what they thought might be the end of the war, sought a familiar 
old network of patronage and hierarchy, in the figure of Buenaventura Báez. 
Meanwhile, however, popu lar collaborations and connections to Haiti only 
grew. The language of a heroic nationalism united them. Three years  after 
Geffrard had resoundingly condemned Spanish occupation, a southern Do-
minican man carried a copy of his 1861 protest in his pocket as he fought.24
A “Regenerated” Republic
A group of rebel po liti cal leaders founded the Provisional Government at 
the center of Dominican liberal nationalist politics, the Cibao valley. “We 
have no doubt that our  brothers in the Cibao  will be the first to embrace 
the cause of regeneration,” a writer had predicted in 1861, and residents of 
the surrounding towns saw entering the fight as “joining up with the Cibae-
ños.”25 Many of the prominent rebel leaders had experience in political move-
ments of recent years and economic ties to the United States,  Eng land, and 
other sites.26 Two wealthy Santiago  women lent their  houses to the early 
meetings: first, Doña Antonia Batista; next, Madame García. García, born 
in Haiti, was famous for the most extravagant masked balls in the Cibao val-
ley.27 Some had entered the annexation loyal to Spain, optimistic about party 
peace and economic pro gress. Their disillusionment was rapid, however. Al-
most all the members of the Santiago colonial municipal government, the 
same who had butted heads with Brigadier Buceta,  were definitively impli-
cated as rebels before the end of the year.  Others switched ranks from Span-
ish to the newly reformed ad hoc government in de pen dently. Although a 
number of prominent Santiagueros cast themselves as fearful witnesses to 
early popu lar opposition, all of the witnesses in the March military  trials in 
Santiago  were able to carefully restate the rebel goals, months before the 
Provisional Government ever drafted its inaugural document. “They said 
they came in the name of the  people . . .  to reconquer the rights of  free men 
and throw off foreign domination once and for all,” one witness ad- libbed.28 
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As the government formed in late summer 1863, news traveled fast. Suspects 
in the Puerto Plata  trials of August 1863 already knew that a letter had been 
sent to the queen asking for the return of the republic, prob ably before the 
letter even crossed the Atlantic.29
Military leaders called on a new history of the “extinguished” First Re-
public to redeem the territory. Their rhe toric was steeped in tales of heroism 
and treason. Rebel leaders and  others recast 1844— once tentatively called 
“Separation”—as “In de pen dence,” and the previous republic achieved in-
creasingly glorious, even mythic, proportions. “Dominicans! The homeland 
of the 27th of February, the country of sacrifices, calls you to her aid!” 
exhorted one general; many echoed his exact phrasing.30 A number of the 
impor tant Liberation Army leaders  were veterans of older campaigns. Trini-
tario veteran Ramón Mella called to other 1844 veterans explic itly. “To my 
co- citizens. The Republic has called you: to arms! . . .  I am a soldier of the 
February 27th Column, you know me, and I am  here to call a few of my own,” 
he began, continuing explic itly: “Sandoval, Lloveres, Sosa, Maldonado, Juan 
Suero, Valenas, Marcos Evangelista, . . .  do not forget that the Republic that 
gave you the fame and glory that your compañeros have for you.” Spain had 
already martyred many, Mella reminded veterans, invoking Sánchez but also 
many earlier military officers killed by Santana during the republic: “[All 
who have died], rise from the other side of the tomb, crying ‘Revenge!’ ‘Re-
venge!’ Dominicans! Listen to the patriotic laments of so many martyrs for 
liberty! . . .  The patria is demanding revenge!”31 Mella reminded his au-
dience of Santana’s 1845 murder of the  woman who might have sewn the 
first Dominican flag: “And you, my friends of Santo Domingo, do not forget 
that Santana was the murderer of Trinidad Sánchez!” Other generals also in-
voked a heroic past of the republic. “Long Live the Dominican Republic . . .  
on Year 17 of the country,” another general reminded his audience.32
The reinvention of a national community required a wiping clean of old 
caudillo loyalties. The fighting dismantled Santana’s and Báez’s patronage 
ties significantly. Báez, in Eu rope, was absent during the height of the fight-
ing. Santana’s network of support catastrophically disintegrated: he could 
not dole out the military titles and patronage as he had done prior to Span-
ish arrival; then the rebellion undermined him; fi nally, he resigned in dis-
grace from the Spanish administration completely. His death a short time 
 later furthered the fragmentation of his former supporters and swelled the 
Restoration ranks further.33 Certainly, anti- Santana sentiment was manifest 
in the rebel ranks; “Abajo España! Abajo el Gran Pendejo!” was a common 
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refrain. One poet suggested a sea change in popu lar sentiment, long in de-
velopment, away from loyalties to the disgraced caudillo,
Your  children, your dear  children,
who used to worship you,
who adored you fervently
you must see them celebrating your ruin34
The Provisional Government, which personified cross- party loyalties, de-
clared the death penalty for Santana in September 1863.  After his  actual 
death from illness a year  later, a number of epitaphs excoriated him, includ-
ing the following:
 Here lies a  great idiot
despotic like no other
he did not understand his fate
and he died like a pig
without having done anything good.35
The spokesmen of the Provisional Government responded to Spanish accu-
sations (and real vestiges) of party factionalism. Their public overtures, ac-
cordingly,  were insistently nonpartisan. “We are  brothers,” Cabral reminded 
his audience in 1861, continuing, “Our arms are open to receive you . . .  
dominicanos all,  union, strength, enthusiasm and confidence, and I 
promise you that the Country  will be freed.36 “Co- citizens, a cordial welcome 
to all Dominicans, what ever your convictions have been, and in good faith, 
come take your place in the glorious lines of the patria,” a government writer 
announced, invitingly.37
Some leaders’ treatises appealed explic itly to an egalitarian nationalism. 
Of all the grievous ele ments of the occupation, “social differences, caused by, 
among other  things, the importations of titles from Spain,”  were the most odi-
ous, Luperón wrote, concluding, “It is a thousand times more worthwhile to 
die than to be slaves.”38  Others concurred. “In Spain  there are distinctions 
of class and trade, that is to say, in equality is consecrated,” an anonymous 
pamphlet writer observed critically.39 In their proclamations, the refrain 
was often that of the former republic— “God, Country and Liberty”— but 
 others deepened its social implications. “Homeland, honor, and humanity,” 
Ramón Mella exhorted, for example.40 “death or liberty,” announced 
one general; “Liberty, In de pen dence, Union,” and “Liberty— In de pen dence— 
the heroic Dominican  people!” concluded  others.41 Explic itly more radical 
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was Gregorio Luperón’s version, scrawled in boldface: “in de pen dence, 
equality, and liberty,” he insisted forcefully during Polanco’s admin-
istration.42 “ Free by nature,  free by institutions,  free, ultimately, through 
the conscience of our dignity— there is no  human power that can sully it,” 
Luperón concluded.43 “ free, we  were born  free, and we have broken  free 
from Spanish oppression,” a poet proclaimed. “If yesterday we  were slaves 
by means of treachery,  today the popu lar opinion damning  those traitors 
makes them instead the slaves, as we cry, restoration!”44 The call to arms 
was universal. “All Dominicans are Soldiers of the Patria. . . .  Considering 
that in Dominican society,  there are no privileged classes, every one with-
out exception should wear war fatigues,” the Provisional Government an-
nounced, and from age fifteen to sixty, all  were expected to fight.45
Italy, Poland, Santo Domingo! . . .  The Sublime Trilogy  
of Modern In de pen dence!
As Spanish general José de la Gándara, veteran of ser vice on two continents, 
took the mantle of Spanish governor of Santo Domingo in 1864, he located 
the Spanish proj ect firmly on the side of reason and civilization. Address-
ing his subjects with a combination of severity and strained optimism, he 
assured his listeners that Santo Domingo continued to be an “impor tant 
province of the monarchy.” Rule of law would continue to apply, for “legality 
is an ele ment of pro gress and civilization that Spanish nationality promises 
you,” the general maintained, “[along with] power ful resources.” The rebels 
 were outside of the law, reason, and civilization itself, he reasoned. To  those 
who had taken up arms, the general directed a chiding message. “You have 
guns in your hands, but no reason in your conscience; . . .  You raise a flag 
that has no name, that does not protect any ele ment of liberty, peace, and 
civilization,” he accused. “I have the duty to pacify this territory . . .  and I 
expect to see it crowned with the success,” he warned.46 He had ample provi-
sions, it seemed, to deliver on his threats; a royal order of April 1864 autho-
rized the governor to use “any means in his power” to defeat the Dominican 
insurrection.47
Provisional Government authors countered de la Gándara’s claims of legal-
ity and civilizing logic point by point, even as they largely accepted his prem-
ises. Nationalist, “civilized” language ruled their discourse, and they directed 
missives widely. In the context of British, French, and U.S. acquiescence to 
the reoccupation, Dominican re sis tance demanded not just armed strug gle 
locally but a hemispheric defense of their right to self- determination. Repre-
sentatives of the Provisional Government sought international attention and 
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condemnation, if not aid. They dedicated the in de pen dence declaration to 
“God, the  whole world, and the throne of Spain.” Signatories announced 
the global import of the fight succinctly: “You have given us the mission of 
proving to the World, that a weak  people cannot have their voice silenced by 
a large and noble Nation, if they are not afraid to fight for justice.” “We are 
guided by humanitarian princi ples, like the rest of civilized Nations,” a dec-
laration insisted. Ulises Espaillat, serving on the Provisional Government’s 
Foreign Relations Commission, circulated their protests to the govern-
ments of  Eng land, France, and the United States, “to make manifest to the 
civilized world the illegal proceedings and sinister and torturous methods 
[of ] Spain.”48 Rebels invoked the Monroe Doctrine, prodding the war- torn 
United States to respond, even if only rhetorically. “[Annexation] obviously 
violates the Monroe Doctrine,” a Boletín Oficial editorial implored.49
Provisional Government authors made pointed parallels between their 
strug gles for national determination and  those of central and southern Eu-
rope. From the safety of San Juan, Puerto Rico, Dominican author Félix 
María del Monte wrote a poem calling the republic an “American Poland,” 
a “tropical siren” who would redeem herself in strug gle.50 “Italy, Poland, 
Santo Domingo!  Here I have the sublime trilogy of modern in de pen dence!” 
proclaimed the Boletín Oficial.51 Poets wrote elegies to Risorgimento leader 
Giussepe Garibaldi in par tic u lar, for his actions in Uruguay as well as the 
Italian peninsula. Ireland and Hungary, too, presented timely comparisons.52 
They  were only reiterating what Geffrard had said two years before. His early 
protest questioned: “Haitians . . .  could you consent [to annexation], in the 
nineteenth  century, when Italy, Hungary, and Poland successfully regain their 
liberty and in de pen dence, oppressed by less terrible servitude than Spain?” 
“History and posterity  will applaud our heroism and civilized nations  will 
avenge our defeat and our patriotism,” Geffrard had asserted. The advances 
of the nineteenth  century rendered  these claims irrevocable, Dominican au-
thors now argued. “Liberty! . . .  Who in the nineteenth  century dares to ask 
what it is? No one;  because . . .  that orphaned and lonely word . . .  is the 
bravest expression of the world’s  future,” an editorial exulted.53
Rebels vaunted Haiti’s and the Dominican Republic’s decades- long 
achievements of in de pen dence. Despite invoking glorious in de pen dence 
in 1844, they dated Dominican experimentation with democracy to the be-
ginning of unification with Haiti in 1822, as they chided the queen: “This 
 people enjoyed forty years of po liti cal and civil liberty  under republican rule, 
tolerance in religious  matters, and innumerable other advantages, not least 
among them a National Congress and the participation in public affairs that 
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democracy necessarily brings with it, a poor fit with monarchical and even 
colonial regimes.”54 A power ful revolution made Haiti  free, and the Brit-
ish islands  were now “calmly on the path of betterment and pro gress”  after 
emancipation, an author argued in the Boletín Oficial. Haiti’s achievements 
in just sixty- three years  were remarkable, the writer asserted. “Thanks to the 
demo cratic system, Haiti has achieved the same level of civilization as exists 
in  sister Republics,” he concluded.55 “Who, then, should win in this strug gle? 
Spain, that is, the Monarchy . . .  or Santo Domingo, the democracy . . . ? . . .  
 Will the cause of humanity and civilization win?”56 It was the colonizing 
Spaniards who  were uncivilized. Santana might have been a “scandal to civi-
lization” for his collusion, but it was Spain’s Liberal Union government that 
held the most spectacular blame; it had failed to admit its “embarrassing 
and willful misconduct . . .  in a proj ect as barbarous as it is ridicu lous.”57 The 
Dominican Republic, just like its neighbor, deserved autonomy. Annexation 
“of a  free  people to the most despotic and backward Nation of the globe” 
was disastrous, the authors concluded.58 Spain has brought “misery and ca-
lamities of its own poor administration; their Government . . .  has made 
the country move backward,” the in de pen dence declaration accused. An-
nexation amounted to “tyranny against right, in short, barbarism against 
civilization.”59 It was a proj ect “as barbarous as it is ridicu lous,” echoed an-
other.60 Poets called Spain a “prideful sultan,” a barbarous “tyrant” spilling 
the blood of “noble Américans.” “Wild despotism  will never, never be able 
to relax . . .  on heroic ground,” the author warned.61
In official addresses, Provisional Government decrees  were fairly quiet 
about connecting Spain’s slaveholding to Spanish misrule on Dominican 
soil. Cuba could not remain  under “a government from another  century 
much longer,” one decree announced vaguely.62 A handful  were direct in 
using abolitionist declarations as condemnation. “Dominicans: the day 
has arrived in which Spain, the only country that insists on keeping slaves, 
should lose her colonies in the Antilles. . . .  Amer i ca should belong to it-
self,” General Ramón Mella argued.63 Letter writers to the Boletín Oficial 
talked about local prejudice, however. “I’ll take advantage of the moment 
to lift a  great weight from my conscience,” a man wrote from the capital, “as 
every thing they write  here is a big lie; every thing they say about treating us 
well is completely the opposite.” He spoke of relentless, repeated reminders 
from Spanish officials about how, in Spanish territories, “ there cannot be 
black Generals and black col o nels” and openly speculated about the threats 
to Dominican individuals in other Spanish possessions. “The only  thing left 
to do to disrespect us more is to spit in our face,” he concluded. He urged his 
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compatriots in Santiago not to believe news of Spanish reinforcements, of 
the distrust and misery in the capital, and of the strength of the re sis tance. 
“Tell all them [in the Cibao] to stay strong,” he wrote, “ because this cannot 
last long . . .  reconquer this country again, that’s just  music, not even all of 
Spain can do it.”64
No, We Do Not Want Your Lights
Sometimes, leaders went beyond republican critiques to grapple with and 
articulate alternative models of civilization. “Prove to the world that you are 
part of the indomitable and guerrilla  peoples who live civilization through 
customs, words, and its idea,” Francisco del Rosario Sánchez began, “but 
who prefer liberty to all the advantages of rights.” The advantages of formal 
rights  were nothing but “golden chains,” he concluded.65 In the develop-
mentalist furor that surrounded the island, some authors also articulated 
a complicated riposte to Spanish promises. Spanish authorities promised 
industry, commercialization, and pro gress. “We want this unlucky country 
to prosper,” the first Spanish governor had proclaimed.66 Dominican writers 
responded to their plans with distrust. While many in their ranks might have 
wished for greater capital and infrastructure— such hopes had been,  after 
all, at the root of loyalist sentiment among a number of merchants in the 
Cibao and Puerto Plata— they  were suspicious of Spanish- led schemes. “You 
want to exploit our coal, the silver and gold that is said to abound,” accused 
an opposition pamphlet in 1861. The writer continued, “Our agriculture is 
not ruined. It’s true that it is paltry; but that is a result of the number of 
inhabitants who can dedicate themselves to it. . . .  You come to rid of us of 
property to which we have a perfect right.”67 Dominican loyalist Manuel de Jesús 
Galván retorted:
Well, fine: what does the author want? That the rock carbon and the iron 
remain permanently in their veins and beds, that is to say, hidden and 
denied to civilization? That’s as much as can be deduced from his verbal 
mess. Or does he want Santo Domingo to remain as it is, with its paltry 
agriculture, its virgin forests, its coal deposits, without civilization ever 
using  those ele ments of well- being and pro gress? Is that to say he wants 
the Dominican  people to remain immobilized in disgrace . . .  limited 
to stasis, passive in the midst of richness and in view of the progressive 
march of civilization!68
Democracy, not development, was the core princi ple of civilization, his op-
ponent argued. “We think it better that the small amount be split among 
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all of our farmers than for two or three of yours to monopolize every one’s 
work,” the Treason pamphlet offered testily. Moreover, the author rejected 
rapacious development; advancement was not worth the cost. And so the 
pamphlet concluded forcefully: “Spain is mistaken in her conviction, pur-
portedly magnanimous, of the mission to bring to our soil all of the ele ments 
of civilization, judging it in a complete state of barbarism, in exchange for 
domination. Dominicans can tell her: No, we do not want your lights,  because 
we prefer to live in the utmost degree of backwardness, to falling,  little by 
 little, shining, into the most degrading servitude.”69  Later government mis-
sives compared the nonexploitation of Dominican resources with feminine 
modesty, calling the territory a “respectable matron of the American world.” 
Despite being small, “we nonetheless appear big in the eyes of the universe,” 
the author insisted. 70 Rebel authors mocked loyalists’ willful claims to mo-
nopolize civilization and reason. “We rarely read La Razón,  unless  there’s 
nothing to do and  we’re in a bad mood,” Boletín writers teased.71
Mass Mobilization, Alliances, and Social Mobility
Government members commented on the vast difference between the fight-
ing and all previous po liti cal mobilizations. The liberal movement of 1858 
had represented “the revolution of a few, dragging the masses along with 
them,” one author wrote in the Boletín Oficial. The new mobilization was far 
more popu lar. “In the current revolution, it was the masses who  rose up, 
dragging with them every one  else,” he observed; “in this one, the educated 
have put themselves in ser vice of the masses.”72 As they entered towns, rebel 
groups sought a pronouncement of loyalty from residents. “Thousands and 
thousands” signed the Act of In de pen dence.73 “The authorities and vecinos of 
this town and its surroundings are gathered . . .  to pronounce it in  favor 
of the Holy Cause of In de pen dence, unanimously agreeing to raise the glo-
rious Dominican flag,’ ” San José de Ocoa’s statement read, and nearly two 
hundred signatures followed.74
For all the efforts of the Santiago- based Provisional Government, the dis-
persed anti- Spanish fighters had to be largely self- reliant. Although some-
times gathered in large numbers, rebels tended to fight in smaller guerrilla 
groups of several hundred or fewer, gathering provisions and materiel as 
they could. Dispersed amid difficult conditions, they relied both on their 
ties to rural families and on their own knowledge of the countryside for 
food. Rebels often ate the  cattle and pigs that roamed  free. Plantains, corn, 
and some meats  were purchased when funds permitted, and nonperishables 
arrived from Haiti. “ Every soldier of ours was a montero,” Bonó wrote approv-
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ingly.75 Munitions  were a constant prob lem, and most of the guns  were sto-
len from Spanish soldiers. Anywhere from seven hundred to three thousand 
rebels  were involved in the Puerto Plata rebellion of August 1863, for exam-
ple, but many reportedly had just five bullets each.76  Others reported that as 
many as one in four had only blanks, while the remaining men had only two 
or three bullets each, rationed from Santiago. Clothing, too, was in constant 
shortage. In order to maintain what standing forces did exist, soldiers of the 
Liberation Army  were to receive sixty papeletas.
In the chaos of mobilization, men  rose to leadership ranks in the army 
and Provisional Government on an unpre ce dented scale. Officers’ ranks 
drew from a wider swath of social classes as a result. “The War of Restoration 
was an event of profoundly popu lar roots; its leaders just as its soldiers  were 
 people from the entrails of the pueblo,” Bosch writes.77 In previous de cades, 
caudillos had mobilized dependents for military operations, largely through 
patronage ties and the promises of military spoils. In the war against the 
Spanish, the dynamics  were much more diverse. Prowess and organ izing 
capabilities ruled. Some emerged from local notoriety to something more 
closely resembling prestige. Prior loyalties did not stain capable command-
ers; a number of military officials and administrators, only the year prior, 
had been loyal to (and even fighting for) the Spanish. A number of men who 
became national figures  rose from  humble origins. Gaspar Polanco, a  cattle 
man from Guayubín, was illiterate, but he was a “capable military chief . . .  
and brave.” Anyway, the disorder of pitched fighting and guerrilla mobili-
zations secured such trajectories. “On top of this,  there was no one who 
could have given [Polanco] the position, nor was  there anyone who could 
have denied him it,” Bosch surmises.78 Within months, Polanco became 
the nominal head of the army, a formal title for an informal network of 
combatants.79
Some leaders, capitalizing on the extralegal spaces of the center- island 
region,  were brutal opportunists and violent men. Juan Rondón, for exam-
ple, was a  career  cattle rustler; authorities reported that he had accompanied 
his  father on thievery missions on both sides of the border from a very young 
age.80 In adulthood, he was at times brutally violent. Allegedly he murdered 
a pregnant  woman from the west and sliced out her unborn baby as she died. 
The sensational crime was discussed throughout the center- island region. 
Rondón first clashed with Spanish authorities in March 1863 when, as a passive 
col o nel, he came  under suspicion of spreading alarming rumors about the 
meaning of the announced “state of siege” on the island. His defense was 
agile. Claiming to be the peón of a  woman named Merced Marunga in Las 
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Matas, he had applied for a license to leave Higuey and return to the center 
of the island, instead stopping at some point in the capital; all his travels, he 
argued,  were as an innocent dependent. Short of evidence, the commission 
freed him.81 Rondón was captured in March 1864 and brought to Port- au- 
Prince  under strict vigilance of the area commander. “Men like that cannot 
possibly be considered émigrés in Haiti or any other civilized country,” Manuel 
Álvarez observed.82 Other caudillo leaders like “El Chivo”  were nothing but 
“vulgar criminals and assassins,” Spanish authorities accused.83 Haitian offi-
cials, too,  were weary of the unrest, accusing Dominican border “criminals” 
of po liti cal troublemaking.84 Other individuals simply had untrustworthy 
allegiances, scheming to put themselves or friends in power. Ramón Mella 
was so disgusted with one general that he retreated from the center of the 
island back to Cibao to regroup.85
At times leaders’ cruel tactics and misconduct  were so extreme that other 
guerrilla leaders felt compelled to intercede against, even murder, promi-
nent transgressors. General Pedro Florentino, long established in the center 
of the island (San Juan de la Maguana), committed considerable atrocities 
in his southwestern campaigns. He murdered twenty- three  people in Las 
Matas, evidently to take their possessions. “In the small valley near the moun-
tain, the ground was still bloody, and the hair of the victims was still caught 
up in the underbrush,” a horrified Spanish official alleged, noting that the 
bodies, left unburied, had been torn apart by wild dogs.86 The total number 
of local murders allegedly committed by Florentino and his accomplices— 
most by machete— was 125, with most of the bodies discarded in the moun-
tains in the same way. A number of Dominican men detained by the Spanish 
testified that Florentino had “forced” them to travel with his ranks; one even 
claimed that the general had shot his  father.87 Florentino allegedly turned 
over the son of a prominent Dominican general to his  brother- in- law, Juan 
“el Ciego,” who marched the captive man to a cemetery and split his head 
with a machete.88 Florentino openly gave permission for looting as a way 
of appeasing his band of soldiers, but his authoritarian grip tightened si-
mul ta neously.89 Harsh punishment of desertion was “of absolute necessity 
to save the Patria,” he concluded severely. He ordered executions and autho-
rized other officials to do the same.90 Eventually, Florentino— “rapacious, 
bloodthirsty, cowardly and inept”— was apprehended and killed by the 
very rebel leaders he claimed to represent, including the infamous Juan 
Rondón.91 Similar conflicts bubbled up elsewhere among abusive leaders 
and their rivals.
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The trajectory of one of the most famous Restoration fighters, Gregorio 
Luperón— who would influence politics  until just years before his death 
at the end of the century, even as he repeatedly refused the presidency— 
exemplified the political mobility that military prowess afforded brilliant 
strategists and leaders. Luperón, the son of a modest fruit seller (he took 
a version of her French- Haitian name, Duperrón, and was not recognized 
by his  father), learned woodworking and a bit of En glish from his artisan 
master during his childhood in Puerto Plata.92 The international itinerary 
of his older  brother exemplified the extensive regional ties of Puerto Plata: 
José Gabriel Luperón fought for the Union in the U.S. Civil War, attaining 
the rank of captain.93  After some scrapes with authorities and immediately 
opposing Spanish annexation, the younger Gregorio fled from Puerto Plata 
to Cap- Haïtien to New York, subsequently leaving for Mexico and Jamaica 
before returning to Dominican soil  under an assumed identity. Sometime 
in the summer of 1862, he arrived amid the hotbed of conspirators south of 
Monte Cristi, in Sabaneta; during the next few years, he became a close per-
sonal friend and ally of Puerto Rican abolitionist and in de pen dentista Ramón 
Emeterio Betances, firebrand liberal priest  Father Fernando Antonio Mer-
iño, and other itinerant, anticolonial gadflies. With veteran general Lucas 
Evangelista de Peña, Luperón fought at Sabaneta in the first rebellions of the 
spring of 1863, earning himself a death sentence from the Spanish in absen-
tia; he was also, crucially, at the Grito de Capotillo that summer.
Luperón’s heroics at the  Battle of Santiago catapulted him to military 
prominence—he was, by his own admission, “guerrillero improvisado”— 
and he led hundreds in some of the most impor tant  battles of the Restoration 
fighting.  After Capotillo, he headed south to face Santana himself at Arroyo 
Bermejo  later that same month.94 His newfound prowess— and the incred-
ible risks he engaged— might have overwhelmed him briefly; his biographers 
detail a moment where he almost walked intentionally into Spanish fire.95 
Luperón was literate, but “as any son of a pueblo whose parents did not have 
the means to pay for school,” Bosch notes.96 He consistently refused admin-
istrative posts that  were offered to him. Ricardo Curiel served as Luperón’s 
secretary during the war, and memoirs of the fighting would  later be written 
by fellow Restorationist and friend, poet Manuel Rodríguez Objío. So sudden 
was Luperón’s rise to prominence that in the first few months he would be 
looked upon with suspicion both by established political- military figures and 
by the new Provisional Government; he was even jailed for a short time. By 
early 1864, however, his authority was difficult to contest. Among the most 
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idealistic of the politico- military leaders of the period, he would also go on to 
be one of the most influential for de cades following, even as the depths of his 
anticolonial views often took him to the wrong side of the law.
Robes pierre of a New Kind
The first president of the Provisional Government, José Salcedo, was a prom-
inent and capable figure. Salcedo, born to Dominican parents in Madrid, 
enjoyed a profitable income in the north coast as a wood seller and land-
owner, with a number of dependents living on his land.  People respected his 
stature.97 He was also an avowed conservative Báez supporter, having even 
conspired against the liberal Revolution of 1857. In the first year of annexa-
tion, Spanish authorities tried Salcedo for the murder of a dependent man 
on his property.  Whether the prosecution was motivated by his opposition 
to the regime or  whether the trial galvanized his opposition, fighting had 
already begun upon his release. Salcedo arrived with men to the Septem-
ber fighting in Santiago, as the town was already  under siege. Promptly, he 
assumed the presidency of the Provisional Government, less than a month 
old, to the irritation of some leaders. The rank and file in Santiago, too, saw 
it as a usurpation.98 Over the next year, Salcedo continued to campaign as he 
governed. In August, he dismissed his ministry and ruled with only his per-
sonal secretary.99 He resented Luperón and hoped to replace him with a pli-
ant and wealthy general, a man educated in  Eng land and with merchant ties 
as far as Louisiana.100 A number of unconfirmed rumors swirled around Sal-
cedo and his small coterie: the first, that he was too conciliatory with Span-
ish brigadier Buceta, who attempted secret negotiations to recoup Santiago; 
the second, that he and his power ful allies  were maneuvering to bring Báez 
back to the country; the third, that he was prepared to accept conditions 
for withdrawal that would leave Spain with control over Samaná or another 
north coast port. As Spanish forces regained the south, Salcedo seemed too 
conciliatory, calling for a return to smaller campaigns. He traveled back to 
Santiago to defend a friend who was suspected of pro- Báez plotting. In the 
capital city, Spanish authorities publicly celebrated Salcedo’s cooperation 
over prisoner exchange. Suspicions mounted.101
Revolutionary figures moved to oust Salcedo. Writing as “A soldier of 
Capotillo” in October 1864, Luperón urged popu lar vigilance of all former 
strongmen and their annexationist collaborators. “ Those men comprised a 
po liti cal party that we can call traitors, and since Dominican In de pen dence, 
since 27 February 1844, they have worked for the ruin of their country,” he 
accused, “ those men sold their hearts and consciences to  every nationality 
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but their own.” Báez was as corrupt as Santana, Luperón added stonily. “Be-
ware, liberating soldiers of In de pen dence, beware!” he warned, “Do not have 
compassion for traitors and traffickers of our freedom! Beware! Beware! 
Beware!”102 Supported by other military figures, General Gaspar Polanco— 
who had been fighting since the siege of Santiago— assumed the presi-
dential post. He ordered Salcedo’s expulsion. Before the ousted president 
might even be disembarked, however, Polanco ordered him shot. Other 
generals, Salcedo’s allies, and even some of Polanco’s allies reacted with 
umbrage and shock. The most radical period of Restoration fighting was 
about to begin.103
The radicalism of Gaspar Polanco’s administration was immediately ob-
vious, from policy to the language of everyday governance.  Under Polanco’s 
brief tenure, “Excelencia, Señoría,” and other titles  were abolished.104 Lead-
ers addressed their fellow fighters occasionally as “los pueblos,” sometimes 
as “compatriotas,” more often still as “Dominicans,” but with increasing 
frequency as “conciudadanos” (co- citizens or fellow citizens). So elevated 
was the language of citizenship that writers called the president “President 
Citizen Gaspar Polanco,” the ministers became “Minister Citizen Rafael 
Leyba,” and so on.105 Not every thing was a revolutionary purge; Polanco 
kept on Salcedo’s vice president, Ulises Espaillat, as an amenable,  adept, 
and idealistic writer and administrator. In fact, he valued civil administra-
tion. Polanco and his ministers passed a decree to fund primary school in 
all the communes and mount a campaign for universal vaccination.106 “De-
mocracy is the guiding light of the world,” Espaillat wrote. “Equality of rank 
and rights, popu lar government, power exercised by the masses, abnega-
tion, generosity, and heroism”— these  were the reforms that the revolution 
sought.107 Writers filled the pages of the government bulletin with praise for 
the French revolution, excoriation of monarchy, and an expansion of demo-
cratic practice to include the populace. “American society is by nature and 
necessity plebeian,” one observed.108 Unnamed authors penned odes to 
hard work.109 Polanco did not draft any of  those missives himself, of course, 
but sincere rebels who admired him and eagerly collaborated surrounded 
him. He and his allies committed to win the war and to revolutionize politics 
at the same time. Already prominent figures  were wondering aloud which 
region might claim the seat of government  after fighting ended. Polanco and 
his administrators urged them to focus on unity instead.110 He redoubled 
military efforts. Rodríguez Objío called him “Robes pierre of a new kind.”111
The tone of Provisional Government writings directed to Spanish au-
thorities and Dominican loyalists became irreverent. From Puerto Rico and 
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from Spain, journalists and authorities rained invective on the Polanco ad-
ministration. One Spanish po liti cal cartoonist satirized all the rebels in an 
 imagined pidgin Spanish- Kreyòl.112 Figures around Polanco responded with 
absolute defiance. Spanish authorities called Ulises Espaillat an “impenitent 
revolutionary.”113 Someone penned a comic opera mocking a prominent 
pro- Spanish priest:
Stop lying, dear  Father, and stop wielding that ancient pen . . .  
You prove that the Spanish despot has lost.
When your ancientness offers me peace with startling quickness if I 
 accept chains . . .  
Our olive branch is our cannon.
Make the Ogre of Castille understand . . .  
Your letter made me double over with laughter . . .  
If your pride and brutality think they can dominate my country . . .  
You are the one who is being played with.
“Stop playing games already,” the author taunted loyalists repeatedly, and the 
fighting continued.114
In the months before Polanco’s rise, military standoffs reached a criti-
cal juncture. Dominican rebels could mount long sieges of the Spanish, but 
they  could not defeat them, and supplies of munitions waned.115 Spanish 
authorities ordered seizures of rebel goods, but the pace of seizures slowed 
when  there  were few possessions left to take.116 The governor proved totally 
intractable on Spanish confiscation of pack animals, even though local offi-
cials tried to explain to him that the seizures  were “the most onerous public 
ser vice in the land.”117 “It must be noted that this poverty cannot be so  great 
as supposed,” he observed, in a haughty non sequitur, “given that many 
jobs . . .  are vacant.”118 The Provisional Government enacted identical mea-
sures, decreeing that any soldier deserting— for example, seeking refuge in 
Haiti— would face confiscation of his possessions.119 All manner of food— 
salted meat, flour, vegetables, yucca, yam (ñame), even plantains— continued 
to be difficult to find in many towns, as boat seizures halted trade from Saint 
Thomas. High prices kept many “emaciated and weakened by hunger,” 
a U.S. observer reported gravely.120 Dominican merchants suffered greatly, 
cut off from the interior.121 Prisons and makeshift detentions brimmed with 
detainees in terrible conditions, as authorities converted vari ous buildings 
to hold the captives.122 Even daily meals  were improbable for prisoners with-
out  family nearby. From the first fall of fighting, prisoners begged for an au-
dience with an official who might see to it that their basic  water and sanitary 
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needs be met, as well as grant them access to a small vegetable garden.123 
Rebel prisoners  were made to do all sorts of menial tasks while detained by 
the Spanish. Four fled at the riverbanks where they had been sent to clean 
the chamber pots, for example.124  Others had to do hard  labor while in 
shackles and chains.125 Improbably, investors continued to send agricultural 
indenture schemes and other plans to authorities, impervious to the violent 
and hungry stalemate.126
In power by the early fall of 1864, Polanco pushed forward. He began with 
a campaign of volunteers on an impossible, symbolic mission to attack the 
entrenched Spanish troops in Puerto Plata. He ordered the creation of re-
gional councils to detect pro- Spanish conspiracy.127 Aware that inflation was 
hurting poorer urban citizens and desperately seeking funds, Polanco created 
a state tobacco mono poly, ordered “forced loans” from prominent citizens, 
seized goods of  those who had defected to Spanish lines, and tried to promote 
cotton near Dajabón.128 To Spanish authorities, Polanco’s tone was unyield-
ing. “We are not afraid of your threats,” he warned. “ Today all Dominicans 
are on the front lines for our country, and nothing you say can offend me. 
We are not afraid of your artillery nor all of your army, we have taken up arms 
to throw off your yoke, and we  will defend ourselves to the death.”129 He or-
dered campaigns everywhere. Center- island fighting raged, and campaigns 
reached all the way east to Higüey. Polanco ordered  those who had returned 
to their homes in the Cibao back out to fight. The call was immediately suc-
cessful; more than two thousand men remobilized.130 Spanish authorities 
also dug in. “A homicidal drama” already sixteen months long, Polanco’s 
ministers lamented, was spilling “a precious blood, the blood of an unlucky 
and innocent  people . . .  resolved to bury themselves in the ruins and ashes 
piling up around them” before giving up their freedom.131 Soon, the admin-
istration turned to Haiti for help.
A Word to the Dominicans, a Word to the Haitians
As the fighting first recommenced, the Geffrard administration had  little 
choice but to demonstrate cooperation with the Spanish. Santana tried to 
forbid all communication with Haiti entirely; military and civil authorities 
 were instructed to use extreme vigilance.132 The Moniteur Haitïen announced 
that Dominican refugees from the border area should be marched to Port- 
au- Prince. “Haitian authorities have shown themselves to be completely di-
vorced from the movement . . .  and desirous of order,” Spanish authorities 
noted with satisfaction.133 A smattering of firings followed. Geffrard’s offi-
cials dismissed Cap- Haïtien’s governor for allowing rebels to gather  there. 
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Further east on the north coast, another commanding general was fired  after 
he received a prominent Dominican rebel. The new commander at Fort Lib-
erté in Ouanaminthe, General Philanthrope Noël, received explicit instruc-
tions not to let anyone cross from the Dominican side without a passport 
signed by the Spanish governor himself, and he promised to inform Spanish 
authorities about the suspected whereabouts of prominent insurgent lead-
ers.134 Madrid officials noted with approval that Geffrard passed on confi-
dential tips that former Dominican minister Felipe Alfau was conspiring in 
Paris, “as proof of his affection for Spain and her Government and of his 
good intentions thereto.”135 When Francisco Bonó, member of the Provi-
sional Government, had visited Port- au- Prince, officials observed a “strict 
neutrality,” ordering him to leave immediately.136
President Geffrard stuck closely to realpolitik, but  there  were also clear 
limits to his cooperation with Spain. When the Spaniards tried to land a ves-
sel in Manzanillo Bay, individuals from the garrison  there ordered them to 
depart. The rebuffed Spanish commander, disgruntled, sent a courier all the 
way to Port- au- Prince to ask President Geffrard directly for the right to land 
troops on Haiti’s northern coast, forty miles west of the Dominican border. 
President Geffrard starkly rejected the officer’s demand, announcing that 
he “could not permit one soldier to land on Haytian territory.” The Spanish 
troops  were forced to land near the trenches of the embattled town of Puerto 
Plata instead.137 Rumors circulated that Geffrard was quietly formulating 
his own anti- Spanish schemes. Some alleged that he sought a protectorate 
for the east, administered by a trinational oversight federation of France, 
 Eng land, and Spain. The British consul had rejected it, reports claimed, 
leaving Geffrard in the uncomfortable position of continued collaboration. 
“I am trying and  will try to avoid provoking any reason for complaint from 
the Spanish government,” he reportedly explained.138
Semicovert Dominican- Haitian military alliances, meanwhile, could not 
be stanched. Haitian border officials and Dominican rebels who had gath-
ered in the center- island area collaborated often. General José Maria Ca-
bral was frequently in Las Caobas recruiting rebels of all flags.139 Pop u lar 
organ izing was obviously gaining strength. In Puerto Plata, an individual 
named Filormé brought letters from Haiti, spreading word of help that was 
to come.140 Domingo Ramírez had a number of rumored allies and friends 
in his hometown of Neiba, including high officials of relative standing, like 
General Pedro Nolasco. He counted on local help and even U.S. aid, accord-
ing to vari ous sources. Letter writers seeking the alliance of Haitian bor-
der officials  were friendly, affectionate, and insistent. “Dear General and 
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friend,” one Dominican letter began, at the very outset of the fighting. “Con-
sidering our position  today, with ten dead,  because of the revolution that we 
have been planning . . .  and the promise that you made to our dear General, 
Don Fernando Valerio (rip), I find myself in the necessity of seeking your 
help, for protection by the army  under your command, so that we can shake 
off and throw out from our land the Spanish standard and its armies. . . .  
Please remember our friend,” the anonymous writer urged.141 In a related 
discussion over jurisdiction and territory, the mingling expatriate groups, 
center- island residents, and rebels reached an agreement about some of 
the center- island towns, like Hinche, which had grown to be socially Hai-
tian over the years. The new jurisdictions  were to be respected, the parties 
agreed, in any foregoing collaboration. Rebels and local Haitian officers 
 were supportive of  these agreements.142
In center- island regions, collaboration with the rebellion grew relent-
lessly. Pop u lar Haitian collaboration intensified  after abolition in the United 
States, the Spanish consul claimed; Spain was now the only imperial slave 
power that threatened encroachment. Along the border, officials became 
openly recalcitrant to extradite Dominican rebel leaders and remit them to 
the Spanish, since the rebels themselves  were simply too popu lar among the 
Haitian families living  there.143 Eastern rebels must have received the news 
eagerly. One Dominican loyalist general tried to mobilize the elite anti- 
Haitian fears of previous decades— warning that “8000 Haitians  were ready 
to disembark” in the east as an invasion— but his tale evidently held so  little 
salience among Dominican audiences that the rumor, for all its popular-
ity in the 1850s, was never repeated again.144 Rather, the west was a refuge 
that many used. In a conciliatory mea sure, the Spanish had to concede and 
extend amnesty to  those residents who chose to remain in Haiti, trying to 
entice them to return.  Cattle trade through San Juan, to Hincha, to Port- au- 
Prince continued steadily. Hincha was not well watched at all, Spanish 
authorities fretted.145
To the north, meanwhile, citizens of Cap- Haïtien only increased their 
support for the Dominican rebels. News of their brazen aid arrived second-
hand— from a Canary Island resident in La Vega, from Tortuga via Puerto 
Plata, from observers in the Turks and Caicos, from rumors on the ground in 
northern Haiti— but it reached Spanish authorities all the same. In Cap, fam-
ilies offered Dominican rebel exiles housing and protection. Whole groups 
of Dominican exiles— not just prominent military figures but also groups 
primarily of  women and  children— arrived, often via other islands, and more 
convoys  were expected.146 Living in Cap- Haïtien  were allies of  po liti cal and 
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military prominence like  M. Macajauc, Laguerre Bart, Alexandre Pouget, 
and General Sylvain Salnave, all of whom  were close allies with Dominican 
general Santiago Rodríguez or other wise offered direct assistance at diff er-
ent junctures. A Saint Thomas man who regularly traveled between Monte 
Cristi and Cap, Huberto Marzán, sewed the flag that flew in the early  battles 
of 1863.147 Reports from Haiti claimed that North American ships entered 
and left Cap- Haïtien daily, secretly disembarking weapons for the opposi-
tion.148 One Dominican living in Cap- Haïtien allegedly had amassed fifteen 
thousand locally manufactured bullets and was storing some within city 
limits and some in nearby Limonade.149 Northern coast sea traffic can only 
be speculated. A small boat caught off the coast of Puerto Plata carried 
wheat, rice,  rifles, lead, and a Haitian flag.150 Whole steamships sometimes 
arrived, too.151 “Credible sources” suggested that north coast authorities 
allowed private American ships to dock with weapons and speculated the aid 
“could not have gone unnoticed” by the American government,  either.152 
Nameless runners ferried messages back and forth from Cap- Haïtien, and 
even neighboring islands, to Santiago.
Trade, and aid, in supplies and weapons flourished in the interior and on 
the coast. Many Dominicans who had been living in Haiti for years ferried 
gunpowder back through Neiba and Barahona.153 Commanders openly sent 
missions in search of weapons. “Seek them from Haitian lines, but always 
mindful of the Country,” one exhorted.154 A supply line thrived at the center 
of the island; Haitian  women sold soap, mackerel, codfish, flour, salt, and 
other supplies at Monte Cristi, Guayubín, and Hinche, receiving coffee and 
tobacco in barter.155 Every one knew of the Hinche trade, which was infa-
mous.156 Runners picked up supplies from the frontier and amassed them 
in Santiago. Mella allegedly gathered and sold ten thousand serones of to-
bacco to Haiti in exchange for war matériel in late 1863.157 Alfredo Deetjen, 
born in Cap in 1824, was an impor tant merchant and politician in Santiago 
de los Caballeros at the moment of annexation, and he immediately sup-
ported the creation of the Provisional Government. At the end of the year, 
he headed back to Cap to negotiate for more munitions. He then traveled to 
Port- au- Prince in search of a printing press that could spread the Domini-
can Provisional Government’s missives.  Later, ad hoc officials in Santiago 
used the press to print money.158 The Provisional Government announced 
that the Haitian gourde would circulate in 1864; Spanish sources reported 
that they sought a loan from Geffrard of 1.5 million gourdes, to be distrib-
uted evenly in the north, Cibao, and the south, payable at 6  percent annual 
interest.159
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President Geffrard’s stance of studied neutrality, in the face of over-
whelming popu lar support and Spanish threats, nearly brought his down-
fall. Spanish authorities observed the disorder with satisfaction, claiming 
that the president, Minister Philippeau, and other Geffrard allies feared the 
Dominican rebel movements as much as the Spanish did. Domestic po liti cal 
opponents blended blatant personal ambition with criticism of Geffrard’s 
approach. Soulouque wrote letters from Jamaica excoriating him, as did 
other po liti cal exiles.160 Prominent families rallied opposition movements 
in the south in 1862, in Artibonite the next year, and the north coast through 
much of 1864. One of the po liti cal aspirants, Sylvain Salnave, claimed com-
mon cause with the Dominican rebel fight. As Geffrard’s personal guard 
pursued him, he fled into Dominican territory and then Saint Thomas.161 
Making a national tour in the spring of 1864, residents in Saint Marc and Go-
naïves received the president coldly. “Upon his arrival, doors  were closed, no 
residents came out to see him, and none of the prominent families attended 
the dance that was held in his honor,” an observer alleged. The  family of 
executed general Aimé Legros was particularly upset. Other recent reforms 
exacerbated the mood. As the report continued, “The rude mea sures that 
Authorities have taken to execute the ban of vodou dancing has contributed 
to the discontent.”162 In the capital, citizens simply  matter- of- factly defied 
Geffrard’s prohibitions. Dominicans came into town with large herds— sixty 
head of  cattle, pairs of yoked oxen, and so on—to trade for flour and other 
nonperishables. They made their sales and  were on their way once more, 
back to Dominican territory.163
As Dominican emissaries lobbied hard for a formal alliance, they empha-
sized popu lar support, made appeals to Haiti’s internationalist leanings, 
and warned that a prolonged strug gle could result in the absorption of Haiti. 
Spanish occupation “endangers true Haitian in de pen dence,” one govern-
ment spokesperson argued, and he warned that a protracted strug gle would 
endanger Haitian sovereignty. Months before Polanco’s administration, in 
a rare moment of discussing race and racism directly in the Boletín Oficial, 
the author made an appeal to Haiti’s antiracist platform. “Haiti, more than 
anyone, must fight to solve the impor tant prob lem of the equality of races,” 
he began, “Haiti [is] so close to Cuba that it can, with just a small effort, 
hear the cries [ayes] and laments of a numerous portion of humanity that 
moans  under the weight of the chains of slavery.” The author praised Haiti, a 
” people so rightly proud of their own glory.” Si mul ta neously, he warned that 
Dominican and Cuban in de pen dence  were vital, or that Haiti would become 
“the slave of Spain.” He suggested a common po liti cal platform, arguing for 
200 | chapter 6
a treaty of “alliance, peace, commerce, friendship and borders, by which the 
po liti cal  future would be assured for all the inhabitants of both parts of the 
island of Haiti, forever.”164
As months passed, the Dominican Provisional Government stepped up 
its diplomatic efforts directly to the Haitian  people. Another author in the 
Boletín Oficial, prob ably Espaillat, wrote “A Word to Dominicans, a Word to 
Haitians”:
A curious fact, proven by experience, is that the  people always march 
ahead of their Governments. . . .  There is not one Dominican who since 
the first days of the revolution  hasn’t asked himself a thousand times a 
day, why the Haitians do not come to help us, given that we do not have 
enough arms and munitions. . . .  And Haitians ask themselves all the 
time why Dominicans do not call on them. . . .  What can possibly ex-
plain this extraordinary and unforeseen reason why? It is precisely the 
Haitian and Dominican Governments,  because  there is no other way to 
explain such a ridicu lous fact. How can two  peoples composed of the 
same race, the same po liti cal interests, ruled by republican institutions, 
and who have lived together as good friends, look at each other with in-
difference when one of them is in danger? Is not the downfall of one the 
downfall of another? Is the danger of this one not the danger of that? In 
a word, if the Dominican  people fall, does that not precipitate the fall 
of the Haitian Republic? The Haitian  people understand that as well as 
we do. It seems to us that it is past time that both Governments under-
stand . . .  and unite to end foreign domination on the island of Haiti.165
“We profess the same po liti cal princi ples,” another author insisted. “The 
ele ments that compose the Dominican  people are identical to  those that 
compose the Haitian  people,” he continued. The writer urged all Domini-
can men, from fifteen to sixty, to vote in the authorization of an island- wide 
alliance.166
Espaillat emphasized the popularity of the anticolonial fight and the 
solidarity— political and racial— that existed between Haitians and Domini-
cans. Support for the rebellion, he argued, amounted to a “universal sym-
pathy” that the state could not possibly ignore. He continued: “ These 
truths are too clear. They are within the grasp that even the most  humble 
of Haitian society, without needing explanation. . . .  Now think: ask any 
citizen of Haiti, any one at all, if the Government should help the Domini-
cans, and they  will not hesitate to answer affirmatively. Is it that their logic 
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has more common sense than the reasoning of a man of State?” His tone 
was frustrated, exasperated even. “What do you hope to see?” he queried, 
continuing, “It is a glorious strug gle, how long  will you remain indifferent?” 
“Your Excellency’s co- citizens are not bothering to hide their sympathies,” 
he reiterated. “Your neutrality is against healthy politics, natu ral rights, even 
common sense . . .  It is false, illogical and absurd,” he pleaded.167 “You  will 
excuse me when I confirm that Your Excellency’s Government has caused 
this revolution, given that, if it did not, it should have,” he wrote, argu-
ing that the fighting was “a necessity not only for the redemption of the 
 Dominican  people, but for the rest of the Spanish colonies, and especially 
for the  future of Haiti. . . .  Your Excellency’s co- citizens are not bothering to 
hide their sympathies to a cause that has come to be, in a manner of saying, 
the most natu ral bond that could possibly exist.” Haitians and Dominicans 
 were “united together by the tightest friendship between two neighboring 
 peoples, who for common po liti cal and racial reasons, have been born to be 
 brothers,” he concluded.168
By the summer of 1864, members of the Provisional Government pro-
posed an outright federation. Their letter to President Geffrard that June 
reiterated the suggestion of a treaty of goodwill, and it included a plan for 
po liti cal integration of the two states. Writing to the “good patriots” of the 
west, the rebels announced: “Even though the Dominican  people have al-
ways been very protective of their In de pen dence and their autonomy, and they 
remain so  today, we do not fear establishing, starting now, the basis for a 
treaty of Federation. We are convinced that the precious gift of our sacred 
natu ral rights as  free and in de pen dent  people, rather than be ill- treated,  will 
be secured, for now and for the  future. For her part, Haiti should see the 
step as a means to protect her po liti cal existence, against any  future com-
promise.”169 Members of Santiago’s Provisional Government personally 
escorted the missive to Port- au- Prince.
This very same revolutionary energy— and some of the very same 
actors— sparked a rebellious movement in the north of the island. North 
coast federation plans  were nothing new— they circulated in 1843, for 
example— but they had never gained much traction. As early as spring 1863, 
rumors flew that the same north coast Haitian allies who  were supporting 
the Capotillo fight  were also hoping to expel Geffrard at the same time, 
seeking “revolution in both countries.”170 Haitian authorities complained 
that Dominican agents in Cap- Haïtien  were “sowing discord and spreading 
insults about President Geffrard, accusing him of españolismo and suggesting 
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the benefits to the  people of the North if they  were to separate and unite with 
Santo Domingo.”171 Dominican rebels planned to collaborate with General 
Ogé Longuefosse. The conspiracy “was very far along, and Dominican in-
surrectionists  were mixed up in it,” the Spanish consul reported from Port- 
au- Prince. The consul summarized their common objective succinctly: “to 
make Geffrard fall, separate out the north [of Haiti] again, and unite it with 
the . . .  Dominican insurrection.”172 General Longuefosse mobilized with 
three hundred men. Haitian authorities pursued him with a steamship and 
infantry.173 Dominican captain Pablo Isidor was captured and arrested with 
Longuefosse  after an attempt on the life of Geffrard’s secretary of state and 
minister of war, General Philippeau. The National Guard managed to crush 
the budding conspiracy, but stemming ongoing opposition proved more dif-
ficult. Philippeau had two thousand men on high alert, and as many as four 
thousand  were on call. Despite  these tensions, the popularity in Haiti for 
collaboration with the Dominicans continued to grow.174
News of this revolutionary scheme almost certainly influenced Haitian 
officials’ response to Dominican Provisional Government entreaties. Gef-
frard’s minister of foreign affairs, Auguste Elie, firmly rejected treaty and 
federation plans, expelling the Dominican emissaries. “This response that 
you are receiving is more of a general statement than personal communica-
tion,” he told them, disdainfully. “I  will not mention or even try to verify if 
the names of your signatories, . . .  you are mere inhabitants of the Spanish 
province, absent of any title.”175 “You understand very well, sirs, that I do 
not recognize in you, collectively nor individually, any po liti cal rank or legiti-
mate authority, and that we cannot accept any proposition of yours of this or 
any other sort,” he continued.
According to you, the two  peoples occupy two territories that in another 
time  were just one State. Well, which  brother separated from which? Ac-
cording to you, the two  peoples are of one same race, that is also true, 
but which  brother has looked down on the other? According to you, both 
 peoples are motivated by sentiments of love of liberty and in de pen dence, 
also true, but which of the two has forfeited them? According to you, they 
profess the same po liti cal princi ples, this is also true, but which of the 
two has trod on them? They have, you say, the same social ideas, the same 
customs, the same character— look at History. Is it true, as you claim, that 
our interests now and in the  future are identical? That is also false. The 
Dominican  people are asking Spain again for their in de pen dence, and 
the Haitian  people have nothing to ask.
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He went on:
Is it true, as you claim, that Haiti  will secure her po liti cal  future through 
the consolidation of this alliance, lending a hand to the Dominican insur-
rection? No, a thousand times no. That is also an error! Haiti is,  today, a 
republican government freely governed by a wise, educated, and popu-
larly elected Leader. It has never blossomed more and it does not seek 
anything more than to develop this nascent prosperity through order and 
tranquility, respecting the rights of other nations and ready to defend its 
own. The Government of President Geffrard seeks nothing other than to 
consolidate Haiti’s po liti cal existence. . . .  There is no one in Haiti who 
does not continue to feel sympathy for the Dominican  people, no one 
who does not admire their courage and lament their misfortunes. The 
Government of Haiti shares  those popu lar sentiments, but it cannot for-
get the duties it must perform and the sacred interests it must protect.
“In light of the current state of friendly relations between the Government of 
Her Majesty the Queen of Spain and the Republic of Haiti, relations whose 
preservation is necessary for the tranquility of this country, the Haitian Gov-
ernment cannot recognize any other legitimate authority in the east than 
that of Her Majesty,” the minister wrote. Plainly, “You are trying to drag 
us into the danger in which you find yourselves, and that has always been 
a bad way to escape danger.” Rather, the Haitian government would con-
tinue “strict neutrality . . .  moderate and impartial conduct,” the rejection 
letter concluded. Furthermore, Elie copied the entire exchange to the Span-
ish consul in Port- au- Prince, the ministry of war in Madrid, the governor of 
Cuba, and the governor of Santo Domingo. “He turns his back more  every 
day, continuing in his neutrality policy that so disgusts the ungrateful Do-
minicans,” a Spanish dispatch claimed gleefully.176
Despite Elie’s pronouncement, Geffrard slowly increased his diplomatic 
involvement in the conflict. General de la Gándara met with him several 
times.  After a long meeting outside of Port- au- Prince late in 1864, both par-
ties agreed Haitian mediation was necessary. “His most ardent desire is that 
we abandon Santo Domingo, and he  will help us in  every way . . .  to find 
an acceptable solution,” de la Gándara observed.177 Geffrard dispatched two 
emissaries to Dominican territory to discuss prisoner exchange and other 
terms of negotiated withdrawal. His public instructions to them  were frank 
and conciliatory, and he lamented the bloodletting. “I would call this par-
ricide,” he remarked.178 The two delegates embarked on a familiar cross- 
island itinerary: travel by small boat to a town on the northern coast, then 
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overland travel to Dajabón. A Dominican general traveled from Santiago to 
receive them with a short note, in French, greeting the “citizen” emissar-
ies. Col o nel Ernest Roumain marveled at his welcome. “Impossible to tell 
you the friendly reception that was made for us,” he wrote. “Our entry into 
Dajabón was practically an ovation.”179 Young men of Santiago or ga nized a 
ball for them on their arrival, he continued, which took place “practically 
 under Spanish bullets.”180 Santiago, he noted sadly, was “a heap of ruins and 
rubble.”181
In war- torn Santiago, Polanco’s officials met with the Haitian diplomatic 
envoy for nearly a month. The idealism of the revolutionary Dominican ad-
ministration was on full display. During a dinner one eve ning, Dominican 
officials delivered a number of toasts: to the heroes of the Haitian Revolution, 
to President Geffrard, and to achieving peace. One official toasted to “social 
and po liti cal solidarity” that  ought to reign between Dominican Republic 
and Haiti. Another brought up hemispheric  battles over emancipation. “It 
is an affront to humanity that the abominable institution of civil slavery still 
subsists,” exhorted a general, commenting on the U.S. Civil War. “I toast, 
therefore, to the absolute freedom of man in all the universe, and that Amer-
ican democracy totally uproots slavery from its breast.” A priest toasted, in 
French, for demo cratic governments. A civilian toasted to the Haitian and 
Dominican flags “casting friendly shadows on each other, that their friend-
ship be strong enough to defend their rights from all foreign powers who 
sought to uproot them.”182 Time passed as the del e ga tion sent letters back to 
Port- au- Prince and awaited reply. Dominican authorities wanted to remove 
noxious Spanish terms from the negotiations and to modify the language 
of their appeal to the Crown; Geffrard, toeing de la Gándara’s line, insisted 
on the original language and terms of the Spanish proposal.183 In Santiago, 
delegates grew close as weeks passed, signing off on affectionate letters, “à 
vous de cœur, votre ami de cœur.”184 At the end of the del e ga tion, Domini-
can officials refused many of de la Gándara’s and Geffrard’s proposals, but 
they praised the president for his efforts “for the cause of humanity,” and 
negotiations about prisoner exchange began in earnest.185
Revolutionary Fever
In retrospect, many combatants considered December 1864 to be the end of 
the war and the beginning of an extensive diplomatic pro cess of Spanish extri-
cation.  There was no revelry. “The country was half- dead, had exhausted its 
resources, only revolutionary fever sustained it,” Rodríguez Objío wrote.186 
“Traitorous plants are blooming,” Luperón warned Restoration soldiers, 
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balefully, in late winter.187 Polanco’s administration lasted only ninety- eight 
days. His power ful opponents, who included landowners and prominent 
urban families of the Cibao, sought to take back the po liti cal scene from 
the first moments he took power. In late January 1865, they mobilized,  eager 
for the demo cratic phase of the fighting to end. An armed group arrested 
 every member of Polanco’s government and put them in shackles. “No per-
sonal interest, no unworthy motive has dictated our conduct,” the usurp-
ing leaders promised the public.188 Before even naming a president, the 
group modified or abrogated almost  every Polanco statute. They pursued 
Polanco supporters returning from Spanish prisons.189 They scattered his 
ministers to diff er ent corners of the territory. Espaillat they sent all the way 
to Samaná.190 They reinstated the 1858 Moca Constitution for a time, eas-
ily drafting a new one within the month. They tried Polanco for Salcedo’s 
murder before an Executive Commission, found him guilty, and sentenced 
him to death. A new president, Pedro Antonio Pimentel, pursued Polanco’s 
supporters as well. He called Polanco and his ilk, common men who had 
gained power, “engrandecidos.”191 Out going missives returned to a repub-
lican script. It is a revolution “purely of princi ples and not of race, as some 
have tried to claim,” a new high cabinet member  later insisted. Furthermore, 
in the wake of radicalism, he observed, “the regularization of the war was a 
necessity everywhere.”192
As 1865 dawned, however, the energy of alliances, optimism, and po liti-
cal ferment  was high. The Haitian emissary, Captain Roumain, could not re-
frain from marveling at the sentiment of every one he encountered between 
the Cibao capital and the center of the island. “We are truly stunned by it,” 
he effused. “ These sirs, whose town offers even a more wrenching portrayal 
of the calamities which have desolated them, do not content themselves 
with lodging us and feeding us at their own expense, but they overwhelm 
us  every day with obliging offers of all kinds.” Reflecting on his experience, 
he promised, “We  will keep the memory of the kind attention of which we 
have been the object for a long time.”193 Meanwhile, extraofficial collabora-
tions burgeoned, too. So intense  were the military schemes on the northern 
coast that some observers suspected another rebel federation might form. 
Observers reported new conspiracies. A Spanish report from Monte Cristi 
in the first month of 1865 warned that “the prolongation of the war is begin-
ning to give the result that Dominicans and Haitians seek to unite and form 
an in de pen dent Republic.”194 Meanwhile, dramatically, Polanco escaped his 
captors and headed north, where the ferment was. In a small town on the 
northern coast, about a third of the way from Puerto Plata  toward Haiti, he 
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raised a special banner that depicted the Haitian and Dominican flags, in-
tertwined. Apparently the flag was in use as far south as Moca.195 The new 
Santiago administration pursued him immediately. “Residents of Santiago: 
the rebellion caused by the naive General Gaspar Polanco has been happily 
crushed,” new officials insisted. “Calm your spirits and return to your labo-
rious life.”196 But repression was not so easy. Polanco slipped into the west, 
and the fighting continued.
Writing from New York, Alejandro Ángulo Guridi— born in Puerto Rico, 
raised in the Dominican Republic, professionally trained in Cuba— published 
an open letter about Spanish defeats on Dominican soil. Even Spanish sol-
diers who had been seasoned in the Ca rib bean  were succumbing to guer-
rilla warfare and tropical diseases,  dying in  great numbers. Spain was clearly 
losing. “Cubans! Cubans!” Guridi exclaimed. “What do you do? What do 
you think?”1 Guridi traveled to Washington, DC, lobbying for in de pen-
dence. He moved on to New York, where he met up with a vibrant group of 
Latin American activists. The famous Cuban author Cirilo Villaverde edited 
Guridi’s opposition pamphlet, Santo Domingo and Spain.2 Three more itiner-
ant stops took him to the Turks and Caicos, Saint Thomas, and Venezuela 
before he returned to Dominican territory. Guridi worked in tandem with 
Provisional Government ministers, who threw their efforts into making re-
gional allies si mul ta neously. Old networks percolated with new energy. In 
Curaçao, exiles and allies formed a Dominican revolutionary club, defiantly 
flying the republican flag.3 A wealthy Curaçao merchant was so implicated in 
arms sales that the Provisional Government named him an official agent; he 
took to addressing his notes “Citizen” and signing them “God and Liberty.”4 
“ Brothers in South Amer i ca: Come fight in Santo Domingo and you  will be 
fighting for the liberty of a  brother  people and for your own,” a government 
writer exhorted. “Come, Come, . . .  to defeat the already decrepit Spanish 
power, and shout with delirious enthusiasm: ¡Long live Amer i ca and the re-
publics that  people it!”5
seven
Nothing Remains Anymore
THE LAST DAYS OF SPANISH RULE
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As the anticolonial fighting raged, Spanish authorities tried to maintain 
day- to- day government functioning and to restrict the local circulation of 
news about the war. In a rare mention of regional opposition, a writer at 
La Razón called Jamaicans’ 1861 anti- Spanish petition “the machinations of 
clowns,” but other wise, the pro- occupation journals maintained a studious 
silence.6 Cuban and Puerto Rican periodicals did the same, only mention-
ing boat movements and the barest of other details. To stanch local trading 
ties, authorities blockaded the northern Dominican coast with twenty- two 
Spanish ships. The captains of small crafts from Saint Thomas, Turks and 
Caicos, Haiti, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Curaçao, and other sites, however, simply 
eluded them.7 In addition to this bustling contraband trade,  human witnesses 
to the conflict arrived steadily to Spanish docks at San Juan, Santiago de Cuba, 
and Havana. Injured soldiers, arriving for treatment, described the rebels’ 
guerrilla victories, the crumbling occupation, and the growth of the revolt. 
Beginning in the  battles of late 1864, Cuban and Puerto Rican soldiers joined 
Spanish regiments, and Dominican reserve corps merged with them. Span-
ish, Cuban, and Puerto Rican deserters joined Dominican rebels, too, in jails 
as far away as Cádiz and Ceuta.
News crisscrossed the Atlantic as well. Spain’s press was fractious and 
strident. Progressive Madrid journalists  were acerbic critics of the war, espe-
cially as the fighting utterly exploded annexation’s voluntary premise. Journals 
like La Discusión arrived in Ca rib bean ports, to the chagrin of local officials. 
From Santo Domingo, the captain general prohibited the paper’s circula-
tion, but La Discusión reached Santiago de los Caballeros all the same.8 Pro-
visional Government journalists reprinted key articles.9 In Cuba, the only 
Spanish periodical to be admitted was a trade circular, Comercio de Cádiz.10 
The Cuban governor, desperate, banned discussion of abolition in Cuba 
in June 1862, and Spanish officials tried to enact the same ban in Spain the 
next fall.11 Empire- wide censorship continued through the summer of 1865, 
even  after the last Spanish soldier left Dominican soil.12 Foreign observers 
sent news, too. Many consular agents from Hanover, Hamburg, Prus sia, the 
United States, and Austria who had been in Puerto Plata took refuge in the 
Turks and Caicos Islands, where they continued to send accounts; Santo 
Domingo– based  U.S. observers like William Cazneau and William Jaeger 
reported on Spanish defeats with unrepentant glee from the relative safety 
of the capital city, and newspapers in New York, Boston, Chicago, and other 
sites reprinted their accounts eagerly.13 Critical voices from Cuba reached a 
Washington, DC, newspaper, for example, in a report that complained that 
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Cuba’s colonial defenses  were being “weakened to sustain a war whose re-
sults could be summarized as defeat.”14
Quickly, Spanish debate over withdrawal focused as much on the dangerous 
example of Ca rib bean defeat as on cost or logistics. The original champions 
of annexation  were gone. Serrano, the Cuban governor who was Santana’s 
coauthor, left Cuba in late 1862; in Spain, O’Donnell’s administration fell the 
following spring. For a short time, wealthy loyalists from Cuba and Puerto 
Rico offered goods and funds to help quell the rebellion, but as the fight 
continued, a “general disgust” grew in Havana and other sites.15 Meanwhile, 
every one, of all po liti cal orientations, civil and military, on the islands and 
across the Atlantic, commented on the example and significance of guerrilla 
warfare. Spanish military figures and politicians suggested crushing the 
Dominican rebels with a massive display of force. “A shameful withdrawal?” 
a Spanish official in Cuba asked contemptuously in 1864. “What a beautiful 
and useful lesson that would be for the blacks and mulatos of Puerto Rico 
and Cuba.”16  Others  were more apocalyptic about an impending race war, 
predicting the collapse of Spanish empire and the white race if Spain admit-
ted defeat.17 But the pro gress of the fighting was undeniable. In late January 
1865, the Crown initiated steps to withdrawal.
At the end of a whirlwind of fighting, and in a devastated landscape, Do-
minicans defeated Spain’s massive mobilization without any formal alliances. 
Major imperial powers largely failed them. Lincoln expressed sympathy, but 
his government remained neutral. French officials kept totally  silent. Britain 
fi nally recognized Dominicans as belligerents when the fighting was almost 
over.18 Politicians from a number of South American republics, critically 
eying Eu ro pean intervention in Mexico, French intervention in the  U.S. 
Civil War, and annexationists in Guatemala and Ec ua dor, expressed support 
for the Dominican rebels.19 The only enduring alliances, however,  were the 
ones Dominican rebels forged, unofficially and often secretly, with their Ca-
rib bean neighbors. Networks of trade, exile, finance, and friendship grew 
tighter. Meanwhile, in de pen dentistas in Cuba and Puerto Rico, busily organ izing, 
watched Spain fight, and lose. Forty- one thousand Spanish soldiers, joined 
by twenty thousand more Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Dominican reserve sol-
diers, could not crush the popu lar re sis tance.20 In Santiago de Cuba, a poet 
praised the victorious Dominicans and predicted the  future of his own island:
Glory and honor to the American world,
the holy idea of liberty triumphs,
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 . . .  raised and victorious
the noble Dominican flag waves . . .  
Hispaniola was the cradle of [Spain’s] empire,
and  today it is the tomb.21
Our Cry of IN DE PEN DENCE! Regional and International Responses
Peruvian authorities condemned the annexation from its first days. Already 
embroiled in a conflict with Spain (known variously as the “Chincha Islands 
War,” the “Spanish- Peruvian War,” and the “Spanish- Chilean War”), Peruvian 
officials looked upon the Dominican cession with par tic u lar disapproval. 
They sent a circular around to other governments, condemning the act as 
“an attack on demo cratic institutions and continental security”; Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela all expressed support.22 “A com-
mon peril for Amer i ca,” the annexation was “neither  free, nor  legal, nor in 
accordance with the Rights of  Peoples, nor the practice of Nations, nor the 
spirit of the  century,” the Peruvian chancellor argued. He warned Venezuela of 
a pos si ble military expedition from Cuba as well and demanded “an alliance 
to reject the reconquest.”23 Peru, Venezuela, and New Grenada recognized the 
Dominican Republic via confidential agent in July 1864; the Peruvian consul 
even offered to help procure arms from Curaçao to Cap- Haïtien.24 As conflict 
continued off the Peruvian coast, the Peruvian president was forced out of 
office in November 1865, primarily for having failed to take a stronger stand 
against the Spanish. One Peruvian, Fruto Fuentes, participated in the fierce 
fighting of Puerto Plata in 1863.25
Venezuelans, long po liti cally linked to Santo Domingo,  were divided by 
their own civil war. Nevertheless, representatives of the Dominican Provi-
sional Government  were in regular contact with Venezuelan arms dealers, 
buying at least five thousand guns and other supplies from Coro in the sum-
mer of 1864. Caracas and other coastal cities hosted a significant and high- 
profile exile population, who wrote back to Dominican papers that they  were 
 eager to return.26 Juan Pablo Duarte, in exile since the 1840s, allegedly sought 
guns and supplies from the Venezuelan government, to be facilitated by the 
commercial  houses of Curaçao.27 Manuel Rodríguez Objío shuttled back and 
forth from Santiago de los Caballeros to Caracas in 1863–64.28 “Our  brothers 
fight for the holy cause of in de pen dence. . . .  [We] have common cause with 
 those who want to sustain the integrity of the world of Columbus,” a Venezu-
elan federalist paper praised in early 1864. “Continuous, heroic, the Domini-
can patriots,” the editorial began, noting, “ There, too,  there are  those who 
know how to love liberty.” The author urged Venezuelan heads of state to 
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send an emissary at once to Spain. “It is upon the Venezuelan Government to 
give this step of americanismo, of diligent and forthcoming friendliness,” the 
paper reiterated, “in honor of the holy ashes of Bolívar.” Perhaps Venezuelan 
mediation would help, the author supposed. “We are the closest to Spain 
and to Santo Domingo,” he urged.29
Venezuela’s own conflicts interrupted state- level diplomacy, but individ-
uals continued to directly lobby, advocate, and even take up arms, with the 
Dominicans. It was a Venezuelan man, Manuel Ponce de León, who penned 
the Acta de Independencia on behalf of the fledgling Provisional Govern-
ment; a Venezuelan general, Candelario Oquendo, became an impor tant 
rebel leader.30 Other individual Venezuelan soldiers participated in the fight-
ing from its first days.31 Capital city officials, suspicious, ordered all arriving 
from Venezuela without a passport to have someone vouch for them (a fianza). 
A small number of well- connected opponents in Madrid, such as conserva-
tive Venezuelan writer Pedro José Rojas, lobbied in Dominican  favor. Other 
prominent Venezuelans lobbied hard for Dominican in de pen dence through 
the national press and in Washington; the Provisional Government thanked 
them officially via the Peruvian agent in Saint Thomas. “Send the titles . . .  
with some sentences that praise their americanismo . . .  as thanks,” the agent 
suggested.32
Residents of nearby British islands  were even closer to the conflict. 
The Turks and Caicos Islands  were reception sites for refugees and well- 
documented gun entrepôts.33 The press openly favored the rebellion. Editors 
at the Royal Standard and Gazette of the Turks and Caicos Islands republished the 
rebel Provisional Government’s protest letter to the queen and reported 
optimistically on Dominican gains. In the Parish Church of Saint Thomas, 
 Grand Turk, congregants heard a sermon on the fight and took up a collec-
tion “in aid of  those poor distressed Dominicans” who  were living  there.34 
Meanwhile, the gun trade was steady. A pair of cannons reached the rebels in 
Puerto Plata in 1863, followed by “war equipment, food, and supplies of all 
kinds.”35 British- registered ships like the Elisa, which ran the Turks– northern 
coast route,  were  under constant Spanish suspicion. In  those instances in 
which the Spanish managed to intercept the ample microtrade between the 
two areas (Monte Cristi equally as implicated as Puerto Plata), the ships’ 
crews alternately abandoned ship or fought back.  Those unlucky enough to 
be jailed appealed to the British consulate for recourse. “It is obvious that 
one of the main  causes of the war’s duration is precisely the continuous 
sending of aid, or ga nized in Nassau and the Turks Islands above all  else,” 
Spanish officials wrote, asking the British government to use “all direct or 
212 | chapter 7
indirect means . . .  to impede, or at least limit, the brazen and practically 
public sending of aid.”36 The Spanish admitted that local ship crews had been 
thrown into crowded cells with Dominican prisoners of war, an unpleasant 
and likely radicalizing experience.37 Despite official condemnation— the 
British consul categorized the Dominican insurgents as rebellious Spanish 
subjects, and the Nassau governor agreed to forcibly return rebels— local 
support continued.38
For reasons of pre ce dent, security, and cost, Cuba’s new governor, Do-
mingo Dulce, came to detest the annexation. He was pessimistic about the 
gravity of the rebellion, and he balked at the request to send five more battal-
ions from Cuba in September 1863. “Even, by some luck, if order is reestab-
lished,” he argued, in the first weeks of fighting, “ will it be the last attempt 
by the Dominicans to reestablish their autonomy? It is practically obvious 
that it  will not.” “The annexation was not the work of the nation: it was that 
of a party who dominated by terror, and who, worried for its  future, negoti-
ated for its own advantage,” he wrote with lucid skepticism, continuing, “The 
 people did not want nor pine to be governed by its old metropolis: and at 
 every instance that has arisen to demonstrate as such, they have done so as 
ostentatiously as pos si ble.” The queen’s “maternal benevolence . . .  has bet-
tered its miserable situation at the cost of Cuba,” he allowed, but he doubted 
that Dominican territory, with its tiny economy and minimal infrastructure, 
could become profitable. And of the difficulty of the fighting, the governor 
was decidedly pessimistic. The guerrilla movements  were “ every day more 
power ful,” he noted, and their logistical advantages  were “obvious.” The 
most dangerous aspect of the uprising, however, was the pre ce dent it set: 
“ These repeated rebellions, even when defeated and punished, establish a 
fatal example in [Cuba], where the spirit of in de pen dence began a while ago 
and remains robust,” Dulce warned. He worried about the security of Cuba 
as it sent away its regiments. He suggested a show of force, “reducing the 
rebellious subjects to obedience, renouncing dominion of the territory of 
Santo Domingo, and re- establishing in it the same government . . .  offering 
it a protectorate,” he argued.39 Upon hearing of the revolution’s increasingly 
critical state, he reiterated his suggestion for abandonment. “A revolution 
that is not immediately crushed is a terrible example in the Antilles,” he 
insisted.40
Despite the Cuban governor’s position, administrative, financial, and 
military ties to Cuba and Puerto Rico made connections to Santo Domingo 
inevitable and constant. The Spanish consul asked for  U.S. cooperation 
in restricting boat travel that might triangulate between Cuba, the United 
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States, and Santo Domingo, noting, “It is extremely impor tant that  there be no 
contraband, illicit traffic, nor communication between the ports of Havana and the rebels 
against this Government.”  There is no evidence that U.S. officials cooperated.41 
Steamship mail ser vice, private British boats, and other vessels connected 
the islands. Spanish authorities wanted to build a telegraph cable between 
Port- au- Prince and eastern Cuba  after the fighting started, without immedi-
ate result. Still, island- to- island communication proceeded regularly enough, 
and it had the attention of neighboring publics. Havana’s Gaceta Oficial neces-
sarily reported the naval blockade of Santo Domingo, for example,  because 
it was patrolled by Cuban ships. Even as Spanish- Cuban periodicals like 
El Redactor de Santiago de Cuba sought to put the most positive pos si ble spin on 
the fighting— “the roots [of the rebellion] are being destroyed in el Cibao,” it 
reported hopefully— their point- by- point coverage of the  battles themselves 
represented raw material for more rebellious interpretations.42 In Guantá-
namo, authorities accused a Spanish merchant of holding meetings with 
 free and enslaved  people of color to read newspapers about the unfolding 
events in neighboring Santo Domingo. He exaggerated Spanish losses, of-
ficials accused indignantly.43
Soldiers and officials traveled, too. Santiago de Cuba was a key port of em-
barkation. Injured soldiers brought word of the fighting in person. Yellow fever 
massively hurt Spanish ranks, sending thousands to Cuba for treatment. Sev-
eral thousand passed through eastern Cuban hospitals during the fighting, and 
more  were sent to other sites.44 Santiago authorities used a cannon captured 
from the Dominicans as a trophy of war in the atrium of the main cathedral 
of the town. More than fifteen hundred soldiers  were pres ent to witness its 
dedication on 6 June 1864, as it was paraded through the street in a military 
pro cession accompanied with fireworks. A new danza entitled “El Cañón” cel-
ebrated the event.45 More Antilles- based Spanish soldiers embarked than ever 
before; fourteen thousand troops from the Ejército de Cuba left for Santo 
Domingo in the beginning of 1864.  Later that year, Spanish officials both 
solicited volunteers from Cuba and Puerto Rico and merged the Spanish and 
reserve regiments. Nonmilitary Spanish officials moved back and forth be-
tween the islands, too, asking for multiple- month sojourns in their former 
stations of Puerto Rico and Cuba to reestablish their failing health.46
No neighboring official wanted to receive the Dominican deportees, 
whose provenance ranged from wealthy merchants to illiterate day laborers. 
The Puerto Rican governor wrote, not a  little perturbed, that he had received 
a group of thirty- five men thought to be leaders of the Dominican insurrec-
tion. He immediately put them into isolation. “I have ordered them to be 
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put in the basement of the Morro  Castle, where they  will be unable to commu-
nicate with the rest of the fort,” he wrote anxiously.47 Prison correspondence 
emanating from the lower floors of the San Juan fortress was censored care-
fully, for both “obscene words and [secret messages] from the gang of ban-
dits,” the governor reported.48  These men  had been arrested in a roundup in 
the early hours of the morning in the Dominican capital, days before. Many 
of them  were released into Puerto Rican towns but kept  under high vigilance. 
They  were supposed to report to authorities once a day.49 As the fighting con-
tinued, the groups of arrestees got larger. More than 150 men arrived in Vi-
eques; hundreds passed through Havana as a way station before being sent 
on to the peninsula. Even when the accused did not stay in Havana, their ar-
rival at the docks provoked commentary and gossip.50 Among their ranks  were 
a few Spanish men as well, such as sailor Léon Mate, sent back to Havana for 
his complicity in the Puerto Plata uprisings of August 1863 (the bulk of Span-
ish infractors, soldiers, remained within their ranks in Santo Domingo).51 Like 
the Puerto Rican authorities, officials in Havana  were uneasy about both the 
spectacle presented by and the pos si ble communication from the insurgents. 
The Cuban governor suggested that deportees be sent not to the peninsula 
but to Ceuta.52 Although  there is no evidence that the transfer occurred on 
a large scale, at least a few  were transferred to north Africa, and their subse-
quent supplication for some sort of daily support left an archival trail.53
Dominican families pleaded for their exiled members, and the deport-
ees themselves entreated for mercy. From Puerto Rico, Havana, and Cádiz, 
petitions combined plaintive (and outraged) descriptions of the conditions 
of incarceration, the impossible cost of daily sustenance, and the pain of 
separation from their lives on the island. Some  were prominent men, mer-
chants from Puerto Plata and the like; paterfamilias supplicated for the right to 
return to their numerous  children and grandchildren.  Other prisoners  were 
younger laborers who enlisted the help of literate men to plead their case. 
Juan Francisco Cuello and Domingo de Leon entreated,  after five months of 
being locked in “tight, terrible” cells in San Juan, that they be given a chance 
to prove their faithfulness to Spain. They and  others urged that neighbors 
could attest to the fidelity of their conduct. “We have never had the most 
remote idea against the peace and tranquility of our country . . .  [and] are 
faithful to our  Mother Country,” one prisoner entreated.54 From Cádiz, one 
man wrote of how he had been surprised in his home in the much- surveilled 
extramuro community of San Carlos, near the capital, precipitating a night-
marish chain of events. Escorted in shackles away from his home, into a 
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ship, and to a cell in Havana, he was then summarily moved again, across the 
Atlantic. From his cell in southern Spain, he begged for clemency, some aid 
in the means of subsistence, and most dearly, freedom. He requested a pass-
port “for any of the Antilles,” to bring him closer to his numerous  family. 
Authorities denied his “inopportune” request; he repeated his entreaties in 
subsequent months.55  Mothers pleaded on behalf of their adult  children. “It 
would be a  grand and worthy act of Your motherly soul, to  free the  father of a 
 family,  today reduced to misery,” one petitioned the queen pointedly.56
The guilt or innocence of deportees— even if loyalty  were any sort of sta-
ble index in the fast- changing climes of the raging conflict— was inscrutable 
at best. Such was the case of Ildefonso Mella, who found himself jailed in 
Havana  after an arrest outside of Puerto Plata. Mella had merely traveled to 
the eastern outskirts of the town with his  daughter for fresh air, his  sister and 
 mother insisted, but damning witnesses  were just as intransigent. Authori-
ties acceded to his  family’s entreaties, and Mella was permitted to board a 
ship back to Hispaniola.57 A number of prisoners made similarly compelling 
cases. One local government official wrote that his imprisonment in Cádiz 
was “some mistaken mea sure, or perhaps a victim of malintentioned persons.” 
He explained, “The  whole neighborhood can attest . . .  to my constant adhe-
sion and re spect for the throne of Your Majesty.” Furthermore, he had been 
close friends with Santana. “Your Majesty,  pardon this benign old man,” he 
concluded.58 The Spanish  were wrong about Ildefonso Mella, it turns out, 
and prob ably many  others. Mella went on to be mayor of Puerto Plata long 
 after the Spanish  were gone, and his rebel loyalties proved as unshakable as 
his irreverence to conservative authorities in the capital city. In subsequent 
years, the governor of Cuba would write outraged complaints about Mayor 
Mella’s “open sympathies for Cuban [in de pen dence] conspirators,” to the 
defiance even of other Dominican officials.59
In Puerto Rico secret sites of anticolonial organ izing grew. In Mayagüez, 
“a true antillanista cenacle” formed.60 If Spanish surveillance meant that few 
guns could traffic through  there, rebels still could.  Father Fernando Antonio 
Meriño—a  high church official, subsequently canonized as “the  Father of 
Dominican oratory”— found himself summarily exiled to Puerto Rico for his 
staunch (and openly defiant) opposition of Santana. He hastily made his way 
to the port city, found other rebels  there, and wrote to  others constantly.61 
From Mayagüez on the Noche de los Muertos, he gave a dramatic sermon in 
the town cemetery, reporting he had seen the shadows of Hidalgo and Mo-
relos (priests who had led anti-Spanish fighting in Mexico). Trinitario José 
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María de Serra lived in Mayagüez, as did Félix Delmonte, former minister of 
war. Delmonte was so influential in “leading po liti cal opinion astray” that he 
was exiled again several years  later.62 Both Delmonte and Meriño met often 
with Ramón Emeterio Betances, whose peripatetic activism during the years 
of Dominican fighting  was matched only by his clandestine abolitionist and 
in de pen dentista organ izing in eastern Puerto Rico itself. Betances met Lu-
perón and José María Cabral while in exile in Saint Thomas and spent at least 
some of the fighting in Santo Domingo and Caracas. Moving on, he lobbied 
for recognition of the Provisional Government in Paris and London.63 Much 
of his organ izing was in secret. Years  after the fighting, Dominican jour-
nalists thanked Betances “for all the generous ser vices he privately lent the 
Republic in moments of the War of Restoration.”64
Organizers in Cuba also arranged secret aid. Private boats from Cuba 
seem to have arrived at Samaná, instead of the commercial docks of Puerto 
Plata and Monte Cristi. Spanish authorities seized one such ship, carry ing 
an inventory billed to a resident of Matanzas, for having gone off of its char-
ter.65 Dominican Carlos Pulien, working in Samaná’s Spanish administra-
tion, was caught receiving multiple dozens of letters from Cuba that had no 
apparent commercial content whatsoever.66 José Ysnaga, born in Cuba but a 
longtime resident in Venezuela, was “a fan of mixing himself up in po liti cal 
questions and a drunk,” the authorities wrote, when they expelled him.67 
In New York, prominent Dominicans mingled with Cuban exiles; Cuban 
nationalist Juan Manuel Macías penned the 1865 pamphlet “Las Colonias 
Españolas y la República Dominicana” for the Sociedad Democrática de los 
Amigos de América, founded just the year before. The society called annexa-
tion “a bloody farce” and exulted, “No Dominican doubts the happy success 
in restoring  free institutions.”68 Some ships sailed from New York  under the 
rebel Dominican flag, authorized by a letter of marque from the Provisional 
Government. Rumors from as far as Paris linked Havana, Matanzas, New 
York, and Boston.69 The Provisional Government observed and supported 
 these covert networks. Ministers published a decree encouraging generals to 
purchase weapons and tighten political bonds in nearby islands.70
Vari ous communities in the United States covertly or ga nized in  favor 
of the effort, and they connected it directly with po liti cal strug gles of their 
own. Dominican emissary Dr. Francisco Basora made secret appeals to the 
Chilean mission in New York, although it is not clear if they bore fruit.71 New 
York’s Spanish- language newspapers began to appear in Puerto Rican ports. 
The authors heartily supported the Dominican rebels, Spanish authorities 
noted grimly.72 Spanish authorities suspected it was Cuban exiles— and, per-
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haps more improbably, U.S. filibusters— who  were outfitting ships in Bos-
ton. Spain seized one  U.S.- registered boat with seven hundred guns, two 
hundred barrels of gunpowder, rice, rum, and other supplies.73 Mostly, they 
speculated wildly about the amount and provenance of aid coming from the 
north that potentially eluded the blockade dragnet. The Spanish consul in 
Washington, DC, even suspected that unnamed allies  were preparing a boat 
in Halifax, Nova Scotia.74 Boston’s vice- consul had slightly more specific 
information— even the names of two British and two American ships— but 
no one could easily intercept the boats: they  were directed to Cap- Haïtien.75 
American citizens in Dominican territory tried to lobby for U.S. opposition, 
but to no avail.76 English- language papers covered the conflict regularly. It 
was Puerto Rican and Cuban activists and exiles, however, who had immedi-
ate plans.
When Spain called for military volunteers from both islands in 1864, anti- 
Spanish sentiments in Puerto Rico flared. “A Regiment of Volunteers has been 
forcibly taken to assassinate their  brothers in Santo Domingo,” Betances de-
cried in a pamphlet. “Let us not be their instruments; and if they take us by force, as 
has been the case with  others, let us go to the lines of our  brothers of Santo Domingo,” 
he urged. Betances invoked an indigenous history of anti- Spanish re sis-
tance. “The jíbaros of Puerto Rico, sons de Agüeibana el Bravo, have not lost our 
pride,” he wrote, “and [we] know how to prove to our tyrants, as the brave 
Dominicans are  doing, that we . . .  will not suffer abuse with impunity.”77 He 
claimed that some Puerto Rican volunteers  were deserting in Dominican 
territory. “Some of them have dispersed and gone into hiding in the mon-
tes,” he described, “and some have even hung themselves before agreeing to 
go to kill and rob our  brothers.” Furthermore, Dominicans  were receiving 
 these Puerto Rican deserter allies “with open arms and shower[ing them] 
with blessings,” he claimed. Another pamphlet from 1864— the grammar 
and syntax of which suggest a diff er ent author who was not Betances— also 
called for immediate action in Puerto Rico:
Let us not sleep: the occasion is magnificent:  there are no soldiers 
on the island, and even if  there  were the war of santo domingo 
should have shown us that one Gíbaro with a machete in his hand is 
worth one hundred spaniards. rise, puerto ricans!
 . . .  our cry of in de pen dence  will be heard and supported by 
friends of liberty; and  there  will be no lack of aid in arms and weap-
ons to drown in the dust the despots of cuba, puerto rico, and 
santo domingo!78
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May the Devil Take Me If I See Resolution to This
As 1865 dawned, Dominicans challenged Spanish authority everywhere. 
Even with the basic necessities of daily life lacking, citizens became confi-
dent that victory was near. Caricatures circulated freely, and the Provisional 
Government celebrated the festivities of 27 February, albeit with a ban on 
costumes.79 Where the Spanish remained, tension was constant. One loyal 
reserves captain, drinking  until dawn in the Azua encampment, suddenly 
turned on his superior officer at some unknown provocation, calling him and 
the rest of the Spanish officers present “unos pendejos.”80 A civilian man 
named Marcos allegedly lashed out at a Spanish soldier, also while drunk, 
brandishing a knife and proclaiming that “all Spaniards are robbers, pigs, 
traitors, and that the [guerrillas]  were with him.” “He said the Spanish  were 
all cunning and that all they knew how to do was steal,” another Span-
ish witness confirmed.81 Thirty- three- year- old  music professor Sebastian 
Morcelo admitted responding “Dominicano libre!” to a watchman’s call of 
“Who’s  there?” “I meant to say Spain,” he deadpanned. His  brother called 
 after him as he was being arrested, “ Don’t worry!  There are plenty of us to 
save you!” The commission condemned Morcelo, who was not armed, to 
serve one month in jail for a   simple “lack of judgment.”82  Others shared 
his conviction. Socorro Sánchez— a single, twenty- six- year- old, literate 
businesswoman in the capital— sent a letter in the care of a young bread 
seller to San Cristóbal seeking provisions. The content of her letter was not 
revolutionary, but it was irreverent in its assurance. “You [should] help me, 
even if it is just for the good friendship you had with your compadre Francisco 
Sánchez,” she wrote. “I am his  sister, and I live with his  widow, we work 
together,” she explained, “Given that the war  will very soon be over, send me 
good sugar . . .  wax, dried cowhide, and tobacco leaves.” She appealed to a 
male cousin as well. For the communiqués, she spent late spring and early 
summer of 1865 in jail, as did her young messenger.83
Meanwhile, Spanish soldiers suffered greatly from a lack of supplies and 
illness. Without bread or salt, many of the Spanish troops on campaign sub-
sisted on chunks of meat.84 “The Spanish soldiers could be seen wandering 
around like squalid ghosts, supporting themselves with walking sticks and 
moving laboriously,” a Spanish commander reflected. Where men could be 
dispatched to sleep, comforts  were exceedingly few. Even in occupied towns, 
soldiers “are mostly lodged in huts in horrible condition, at grave risk to 
the health of the soldier and the discipline of the corps,” the governor com-
plained, but no funding for new barracks was forthcoming.85 Endless fall 
nothing remains anymore | 219
rains in late 1864 dampened spirits and supplies. The trea sury official asked 
for thousands of pesos to fix roads around the capital, where rain and heavy 
transit had made the roads nearly impossible, even for individuals; word ar-
rived three months  later that his request was denied  until the colony’s status 
was clear.86 Overland, the marching was “excruciating,” the governor related 
to the peninsula. “The rough roads, or rather paths, of this island have no 
resources of any kind, [troops] having to cross rivers with  water up to one’s 
waist,” he continued.87 The Dominican reservists  were perhaps even more 
poorly provisioned. “They marched mostly barefoot, with their pants rolled 
up to their knees,” one Spanish general wrote in his memoirs, and “ others 
 were so sick it made the camp look like a hospital.”88
Unluckily for  those who might have found themselves in serious need 
of medical attention, the makeshift hospitals  were no place to recuperate. 
Hospitals  were most often “nothing more than a barrack hut made from 
tree branches and sticks,  under which refuge the sick rested, laid out on the 
ground,” a Spanish commander observed.89 Sickness compounded the mis-
ery. Yellow fever fatalities  were high even in the summer before the fight-
ing.90 A mystery illness flooded hospitals in the fall of 1863; although it was 
mild, the governor estimated he had better send some of the sick soldiers to 
Cuba for treatment.91 The U.S. agent observed that poor drainage in the cap-
ital city made it “at times a perfect graveyard.”92 The cleanliness of smaller 
towns would have brought  little comfort to soldiers laboring and injured  there; 
it was in the interior that scarcity was the worst. Medicine was hard to come 
by and expensive; improvised hospitals lacked staff, even sheets to cover the 
improvised bedding. “Hospital is a magic and terrible word that the soldiers 
instinctively reject,” one report summarized, “One can well imagine the 
morale of the average soldier . . .  , especially  those recently arrived from 
Spain, a country with [modern supplies] . . .  a disconsolate portrait. . . .  
Overcome with pain, they can only announce their impending end, mouth-
ing constantly, ‘I’m  dying.’ ”93 Typhoid fever “ran through all the housing 
and left barely a soldier useful” in Samaná; the hospital had burned, but 
staff  were without the means to bleach instruments for use again, authori-
ties remarked gravely. An anonymous complaint from a soldier protested 
that most in the military hospital did not have nearly enough to eat.94 Only 
in larger towns did some Spanish troops receive limited aid from charitable 
loyal Dominicans, “without which they would have perished in the hospi-
tal,” one soldier reported.95  Others could not have been so lucky.
More Spanish troops deserted, even though soldiers faced harsh pun-
ishment. Desertion during war time carried the threat of shooting by firing 
220 | chapter 7
squad. One young Spanish soldier from Cartagena (serving in the Regimento 
de la Habana), absent for a month, pleaded that he had only left to find food, 
that he had been reduced to sleeping in abandoned huts, and that his con-
sorting with Dominicans had been only out of necessity. Officials evidently 
took pity on the man, but he faced a de cade in prison.96  Those who had for-
merly been stationed in Cuba and Puerto Rico fled the most.97 The Second 
Cuban Crown Regiment was not to be separated from the First Crown Regi-
ment, the governor wrote, and they should be sent back to Cuba for reasons 
of discipline.98 According to rebel pamphlets, Cuban and Puerto Rican vol-
unteer regiments deserted at an astronomical rate.99 Officials proposed that 
1845- era Cuban penalties be brought against deserters. In Monte Cristi, the 
military commission surveyed the troops, asking them if they had witnessed 
 others expressing  great dissatisfaction with ser vice, speaking with or being 
friends with the “ enemy,” facing punishment, or simply pining for their fami-
lies.100 Every thing dampened morale. Occasionally, a deserter sent back an 
infuriating letter to his fellow soldiers, sometimes anonymously, sometimes 
directly. One deserter, who asserted, “The Captain knows my name very 
well,” wrote, “A few months ago I was in your ranks, submitted to Buceta’s 
despotism in Samaná. . . .  Dominicans are just and virtuous. Every thing I 
say to you is true, and I say it with my hand over my heart. [The Dominicans] 
 don’t need us; they have enough  people, they are just trying to save us from 
torment. Countrymen, flee  those proud and unnatural Commanders who 
are just trying to reduce us to ashes.” He called select Dominican loyalists 
“scum.”101 Editors at the Boletín Oficial gleefully republished a letter from an-
other Spanish soldier, insults and all:
I am taking advantage of the short break we have to write and give you 
news of this famous campaign, which is nothing like the one we did in 
Morocco. Well, this mess is capable of irritating even a saint. One minute 
we go  there, the next we come back. . . .  May the Devil take me if I see 
the resolution to this.  These damn indios are always out of sight; as soon 
as you see them one place they dis appear, and just when we think  they’re 
defeated, they show up shooting. . . .  And  they’re not bad shots. In fact 
it appears that the damn [ people] have spent their  whole life hunting, 
well when they aim, Jesus, the only  thing one can do is cross oneself. . . .  
And that with not all of them armed. . . .  What  will happen, then, the 
day that  these cunning dev ils get good precision weapons? . . .  When 
 will we be able to pacify such a vast country, cut off on all sides by moun-
tains and narrow paths; populated by a damn riffraff [canalla] who live 
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just as easily in the montes as in a palace; who know the territory like you 
know your bedroom, while we cannot completely trust any who pres-
ent themselves as friends. . . .  And that would be nothing, if we had 
better superior officers, what cowards! What rogues! They are soldiers 
for a theater.102
Another soldier was even more succinct in his frustration:
Me c . . .  , c . . .  , en Colón,
en Cortés y el los Pizarros . . .  
en los Estados Unidos
y en el seno Mexicano . . .  
por uno y otros oceanos.103
[I s— , s— on Columbus,
on Cortés and on the Pizarros . . .  
on the United States
and the interior of Mexico . . .  
on this ocean and that one.]
By the spring of 1865, many troops must have felt aimless. In the capital, “some 
individuals who claimed to be officers of the King’s Regiment” drunkenly 
broke down the doors of a number of single  women’s residences, to the chas-
tisement of authorities the next day. Four  women brought a collective case 
against them, and they won.104
The Last Days of Spanish Rule
Facing the rebellion, Madrid authorities issued policy changes month by 
month. In the spring of 1864, the Crown had demanded victory at any price, 
and de la Gándara himself hoped for thirty thousand more troops. By fall, 
both the queen and the general had become convinced of the futility of the 
fighting. Madrid authorities authorized evacuation from all of Seybo and 
froze any new embarkation of troops. De la Gándara was relieved at the 
new  orders, which permitted an orderly Spanish retreat. “It  frees us from 
expenses and embarrassment, and saves the sad remains of our most virtu-
ous Division from complete ruin, now resting in the relatively healthy dis-
tricts of Azua and Baní,” he confessed.105 All the while, however, some in 
Madrid forcefully argued for the continued strategic and economic value 
of the colony.106 “The island of Santo Domingo is ours . . .  has been ever 
since it opened its eyes to civilization,” argued one author. He character-
ized the rebellion as “a handful of bandits followed by some thousands of 
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a strange race,” and concluded more decisive military action would save 
the endeavor. “Colonization demands  great sacrifices,” he insisted.107 
Manuel Buceta— perhaps the most hated military figure of the Cibao— also 
argued for continuing the hostilities.108 The conservative, inveterate rac-
ist Marques de Lema gave an impassioned speech to the Senate that was 
quickly reprinted in pamphlet form. Point by point, he attempted to refute 
the pro- abandonment arguments about Dominican fidelity, cost, and futil-
ity. Nearly 40 million pesos had been spent decorating the Puerta del Sol in 
Madrid; “a small amount of this” could have pacified Santo Domingo, he 
claimed. Without sufficient resources to suffocate “the African insurrection,” 
Spain’s honor had been compromised, he argued.109 News of  these debates 
reached President Geffrard even before the Spanish governor in Dominican 
soil; some suspected, prob ably correctly, that he rushed the news of Spanish 
division to the Dominican side.110 As of 19 January, the decision to abandon 
Santo Domingo was irrevocable.
In a final review for the Crown of the social and po liti cal conflicts of an-
nexation, Spain’s ministers did not shy away from frank discussion of Span-
ish racism and slavery. “Since emancipation, Santo Domingo has held as an 
unbreakable canon the most complete equality not only of race and condi-
tion but also social, civil and po liti cal order,” the ministers remarked. “So 
the negro and the moreno put on the sash of General, dress in the most distin-
guished uniform, flaunt the most prized insignia and decoration, and take 
part in the governance and administration of the island,” they continued, 
“while the wretched of their race groan in servitude in the other Antilles, 
fourteen and sixteen leguas away.” They  were sober in their assessment of the 
impact of the failure of the proj ect on Cuba and Puerto Rico: “The slaves of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico must see day in and day out their  brothers in so dif-
fer ent a condition; can it be believed for one second that this spectacle, this 
living provocation, would not produce dismal results in our other Antilles?” 
They repeated the islands’ proximity again and again. “An Antille fourteen 
and sixteen leguas distant from the  others could not govern itself with a dif-
fer ent regimen from the  others, and they in turn could not use the one Santo 
Domingo desired, without grave danger to their respective interests; the 
prob lem was unsolvable,” they concluded fi nally.111  There was nothing left 
to do other than to admit failure.
The ministers’ withdrawal recommendation of January 1865 and the Do-
minican diplomatic response  were emphatically principled and calm. The 
reincorporation had been an “act of laudable patriotism,” the Spanish min-
isters asserted, and so its end  ought “to reflect the intentions that brought it 
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about.” With mea sured tone, they recapped an unwavering official narrative 
of the proj ect’s brief trajectory: peninsular authorities had seen potential an-
nexation as onerous, even as they sought to tighten ties with Spanish Amer-
i ca; they accepted annexation only as a benevolent mea sure, and contingent 
on Dominican consent “not as a breach of rights, but as part of their poli-
tics,” spontaneous and voluntary. Once undertaken, the proj ect had failed 
 because po liti cally, socially, and religiously, the former republic was too dif-
fer ent from the neighboring Spanish proj ects. What remained was an ex-
traordinarily costly proj ect of conquest and military occupation, “not a case 
of quelling a rebellion but of conquering a territory.” As such, continued oc-
cupation would be fruitless and costly. Spain had spent 13.5 million pesos in 
four years, more than 70  percent of that from Cuba’s coffers, about 10  percent 
from Puerto Rico, and the remaining 20   percent from the peninsula. “So 
much blood spilled and so much trea sury wasted,” the letter lamented. The 
next step, the ministers concluded,  ought to be withdrawal.112 Dominican 
emissaries, for their part,  were relentlessly civil. Peace  will be achieved “as 
Spain is an educated nation, [and] Santo Domingo is an extremely generous 
pueblo,” one official offered.113 “Think, Queen, where  there  were flourish-
ing cities, now  there are just piles of ruins and ashes,” another wrote. He 
described a bloody scene and an exhausted  people. “Blood has been  running 
this way and that for sixteen months . . .  the blood of a pueblo rudely 
treated, resigned to all types of sacrifices, resolved to bury itself  under the 
mounting ruins and ashes around them,” he observed gravely, “before ceas-
ing to be  free and in de pen dent.” Despite the “homicidal drama,” however, 
he insisted that  there was no rancor, concluding, “Between this  people and 
the Spanish nation,  there can exist neither animosity nor hate . . .  there is 
no fault on  either side.”114
For an awkward interim, Spanish officials in Dominican territory at-
tempted to continue quotidian governance, with limited success. Prominent 
officials left steadily; the archbishop found war time not at all to his liking, 
requesting evacuation as early as fall 1863.115 Azua, still  under Spanish 
control, had burned, but  there  were just sixty- five pesos in the trea sury to 
resume affairs.116 The government of the eastern province of Seybo retreated 
to the capital in February, four months  after Madrid first authorized it. The 
evacuating officials managed to bring with them the court paperwork but 
not the prisoners. “Given the absolute lack of a secure jail, and the absolute 
lack of resources, [the prisoners] went around the City procuring their sus-
tenance, some  were armed and added to the provincial reserves,” a report 
confessed. It continued, “At the moment of retreat  there was neither the 
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time nor the means to gather them up and bring them along.” Once in the 
capital, the officials tried to continue with judicial paperwork, borrowing 
the escribano from La Vega, but  lawyers  were also lacking.117 Also in the capi-
tal, the Gaceta de Santo Domingo was eerily  silent on the conflict. The paper, 
which stuck to official announcements and was always less garrulous than 
its polemic counterpart, La Razón, barely mentioned the fighting at all in the 
early months of 1865, except to note honors given to some, and the freeing 
of Spanish and reservists from the Dominican camp in April.118 It remained 
doggedly on message about proj ects of industry, however. In January, the 
paper began a multipart series on tobacco;  later that month, the back page 
ran an ad for reprints of the famous Dominican developmentalist text La idea 
de valor en Santo Domingo (never mind that it had called for more slave impor-
tation as a central tenet).119 The capital city administration was totally para-
lyzed by late spring. The governor reported a number of the government’s 
scribes had passed to the rebels.120 More and more prisoners and exiles  were 
permitted to return. One man asking to return was a high- ranking general in 
the Dominican army, “or so he calls himself,” Cádiz officials noted. A royal 
order from 10 April 1865 decreed that “he, like every one,” could return to the 
island.121
Evacuation preparations proceeded fairly smoothly. Prisoner exchanges 
 were general and inclusive. Many Spanish prisoners of war  were fi nally freed 
in late spring, some  after a captivity of nearly two years.122 President Geffrard 
continued to mediate, urging compassionate treatment of the Dominican re-
servists who had left Spanish ranks for reasons of necessity. They should be 
allowed to return to Spanish ser vice if they so desired, he lobbied kindly.123 
The evacuation order promised “help and support” for Provincial Reserves 
“who had loyally and bravely supported [the Spanish] cause,” but decom-
missioning loomed.124 Spanish officials in the capital began ordering the 
recall of weapons from individuals in the Provincial Reserves in mid- May, 
although, true to his word, General de la Gándara oversaw the payment of 
Azua and Baní reservists to the very day of departure.125 Dominican  women 
came  under intense scrutiny as Spanish officials perceived the discipline 
of their troops faltering further. Authorities blamed Dominican  women 
who  were “the enemies of Spain” for using “seduction” to “demoralize” the 
troops. Twenty- three soldiers had dis appeared just from the town square of 
the capital in January and early February alone;  women, particularly  those 
living near the quarters,  were the primary witnesses called to trial, and sev-
eral found themselves in jail.126 One  woman in Azua, Petronila Núñez, was 
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very nearly executed for her perceived influence in causing a soldier to desert. 
An Azua man, Honorio de los Santos, received no such  pardon. “I cannot 
hide that it affects me greatly such severe punishments . . .  but I must re-
press it with all the rigor of the law,” the governor wrote.127 The Gaceta Oficial 
announced De los Santos’s execution in the capital.128 Displaced Domini-
cans, meanwhile, asked the administration for help. Josefa Roman, an émi-
grée from Puerto Plata, wrote to the governor on behalf of one Guillermo 
Vives, former administrator of customs, also living in the capital. The ostensi-
bly formerly wealthy man “has lost all of his goods . . .  is indigent,” Roman 
entreated for her colleague. His and many other indemnity petitions likely 
went unfilled, lost in the spiraling costs and chaos of conflict and the juridical 
limbo of slow steps made to evacuate.129
A small civilian diaspora left for Puerto Rico and Cuba. Some, like Juan 
Caballero from Cádiz, deci ded to move to Port- au- Prince permanently dur-
ing the fighting.130 A number of Spanish colonists, especially  widows, ap-
plied for return passage to Spain. Many  others requested transfer to Cuba 
and Puerto Rico. Some took big families, leaving immediately.131 Among 
the applicants, one evacuee to Puerto Rico made a remarkable claim on the 
Spanish state: her freedom. In her own petition, Victoria Medina, born in 
Aguadilla, described how she had arrived in Santo Domingo and been kept 
covertly enslaved to a man named Nicolas Danbon. In her own hand, Medina 
described the details of her case. By May 1865, Danbon had left the capital, 
Medina explained, and she wanted to secure proof of her  free status. Me-
dina petitioned for a carta de libertad, so that she could return to Aguadilla with 
her  family. Spanish authorities ruled her petition null, but they also acknowl-
edged her freedom. They concluded “extraofficially” that Danbon had already 
granted Medina’s freedom in the neighboring island, and secondly, as she 
was also asserting, “the mere fact of coming to [Santo Domingo] made her 
cease to be a slave.”132
Departing authorities debated about Dominican émigrés. In early spring 
de la Gándara described the “delicate and grave question” of émigrés of 
color. He planned to encourage most officials and their families to  settle 
in Curaçao and Saint Thomas. “I  will inspire them with confidence in the 
good faith of the Government, that they  will be paid their pensions regu-
larly through the consuls, and persuading them of the benefit of living 
where their race is more respected, and from where they can most easily 
return to Santo Domingo,” he wrote to the neighboring governors. “ Those 
islands must remain incommunicado with Cuba and Puerto Rico,” he warned. 
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If it proved too impolitic to order the nonwhite officials to  these locations— 
“the white families can choose their destination,” he asserted— and they 
chose Cuba, the general recommended they be directed to eastern areas 
like Baracoa, where some recent colonization proj ects had occurred.133 Sev-
eral months  later, his restrictions for Cuba tightened further. In a private 
communication to a commander in Baní, he advised that loyalist Domini-
can colonial officials seeking reassignment outside of the island should be 
steered by color: to Cuba, only white Dominicans, “and even then, one must 
be circumspect whom  will be permitted”; men of color  were to be ushered to 
Puerto Rico, Curaçao, Saint Thomas, the Canaries, the Balearic islands (off 
the coast of Cataluña), Spanish outposts in Africa and Asia, or the peninsula 
itself, he ordered.134 The Cuban governor did not want to receive anyone at 
all. He wanted the ministry to send all Dominicans to the Canary Islands, 
Africa, or the Philippines.135
When it was time to load the ships in early June, evacuation proceed-
ings  were orderly and without incident. Most troops embarked from San 
José de Ocoa (Maniel), Azua, and Baní. About thirty- three hundred tons of 
goods and supplies, seven thousand large packages (bultos), needed evacu-
ation from the capital alone; four more ships’ worth of cargo, or almost the 
same amount, awaited on the northern coast.136 Some loyalist Dominicans 
requested transfer to Cuba well before fighting ended, even though they had 
never served in the Spanish state at all. Such was the case of wealthy Ramón 
Paredes, who wrote that he had not served militarily as he “had never been 
inclined to military life.” His loyalty to Spain had cost him his bakery, his 
 house, his  brother, and several nieces, “just for the fact that he had always 
been satisfied with [Spanish] good government,” he wrote sorrowfully.137 A 
number of  women expressed a desire to follow the Spanish troops to Cuba 
as well.138 Before evacuations had even become widespread, some sneaked 
onto supply ships as stowaways; a few  were caught “by chance,” but a num-
ber of  others prob ably escaped.139 Of the poor  people from southern towns 
who attempted to follow the soldiers, even to the point of trying to board 
the ships, de la Gándara was less empathetic. “I gave  orders that absolutely 
prohibit the embarking of any person of that class,” he observed.140 Already 
in Cuba, the departed governor expressed real affection and sentiment for 
the reservist troops he had left  behind in Azua and Baní, three days earlier. 
Worried about reprisals, the general took the unusual step of leaving them 
arms, confident that the queen would also accede to the “sincere recogni-
tion of . . .  their worthiness and distinction.”141 A popu lar rhyme was more 
sardonic about their fate:
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Se fueron los españoles,
¡cosa buena nunca dura!
Y quedaron los azuanos
Recogiendo la basura.142
[The Spanish left
¡nothing good ever lasts!
And the Azuans stayed  behind
Picking up the trash.]
Santiago Was . . .  Nothing Remains Anymore
Everywhere,  there was devastation. Fighting “floods the city with blood 
and swells the land with cadavers,” a newspaper lamented, in the fall  after 
the Spanish left.143 The injured, widowed, and homeless numbered in the 
thousands. In towns across the territory, bad news broke excruciatingly 
slowly. Some prisoners never made the return trip from Jerez to Santo Do-
mingo, as  widows like María de Jésus Gantreau sorrowfully learned. Her 
husband had died in custody nearly seven months earlier.144 Elsewhere, the 
toll of fire alone was incredible: in the south,  little but the capital was safe. 
Azua burned in 1863 (along with Baní).145 Azua had burned again in early 
1865, reducing seventy  houses to ashes, “among them the most prominent 
of the population,” an official observed. For residents not involved in the 
fighting, it amounted to a “terrible accident. . . .  Azua has always shown 
unequivocal proof of her unwavering faithfulness,” de la Gándara had writ-
ten empathetically at the time.146 Each new sweep through the towns had 
brought pillaging, too, as rebels gathered both supplies and personal 
goods.147 San Cristóbal passed back and forth between rebel and Spanish 
control, suffering the ravages of fighting on multiple occasions. Life in the 
Cibao, the source of nearly 65   percent of the country’s exports, had been 
totally upended. Tobacco fields  were fallow, towns burned nearly to ashes, 
countless  were homeless, and even more  were wounded. A Spanish observer 
described the approaching flames as Santiago burned for the first time as a 
“whirlwind of fire,” vis i ble from a  great distance in “the rich and populous 
capital.” The man described “a horrible bonfire . . .  [that] was devouring al-
most its entirety.” The first fire to rip through Puerto Plata had lasted three 
 whole days; it had been “an implacable war of blood and fire,” an aghast wit-
ness recorded.148 In Samaná, schools, churches, and missionary  houses had 
burned.149 “Santiago was . . .  nothing remains anymore,” mourned Rodrí-
guez Objío of the ashes of his city in November 1864.150 “Light ashes cover 
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all of the homes where opulence lived; and an occasional breeze . . .  mocks 
the mundane insanity,” he marveled, in horror.
Javier Ángulo Guridi grappled with the devastation in his 1866  novel, 
La campana del higo, ostensibly set on the eve of another in de pen dence, the 
year 1842. An earthquake had devastated the landscape of the Cibao. Guridi 
described an apocalyptic rural landscape, “an indescribable scene in which 
nature seems to lose its equilibrium and threatens to commit massive 
hom i cide . . .  even the survivors cannot cry enough tears to commiserate 
the absolute ruin.”151 The  people, in their sober virtue, tried to show “they 
 were all a  family, not even arguing, not even a complaint or gripe among any 
of their infinite members,” he wrote. Celestial instability had made them 
fearful, he explained, and they sought to avoid anything that might “cast 
a shadow on the tranquil sky.”152 Higo tells no happy tale; it is a vengeance 
tragedy, in which an innocent  daughter, Florinda, has been assaulted. Her 
 father becomes so obsessed with revenge that he cannot cultivate his field. 
“You are still not satisfied!” he cries wildly at his unseen  enemy. “The hyena 
comes back  after devouring its victim, to drink the very last drop of blood 
spilled on the field!”153 The text ends with Florinda’s real paramour in exile, 
“far from his  family and his patria.” He longs to return to Dominican soil, a 
“country as unhappy as it was worthy of a better fate.”154
Slowly, however, life began again. A man in the capital city christened 
his new barbershop The Hills (La Manigua), in proud reference to manigüe-
ros, the rural fighters. He promised that the youth of the capital would find 
“complete satisfaction” in his ser vices.155 On the streets of Puerto Plata, one 
man spotted his old burro, lost during the fighting, and he took it back.156 
Nearly six months  after the last Spanish soldier embarked, townspeople  were 
fi nally starting to return home. “We welcome back all our lost  brothers,” a 
journalist observed, softly.157  Others started a new life away from the island. 
Máximo Gómez left in anonymity. Born in Baní, he was one of the loyal Do-
minican reservists whom Spanish authorities scattered throughout rural 
eastern Cuba  after evacuating from Dominican soil. When in de pen dence 
and antislavery fighting began in Cuba in 1868, however, Gómez resolved to 
fight for liberation. He captured Venta del Pino in just two weeks. Another 
Dominican man helped  free Bayamo.158 “Every thing I did in Cuba, as a fer-
vent and  humble soldier of liberty,” Gómez  later wrote, “I did it in the name 
of the Dominican  people, whose eyes  were fixed on me.”159
In a lucid editorial, published in the fall  after the last Spanish soldier left, a 
writer for the Puerto Plata newspaper La Regeneración proposed a lofty plan 
to unite Haiti and the Dominican Republic, “born and rooted in the same 
soil.” He called for the tightest relationship between the two republics since 
the Boyer administration. “In de pen dence and freedom for both  peoples 
are irrevocable,” he wrote, discussing a new military alliance. “God has 
separated son from  father,  brother from  brother, pueblo from other pueblo. 
But . . .  can we not form an offensive and defensive alliance to conserve the 
integrity of our common territory, to avoid what just happened to us?” The 
alliance would bring security, he argued, observing, “The foreign [power] 
would not be able to tell which hand struck it.” He suggested that the po-
litical federation include a pragmatic economic ele ment of trade and barter 
for mutual benefit, “generous commerce treaties” of  free trade within the 
island for a variety of products. Fi nally, the collaboration should extend to 
deepened diplomatic relationships and, most radically, to dual citizenship. 
“Can we not make the ties that must unite us tighter,” he argued, “to declare 
that  those born in the territory of the island be citizens of both in de pen dent 
states?” Peace, profit, and external security would result, he promised. “Let 
us love each other as  brothers,” he urged. “We  will wave one flag with  these 
words: Union, fraternity . . .” Working together, he concluded, “[we can] 
build between us an epoch in which man is truly a  brother to fellow man.”1
In towns throughout the territory, idealists emerging from the Restora-
tion struggle supported a range of ambitious po liti cal reforms. They echoed 
wish lists from previous de cades: rule of law, reduction and regularization of 
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the army, amortization of paper money, and responsible national credit.2 As 
an antidote both to the authoritarian po liti cal culture of previous regimes and 
the recent vio lence, abrogation of the death penalty was an easy target.3 Au-
thors of the November 1865 Constitution, drafted in Moca, aimed for all  these 
objectives. In addition to three branches of central government, the constitu-
tion recognized municipal power, represented by local delegates throughout 
the territory. Perhaps its most radical clause— one that would last through 
numerous constitutional changes, all the way  until 2004— was the provision 
of jus soli, or birthright, citizenship. The jus soli provision represented part 
of an ambitious redefinition of the nation. Anticipating po liti cal rivalry, re-
formers proposed a single- party system. “The Republic is starting a new life 
and needs to be regenerated by new ideas that new men determine,” one writer 
eagerly urged. “We dream together.”4
Dominican anticolonial activists threw themselves into regional organ-
izing, in familiar foreign ports and on Dominican soil. Puerto Plata emerged as 
a strategic and ideological center. Freemasons returned to organ izing openly 
within months of the end of the fighting; “meeting again with frequency and 
enthusiasm,” they founded a lodge with a singularly ambitious title: the Cradle 
of América.5 Much closer than New York for Cuban and Puerto Rican activists, 
Puerto Plata was also out of reach of the Dominican capital. Enthusiastic Cuban 
émigrés arrived in the town in such numbers that its population almost tripled 
in size.6  After in de pen dence fighting began in Cuba, Puerto Platan journalists 
openly ridiculed the idea of neutrality and called on the Dominican state to 
protect anti- Spanish revolutionaries from Cuba, in the interests of a sovereign 
Ca rib be an.7 The town was full of inveterate anticolonial activists, who spoke of 
Ca rib bean unity in affective and military vocabulary equally.8 The opening lines 
of a Regeneración editorial offered solidarity and optimism, “When oppressed 
 peoples throw off the heavy and disgusting hand of despotism and awake from 
their lethargy . . .  they discover in the distant horizon the outline of  these fiery 
letters: we are all  brothers, made by the Almighty, from the same mass, from a soul made in 
his image: we are to love and help each other mutually, live united at all times, and we  will 
be strong, we  will be  free, and we  will be happy.” Revolution was a “new existence . . .  
working between fear and hope,” the writer began.9
Meanwhile, Spanish authority was collapsing. In an effort to mediate 
the rising in de pen dentista sentiment in the wake of their embarrassing de-
feat, Madrid authorities enacted stopgap measures— the promise of greater 
repre sen ta tion in both islands, the return of the whip in Puerto Rico— with 
 little success.10 Island elites called for identical rights as Spaniards, but they 
also wanted more autonomy, not greater integration.11 Abolitionist lobby-
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ing grew stronger, too. “We reformists . . .  want a single and identical Spain on 
both sides of the ocean without dictators, without monopolies, and without 
slaves,” the leader of Spanish Abolitionist Society announced in 1865.12 From 
New York, the Revolutionary Puerto Rican Committee called on Puerto Ri-
cans to follow the Dominican example immediately.13 “Every thing that has 
happened in [Santo Domingo], and the reasons for which it has happened, 
are identical to what produced rebellion in the rest of Hispanic Amer i ca, 
and the same that might, not too long from now, cause uprising in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico,” an observer had predicted during the fighting.14 He was right. 
Just more than three years  after the last troops retreated in defeat from Santo 
Domingo’s southern coast, rebellions flared in both neighboring islands. 
In the interior town of Lares, far from the locus of Dominican activism in 
Puerto Rico’s western towns, rebels raised a flag for abolition and in de pen-
dence modeled precisely on Dominican colors. Troops managed to crush 
the mobilization, but authorities conceded a path to gradual abolition at 
last.15 Cuba exploded into a de cade of war. Dominicans  were everywhere in 
Cuba’s rebel ranks; a few  were loyalists, too.16 Authorities invoked the spec-
ter of race war endlessly, and wealthy citizens warned each other about “the 
fate of Haiti and Santo Domingo.”17 French occupation in Mexico collapsed, 
as rebels  there exulted in their own revolutionary republicanism.18 Spanish 
liberals and military figures fought with, and against, each other. The queen 
fled the country. Everywhere  there was ferment.
Following the Restoration fighting, however, old hierarchical po liti cal 
networks returned to the devastated landscape like a flood. In the ashes of 
Santiago, the Cibao- based government did not last six months. First, south-
ern politicians challenged it, and then,  after a series of intrigues, Buenaven-
tura Báez returned. His clique relied on armed supporters, an exhausted 
country, and a ritual of legitimation in the capital city press. Allies at El Monitor 
announced his return gingerly; he was returning, but not as president, they 
claimed. As his networks solidified, editors published statements from towns 
across the territory with prominent citizens announcing their fidelity to the 
returning figure.19 Generals signed: former president Pimentel, who had un-
seated Polanco’s radical administration, wealthy rancher General Santiago 
Rodríguez, a Restoration hero, and  others like him. Revolutionary words 
lost their meaning. Redubbed “ Great Citizen,” Báez assumed power as 
a man without rival.20 Isolated protests occurred in towns across the coun-
try, but armed partisans of Báez praised him as the “Angel of Peace.”21 
Military authority grew to be more predominant than ever— even  those who 
had served the Spanish invoked their rank and prestige— but these networks 
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 were intensely regional and fractured. Soldiers had local loyalties, and high- 
ranking officers made a multitude of claims.22 “ Those who  were decorated 
with the rich crosses of Carlos III, Isabel 2 . . .  ;  today are called citizens 
instead of Sirs,” one journalist observed with disgust.23
Social contests surrounding the island  were intense. Colombian politi-
cians explic itly attacked emancipation, and they moved to restrict suffrage.24 
In the wake of protests in the fall of 1865, known by authorities as the Morant 
Bay Rebellion, the Jamaican governor’s forces killed, arrested, and burned 
homes indiscriminately. Then, in mea sures precisely opposite to policy in 
Canada and Australia, legislators dismantled Jamaica’s self- rule. In Bar-
Fig. E.1  The Flag of Lares, modeled  after the Dominican flag, first flew in October 1868. 
Calle Sol, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Photo by Tito Román Rivera, December 2015.
bados, some felt that real freedom might be “put off for another time,” or 
perhaps across the Atlantic, and a small number of Barbadians and  others 
chose to migrate to Liberia.25 Some left the island to indenture proj ects 
elsewhere, as intra- Caribbean migration increased.26 As fighting began in 
Cuba’s Oriente, exiles desperately made their way to Jamaica and Haiti to 
regroup.27 On Hispaniola, the same colonial diplomats stuck around, del-
eteriously, immune to metropolitan po liti cal transitions. They maintained 
the same enduring hostility  toward the island’s residents that they always 
had.28 Britain bombarded Cap- Haïtien in 1865. Eu ro pean financiers offered 
loans on equally interventionist terms. Their competitors  were back, and 
stronger than ever: U.S. politicians emerged from Civil War disunion with 
their eyes trained, once more, on the Ca rib bean. As the importance of naval 
steam power became increasingly clear, they joined other powers that hoped 
for coercive territorial cessions of strategic ports and peninsulas.29
Aggressive foreign interest loomed over the Dominican Republic again. 
“The country suffers a terrible monetary crisis,” a journalist observed with 
foreboding. Eagerly awaiting collaborators, foreign industrialists and mer-
chant  houses stood at the ready to make deals with unscrupulous heads of 
state.30 “Country sellers [vendepatrias] still want to have their way with this 
 people,” critics remarked, in alarm.31 In 1869, Báez very nearly managed 
to annex the Dominican Republic to the United States, galvanizing a new 
round of radical anticolonial activism on the island and in diaspora. His fi-
nancial imperatives  were clear: customs, coal mines, state lands, even the 
guano deposits offshore had been mortgaged, paper money printed and 
devalued multiple times.32 Báez enjoyed support from prominent collabora-
tors, many of whom had opposed Spanish annexation only years before.33 
The old annexationist arguments of hispanismo and anti- Haitianism could 
not serve him; his own collaboration with the incumbent Haitian president, 
Sylvain Salnave, was simply too close. Only po liti cal ambition and economic 
imperatives remained. Although the annexation mea sure fell well short of 
the two- thirds majority it needed in the U.S. Senate, Báez’s opponents, and 
the public,  were incensed and fearful.
Unlike in previous de cades, however, Báez’s most radical opponents 
 were already armed, and they mobilized new alliances quickly. For the next 
six years, the Dominican Republic faced almost constant po liti cal unrest.34 
The  U.S. threat reinvigorated activism for a defensive Ca rib bean alliance, 
and it threw prominent opponents into unrelenting military campaigns. 
Luperón and his allies hoped for a federation of the four states across the 
three islands: Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico.35 His 
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close friend Manuel Rodríguez Objío traveled to New York to help or ga nize 
supplies; Betances joined him  there, with ambitious proposals of his own. 
Betances saw the embattled republic at the center of an ambitious plan of 
“Antillean Nationality” and hoped for a Ca rib bean parliament with its seat 
in Santo Domingo. From Haiti, where he took up residence, he urged col-
laboration, and he met with the British prime minister and  others to rally 
support.36 Luperón remained in constant motion back and forth from Saint 
Thomas,  Grand Turk, Jamaica, and the northern coast, allied with a leader 
of liberal po liti cal opposition in Haiti, Jean- Nicolas Nissage- Saget, to seek 
the simultaneous ouster of both of the island’s presidents. Nissage- Saget— 
like Luperón himself, “profoundly anti- yankee”— authorized Luperón to 
impress Haitian soldiers into his anti- imperial efforts and allowed him to 
or ga nize freely along the border. They fought relentlessly against the cession 
of coaling stations on both sides of the island.37 “The  whole republic is in a 
state of insurrection,” observers wrote in concern.38
Given the unrelenting imperial climate— foreign sugar cap i tal ists ar-
rived within the decade— these actors’ consistent, unrelenting anticolonial-
ism was simultaneously a radical and stable philosophy. Their opposition 
to large- scale outside intervention, furthermore, reflected the sentiment of 
most of the island’s residents. The interests of cottage industry producers 
coincided with  these activists’ steadfast aversion to aggressive foreign capi-
tal. “Each Dominican is a soldier and a hero,” one antiannexationist wrote 
hopefully.39 As citizens returned to their homes, many dis appeared, once 
again, from historical rec ord.  Others remained mobilized, in the highlands 
of the Baoruco mountains, in the Cibao valley, and other sites, to fight in 
united bands opposing  U.S. annexation.40 From  Grand Turk, a journalist 
marveled at the scene in Puerto Plata. “ ‘Liberty’ and ‘we have beaten the 
whites,’  these words are heard day and night,” he wrote. “They despise all 
governments and consider themselves eminently power ful to whip them 
all.”41 Despite limited means, ordinary citizens offered revolutionary soli-
darity. Officials and town residents sent a vessel to neighbors in  Grand Turk, 
 after a hurricane, offering a ship full of aid, proposing tariff reductions, and 
sending well- wishes to “fellow beings in distress and want.”42 “Dominicans 
and Haitians, we are all  brothers,  brothers in origin,  brothers in the days of 
trial,” a rebel official in southern Haiti effused.43
Domestically, rebel efforts stood on shifting sand. Regional military loy-
alties, po liti cal patronage, and economic necessity frustrated stability in the 
capital. Each administration hoped for “a small loan, from a trusted lender,” 
but inflation and terms  were desperately unfavorable.44 Po liti cal opponents 
considered armed mobilizations the only recourse. Rodríguez Objío, inde-
fatigable friend and ally of other Restoration fighters, and poet, biographer, 
and historian of the Restoration fight, lost his life opposing Báez’s annexation 
plan. Domingo Ramírez, the general who had bedev iled Santana with his 
reunification schemes, never returned to Dominican soil. He lived the rest of 
his days in Haiti, receiving and welcoming fellow travelers but never return-
ing to another  battle.45 Years of po liti cal turmoil weighed on politicians of 
 every po liti cal orientation. One famous old annexationist, Tomas Bobadilla, 
had been born a Spanish citizen.  After de cades of collaboration at the high-
est ranks in many administrations, he changed his mind in  later years,  after 
his own son defiantly opposed foreign occupation. Out of  favor, he spent the 
last year of his life in Cap- Haïtien.46 Poet Salomé Ureña wrote verses lament-
ing the “lakes of blood” spilled in her country as coups proliferated.47 Still, 
fighting continued.
Even as it could no longer sustain annexationist logic, conservative anti- 
Haitian rhetoric emerged in Dominican politics once more. Summoned in 
the ser vice of power seekers, of the “Civilized,” of the cynical,  those who 
invoked anti- Haitian discourse used it for facile patriotism where po liti-
cal unity flagged. The narrative reemerged among the reactionaries who 
strug gled adamantly to regain power in 1864; they accused Gaspar Polanco 
of being “pro- Haitian,” and they clearly understood it as a slander.48 Writ-
ers for El Tiempo, which served as Báez’s primary mouthpiece in the capital, 
distorted stories to meet their needs, pillorying the Haitian president  until 
he was the caudillo’s ally, for example. As ever, journalists and authorities 
spoke obliquely about popu lar Dominican- Haitian collaboration on domes-
tic soil, dismissing all of the popu lar opposition to U.S. territorial cessions 
as the machinations of peasant rebels (cacos) who had no platform.49 Pri-
vately to  U.S. officials, Báez’s aides added additional commentary, claim-
ing the anticolonial opposition hoped “the African race [ will] dominate the 
island.50
Thus diverged two histories— and two  futures— for the republic. As La 
Regeneración wrote one history, El Tiempo wrote another. Where the journalists 
from the first hoped for dual citizenship born out of the collaboration of 
1863–65, writers in the latter remembered Haitian collaboration of the previous 
period as nothing but venal self- interest. Where the first sought to foster 
markets in the center of the island, the second saw contraband. “The Gov-
ernment  will take it upon itself to dictate energetic mea sures to repress this 
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abuse, and it is strange that local authorities have not taken steps to prevent 
this prob lem,” El Tiempo complained.51 Luperón was “a conspirator . . .  per-
verse and antinational,” a writer accused, with “something mysterious and 
contrary to the true Dominican spirit.” Of the rebels’ desperate collaborative 
efforts to save the country from U.S. annexation, the journalist concluded, 
“The Puerto Plata movement is nothing other than an attempt to destroy na-
tional in de pen dence in  favor of the Haitians.“52 In Puerto Plata, meanwhile, 
La Regeneración’s writers pleaded for a diff er ent interpretation. “It is past time 
to close the disastrous period of our conflicts and begin a new era of peace 
and  union,” one urged. Hope and pessimism intermingled: “The po liti cal 
generation who bring with them ideas, passions, hate and rancor is disap-
pearing. . . .  [ After] a foreign power’s interference, a bloody revolution, 
a total victory, frequent bonds between the two  peoples long separated, a 
community of ideas in the strug gle, a unity of aspirations, signs of friend-
ship, help and compassion amid the  trials, must we revive old hates that 
should be extinguished, never to be reborn?”53 Or ga ni za tion and outrage 
continued in the town, in the center of the island, and all across the territory. 
“For how long  will parties toy with the destiny of pueblos?” another asked, 
demanding, “When  will  these wicked idols fall from their pedestals?”54
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